Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Mahdi Assadi
Abstract
Abstract IntroductionAlthough the time dilation is one of the important problems of physics and its philosophy in the contemporary world, throughout history too some philosophers have – though negatively and in a critical manner – discussed about it: they have usually proposed the plurality ...
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Abstract IntroductionAlthough the time dilation is one of the important problems of physics and its philosophy in the contemporary world, throughout history too some philosophers have – though negatively and in a critical manner – discussed about it: they have usually proposed the plurality of and the slowness/fastness of time as a probable view and then have criticized it by several proofs. On the contrary, especially some Neo–Ṣadrīan philosophers have explicitly asserted that there are as many times as motions. These times can even be – in a way different from the relativity physics – slow or fast: if a motion is fast, then its time too is fast; and if it is slow, its time too is slow. I have gathered, in this paper, the philosophical reasons of the two opposite views and have rationally analyzed and criticized them. I have showed that the various reasons of the notable opponents of the plurality of and the dilation of time – including Aristotle, Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī and Fakhr al–Dīn al–Rāzī – are not very strong. But the claim of the proponents can philosophically be strengthened and reconstructed.MethodI collect and review various perspectives using the historical method, then analyze and assess them using the philosophical method and through logical tools.DiscussionWhile Plato’s Timaeus suggests that not just one time but various times can exist, it does not address the relativity of time and the slowness and fastness of these times. Aristotle denied the plurality of time and also claimed that time cannot be described as fast or slow; Otherwise, this would create a vicious circle: a fast time would be one that occurs in a short time. In critique of Aristotle's argument, we can show that:(1) By distinguishing between the time per se and the relational time, no circularity arises. For instance, in a one–hour contest, since the rabbit's motion is faster than the turtle's, the rabbit motion’s time per se – subordinate to the fastness of its motion – must be more than the turtle motion’s time per se. This distinction is not, of course, incompatible with the fact that the relational time of both of them to be the current one–hour compared with, and related to, the current time of todays.(2) This argument would work only if there were no other way to understand a fast time, but there is. Because, one of the descriptive definitions (Rasm) of "fast" is for something to reach and exceed something else. By such a definition, we see that the rabbit reaches and exceeds the moving turtle. To grasp, here, the meaning of reaching and exceeding, we do not need to understand the time. Thus, at least in this example, understanding fastness does not require an understanding of time.(3) If the fast time involves circularity, then the fast motion, just in the same way, would also involve circularity, as a fast motion is defined as a motion occurring in a short measure of motion (= in a short time).Likewise, other claims of Aristotle about the unity of time and its lacking fastness and slowness can be challenged. For instance, in the case of time, he conflates the typical and numerical unity.After Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī, and Fakhr al-Dīn al–Rāzī, who presented objectionable views on the problem at hand, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāyī argued that there are as many times as there are motions, and Jawādī Āmulī explicitly discussed the fastness and slowness of time. My own view too is that since time is the measure of motion, it is inevitable to accept the multiplicity of time and even its subordinate fastness and slowness: since motion is numerous, measure of motion (time) is also numerous. And since motions are fast or slow, their measures, namely times, too are fast or slow subordinate to themselves. Nevertheless, the neo–Ṣadrīan philosophers have connected other views to this theory, which I believe are unnecessary and even mistaken, such as the general substantial motion and the uniform general time. The general substantial motion cannot be established through the general and common time.Firstly, since time is the measure of motion, so assuming the existence of time already presupposes the existence of motion. And from an epistemic point of view too, we, as Aristotle notes, can experience no time if we are aware of no motion. Hence, it is question–begging to establish motion through time. Similarly, assuming the existence of general and common time presupposes the existence of general motion, making it question–begging to prove general motion (whether substantial or non–substantial) through general time.Secondly, I believe that if time is considered as the measure of motion, then to prove the uniform general and common time, we must establish the existence of a permanent or long–lasting motion uniform without acceleration. However, since such a uniform motion has not been proven in the exact sense of the term, the uniform general and common time, whether substantial time or accidental one, cannot be proven in the exact sense of the term either.ConclusionThroughout history, some have argued that there is only one time, presenting its fastness or slowness as a hypothetical possibility that they subsequently reject. Aristotle denied the plurality of time and dismissed, due to the problem of circularity, its fastness or slowness as well. After critically addressing the circularity objection, I also challenge his other claims about the unity of time and its lack of fastness or slowness. The main point of Plotinus's objections concerning the relationship between the time and the measure of motion, if it is correct, is the fact that it would only challenge the specifically Aristotelian version; Otherwise, there is no issue with having multiple motions and multiple times as well, where each time is subordinate to its own specific motion.Due to the regress argument against the existence of time, Ibn Sīnā rejects the existence of the plurality of times. However, I have showed that no regress would occur if the essential time and per se one be distinct from the accidental and relational time. I even, in defense of the plurality of time, present several other objections to Ibn Sīnā's position.After reviewing and criticizing the arguments by Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī and Fakhr al–Rāzī regarding the rejection of time as the measure of motion and the denial of the multiplicity of time, I show that Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāyī was the first Muslim thinker to explicitly support the idea that there are as many times as motions. Similarly, Jawādī Āmulī explicitly advocates for the fastness and slowness of time. My own view too is to show that since time is the measure of motion, it is inevitable to accept the plurality of time and even its subordinate fastness and slowness, although this differs from the treatment of time in the relativity physics.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Morteza Hajihosseini; Mohammad Hossein Esfandiari
Abstract
AbstractIn Classical Logic, the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are considered theorems and have proof. Recently, Morteza Hajihosseini has written a book titled Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic (2017) and also published the second edition (2023) ...
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AbstractIn Classical Logic, the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are considered theorems and have proof. Recently, Morteza Hajihosseini has written a book titled Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic (2017) and also published the second edition (2023) of it. In this book, he established two truth-functional and non-truth-functional systems in logic. In this logic, the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are in the form of a rule that every line of the argument is written based on them and are therefore considered unprovable.Asadollah Fallahi has recently written several criticisms on this book in the form of separate articles and the author of the book has responded to each of these articles separately. Fallahi, in his last review of the book titled "Philosophical Foundations of Hajhosseini's Logics" Volume 14, Issue 2, February 2024 in Contemporary Wisdom Journal, critiques the philosophical foundations of the truth-functional and non-truth-functional systems, including the author’s views on the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle and their consequences, without clarifying his stance on whether a non-formal language is presupposed or not.In this article, we first explain the philosophical and epistemological foundations of logical systems and compare these systems with respect to these foundations. Then, we respond to Fallahi’s criticisms one by one.Keywords: Logical system, The law of non-contradiction, The law of excluded middle, Natural language, Natural intuition.IntroductionWith its philosophical assumption that there is a non-formal language to be paraphrased, classical logic has been founded to provide an exact formal method for mathematical arguments and as well as their logical explanation. In this logic, the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle are considered to be as theorems for which there is proof. Recently, Morteza Hajihosseini wrote a book titled Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic (2017) whose second edition was released in 2023. In this book, the author begins with this philosophical assumption that there is a non-formal language that the formal language is trying to represent, and then he discusses the consequences of this assumption. Furthermore, with the aim of providing a precise formal method for the arguments in natural language and explaining them logically, he established two truth-functional and non-truth-functional systems in logic. In this logic, the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle function as rules based on which every line of the argument is written and are therefore considered unprovable.Materials & MethodsThe research method used in this article is descriptive-analytical. In this article, we have systematically examined each critique that Fâllāhī has leveled against the book Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic and have responded to them based on the book itself.Discussion & ResultIn this article, we first explain the philosophical and epistemological foundations of logical systems and compare these systems with respect to these foundations. Then, we respond to Fallahi’s criticisms singly. Finally, our responses to these criticisms, presented in the form of the conclusion of this article, are summarized under the following headings:Firstly, Fallahi, not clarifying his stance on meta-systematic non-formal language, the value of intuition and its role in evaluating logical problems, and instrumentalism, has, as explained in our response to the criticisms, muddled up various logical, epistemological and psychological problems. Secondly, Fallahi, with his arbitrary interpretation of applied logic and its distinction from theoretical logic, has not only blocked the application of logical systems in non-formal languages but has also reduced theoretical logic to an artificial and featureless system. Despite acknowledging the importance of intuitive insights, he has undermined the validity of intuition by employing an incorrect definition of paradox.Thirdly, except for one criticism which is irrelevant to the philosophical and epistemological foundations of the systems and could be easily corrected, his other criticisms arise from misconceptions, misinterpretations, contrived accusations, and fallacies. Among them, we could refer to the following:- The misinterpretation that the author of the book considers the axioms to be completely self-evident.- The misinterpretation that adding axioms to the premises of a correct argument leads to the incorrectness or invalidity of the argument.- The misconception that the following arguments in the book have been evaluated as false/invalid and are in conflict with some other claims in the book:A ∨ ~ A ⊢ A ∨ ~ AA → A ⊢ A → A- The misinterpretation that the formulation rules in Classical and Non-Classical Logics are incorrect.- The fabricated accusation that the author of the book considers Classical Logic to be based on the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein, the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, and the naturalized epistemology of Quine.- The fabricated accusation that Abdullah Javadi Amoli considers sentences like "Wednesday is a triangle" and "the wall is blind" to be meaningful but false.- The fallacy that in philosophy and mathematics some propositions result in their contradiction.- The fallacy that in logic and epistemology, as opposed to philosophy, "circularity" is allowed.- The fallacy that counterfactual conditionals are biconditionals, which are caused by the fallacy of False Conversion.ConclusionOur analysis of Fallahi's article titled "Philosophical Foundations of Hajhosseini's Logics" reveals that his critiques of the book Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic are founded on fallacies, misconceptions, misinterpretations, and unfounded accusations. The responses provided in this paper clearly show that none of these criticisms hold water.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
hasan Mohammadzadeh; Mansour Imanpour
Abstract
AbstractThe "Theory of Grace" is one of the innovations of Plotinus and serves as a response to the issue of the emergence of multiplicities from the One. Throughout history, various explanations of grace have been provided by philosophers, but Ibn Arabi's interpretation is notably different. This research ...
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AbstractThe "Theory of Grace" is one of the innovations of Plotinus and serves as a response to the issue of the emergence of multiplicities from the One. Throughout history, various explanations of grace have been provided by philosophers, but Ibn Arabi's interpretation is notably different. This research aims to examine the issue of the semantic coordinates of the system of grace by balancing the views of Plotinus and Ibn Arabi, utilizing the method of Aristotelian description and analysis, and evaluating it at two levels: components and foundations. The goal of this research is to discover and infer the components of the system of grace within the two epistemological frameworks of Plotinus and Ibn Arabi, in such a way that the relationship between the foundations and views of these two thinkers is demonstrated. The findings of the study indicate that the system of grace in Plotinus and Ibn Arabi has fundamental and structural differences in terms of both foundation and structure. Specifically, Ibn Arabi has been able to present a more precise and comprehensive analysis of grace by situating the theory within the context of the personal unity of existence. The most significant achievement and characteristic of Ibn Arabi's grace can be seen in his transition from the multiplicities of being and his profound explanation of the relationship between the Divine and creation, as well as the degree of presence and activity of the Divine.Keywords: Grace, Meaning, Plotinus, Ibn Arabi.IntroductionThe ongoing inquiry and research regarding "How multiplicities emerge from the One" has been one of the important and fundamental issues for both Muslim and non-Muslim philosophers and sages. This question has led to the emergence of various viewpoints and theories, such as the theory of evolution, the theory of participation, the theory of stimulation, the theory of all-godliness, the theory of creation from nothing, the theory of grace, and the theory of manifestation (Jaspers 1398 AHS: 21; Rahimian 1381 AHS: 69). In this context, Plotinus introduced another concept known as the "theory of grace" and sought to justify the emergence of multiplicities from the One. After Plotinus, several philosophers discussed this idea, each explaining it according to their own epistemological system, one of the most important of whom is Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi (1165-1240 CE). As a Muslim mystic, he provided a different interpretation of grace and even critiqued Plotinus and his view on the meaning of grace at times (Ibn Arabi 1356 AH: Vol. 2, 337; same: Vol. 2, 179-178; same: Vol. 2, 151). The significance and ontological status of the grace system on one hand, and Ibn Arabi's critique (died 638 AH) on the other, indicate the necessity of examining its semantic implications. The main question of this research is: what is the meaning and nature of the theory of grace from the perspectives of Plotinus and Ibn Arabi? By analyzing this question, the following sub-questions can be posed: 1. What meanings and truths do the components and elements constituting the meaning of grace have in these two epistemological systems? 2. In what cultural context and with what ontological basis was the theory of grace proposed by them? And fundamentally, where does this semantic difference originate? The author's hypothesis is that, given the foundational divergence of these two thoughts, the theory of grace is presented within two completely different frameworks, each having distinct ontological and semantic implications.Materials & methodsThe method used in this research is the Aristotelian analysis method, which focuses on the four causes of the system of grace. This method employs various techniques such as conceptual analysis, propositional analysis, and systemic analysis, as well as the reconstruction of viewpoints to arrive at a superior model and perspective. In addition, comparative studies at the level of reasons and foundations have also been utilized in this article to showcase Ibn Arabi's innovative system. The method of data collection from first-hand and relevant sources for the present research is also bibliographic and library-based.Discussion & ResultIbn Arabi, by proposing the theory of grace within the framework of the unity of existence, presents a different meaning of the system of grace. He argues that by transcending the multiplicities of existence and introducing the theory of manifestation, God is seen as the only being in the universe, while everything else is a reflection and manifestation of Him. Through this epistemological system, he discusses the system of grace and derives its semantic characteristics. The features of the system of grace according to Ibn Arabi can be summarized in the following points: "continuity," "immediacy," "unity and identity," "conformity with the God of religions," "proximity and active presence of God," "extensiveness and universality," "comprehensiveness and returnability to unity," and "absence of constraints such as: involuntariness and ignorance." The result and outcome of these characteristics can be observed in the profound explanation of this model of the relationship between the Truth and creation, as well as the degree of presence and activity of the Truth.ConclusionThe concept of grace in Plotinus's epistemological system refers to divine and non-religious souls, whereas the grace in Ibn Arabi's thought aligns with religious teachings, performing the act of grace both in terms of occurrence and persistence. The grace in Plotinus's knowledge system pertains to the existence and being of things, while from Ibn Arabi's perspective, it represents the manifestation of being and the existential radiance of the Creator. Additionally, the source and object of Plotinus's grace is directly only the First Intellect, whereas in Ibn Arabi's view, the entire universe is encompassed by the general divine grace, which signifies the extensive nature of grace in Ibn Arabi's worldview. From Ibn Arabi's standpoint, the act of grace occurs directly and continuously, while in Plotinus, this truth happens through intermediaries. Furthermore, Ibn Arabi's grace possesses such comprehensiveness that it addresses the return of grace and the issue of resurrection, a point that remains unaddressed in Plotinus. Although both epistemological systems emphasize the impartiality of grace, the rationale behind grace in Ibn Arabi is explained by distinguishing the realm of the unseen from the realm of action and testimony, in such a way that grace is attributed to the perfection of God and the manifestation of His names.In applying the second layer of the discussion and the ontological basis of the statements that account for the differences between these two perspectives, it can also be said that the ontological basis of the theory of grace in the mystical and philosophical systems of Plotinus and Ibn Arabi is different. Since the theory of grace is presented in two completely different contexts, it has thus taken on a fundamentally different nature; because Ibn Arabi believes in the personal unity of existence, while the intellectual framework of Plotinus is alien to this premise. In conclusion, it can be said that both theories provide a successful framework for justifying the emergence of multiplicities from a single source, but the differences in their underlying structures and foundations have led to distinctions in issues, particularly the matters of "the relationship of the Truth with creation" and "the nature of the presence and activity of the Truth in the world," which are significant achievements of the theory of grace as interpreted by Ibn Arabi.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
erfan gholami; Nadia MAFTOUNI
Abstract
AbstractThe problem of the soul’s perfection and the attainment of human happiness held immense significance among Islamic philosophers, including Ibn Ṭufayl and Shaykh al-Ishrāq. These thinkers outlined the stages, conditions, and prerequisites for the soul's perfection, which indicates the ...
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AbstractThe problem of the soul’s perfection and the attainment of human happiness held immense significance among Islamic philosophers, including Ibn Ṭufayl and Shaykh al-Ishrāq. These thinkers outlined the stages, conditions, and prerequisites for the soul's perfection, which indicates the emphasis Muslim philosophers place on practical mysticism and spiritual wayfaring. Given that research on the soul, its ultimate purpose, and its perfection profoundly impacts one's worldview and leads to the correction of behavior and practices, this article employs a descriptive-analytic method to compare the perspectives of Ibn Ṭufayl and al-Suhrawardī on the soul’s perfection and the path to attaining true happiness. Research findings show that, according to the views of Ibn Ṭufayl and Shaykh al-Ishrāq, the perfection of the human soul requires passing through three stages, some of which bear similarities, though there are distinctions. Both philosophers consider the first stage to be self-awareness. For Ibn Ṭufayl, the second stage involves acquiring a resemblance to celestial bodies and heavenly souls as part of the soul’s perfection and the attainment of happiness. In contrast, al-Suhrawardī views the second stage as seeking guidance from a spiritual healer. While Ibn Ṭufayl sees the third stage as direct contact with the Necessary Existent, Shaykh al-Ishrāq takes it as a connection to what he calls the “world-illuminating sun,” which can be construed as both the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) and the Necessary Existent.Keywords: human soul, perfection, celestial bodies, heavenly souls. IntroductionIbn Ṭufayl and Shaykh al-Ishrāq are prominent philosophers of the Islamic period who presented unique theories regarding the perfection of the human rational soul. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the term "Oriental Wisdom" (al-ḥikmat al-mashriqiyya) was first introduced by Avicenna, marking a significant shift in his thought by transforming discursive wisdom (al-ḥikmat al-baḥthiyya) into gustatory (or intuitive) wisdom (al-ḥikmat al-dhawqiyya). However, Avicenna’s concept of Oriental Wisdom remains ambiguous and contentious. Therefore, examining the theories of philosophers influenced by him can provide valuable insights into this notion.Ibn Ṭufayl explicitly stated that in his work Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān (Living the Son of Awake), he sought to articulate Avicenna’s Oriental Wisdom. His narrative offers an interpretation of Avicenna’s notion of Oriental Wisdom. Shaykh al-Ishrāq, heavily influenced by Avicenna, owes much to him in his writings and can, in some ways, be seen as a continuation of Avicenna’s philosophy. Al-Ishrāq even mentioned that he wrote Qiṣṣat al-ghurbat al-gharbiyya (The tale of Occidental exile) as a complement to Avicenna’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān. This article examines the stages of perfection according to these two renowned philosophers, highlighting both their similarities and differences.Methods and materialsThis research employs a descriptive-analytic method to examine the theories of the soul’s perfection according to Ibn Ṭufayl and Shaykh al-Ishrāq.ResultsThe question of the perfection of the human rational soul has always held great significance for philosophers, with some even defining philosophy as the perfection of the soul itself. Notably, Ibn Ṭufayl al-Andalusī and Shaykh al-Ishrāq addressed this issue through a framework of three stages, which reveal both similarities and distinctions. For both philosophers, the first stage of the soul’s perfection is self-awareness and self-knowledge, as without this foundation, the structure of human existence cannot be established. Ibn Ṭufayl's concept of self-knowledge begins with an understanding of the body and its importance, while Shaykh al-Ishrāq's approach focuses on identifying and addressing the ailments of the soul. In the second stage, Ibn Ṭufayl asserts that actions must be performed to enable humans to attain a resemblance to celestial bodies, which itself involves multiple stages. In contrast, for Shaykh al-Ishrāq, this stage is achieved only through submission to a spiritual healer who addresses the soul’s ailments. In the third stage, Ibn Ṭufayl emphasizes the necessity of knowing the attributes of the Necessary Existent and striving to emulate Him, whereas for Shaykh al-Ishrāq, the third stage involves complete trust and the lifting of all constraints.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Cyrus Alipour; Hosein Kalbasi Ashtari
Abstract
AbstractSymbolism has long been applied to religion, mysticism, and philosophy. Shaykh al-Isrāq, al-Suhrawardī, through his symbolic language, portrays transcendent themes that are beyond the reach of ordinary language and demonstrative reason. Al-Suhrawardī views the pre-Aristotelian tradition, particularly ...
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AbstractSymbolism has long been applied to religion, mysticism, and philosophy. Shaykh al-Isrāq, al-Suhrawardī, through his symbolic language, portrays transcendent themes that are beyond the reach of ordinary language and demonstrative reason. Al-Suhrawardī views the pre-Aristotelian tradition, particularly Plato, as the Western representative of the primordial tradition of wisdom. The fundamental problem addressed in the present article is an analysis of al-Suhrawardī's symbolist perspective and its impact on interpreting Platonic wisdom based on the primordial tradition. The present research adopts a descriptive-analytic and comparative approach, referencing the works of both philosophers—al-Suhrawardī and Plato—to analyze the characteristics of symbolic language and its fundamental connection to transcendent truths and the primordial tradition of wisdom, and doctrines such as the purification and detachment of the soul, divine illumination (al-ishrāq) and inception, revelation (al-kashf), and intuition (al-shuhūd). The results indicate: first, a symbol is connected to and arises from transcendent truths. Second, the primordial tradition of wisdom has two aspects: a universal aspect (historical) and a divine aspect (nonhuman and trans-historical). Third, understanding transcendent truths and the shared divine foundation is possible through elements such as the detachment and purification of the soul and inner insight. Fourth, symbolic language enters the realm where experience and intuition serve as its dynamic elements. Fifth, Plato, as a divine sage, is a man of mystical experience and intuition who attained the state of detachment from the body (khalʿ al-badan); his wisdom is filled with transcendent truths. Sixth, symbolism is the means through which Plato and other philosophers expressed themselves. Thus, al-Suhrawardī employs a symbolic approach based on the primordial tradition when interpreting Plato. Through this approach, he conveys the profound meanings of the wisdom of illumination, seeking wisdom not in history but beyond it, in his interpretation of this tradition and others.. IntroductionIslamic philosophy is undeniably influenced by Greek philosophy, particularly Platonic thought. Al-Suhrawardī sought to establish a connection between ancient Persian wisdom and ancient Greek philosophy. Some scholars, like Henry Corbin, believe that his objective was to revive ancient Iranian wisdom. Al-Suhrawardī believed that the "Khosrowian tradition" (khamīra khusrawānī) and the "Pythagorean tradition" (khamīra Fīthāghūrī) are two manifestations of the primordial tradition (khamīra azalī) of wisdom. Through a symbolist approach, he highlighted primordial wisdom in his allegorical and mystical historiography. By reviving Khosrowian wisdom, he presented the shared foundations and symbols of early philosophers as a fundamental unity.Research MethodThis research adopts a descriptive, analytic, and comparative method to examine the characteristics of symbolic language by referencing the texts of al-Suhrawardī and Plato. It analyzes the connection of this language to transcendent truths, the primordial tradition of wisdom, and doctrines such as the purification and detachment of the soul, illumination, divine inspiration, and intuitive experience. Through this analysis, it will become clear how al-Suhrawardī approached the Platonic tradition and how illuminative wisdom aligns with that tradition and the primordial tradition of wisdom through symbolism. The research does not aim to demystify or compare the similarities and differences in the symbolic languages of these two philosophers, nor does it seek to measure how much al-Suhrawardī drew from Plato’s works.Discussion and ResultsThe symbolist approach is a creative use of symbols to express profound and transcendent philosophical and mystical truths, which require insight and the liberation of the soul to be understood, as they transcend ordinary language and rational perception. In the "primordial tradition of wisdom," al-Suhrawardī's use of symbolism is not merely a means to convey knowledge but a path to attaining mystical experience and the direct understanding of spiritual truths. Al-Suhrawardī views himself as a follower of Plato, and his approach to the Platonic tradition is reflected in their shared mystical experiences.Al-Suhrawardī bases his methodology on a combination of theoretical knowledge and intuitive experience, viewing both as essential. He sees discursive reason as a prelude to intuition, though he emphasizes the superiority of mystical experiences over discursive reasoning. His critique of Peripatetic philosophy, particularly Aristotelian rationality, serves as a path toward illuminative wisdom and inner intuition. Al-Suhrawardī underscores that while discursive wisdom is a prerequisite for intuitive wisdom, the latter is ultimately attained through intuition, not conceptual arguments.In his encounter with the Greek tradition, al-Suhrawardī adopts both a negative and a positive approach. In his negative approach, he critiques the autonomous Aristotelian rationality embraced by the Peripatetic philosophers. In his positive approach, he views pre-Aristotelian wisdom, particularly Plato’s, as a branch of illuminative wisdom. By focusing on the shared roots of ancient Iranian and Greek philosophies, he seeks to characterize both traditions as manifestations of the same truth.The concept of “perennial reason” in traditionalism refers to the eternal and primordial wisdom that has manifested across various religions and cultures, and is accessible through intuitive reason. Al-Suhrawardī similarly believes in a "primordial and sacred tradition of wisdom," which has appeared in traditions such as those of Iran, India, Egypt, and Greece. Both perspectives emphasize the hierarchy of being and the existence of a sacred, eternal, and divine entity beyond history and humanity. They hold that truth can only be grasped through intuitive reason and symbolic language, rather than discursive reason. Both al-Suhrawardī and Plato stress the importance of spiritual training and purifying the soul to attain divine truth and light. Al-Suhrawardī asserts that divine philosophers such as Plato, Hermes, and Pythagoras attained these truths through illumination and intuition, employing symbolic language to express them.Perennial wisdom has two dimensions: one oriented toward the divine realm and the other toward the historical context. The primordial tradition of wisdom (perennial reason) serves as the shared motif through which the historical traditions of Iran, Greece, and other civilizations converge. This tradition manifests as a trans-historical (divine) phenomenon within the framework of historical (human) traditions. Building on this concept, al-Suhrawardī emphasizes the eternal and divine aspect of wisdom. He views his symbolic approach to the Platonic tradition as a means of expressing and deeply understanding ancient divine wisdoms, which cannot be conveyed through ordinary language. This symbolic approach enables al-Suhrawardī to draw upon shared concepts between illuminative and Platonic wisdoms, examine and interpret these ideas more profoundly, and transcend human history and traditions.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
leila kiankhah
Abstract
IntroductionFrom Fārābī’s perspective, one of the most important, and perhaps the most pivotal, aspects of metaphysics is the discussion of theological issues—namely, the study of God as the origin of the universe and His attributes. Fārābī often defines metaphysics in his works in ...
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IntroductionFrom Fārābī’s perspective, one of the most important, and perhaps the most pivotal, aspects of metaphysics is the discussion of theological issues—namely, the study of God as the origin of the universe and His attributes. Fārābī often defines metaphysics in his works in terms of theology, describing it as the study of the first existent and other existents insofar as their existence is caused by the first existent.Thus, in Fārābī’s view, God is not only the existent on whom all other existents depend, but other existents merit metaphysical examination only insofar as they are connected to God. Therefore, a proper understanding of the first existent, His attributes, and His relation to other existents is among the most important and pivotal research issues in the study of Fārābī. While the first existent and His attributes have been discussed in another article (Kiankhah 2022b), due to its limited scope, that article did not address the proof or proofs for the existence of God in Fārābī’s view—an essential issue in Fārābī’s theology. In continuation of my research on Fārābī’s theology, this article primarily focuses on the proof or proofs for God’s existence in Fārābī’s works. It analyzes and examines Fārābī’s approach to proving God’s existence and addresses a crucial philosophical question that has concerned thinkers for a long time: Why does God exist?In the fourth chapter of Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm (Enumeration of the Sciences), which is dedicated to natural science and theology, Fārābī divides theology (metaphysics) into three parts. The first addresses existents and their accidents insofar as they are existents. The second deals with the preliminaries of proofs and the definition of substances (primitive definitions), while the third is devoted to the study of existents that are neither physical nor associated with physical objects. Fārābī then outlines the general issues of this third part, mentioning the proofs presented for its problems, such as the proof for the existence of detached (immaterial) existents, the proof for the multiplicity of detached existents, the proof for the finitude of detached existents, and the proof for the hierarchical degrees among these existents, where this hierarchy ultimately leads to an existent that is the most perfect, free of any imperfections, and from which other existents derive their existence, unity, and truth (Fārābī 1996, 75–79).According to this text, Fārābī holds that the existence of the first existent and non-physical existents is not self-evident. Thus, a key problem in theology (metaphysics) is to prove the existence of immaterial beings and demonstrate that the hierarchical chain of these beings culminates in the first origin. Like Avicenna, Fārābī does not consider God’s existence self-evident and regards the proofs for His existence as a metaphysical issue. However, a closer examination of Fārābī’s works reveals that his approach to proving the first existent is more complex than Avicenna’s, requiring deeper scrutiny.Research MethodologyAs with other research on Fārābī, it is essential, before embarking on a study, to distinguish between the works attributed to him in terms of their authenticity and then examine their content. Regarding the central issue of this article, there are profound and fundamental differences between the authentic and non-authentic works attributed to Fārābī, and failing to distinguish them would result in a conflation of various views and imprecision in reporting and analyzing Fārābī’s thought. As I suggested in the article “The First existence and its attributes in Fārābī’s view” (Kiankhah, 2022b), many historical books and research papers have attributed the ideas presented in treatises such as al-Daʿāwī al-qalbiyya, Sharḥ risālat Zīnūn al-kabīr, and ʿUyūn al-masāʾil to Fārābī without scrutinizing their authenticity, simply because these treatises contained significant material on theology and proofs of God’s existence. However, these treatises often align with an Avicennan intellectual approach. The author or authors of these three treatises, and similar works, emphasize the distinction between existence and quiddity, as well as necessity and possibility, proving God’s existence based on possibility and necessity. In contrast, an examination of the views presented in the definitively authentic works of Fārābī shows that, unlike Avicenna, he did not consider the distinction between essential necessity and essential possibility in his metaphysics, and, in fact, he never describes God as the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd).Thus, when examining the proofs for God's existence in Fārābī’s view, it is crucial to consider such proofs separately in his definitively authentic works and in more doubtful ones, in order to avoid conflating the differing views presented in these two groups of writings.Contributions and ResultsOverall, after examining the proofs for God’s existence in the works attributed to Fārābī, the following points can be noted.An examination of Fārābī’s works reveals that those doubtfully attributed to him present clear-cut proofs for God’s existence based on the distinction between existence and quiddity, as well as necessity and possibility. The fact that these proofs are grounded in principles that contradict Fārābī’s theoretical foundations, along with other evidence in the texts, strengthens the hypothesis that these works were not authored by him. Many researchers, without acknowledging this, have cited these works to argue that Fārābī was the first philosopher to view God as the essentially Necessary Existent and to present the proof from necessity and possibility for God’s existence, thus rejecting Avicenna’s role as the originator of these arguments.A review of Fārābī’s definitively authentic works reveals that al-Ḥurūf, Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, Falsafa Arasṭūṭālīs, and Fuṣūl muntazaʿa contain a version of the causal proof for the existence of the first existence when establishing the necessity of the third branch of the theoretical sciences, namely theology.While Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya contain the most extensive theological discussions among Fārābī’s works and provide detailed presentations of the proof from the unity of the first existent and the proof from the negation of opposites, they do not explicitly offer a clear-cut proof for the existence of the first existent. However, there are passages in Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila where it appears that Fārābī seeks to establish the existence of the First Existence through an analysis of its essence.It seems that the reason Fārābī does not present a proof for God’s existence in his two major works, Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya, is that he assumes God's existence, having already somewhat established it in Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda and similar works. Thus, he begins his discussions with an explanation and analysis of the problems concerning God and higher principles. In Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, he emphasized the necessity of addressing theology without fully engaging with it.One contribution of this article is the examination of evidence for rejecting the attribution of three treatises to Fārābī: ʿUyūn al-masāʾil, al-Daʿāwī al-qalbiyya, and Sharḥ risālat Zīnūn al-kabīr. This helps researchers of Fārābī avoid errors in attributing philosophical views to him and accurately assess Avicenna’s innovations in presenting proofs for God’s existence.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Fatemeh Sadeqzadeh Qamsari
Abstract
Abstract
In their theological works, Muslim philosophers tend to elaborate on the unity and other attributes of the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) after establishing its existence. In such discussions, they examine the essence (dhāt) alongside its attributes but remain silent regarding the essence ...
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Abstract
In their theological works, Muslim philosophers tend to elaborate on the unity and other attributes of the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) after establishing its existence. In such discussions, they examine the essence (dhāt) alongside its attributes but remain silent regarding the essence independent of the attributes. In some of their works, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī address the reasoning behind this silence. Drawing upon the principle of simplicity (bisāṭa) and the transcendence (tanazzuh) of the essence from any form of composition or multiplicity, Avicenna arrives at the theory of the conceptual unity of attributes. He considers essential attributes such as knowledge and power to be inextricable concomitants (lawāzim) of, and posterior to, the essence. From Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn’s perspective, all determinations dissolve in the Unique Essence (al-dhāt al-aḥadiyya), while attributes, names, and their manifestations are collectively present at the level of Oneness (wāḥidiyya). ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī holds that each of God's perfectional attributes (al-ṣifāt al-kamāliyya) encompasses other perfections. Emphasizing the absoluteness of the essence and distinguishing between the two ranks of Uniqueness (aḥadiyya) and Oneness (wāḥidiyya), Ṭabāṭabāʾī regards names and attributes as posterior to the rank of essence. Given the indescribability of the essence, any discourse on the Unique Essence is deemed impossible.
The present study employs a descriptive-analytical method, seeking to examine the philosophical silence in confronting the Unique Essence by analyzing the views of Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Keywords
Simplicity, absoluteness, uniqueness (aḥadiyya), silence, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Introduction
The mystics were perhaps the first to distinguish between the three domains of essence (dhāt), uniqueness (aḥadiyya), and oneness (wāḥiyya). In mystical terminology, the Unique (Aḥad) is a name for the essence without consideration of attributes, names, relations, or determinations. In contrast, oneness refers to the essence along with the names that emanate from it. From this perspective, the essence in its state of uniqueness is infinite, absolute, undetermined, and in a state of complete concealment (buṭūn).
Beyond the mystics, some Muslim philosophers, despite their adherence to the theory of the identity of the essence and attributes, occasionally take a more elevated approach by considering the Unique Essence as absolute and independent of any perfectional attributes. This notion, initially hinted at by Ibn Sīnā, was later emphasized and explicitly articulated by Mullā Ṣadrā and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Research Methodology
This article is conducted using a descriptive-analytical method within the framework of Islamic philosophy, particularly the works of Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Discussion and Analysis
Consideration of the level of the essence among Muslim philosophers can be pursued as a non-dominant approach. This perspective appears at different levels in the works of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī:
In his discussion of divine attributes, Avicenna strongly emphasizes the simplicity and unity (waḥdāniyya) of the divine essence, safeguarding it from any form of multiplicity. In his view, God is utterly simple, and His essence is beyond the attachment of any attribute. The utmost that humans can grasp about the divine essence is its most specific concomitant—namely, the necessity of existence. Through this attribute, one can come to know other attributes such as unity, knowledge, will, and power, which are considered posterior to and external to the essence of God.
It appears that, in formulating the theory of the conceptual unity of divine attributes and insisting on the simplicity of the Necessary Existent, Avicenna had an implicit regard for the level of the Unique Essence.
In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā presents two different formulations of the level of the essence and the consideration or non-consideration of attributes and actions at this level. At times, he explains the relationship between the essence and attributes in terms of monotheism of attributes or unity of divine attributes (al-tawḥīd al-ṣifātī), meaning the gathering of all perfectional attributes within a singular existence. According to this view, attributes such as knowledge, power, will, and life, while conceptually distinct, all exist within the Unique Essence. However, on other occasions, Mullā Ṣadrā addresses the Unique Essence and its relation to perfectional attributes in a different manner and at a higher level. He seeks to consider the Unique Essence in an absolute sense, devoid of any perfectional attribute. According to this view, the existence of the First Principle is such that all determinations and conceptual distinctions—such as attribute and subject, name and named, quiddity and concept—dissolve within it. At the level of the essence, all divine attributes, including knowledge, power, and will, are united and indistinguishable from one another. Thus, no reference to it is possible, and at the level of unique (aḥadī) identity, the essence has neither name nor designation. However, this latter view, which Ṣadrā presents only in rare instances within his works, is not as well-known as his first theory.
In some of his works, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, like other Muslim philosophers, elaborates on the theory of the identity of the essence and attributes. However, at times, he emphasizes the absoluteness of the level of uniqueness and the exclusion of perfectional attributes from this level, associating the theory of the identity of the essence and attributes with the level of oneness. According to this view, the reality of existence is, in and of itself and in all aspects, necessarily existent, possessing every real perfection while being free from all deficiencies and negations. On the other hand, every concept is inherently distinct from other concepts, and thus, the application of any concept to a referent imposes a form of limitation upon that referent. The application of a concept to the Necessary Existent, which is inherently absolute and unlimited, is therefore only possible at a level posterior to the essence. From ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s perspective, at the level of uniqueness, only the essence itself can be considered, while names and attributes—whether pertaining to the essence or to actions—are present only at a level subsequent to the essence.
Conclusion
It appears that in formulating the theory of the conceptual unity of divine attributes and insisting on the simplicity of the Necessary Existent—while ensuring that His attributes do not lead to composition or multiplicity in the essence—Ibn Sīnā implicitly acknowledged the level of the Unique Essence. Mullā Ṣadrā, and more explicitly ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, hold that any form of description—whether affirmative or negative—and the application of any of the Divine Names is only possible within the domain of divinity or the oneness of the essence. The Unique Essence is utterly transcendent, beyond all attributes and names. With its mysteries and secrets, the Unique Essence is not a realm for discourse and elaboration but rather a domain of awe and silence.
