Document Type : Biannual Journal

Author

Assistant Professor, Imam Sadiq University

10.30465/cw.2025.50068.2076

Abstract

Abstract
Introduction
 
The identity and character of an individual are formed through a combination of their thoughts, beliefs, traits, and character (khulq). Through self-knowledge and awareness of these existential attributes, one can strive to overcome personal shortcomings and cultivate their strengths. From a social perspective, understanding personality traits—particularly characters—of individuals within a society allows for the anticipation of their behavior in various social contexts, enabling more effective management and interaction within that society. Thus, the study of character has remained a focal point of philosophical inquiry throughout history.
Among ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato identified character (ethos) with knowledge (Copleston 2001, 1:130, 253). However, Aristotle distinguished moral virtues from knowledge, defining them as character or habits associated with the non-rational part of the soul. He argued that these virtues are not acquired through instruction and education but, like skills, develop through repeated practice (Aristotle 1964, 1:219–242).
Among Muslim philosophers, al-Kindī was the first to reconcile Plato’s theory of faculties and Aristotle’s theory of moderation. He suggested that the soul consists of three faculties—rational (nāṭiqa), irascible (ghaḍabiyya), and appetitive (shahawiyya)—and, contrary to Aristotle, applied the theory of moderation not to actions but to these three faculties (Atrak 2014). Ibn Miskawayh and al-Fārābī emphasized the role of social interaction in shaping moral character, incorporating the social dimension into the essence of character (Fārābī 1996, 83; Ahmadpour 2006, 111–118). Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) highlighted the role of practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī) among human faculties, stressing its transcendent or subordinate status in relation to the animalistic faculties in shaping various characters and moral traits (Ibn Sīnā 1996, 65–66). Mullā Ṣadrā, drawing on the fundamental principles of his philosophical system, offered a distinct analysis and interpretation of the nature of character and its role in the emanation of action, setting him apart from his predecessors.
The main question of this article is: From Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective, what is the ontological status of character in the emanation of human action? In this context, subsidiary issues such as the nature of character, its developmental stages and influencing factors, as well as the criteria for categorizing character, are also examined.
 
Keywords: character (khulq), psychological disposition (malaka), deliberation, practical reason, Mullā Ṣadrā.
 
Research Background
Among the published works, only a few have explored the concept of character from the perspective of Islamic philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā.
Soleimani (2021), in the article "The status of characters and emotions in human existence from Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective," examines the nature of character, emotions, and feelings, as well as their place in human existence. This article discusses character alongside emotions and feelings, focusing primarily on their mutual influence on an individual’s physical state and behavior, offering an introductory analysis rather than an in-depth exploration.
Azim Hamzeian (2012), in the article "The relationship between ethics and substantial motion in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought," explores the intensificatory (al-ishtidādiyya) substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya) of the soul and the role of ethics, along with normative ethical propositions, in the soul’s developmental journey.
Tooba Lal Sahebi (2017), in the article "Mullā Ṣadrā’s existential ethics and some of its implications," highlights the commonalities between Mullā Ṣadrā’s ethical perspective and both virtue and deontological ethics while also distinguishing their differences.
Esmaeil Saadati Khamseh (2015), in the article "The relationship between theory and practice and moral characters and the essential transformation of humans in transcendent philosophy," demonstrates the reciprocal influence of thoughts, actions, and character throughout the process of substantial motion.
Hossein Ahmadi (2021), in the article "The role of character and corrective disciplines in moral philosophy," examines ethical propositions, arguing that statements concerning the personal interests and harms of moral traits and behaviors pertain to character, while those concerning the educational and social aspects of moral traits and behaviors fall under corrective disciplines.
All these articles primarily discuss ethics and the adherence to moral imperatives as prescriptive propositions on both individual and social levels. However, none of them addresses the existential nature of character, its stages of formation within the human soul, or its role in the emanation of action.
Conclusion
Character is a disposition (malaka) that enables actions to be effortlessly and habitually performed by the soul without deliberation (rawiyya) or contemplation. Throughout the process of action, a person continuously engages imaginative, intellectual, appetitive, and irascible faculties. A faculty becomes dominant and imprints itself on the agent, as it is repeatedly exercised. This process leads to the formation of a specific moral disposition. Character is not independent of the principles of action; rather, it is a state that becomes ingrained in the soul through the repeated activation of these principles. In essence, the very substance of the soul becomes characterized by a particular disposition, and as this disposition takes shape, the soul gains the ability to perform actions that align with it.
The primary origin of various types of character lies in the dominance or subjugation of practical reason in relation to other cognitive and motive animal faculties. When practical reason prevails over these faculties, an angelic disposition emerges. Conversely, if practical reason is subjugated and the imaginative faculty, the appetitive faculty, or the irascible faculty dominates, then demonic, bestial, or predatory dispositions develop, respectively. These four dispositions serve as the most proximal differentiae for human beings, leading individuals to assume distinct existential types by the end of their worldly lives.
Regarding the formation of character within the human soul, it must be noted that human actions originate from the soul through its faculties—both cognitive and motive. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul is unified with its faculties, which are merely manifestations and lower degrees of its existence. Therefore, every action emanating from the soul through the exertion of will serves as evidence of the specific state of its faculties. Consequently, as a person’s thoughts and inner states change, so too do their actions. However, when actions are repeated, it indicates that the soul has consistently chosen a particular orientation over time. As these temporary states become reinforced, they transform into stable dispositions. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, a disposition is an intensified and solidified form of prior states, leading the soul to acquire a new form or actuality. This newly established form acts as a substantial principle within the soul, producing its own specific effects and serving as the source of corresponding actions. Ultimately, these substantial forms evolve into distinct personalities and independent essences, shaping a stable and enduring identity for the soul.
Due to the ambiguity in the criteria offered by his predecessors for the classification of character into virtue and vice—where the mean is associated with positive character and the extremes with negative character—Mullā Ṣadrā introduces a different criterion. He identifies wisdom and freedom as the markers of a strong and noble soul, representing virtuous character, while ignorance and enslavement are seen as indicators of a weak and base soul, symbolizing vicious character.
Human actions are characterized by three attributes: character (disposition), habit, and skill, all of which ultimately stem from a single source. This common source refers to the relationship between the repetition of an action and the formation of a stable state in the soul, allowing actions to be performed easily and without deliberation. However, these three attributes differ from one another. Character is the firm establishment of a particular trait within the soul, which enables actions corresponding to that trait to occur effortlessly. Skill, on the other hand, involves the individual using tools and materials to attain expertise in a particular craft or trade. Habit refers to actions driven solely by imagination and the pursuit of immediate, animalistic pleasure, with the ultimate goal being the habitual pattern that forms as a result.

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