Document Type : Biannual Journal
Author
Assistant Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Contemporary Wisdom, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
Although the time dilation is one of the important problems of physics and its philosophy in the contemporary world, throughout history too some philosophers have – though negatively and in a critical manner – discussed about it: they have usually proposed the plurality of and the slowness/fastness of time as a probable view and then have criticized it by several proofs. On the contrary, especially some Neo–Ṣadrīan philosophers have explicitly asserted that there are as many times as motions. These times can even be – in a way different from the relativity physics – slow or fast: if a motion is fast, then its time too is fast; and if it is slow, its time too is slow. I have gathered, in this paper, the philosophical reasons of the two opposite views and have rationally analyzed and criticized them. I have showed that the various reasons of the notable opponents of the plurality of and the dilation of time – including Aristotle, Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī and Fakhr al–Dīn al–Rāzī – are not very strong. But the claim of the proponents can philosophically be strengthened and reconstructed.
Method
I collect and review various perspectives using the historical method, then analyze and assess them using the philosophical method and through logical tools.
Discussion
While Plato’s Timaeus suggests that not just one time but various times can exist, it does not address the relativity of time and the slowness and fastness of these times. Aristotle denied the plurality of time and also claimed that time cannot be described as fast or slow; Otherwise, this would create a vicious circle: a fast time would be one that occurs in a short time. In critique of Aristotle's argument, we can show that:
(1) By distinguishing between the time per se and the relational time, no circularity arises. For instance, in a one–hour contest, since the rabbit's motion is faster than the turtle's, the rabbit motion’s time per se – subordinate to the fastness of its motion – must be more than the turtle motion’s time per se. This distinction is not, of course, incompatible with the fact that the relational time of both of them to be the current one–hour compared with, and related to, the current time of todays.
(2) This argument would work only if there were no other way to understand a fast time, but there is. Because, one of the descriptive definitions (Rasm) of "fast" is for something to reach and exceed something else. By such a definition, we see that the rabbit reaches and exceeds the moving turtle. To grasp, here, the meaning of reaching and exceeding, we do not need to understand the time. Thus, at least in this example, understanding fastness does not require an understanding of time.
(3) If the fast time involves circularity, then the fast motion, just in the same way, would also involve circularity, as a fast motion is defined as a motion occurring in a short measure of motion (= in a short time).
Likewise, other claims of Aristotle about the unity of time and its lacking fastness and slowness can be challenged. For instance, in the case of time, he conflates the typical and numerical unity.
After Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī, and Fakhr al-Dīn al–Rāzī, who presented objectionable views on the problem at hand, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāyī argued that there are as many times as there are motions, and Jawādī Āmulī explicitly discussed the fastness and slowness of time. My own view too is that since time is the measure of motion, it is inevitable to accept the multiplicity of time and even its subordinate fastness and slowness: since motion is numerous, measure of motion (time) is also numerous. And since motions are fast or slow, their measures, namely times, too are fast or slow subordinate to themselves. Nevertheless, the neo–Ṣadrīan philosophers have connected other views to this theory, which I believe are unnecessary and even mistaken, such as the general substantial motion and the uniform general time. The general substantial motion cannot be established through the general and common time.
Firstly, since time is the measure of motion, so assuming the existence of time already presupposes the existence of motion. And from an epistemic point of view too, we, as Aristotle notes, can experience no time if we are aware of no motion. Hence, it is question–begging to establish motion through time. Similarly, assuming the existence of general and common time presupposes the existence of general motion, making it question–begging to prove general motion (whether substantial or non–substantial) through general time.
Secondly, I believe that if time is considered as the measure of motion, then to prove the uniform general and common time, we must establish the existence of a permanent or long–lasting motion uniform without acceleration. However, since such a uniform motion has not been proven in the exact sense of the term, the uniform general and common time, whether substantial time or accidental one, cannot be proven in the exact sense of the term either.
Conclusion
Throughout history, some have argued that there is only one time, presenting its fastness or slowness as a hypothetical possibility that they subsequently reject. Aristotle denied the plurality of time and dismissed, due to the problem of circularity, its fastness or slowness as well. After critically addressing the circularity objection, I also challenge his other claims about the unity of time and its lack of fastness or slowness. The main point of Plotinus's objections concerning the relationship between the time and the measure of motion, if it is correct, is the fact that it would only challenge the specifically Aristotelian version; Otherwise, there is no issue with having multiple motions and multiple times as well, where each time is subordinate to its own specific motion.
Due to the regress argument against the existence of time, Ibn Sīnā rejects the existence of the plurality of times. However, I have showed that no regress would occur if the essential time and per se one be distinct from the accidental and relational time. I even, in defense of the plurality of time, present several other objections to Ibn Sīnā's position.
After reviewing and criticizing the arguments by Abū al–Barakāt al–Baghdādī and Fakhr al–Rāzī regarding the rejection of time as the measure of motion and the denial of the multiplicity of time, I show that Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāyī was the first Muslim thinker to explicitly support the idea that there are as many times as motions. Similarly, Jawādī Āmulī explicitly advocates for the fastness and slowness of time. My own view too is to show that since time is the measure of motion, it is inevitable to accept the plurality of time and even its subordinate fastness and slowness, although this differs from the treatment of time in the relativity physics.
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