Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Hossein Atrak
Abstract
Introduction
One of the disputed stories in the Qur'an, which is related to the discussion of the infallibility of the prophets, is the story of Adam. Regardless of the controversies about whether this story is real or symbolic, the appearance of these verses indicate Adam's disobedience to God's command. ...
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Introduction
One of the disputed stories in the Qur'an, which is related to the discussion of the infallibility of the prophets, is the story of Adam. Regardless of the controversies about whether this story is real or symbolic, the appearance of these verses indicate Adam's disobedience to God's command. A group of Islamic theologians, who believe in the absolute infallibility of the prophets, did not consider this disobedience of Adam as a sin and tried to justify his disobedience based on the concept of Taki Awla (abandoning a better act and doing good one). The purpose of this article is to examine the strength of this justification and criticize it.
Methods and Materials
This article has been done by descriptive-analytical method and collecting information from library sources.
Results and Discussion
In this research, the most important justification of Islamic and Shiite theologians for Adam's disobedience in eating from the forbidden tree, i.e. Tarki Awla or disobeying God's advisory prohibition was investigated. First, it was pointed out that Adam's action was not an instance of Tarki Awla, but it was the commission of God's compulsory prohibition. And since according to the Usulian rules, divine prohibitions indicate the existence of corruption in the prohibited act, it should be concluded that committing God's prohibition in any case, whether it is a compulsory, advisory or Tanzihi prohibition, is intellectually wrong, and committing a wrong act is not compatible with the prophets' infallibility thought.
In the following, the claim that God's command to Adam was advisory was examined. By stating the definitions and criteria of advisory prohibition mentioned in ʿIlm al-Usūl and applying them to Adam's actions, I came to the conclusion that God's command to Adam was not advisory.
Then, by proposing another fundamental discussion in ʿIlm al-Usūl that the negative imperative verb has initial semantic appearance in forbiddance unless there were some evidences indicating that action is permissible, it was shown that God's command to Adam was compulsory prohibition. Then, the evidences mentioned in the verses 117-119 of Surah Taha that Shia theologians claimed for being God's prohibition advisory was investigated and it was shown that the divine warning to Adam for leaving paradise and falling into hardships cannot be the proofs of being God's prohibition of eating from the tree as advisory prohibition.
In addition, the words such as disobedience, misleading, and injustice used in the Quran about Adam's actions have initial appearance in violation of God's compulsory prohibition and committing a sin.
On the other hand, on the assumption of accepting the justification of Tarki awla regarding Adam's disobedience, it seems that this justification is still incompatible with the theory of the prophets' absolute infallibility in the Shi'ite tradition. Because accepting that Adam's action was an instance of Tarki awla is in the meaning of accepting that he committed a mistake and was tempted by Satan, which the reasons for infallibility in the Shia theory are against both.
Conclusion
The final result is that, according to the author's opinion, the justification of Tarki Awla and being God's command advisory is not successful in defending the infallibility of Prophet Adam, and it is better to carry these verses in the same apparent meaning according to the principle of apparent authenticity or use other justifications for Adam's action that are mentioned in theological sources, such as: committing the prohibition of God in heaven, or the omission of a noun i.e. the children of Adam, or disobedience due to forgetfulness or error, etc. Of course, deciding on their strengths and weaknesses requires another research.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
seyede Zeynab Hosseini; Ebrahim Noei; Mohsen Jahed
Abstract
Abstract
Determining the reason for legislating worships and their role in other human affairs provides the opportunity for perceptions such as the intrinsic purpose, negative dignity or positive and preparatory dignity of worships. The present research is trying to answer this question that in the ...
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Abstract
Determining the reason for legislating worships and their role in other human affairs provides the opportunity for perceptions such as the intrinsic purpose, negative dignity or positive and preparatory dignity of worships. The present research is trying to answer this question that in the eyes of Sadr al-Mutalahin Shirazi, what is the status of worship in the origin, evolution or emergence of human conditions and knowledge? The purpose of this research is to discover the functions of worship in this process, which is followed by descriptive-analytical method. Sadra considers the rulings to be subject to the criteria of self-determination and considers the purpose of legislating rulings to be to provide general benefit and general expediency to humans. Based on the findings of this research, in explaining the relationship between actions, circumstances and knowledge, the existence of real criteria for worship should be accepted and focused on the interaction between human affairs and the process of the two ascending and descending arcs of the voluntary course of man. According to Sadra, the aforementioned three authorities have a bilateral and multilateral relationship, and discovering this relationship is possible through understanding the interactive movement between the soul and the body and explaining the collective reality of human beings. Paying attention to the interactive relationship and the positive-preparatory interaction between the soul and the body, and the concession and escalation of the citizen of the two, shows that actions in the arc of ascent have non-existent, preparatory and preliminary status, and in the arc of descent, they have existential and fruitful status.
Introduction
Man is a being who has a benefit from the lower world, i.e. the world, and a share from the upper world, i.e. the hereafter. Every religious practice also has an external shell and an internal core; The shell is related to this world and its core is related to the hereafter, just as the Sharia's meaning of the purity of clothes and body is the purity of the heart, which is the inner core, and the purity of the heart is to purify it from religious pollution such as disbelief and reprehensible filth. Morality is like envy, miserliness, extravagance, similarly, the meaning of the Shariah of any worship is the effect it creates in the heart. (Sadr al-Din Shirazi, 1366 A: 1/279) If there are no real benefits and harms behind the acts of worship, then talking about the effect of action in the creation of knowledge will not have the same meaning.
Method
In the upcoming article, we will analyze the wisdom of the law of worship or commitment to worship (by relying on and analyzing the texts of the Sadras). Sadra believes in the basis of rulings on merits and demerits and documents Sharia rulings on merits and demerits. It is important to address this issue because it states whether the desired materials are genuine in essence and purpose or are they merely preparatory and preliminary? For this purpose, based on the thoughts of Sadrul Matalhin Shirazi, the following of the rulings is explained first, and then the nonexistent or existential dignity of the phrase, and in other words, their preparatory or positive dignity, is explained.
Discussion /Result
The results obtained from the above research can be summarized in the following axes:
Each religious authority has three components: science, present and action. The relationship between these three is one-sided and multilateral. The mechanism of the effect of each of these three things on the other is as follows. In the ascending arc, there is a movement from the side of action to the side of knowledge. Action by repetition creates the queen, and the queen causes the birth of knowledge. In the descending arc, science strengthens the properties and the properties produce a new action.
Each of the knowledge, conditions and actions are valid and reliable. Knowledge and knowledge are both the beginning of states and actions and the end of them. As science and knowledge are both subject and end.
Acts and acts of worship have both nonexistent and existential dignity. The lack of dignity of worship is related to the arc of the ascension, which causes the repetition of the deeds of the queens. Following the repetition of the action, the effect and state that arises in the soul, becomes solid and becomes a habit. The more the action is repeated, the more the current becomes the queen. Repetition of actions, in Sadra's eyes, removes obstacles and hijabs so that the soul can enjoy possessions; Therefore, repeating the actions is not from the appropriate Sunnah, but from the Sunnah of the removal of obstacles and hijab, which are non-existent matters. Also, when the soul reaches the level of possessing and being capable of possessing a conscience, it removes the veils of acquiring knowledge. Therefore, in Sadra's view, action is important due to the role it plays in self-fulfillment and knowledge acquisition, which is a secondary and transverse role.
Existential dignity of worship and actions finds its meaning in the arc of descent and movement from knowledge to states and then actions. In this movement, action is considered as the fruit of science, and knowledge is a prelude to action as required by science. With this knowledge, man performs worship and avoids sins.
Worships because of their role in reaching the knowledge of God. are ranked. Sins are also ranked due to the negative role they have in acquiring knowledge. Therefore, the greatest sin is to block the way to divine knowledge.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Reza Eskandari; Rouhollah Souri
Abstract
Abstract
The present article examines and critiques the concept of "generic unity" (al-waḥdat al-sinkhiyya) in Islamic philosophical thought, particularly in relation to the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd). Initially, the concept is precisely explained, and it is clarified that proponents ...
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Abstract
The present article examines and critiques the concept of "generic unity" (al-waḥdat al-sinkhiyya) in Islamic philosophical thought, particularly in relation to the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd). Initially, the concept is precisely explained, and it is clarified that proponents of this type of unity do not accept any external realization of unity, considering it only as a mental construct that does not have true correspondence with external reality. In contrast, proponents of permeating unity (al-waḥdat al-sarayāniyya) affirm an external realization of unity, accepting all multiplicities within that singular, real, permeating unity. According to the findings of this study, this understanding of unity cannot be accepted due to its logically flawed consequences. There is a profound inconsistency between this notion of unity and key concepts in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, such as the criterion of gradation (tashkīk) in existence—the primacy of existence. The results of this research suggest that generic unity, particularly within the framework of the primacy of existence, faces serious contradictions that appear unacceptable in metaphysical explanations.
Keywords: generic unity, primacy of existence, gradation of existence, philosophical critique, secondary intelligibles, Mesbah Yazdi, Mudarris Zunūzī.
Introduction and Problem Statement
The concept of "generic unity" in Islamic philosophy is examined as an important principle in explaining the unity and multiplicity of the order of being. According to this concept, different beings, with a type of quiddity-based unity established in the mind (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1989, 6:20), are distinct and separate from each other in the external world, such that multiplicity is incompatible with this type of unity. While Ṣadrā explicitly states that external universality and commonality are not quiddity-based (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 2/328; 1375: 313; 1361: 6), proponents of this form of unity, such as Mesbah Yazdi, emphasize the primacy of existence, in which only existence is deemed fundamental, and quiddity-based and generic concepts are merely abstractions of it (Mesbah Yazdi, 1987, 1:342). This article critiques and analyzes generic unity and its inconsistency with other principles of Ṣadrā's philosophy, such as the primacy of existence, gradation in existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), and Ṣadrā's intermediate thinking (miyānī ʾandīshī). It demonstrates that these principles are incompatible with generic unity.
While research has been conducted on this topic, the distinguishing feature of this research is that none of the aforementioned articles have addressed the concept of permeating unity and its contrast with generic unity in a precise and detailed manner. Another distinguishing aspect is that none of the valuable studies mentioned have provided a critical analysis of the generic unity account. Therefore, this study, proves the falsity of the generic unity claim by presenting its flawed implications, such that the unity hidden within gradation can no longer be considered generic unity.
Material and Methodologies
This study primarily employs the method of conceptual and philosophical analysis, examining the works of various Islamic philosophers, including Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, Mudarris Zunūzī, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, and Mesbah Yazdi. Using comparative and analytical methods, the study analyzes and evaluates different perspectives on generic unity and the primacy of existence, ultimately setting aside generic unity based on various arguments. To achieve this approach, a range of philosophical and logical texts has been utilized to elucidate different dimensions of the discussion.
Discussion
Generic unity generally seeks to justify the interconnectedness and harmony among beings. This perspective is based on the principle that different beings are identical in terms of their quiddities (māhiyya) but lack any true existential unity (Mesbah Yazdi, 2015, 1:158). In contrast, from the standpoint of Islamic philosophy, particularly in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought, the primacy of existence is considered the foundational principle, and the interconnectedness of beings is attributed to existence itself. This is inherently tied to the integrated realization (al-taḥaqquq al-indimājī) of attributes concomitant with existence, one of which is unity. In this framework, it is existence that holds primacy, while quiddities and the attributes of quiddities are merely conceptual constructs that do not have an independent external reality. Consequently, generic unity, which is based on quiddity, is incompatible with the primacy of existence.
Another problem with generic unity is its inconsistency with the criterion of gradation, which is the main foundation of the issue of gradation in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system. The criterion of gradation in Ṣadrā's framework is the "identity of the differentiating factor (mā bih al-imtiyāz) with the shared factor (mā bih al-ishtirāk)" (Mullā Ṣadrā 1989, 1:427–428; 1422: 356; Zunūzī 1999, 1:266; Ṭabāṭabāʾī 2004, 56; Mesbah Yazdi 1984, 45; Oboudiat 2008, 22). This criterion is fulfilled only when the context of realization for the shared factor is identical to the context of realization for the differentiating factor. However, according to the notion of generic unity, the unity resides in the mind while the multiplicity resides in the external realm.
Moreover, accepting generic unity might necessitate conceding to the absolute disjunction or divergence (tabāyun) among beings. However, accepting such disjunction among existents leads to inconsistencies within philosophical thought and results in numerous philosophical challenges.
Conclusion
The present study indicates that generic unity faces fundamental challenges in its connection with the primacy of existence and gradation in existence. The findings of this article demonstrate that, within Islamic philosophy—particularly considering the acceptance of the primacy of existence and the emphasis on gradation—generic unity is untenable, especially from the perspectives of philosophers such as Mullā Ṣadrā, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, and Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī. Specifically, the critiques leveled against this concept and its inability to account for a true unity among beings render it ineffective in explaining the structure of existence and in analyzing the multiplicities and unities within it. Ultimately, this study underscores the need for a reevaluation and more rigorous analysis of generic unity in relation to Islamic philosophy and its foundational principles.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Maedeh Rahmani; Hossein Ardalani
Abstract
Abstract IntroductionThis article focuses on the evolution of the concept of mimesis from the Greek philosophy to al-Fārābī's philosophy and the relation between mimesis and art in al-Fārābī's thought. Mimesis is a core concept in exploring ideas of Plato and Aristotle about art. The ...
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Abstract IntroductionThis article focuses on the evolution of the concept of mimesis from the Greek philosophy to al-Fārābī's philosophy and the relation between mimesis and art in al-Fārābī's thought. Mimesis is a core concept in exploring ideas of Plato and Aristotle about art. The same key role is traceable in al-Fārābī's philosophy of art. Mimesis was translated as muḥākāt in Islamic philosophy and played an important part in explaining how artworks are shaped and how they affect their audience. The question is whether this transformation from Mimesis to muḥākāt was simply a formal transformation or there happened recognizable changes in this concept making it interpret artworks differently. Methods and MaterialBenefiting from descriptive-analytical method, this article employs primary and secondary sources on al-Fārābī to explore its inquiries. Results and DiscussionAnalyzing al-Fārābī’s discussions on Mimesis, one could see close similarities between Mimesis in the Greek philosophy and the newly branded muḥākāt. Primarily, the terms mimesis and techne and their corresponding translations in al-Fārābī’s Arabic texts have been discussed. Al-Fārābī has approved muḥākāt as an equivalent for Mimesis and ṣanāʿa for techne. Aristotle has marked out the difference between mimetic technes and other technes. What distinguishes technes like painting or poetry from other practical technes is the presence of the element of Mimesis. Likewise, in al-Fārābī’s philosophy, muḥākāt is what distinguishes artistic ṣanāʿas from practical ones. Although the the term “mimetic technes” has been used by Aristotle and hasn’t been adopted by al-Fārābī, but the idea of some technes being different because of mimesis is still traceable. Al-Fārābī assignes multiple capabilities to imagination which is corresponding faculty of the soul for muḥākāt. The most basic capability of imagination is saving a sensible image after the sensory medium is disconnected. For instance, one sees a lion, then closes her eyes, and she imagines the same lion. This is the principal ability of the imagination faculty. The second, more complex capability of imagination is composing and the composing sensible images. For example, one takes a lion’s body and attaches a human’s head to it. There is a level of decomposing man’s body and lion’s head and a level of composing a lion with a man’s head. The third function of imagination is muḥākāt which itself consists of two types, the more basic being likening a sensible image to another sensible image. For instance, a warrior is likened to a lion. These are both two things from the realm of the sensible. The second, more complex type of muḥākāt is likening a concept from the realm of the intelligible to an image from the realm of the sensible or imaginable. For example, Rumi likens soul to a dragon in his verse “Your soul is a dragon; not dead, only frozen.” What distinguishes al-Fārābī’s coordinates of muḥākāt from Mimesis is the ability of muḥākāt in imitation from the intelligible concepts. Al-Fārābī has also categorized mimetic technes based on other criteria, i.e. moral perspective and objective perspective, that is, the ends towards which imagination is used. In his moral categorization, al-Fārābī counts six types of music; music being an instance of mimetic techne. Three of these types are commendable and the other three are condemnable. The first type of commendable music is the type that tends to balance low extremes of the soul like fear and laziness. The second type tends to balance high extremes of the soul like impetuosity and selfishness. In the third type of commendable music, the element of muḥākāt is considered. Such type of art tends to move all thoughts and deeds towards goodness and happiness. Al-Fārābī’s other categorization dealing with ends of mimetic technes describes three objectives. In case of music, for instance, there are some tunes that merely tend to cause joy and comfort in the soul. Another type tends to create imaginations and mimetic images in the soul in addition to causing joy and comfort. Al-Fārābī mentions another type inspired by reactionary sentiments of the soul. This type isn’t concerned with objectives of such technes, but instead describes their roots. One could outline multiple similarities between what al-Fārābī describes about muḥākāt and the general understanding of Mimesis in the Greek philosophy. But what differentiates Al-Fārābī’s specifications of muḥākāt from Mimesis is a capacity in the former in likening intelligible concepts to sensible examples. ConclusionThrough analysis of the subject according to al-Fārābī’s treatises, it was concluded that Al-Fārābī’s muḥākāt has new features compared to the concept of Mimesis in Greek philosophy. This is particularly conceivable in the idea of imitating from the intelligible or maʿqūlāt, which is a bonus of al-Fārābī’s philosophy compared to imitation from the sensible and imaginable sources which was already suggested in Greek philosophy.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
AbstractIn another article, I have shown that Avicenna regards categorical propositions as “different” and “not identical,” yet “equivalent” to conditional propositions. In this article, I demonstrate that Arabic logicians after him disagreed on whether categorical ...
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AbstractIn another article, I have shown that Avicenna regards categorical propositions as “different” and “not identical,” yet “equivalent” to conditional propositions. In this article, I demonstrate that Arabic logicians after him disagreed on whether categorical and conditional propositions are “identical” or merely “equivalent.” Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭusī, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī accepted the “identicality” of categorical and conditional propositions, while Khūnajī, Samarqandī, Mīrdāmād, and Mulla Ṣadrā defended Avicenna’s theory of “equivalence” by rejecting the theory of “identicality.” Alongside these logical discussions, linguistic scholars such as Sakkākī, and following him, Taftāzānī, presented a new version of the theory of “identicality” between categorical and conditional propositions, considering the antecedent of a conditional as a part of the consequent’s predicate and as one of its adverbs or modifiers.Keywords: Categorical, Conditional, Subject, Predicate, Antecedent, Consequent. Extended AbstractIntroductionOn the transformation of categorical propositions into conditional ones and vice versa, in another article I have shown that Avicenna accepts these transformations in one sense and rejects them in another. According to him, categorical and conditional propositions are “equivalent” but not “the same.” The statement “Every human is an animal” does not mean “If this is a human, then it is an animal,” but it is equivalent to it, in the sense that whenever one is true, so is the other. Materials & MethodsNow, the question of this article is what perspectives Muslim logicians, followers of Avicenna, have taken regarding the equivalence of categorical and conditional propositions or the transformation of one into the other. The significance of this issue is that in modern logic, universal propositions are transformed into conditionals while particular propositions into conjunctions, and it is clear that the views of Muslim logicians in this regard can lead to valuable comparative discussions between Avicennan and modern logics. In this article, I will show that Muslim logicians have been divided into several different groups and have presented views, some of which have not been previously found in Avicenna or discussed even in modern logic. Discussion & ResultBy examining the views of Muslim logicians after Avicenna, we conclude that they can at least be divided into three groups: - The first group, containing Shams al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, adhere to the theory of “identity” between categorical and conditional propositions, thereby they oppose Avicenna. - The second group, containing Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnjī, Shams al-Dīn al-Ṣamarqandī, Mīr Dāmād, and Mullā Ṣadrā, revert to Avicenna’s theory of “equivalence” and oppose the theory of “identity.” - The third group, starting from Al-Sakkākī and following Al-Taftāzānī, consider the antecedent of a conditional as a part of its consequent; and in this new manner, they transform conditional propositions into categorical ones. This third group can also be regarded as proponents of the theory of “identity” between categorical and conditional propositions, except that here the positions of the antecedent and consequent change. In the view of the first group, the antecedent and consequent turn into the subject and predicate, while the conditional operator “if” transforms into terms like “entails” or “implies” and thus returns to the consequent. However, from the perspective of the third group, the antecedent, together with the conditional operator, becomes part of the predicate of the consequent.Before these three groups, Bahmanyār, the most prominent student of Avicenna, transforms repetitive (istithnāʾī) conditional syllogisms to categorical ones, which is a complete innovation that, surprisingly, was not continued after him. Before him, his master Avicenna had referred connective (iqtirānī) conditional syllogisms to categorical ones but had not spoken of referring the repetitive (istithnāʾī) conditional syllogisms to categorical ones.No research has been conducted on the subject of this article aside from the three works mentioned below: Bahmanyār proposed the following repetitive (istithnāʾī) conditional Modus Tollens syllogism as a categorical one of the second figure: “If a human is braying, then a donkey is speaking. But the donkey does not speak. Therefore, the human does not bray.” Bahmanyār analyzes the syllogism as follows: “every time when a human is braying, is a time when a donkey is speaking. Now is not the time when the donkey speaks. Therefore, Now is not the time when the human brays.” Here is a problem: in the Avicennan logic, a conditional with false antecedent and consequent is false. So how can Bahmanyār’s conditional be true while it has false antecedent and consequent? An answer is that we can take Bahmanyār’s conditional as truth-functional material implication. The author elsewhere showed that the material implication had been used by Avicennan logicians, though they couldn’t discuss it systematically (Fallahi 2009, Fallahi 2011: 131-135).Ahmad Ahmadi, in his article “The Conditional Proposition is the Same as the Categorical Propositions,” and also in his book Substrata of Knowledge, in Chapter Ten titled “Structure and Nature of Conditional Propositions,” addresses the subject of this article and examines the views of al-Sakkākī and al-Taftāzānī but does not discuss other Avicennian logicians (Ahmadi 2001, Ahmadi 2009). Additionally, the present author, in an article titled “Transformation of Categorical Propositions into Conditionals According to Avicenna,” has focused solely on Avicenna’s views on this topic (Fallahi 2024), and the present article aims to explore the perspectives of other followers of Avicenna in detail. Conclusion From the above, it becomes clear that Muslim logicians after Avicenna can be divided into at least five groups: Those who generalize the equivalence of categorical and conditional propositions to that of connective conditional syllogisms and repetitive conditional syllogisms (Bahmanyār).Those who, in addition to equivalence, assert the “identity” of categorical and conditional propositions (al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (in one topic), Akhundi Khurasani, and Naʾini).Those who deny the theory of “equivalence” altogether (Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, in another topic).Those who reject the theory of “identity” and revert to Avicenna’s theory of “equivalence” (Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnjī, Shams al-Dīn al-Ṣamarqandī, Mīr Dāmād, and Mullā Ṣadrā).Those who regard the entire antecedent as a modifier of the consequent’s predicate (Al-Sakkākī, Al-Taftāzānī, Akhūnd Khurāsānī, Nāʾīnī, Ahmad Ahmadi).This categorization shows that, contrary to expectations, most Avicennian logicians at least accept the equivalence between categorical and conditional propositions, and some even believe in their identity—an opinion that has been explicitly and emphatically stated in modern logic. Therefore, from this perspective, Avicennan and modern logics have had more or less similar views, although of course there have always been and still are disagreements in details.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Zahra Sadeghimanesh; Seyed Mohammad Kazem Alavi; Mohammadkazem Elmisola
Abstract
Abstract Problem: Epistemic authority or trust and reference to others in acquiring knowledge has long been a subject of interest for philosophers. However, this issue has been challenged and criticized in the modern era based on the concept of autonomy in rationality. This study examines the foundations ...
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Abstract Problem: Epistemic authority or trust and reference to others in acquiring knowledge has long been a subject of interest for philosophers. However, this issue has been challenged and criticized in the modern era based on the concept of autonomy in rationality. This study examines the foundations of epistemic authority according to contemporary virtue philosopher, Linda Zagzebski, and compares them with similar themes in the reflections of Suhrawardi, the founder of Illuminationist philosophy. It can illuminate aspects of rationality in accepting epistemic authority and creating a beneficial perspective in acquiring knowledge in a general approach.Method: The research methodology is descriptive-comparative, focusing on the analysis of key concepts in the works of both philosophers to identify their points of convergence and divergence.Results: The findings indicate that the key components of epistemic authority in Zagzebski's thought—namely, "conscious self-reflection," "the legitimacy of epistemic trust," and "the epistemic exemplar model"—align with concepts such as "self-knowledge," "epistemic trust for the revival of eternal wisdom," and "the model of the divine sage" in Suhrawardi’s theosophy. The study demonstrates that, despite historical and cultural differences, both philosophers endeavor to situate the pursuit of truth within a contemplative process, enabling knowledge to follow a path of self-reflection aimed at promotion of unifying beliefs. This research offers a novel perspective on understanding the concept of epistemic authority and its relationship with autonomy across different philosophical traditions. Keywords: Suhrawardi, Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, Autonomy, Introspection, Self-knowledge. Introduction/Modern rationality fostered autonomy development in its historical course, which was identical to "rationality" and opposed to epistemic authority in an unalterable sense. Zagzebski mentions this process as the autonomous conceptual turn. He ignores essential rational necessities that have high epistemological and virtuous significance. Therefore, Linda Zagzebski (1946) exposes this misconception and examines the concept of autonomy. She explains the necessities that have been ignored in acquiring knowledge.The concept of autonomy states that humans should understand propositions by relying on their epistemic powers and prevailing views and not entrust the responsibility of justifying their beliefs to anyone. It faces the important questions as follows: 1) Is the goal of knowledge achieved by focusing solely on faithful belief? 2) Does autonomy pay attention to the rational necessities required for acquiring knowledge in this comprehensive sense? 3) In which rational ignored imperatives do the moral imperative understand and promote knowledge or accept the epistemic superiority of another being harmed? 4) Is the absolute negation of epistemic authority rational and feasible for these necessities? In the following research, we have analyzed Zagzebski's pillars of epistemic authority and its relationship with rationality. We find Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi's (549-587 AH/1155-1191 AD) critical and sympathetic components, which reflect the ordinary and original approaches in the thinking of these two thinkers in the approach of the illumination philosophies. Suhrawardi attempts to move beyond purely argumentative knowledge and change the evaluation focus from belief to the believer. He advances the true path of knowledge differently from his peripatetic philosophy. The themes of the illumination philosophy reveal the importance of forgotten angles, thoughtful coherence with Zagzebski's philosophy's pillars, and a deep understanding of the issue of epistemological authority. Materials & MethodsThis research was conducted using a comparative method between Linda Zagzebski and Suhrawardi. Although it is difficult to find common features and compare two philosophers who have viewed knowledge from different civilizational and temporal perspectives, this can be influential in gaining a broader understanding of some problematic philosophical issues. To understand Zagzebski's perspective, epistemic authority, a topic widely questioned in today's epistemology, contains important rational imperatives that become clear. Like Zagzebski's viewpoint, Suhrawardi's philosophy does not address the issue of epistemic authority, and his important epistemic themes contain some standard features that criticize the proposition-centered view and justify epistemic authority. It becomes increasingly apparent in comparison and analytical studies and is introduced as a unique example of Zagzebski's results.This study is organized into three parts, with three common pillars between the two philosophers. The method proceeds in each section: First, we address the concept's pillars. Zagzebski places autonomy in its true meaning and makes it justifiable while compatible with epistemic authority. Then, from Suhrawardi's point of view, we compared his approach with Zagzebski's perspective by dwelling on consistent themes. Finally, we have reached a final summary and conclusion. Discussion & ResultIn the first section, we have shown that Zagzebski's central importance of reflective self-consciousness is consistent with Suhrawardi's theme of self-knowledge. Zagzebski recognizes the contemplative trust consciously to accept the sublime based on intellectual virtues. Suhrawardi also achieves knowledge by emphasizing the practical approach to self-knowledge and acquiring spiritual virtues to aid self-discipline.In the second part, we have shown that Zagzebski focused on reflective reasons to explain the rationality of epistemic trust in the virtuous by achieving the foundation of trust's validity as a non-cognitive state. This component's coherence with the theme of companions of trust and truth opposes self-supremacy in Suhrawardi's revival of wisdom. It is worthy of consideration and provides the basis for tolerance and interaction in religions and cultures.In the third section, we compare Zagzebski's epistemological model to the development of practical wisdom in Suhrawardi's divine model. We emphasize the transfer of personal and intuitive knowledge to increase humanity's cognitive reserve and the unity and cohesion of societies. ConclusionWe can reach the following conclusion and summary based on the comparative nature of this research:There is an understanding of seeking truth from two perspectives that reduce the distance between the other self and another. At the same time, he sees himself as similar and familiar to the other in that understanding. This self-cultivation and reflective attention reduce incorrect inference and, consequently, the incorrect tendency towards epistemic egotism.Autonomy without a practical path of self-purification lacks the humility or intellectual courage necessary to acknowledge the epistemic superiority or another's authority.Zagzebski and Suhrawardi have considered influencing the nature of knowledge and changing its relationship with rationality by proposing reviving wisdom and transmitting the legacy of sages and theologians.Mere imitation and the pleasure of seeking resemblance are not conscious and virtuous. It must be taken not to lose self-confidence and self-awareness.In Suhrawardi's philosophy, epistemic authority is compatible with the components of traditional culture, and its challenges in endangering self-awareness have not been considered. However, Zagzebski thinks about limiting it and is aware of the consequences of epistemic tyranny.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Morteza Motavalli; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
One of the theories of perception is the Theory of Appearing based on which when we see, the physical objects appear to us. But like other direct realist theories, it faces many challenges, the most important among them are the illusion and hallucination challenge and the time-lag ...
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Abstract
Introduction
One of the theories of perception is the Theory of Appearing based on which when we see, the physical objects appear to us. But like other direct realist theories, it faces many challenges, the most important among them are the illusion and hallucination challenge and the time-lag challenge. Alston presents the Theory of Appearing more clearly, more extensively, and more powerfully than others. But it can still be improved−which is what this article is about.
Methods and Materials
With an analytical approach, including linguistic analysis, and by using the ideas of copula existence (wujūd-e rābit) and copulative existence (wujūd-e rābitī) and two types of copula existence, I will bring up two types of appearing, and I will focus more on the objective aspect of appearing. Thus, the following facts will get a better explanation: time-lag, illusion, senses’ producing knowledge.
Discussion
Alston’s Theory of Appearing
According to this view, for S to see X is for X to appear/seem/be presented to S in some way (as so and so, as p). This appearing, seeming, being presented, in this view, is fundamental and unanalyzable. The very appearance provides us with a prima facie justification for the belief that comes from that perception. This justification will lead to unqualified justification if there is no rebutter (i.e., sufficient reason to think the belief false) or underminer (i.e., sufficient reason that the basis of belief lacks its usual justificatory power). An advantage, or rather an important difference, of the appearing theory over/from naïve realism is that the way in which an external physical object presents itself to perceiver may not be the same as the reality of that object.
A New Version Based on Alston’s View
In our view, appearance takes different forms depending on many external factors. The least elements involved in the formation of an appearance are the totality of the environment in which the object is, such as the object itself, water/air/etc., light with its different degrees and colors, and the place and angle of view. Different combinations of these elements cause different appearances−appearances that are where the object is and are not separated from it. According to this point, illusion is explained. In illusion, no error has actually occurred, but the object has appeared in a different way. We think that the object should always be such and such because we are accustomed to see certain appearance and because of its regularity. But this is not the whole story.
Another element that plays a role in the formation of an appearance is concepts, judgements, memories, expectations, culture, language, images, models, character traits, moods, and even the sense organs and genes of the knowing subject; in other words, the nature of the knowing subject. By adding this element, the appearance of the object no longer has only an objective aspect where the object is, but also finds a subjective dimension. Now it can be said that the appearance of an object for a person is a combination of the mental activity of the subject and the appearance of the environment containing the object exposed to consciousness.
Now the question is whether this appearance is relational and should there be a subject indeed for appearance to be realized? If the answer is yes, can this subject be something else besides animals and humans? From our point of view, contrary to Whitehead and Alexander, only humans and animals can be parties to the relational connection of appearing in perception. But in this case, when humans and animals are not around to perceive the objects, the unperceived objects will suffer from a kind of emptiness, and with the coming of the subject, a kind of miracle will happen and the appearance for the subject will expose the reality itself to the subject.
This is where it seems that the solution should be found in the negative answer to the first question. It should be said that appearing is not relational and, for example, a book can appear without appearing to anything. Just as existence is sometimes copula existence and sometimes copulative existence, appearing can sometimes be copula and relational and sometimes copulative and non-relational. The first is realized between two things, but the second is a feature of one thing. It is also possible to express the meaning by introducing two types of copula existence: the one established between two things such as ratios and the indigent one dependent on one thing such as the existence of the effect compared to the cause in some philosophies. Similarly, there will be two kinds of appearing: the appearing of something for something and the appearing dependent on something. Our language also supports us in our claim. As we can see in English, the word “appear” is used in two different ways: “appear to” and “appear as”.
In our view, various appearances, at least to some extent, arise from reality itself; they confirm a relativism arising from reality. It is as if reality is a dark substance that manifests itself in different ways. Of course, the relativism arising from the subject is also added to it.
Conclusion
In this article, we tried to empower the theory of appearing. In this way, illusion is easily explained, because it is nothing but a different appearance that we are not used to it. This appearance is as much rooted in reality as the veridical perception, but we constantly expect our other perceptions to be the same as the latter because of its regularity. It was also revealed that the irreducible hallucination to the veridical perception, assuming the truth of the phenomenal principle, is discernable and separate from the veridical perception. The time-lag difficulty is resolved in our version of the theory of appearing because the appearance of the destroyed/changed object remains as long as the light is in between. By coping with illusion and hallucination, the senses' knowledge-producing is readily established.
Biannual Journal
Islamic mysticism
seyyed ali alamolhoda; akram askarzadeh mazraeh
Abstract
Abstract
What is the nature of woman in relation to man? In elucidating Ibn ʿArabī’s response to this question, it is necessary to approach the discussion of the ontological, epistemological, and pragmatic dimensions of woman in contrast to man within a trilogical framework. Ontologically, woman ...
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Abstract
What is the nature of woman in relation to man? In elucidating Ibn ʿArabī’s response to this question, it is necessary to approach the discussion of the ontological, epistemological, and pragmatic dimensions of woman in contrast to man within a trilogical framework. Ontologically, woman is the agent of proliferation and the emanation of various manifestations from the Divine Essence. Epistemologically, the cognitive capacity of the feminine gender is imagination (al-khayāl), and in epistemic terms, woman symbolizes wisdom. Wisdom refers to theoretical reflection combined with the pragmatic dimension. The wise person is responsible for resolving crises by drawing upon the knowledge of divine truths. In other words, through three processes—revelation, inspiration, and true dreams—woman perceives the divine names and attributes and molds them into tangible forms. She achieves a symbolic understanding of esoteric knowledge and wisdom. From a pragmatic perspective, woman is like the wise person. The difference between wisdom and mere theoretical contemplation is that the wise must have the ability to solve problems and crises using divine knowledge. Thus, naturally, woman becomes a guide.
Keywords: gender, femininity, feminine, masculine, Ibn ʿArabī.
Introduction
What constitutes the core of all three waves of feminism in the modern world is the shared question about the demarcation between men and women. How should these distinctions be drawn? What are their boundaries? Any response to this question depends on addressing the underlying issue: What is the nature of woman in contrast to the nature of man? The term "in contrast" is used deliberately. This is because we want to emphasize that we must seek a description (not a logical definition) of woman that elucidates woman in relation to man and man in relation to woman. The modern world’s inquiry into the nature of woman examines the historical and contextual dynamics of this relationship and ultimately seeks to resolve the nature of this confrontation. Therefore, if we aim to engage our intellectual tradition to respond to the philosophical and epistemological question of the nature of woman, it is essential to consider the contrast underlying this modern inquiry. We must, so to speak, develop a dialectical response from within our intellectual tradition—one that defines woman in contrast to man and man in contrast to woman.
This study attempts to address the question of "the nature of woman" by drawing on the intellectual framework provided by Ibn ʿArabī, which offers a particularly suitable foundation for such an inquiry. (The research explains why and how Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, more than that of many other Muslim thinkers, is equipped to answer this modern question.) It seeks to revisit Ibn ʿArabī’s theoretical mysticism to explore the nature of woman and femininity within his theoretical framework. By doing so, the study aims to provide a basis for understanding the distinctions between the feminine and the masculine, and vice versa, from the perspective of this intellectual tradition. This approach ultimately seeks to answer a fundamental question of the modern and postmodern world in a manner that aligns with the ethos of Islamic civilization.
Discussion
In exploring the nature of femininity in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, this article employs a trilogical approach. It first examines the methodological significance of trilogy in studying Ibn ʿArabī. Subsequently, it analyzes the concept of ʿArabī and its position within the levels of existence according to Ibn ʿArabī, focusing on the triad of Wāḥidiyya (Oneness), Raḥīmiyya (Mercifulness), and Nafs (Self or Soul). The feminine aspects are then elucidated through a trilogical framework: Creatorship (ontological dimension), Wisdom (epistemological dimension), and Guidance (pragmatic dimension). Finally, building upon this analysis, the feminine gender is outlined in contrast to the masculine gender in terms of Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism.
Method
The research method adopted in this article is descriptive and analytic, based on library sources.
Conclusion
The feminine aspect of existence, in its manifestation through Oneness, Mercifulness, and Self, is revealed as direct manifestations of the Divine Essence. The core of these three manifestations lies in the creative aspect, creation, and proliferation. Thus, the descending arc (qaws al-nuzūl), or the unity within multiplicity, is the feminine identity of being. This feminine identity is manifested in humans as woman, who embodies the component of creatorship from an ontological perspective, wisdom from an epistemological perspective, and guidance from a pragmatic perspective.
In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, femininity represents a human identity that is the source of creation, production, and proliferation. The imaginative faculty plays a more prominent role in this identity, which is why the acquisition of intuitive wisdom, and the gaining of knowledge through true dreams, inspiration, and revelation, finds a more suitable ground in women. Therefore, women possess a greater ability to understand the signs of transcendent realities within sensory and natural phenomena. Woman has a greater capacity to comprehend divine signs through natural phenomena to achieve an understanding of divine realities. Given the superiority of their imaginative power, women are also more adept at understanding metaphorical and allegorical meanings.
Woman symbolizes the perfect human in the descending arc. She belongs to the stage of proliferation while being responsible for understanding the singular, transcendent divine reality within this multiplicity. Her role is to guide the perplexed human being through the manifold sensory and natural realms, revealing the truth of the One Being amidst the material multitudes. This is why, in Ibn ʿArabī’s view, the mother of Moses is seen as the source of wisdom imparted to Moses, symbolized through the act of breastfeeding. The duty of breastfeeding Moses is divinely determined through her, and no other woman can fulfill this role.
Thus, woman, from an epistemological perspective, symbolizes a figurative understanding of the Divine Essence. From a pragmatic perspective, she represents guidance and nurturing. It is she who has the ability to elevate a child, initially limited to natural and material understanding, to a level where the recognition of divinity can be realized amidst the multiplicity of sensory and natural phenomena.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
fateme soleimani
Abstract
AbstractIntroduction The identity and character of an individual are formed through a combination of their thoughts, beliefs, traits, and character (khulq). Through self-knowledge and awareness of these existential attributes, one can strive to overcome personal shortcomings and cultivate their ...
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AbstractIntroduction The identity and character of an individual are formed through a combination of their thoughts, beliefs, traits, and character (khulq). Through self-knowledge and awareness of these existential attributes, one can strive to overcome personal shortcomings and cultivate their strengths. From a social perspective, understanding personality traits—particularly characters—of individuals within a society allows for the anticipation of their behavior in various social contexts, enabling more effective management and interaction within that society. Thus, the study of character has remained a focal point of philosophical inquiry throughout history.Among ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato identified character (ethos) with knowledge (Copleston 2001, 1:130, 253). However, Aristotle distinguished moral virtues from knowledge, defining them as character or habits associated with the non-rational part of the soul. He argued that these virtues are not acquired through instruction and education but, like skills, develop through repeated practice (Aristotle 1964, 1:219–242).Among Muslim philosophers, al-Kindī was the first to reconcile Plato’s theory of faculties and Aristotle’s theory of moderation. He suggested that the soul consists of three faculties—rational (nāṭiqa), irascible (ghaḍabiyya), and appetitive (shahawiyya)—and, contrary to Aristotle, applied the theory of moderation not to actions but to these three faculties (Atrak 2014). Ibn Miskawayh and al-Fārābī emphasized the role of social interaction in shaping moral character, incorporating the social dimension into the essence of character (Fārābī 1996, 83; Ahmadpour 2006, 111–118). Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) highlighted the role of practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī) among human faculties, stressing its transcendent or subordinate status in relation to the animalistic faculties in shaping various characters and moral traits (Ibn Sīnā 1996, 65–66). Mullā Ṣadrā, drawing on the fundamental principles of his philosophical system, offered a distinct analysis and interpretation of the nature of character and its role in the emanation of action, setting him apart from his predecessors.The main question of this article is: From Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective, what is the ontological status of character in the emanation of human action? In this context, subsidiary issues such as the nature of character, its developmental stages and influencing factors, as well as the criteria for categorizing character, are also examined. Keywords: character (khulq), psychological disposition (malaka), deliberation, practical reason, Mullā Ṣadrā. Research BackgroundAmong the published works, only a few have explored the concept of character from the perspective of Islamic philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā.Soleimani (2021), in the article "The status of characters and emotions in human existence from Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective," examines the nature of character, emotions, and feelings, as well as their place in human existence. This article discusses character alongside emotions and feelings, focusing primarily on their mutual influence on an individual’s physical state and behavior, offering an introductory analysis rather than an in-depth exploration.Azim Hamzeian (2012), in the article "The relationship between ethics and substantial motion in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought," explores the intensificatory (al-ishtidādiyya) substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya) of the soul and the role of ethics, along with normative ethical propositions, in the soul’s developmental journey.Tooba Lal Sahebi (2017), in the article "Mullā Ṣadrā’s existential ethics and some of its implications," highlights the commonalities between Mullā Ṣadrā’s ethical perspective and both virtue and deontological ethics while also distinguishing their differences.Esmaeil Saadati Khamseh (2015), in the article "The relationship between theory and practice and moral characters and the essential transformation of humans in transcendent philosophy," demonstrates the reciprocal influence of thoughts, actions, and character throughout the process of substantial motion.Hossein Ahmadi (2021), in the article "The role of character and corrective disciplines in moral philosophy," examines ethical propositions, arguing that statements concerning the personal interests and harms of moral traits and behaviors pertain to character, while those concerning the educational and social aspects of moral traits and behaviors fall under corrective disciplines.All these articles primarily discuss ethics and the adherence to moral imperatives as prescriptive propositions on both individual and social levels. However, none of them addresses the existential nature of character, its stages of formation within the human soul, or its role in the emanation of action.ConclusionCharacter is a disposition (malaka) that enables actions to be effortlessly and habitually performed by the soul without deliberation (rawiyya) or contemplation. Throughout the process of action, a person continuously engages imaginative, intellectual, appetitive, and irascible faculties. A faculty becomes dominant and imprints itself on the agent, as it is repeatedly exercised. This process leads to the formation of a specific moral disposition. Character is not independent of the principles of action; rather, it is a state that becomes ingrained in the soul through the repeated activation of these principles. In essence, the very substance of the soul becomes characterized by a particular disposition, and as this disposition takes shape, the soul gains the ability to perform actions that align with it.The primary origin of various types of character lies in the dominance or subjugation of practical reason in relation to other cognitive and motive animal faculties. When practical reason prevails over these faculties, an angelic disposition emerges. Conversely, if practical reason is subjugated and the imaginative faculty, the appetitive faculty, or the irascible faculty dominates, then demonic, bestial, or predatory dispositions develop, respectively. These four dispositions serve as the most proximal differentiae for human beings, leading individuals to assume distinct existential types by the end of their worldly lives.Regarding the formation of character within the human soul, it must be noted that human actions originate from the soul through its faculties—both cognitive and motive. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul is unified with its faculties, which are merely manifestations and lower degrees of its existence. Therefore, every action emanating from the soul through the exertion of will serves as evidence of the specific state of its faculties. Consequently, as a person’s thoughts and inner states change, so too do their actions. However, when actions are repeated, it indicates that the soul has consistently chosen a particular orientation over time. As these temporary states become reinforced, they transform into stable dispositions. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, a disposition is an intensified and solidified form of prior states, leading the soul to acquire a new form or actuality. This newly established form acts as a substantial principle within the soul, producing its own specific effects and serving as the source of corresponding actions. Ultimately, these substantial forms evolve into distinct personalities and independent essences, shaping a stable and enduring identity for the soul.Due to the ambiguity in the criteria offered by his predecessors for the classification of character into virtue and vice—where the mean is associated with positive character and the extremes with negative character—Mullā Ṣadrā introduces a different criterion. He identifies wisdom and freedom as the markers of a strong and noble soul, representing virtuous character, while ignorance and enslavement are seen as indicators of a weak and base soul, symbolizing vicious character.Human actions are characterized by three attributes: character (disposition), habit, and skill, all of which ultimately stem from a single source. This common source refers to the relationship between the repetition of an action and the formation of a stable state in the soul, allowing actions to be performed easily and without deliberation. However, these three attributes differ from one another. Character is the firm establishment of a particular trait within the soul, which enables actions corresponding to that trait to occur effortlessly. Skill, on the other hand, involves the individual using tools and materials to attain expertise in a particular craft or trade. Habit refers to actions driven solely by imagination and the pursuit of immediate, animalistic pleasure, with the ultimate goal being the habitual pattern that forms as a result.
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