Evolution of Mimesis to Muhakat in Farabi's Philosophy

 
Abstract
 
Introduction
This article focuses on the evolution of the concept of mimesis from the Greek philosophy to al-Fārābī's philosophy and the relation between mimesis and art in al-Fārābī's thought. Mimesis is a core concept in exploring ideas of Plato and Aristotle about art. The same key role is traceable in al-Fārābī's philosophy of art. Mimesis was translated as muḥākāt in Islamic philosophy and played an important part in explaining how artworks are shaped and how they affect their audience. The question is whether this transformation from Mimesis to muḥākāt was simply a formal transformation or there happened recognizable changes in this concept making it interpret artworks differently.
 
Methods and Material
Benefiting from descriptive-analytical method, this article employs primary and secondary sources on al-Fārābī to explore its inquiries.
 
Results and Discussion
Analyzing al-Fārābī’s discussions on Mimesis, one could see close similarities between Mimesis in the Greek philosophy and the newly branded muḥākāt. Primarily, the terms mimesis and techne and their corresponding translations in al-Fārābī’s Arabic texts have been discussed. Al-Fārābī has approved muḥākāt as an equivalent for Mimesis and ṣanāʿa for techne. Aristotle has marked out the difference between mimetic technes and other technes. What distinguishes technes like painting or poetry from other practical technes is the presence of the element of Mimesis. Likewise, in al-Fārābī’s philosophy, muḥākāt is what distinguishes artistic ṣanāʿas from practical ones. Although the the term “mimetic technes” has been used by Aristotle and hasn’t been adopted by al-Fārābī, but the idea of some technes being different because of mimesis is still traceable. Al-Fārābī assignes multiple capabilities to imagination which is corresponding faculty of the soul for muḥākāt. The most basic capability of imagination is saving a sensible image after the sensory medium is disconnected. For instance, one sees a lion, then closes her eyes, and she imagines the same lion. This is the principal ability of the imagination faculty. The second, more complex capability of imagination is composing and the composing sensible images. For example, one takes a lion’s body and attaches a human’s head to it. There is a level of decomposing man’s body and lion’s head and a level of composing a lion with a man’s head. The third function of imagination is muḥākāt which itself consists of two types, the more basic being likening a sensible image to another sensible image. For instance, a warrior is likened to a lion. These are both two things from the realm of the sensible. The second, more complex type of muḥākāt is likening a concept from the realm of the intelligible to an image from the realm of the sensible or imaginable. For example, Rumi likens soul to a dragon in his verse “Your soul is a dragon; not dead, only frozen.” What distinguishes al-Fārābī’s coordinates of muḥākāt from Mimesis is the ability of muḥākāt in imitation from the intelligible concepts. Al-Fārābī has also categorized mimetic technes based on other criteria, i.e. moral perspective and objective perspective, that is, the ends towards which imagination is used. In his moral categorization, al-Fārābī counts six types of music; music being an instance of mimetic techne. Three of these types are commendable and the other three are condemnable. The first type of commendable music is the type that tends to balance low extremes of the soul like fear and laziness. The second type tends to balance high extremes of the soul like impetuosity and selfishness. In the third type of commendable music, the element of muḥākāt is considered. Such type of art tends to move all thoughts and deeds towards goodness and happiness. Al-Fārābī’s other categorization dealing with ends of mimetic technes describes three objectives. In case of music, for instance, there are some tunes that merely tend to cause joy and comfort in the soul. Another type tends to create imaginations and mimetic images in the soul in addition to causing joy and comfort. Al-Fārābī mentions another type inspired by reactionary sentiments of the soul. This type isn’t concerned with objectives of such technes, but instead describes their roots. One could outline multiple similarities between what al-Fārābī describes about muḥākāt and the general understanding of Mimesis in the Greek philosophy. But what differentiates Al-Fārābī’s specifications of muḥākāt from Mimesis is a capacity in the former in likening intelligible concepts to sensible examples.
 
 
Conclusion
Through analysis of the subject according to al-Fārābī’s treatises, it was concluded that Al-Fārābī’s muḥākāt has new features compared to the concept of Mimesis in Greek philosophy. This is particularly conceivable in the idea of imitating from the intelligible or maʿqūlāt, which is a bonus of al-Fārābī’s philosophy compared to imitation from the sensible and imaginable sources which was already suggested in Greek philosophy.