Document Type : Biannual Journal
Author
Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Abstract
In their theological works, Muslim philosophers tend to elaborate on the unity and other attributes of the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) after establishing its existence. In such discussions, they examine the essence (dhāt) alongside its attributes but remain silent regarding the essence independent of the attributes. In some of their works, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī address the reasoning behind this silence. Drawing upon the principle of simplicity (bisāṭa) and the transcendence (tanazzuh) of the essence from any form of composition or multiplicity, Avicenna arrives at the theory of the conceptual unity of attributes. He considers essential attributes such as knowledge and power to be inextricable concomitants (lawāzim) of, and posterior to, the essence. From Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn’s perspective, all determinations dissolve in the Unique Essence (al-dhāt al-aḥadiyya), while attributes, names, and their manifestations are collectively present at the level of Oneness (wāḥidiyya). ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī holds that each of God's perfectional attributes (al-ṣifāt al-kamāliyya) encompasses other perfections. Emphasizing the absoluteness of the essence and distinguishing between the two ranks of Uniqueness (aḥadiyya) and Oneness (wāḥidiyya), Ṭabāṭabāʾī regards names and attributes as posterior to the rank of essence. Given the indescribability of the essence, any discourse on the Unique Essence is deemed impossible.
The present study employs a descriptive-analytical method, seeking to examine the philosophical silence in confronting the Unique Essence by analyzing the views of Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Keywords
Simplicity, absoluteness, uniqueness (aḥadiyya), silence, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Introduction
The mystics were perhaps the first to distinguish between the three domains of essence (dhāt), uniqueness (aḥadiyya), and oneness (wāḥiyya). In mystical terminology, the Unique (Aḥad) is a name for the essence without consideration of attributes, names, relations, or determinations. In contrast, oneness refers to the essence along with the names that emanate from it. From this perspective, the essence in its state of uniqueness is infinite, absolute, undetermined, and in a state of complete concealment (buṭūn).
Beyond the mystics, some Muslim philosophers, despite their adherence to the theory of the identity of the essence and attributes, occasionally take a more elevated approach by considering the Unique Essence as absolute and independent of any perfectional attributes. This notion, initially hinted at by Ibn Sīnā, was later emphasized and explicitly articulated by Mullā Ṣadrā and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Research Methodology
This article is conducted using a descriptive-analytical method within the framework of Islamic philosophy, particularly the works of Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
Discussion and Analysis
Consideration of the level of the essence among Muslim philosophers can be pursued as a non-dominant approach. This perspective appears at different levels in the works of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, and ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī:
In his discussion of divine attributes, Avicenna strongly emphasizes the simplicity and unity (waḥdāniyya) of the divine essence, safeguarding it from any form of multiplicity. In his view, God is utterly simple, and His essence is beyond the attachment of any attribute. The utmost that humans can grasp about the divine essence is its most specific concomitant—namely, the necessity of existence. Through this attribute, one can come to know other attributes such as unity, knowledge, will, and power, which are considered posterior to and external to the essence of God.
It appears that, in formulating the theory of the conceptual unity of divine attributes and insisting on the simplicity of the Necessary Existent, Avicenna had an implicit regard for the level of the Unique Essence.
In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā presents two different formulations of the level of the essence and the consideration or non-consideration of attributes and actions at this level. At times, he explains the relationship between the essence and attributes in terms of monotheism of attributes or unity of divine attributes (al-tawḥīd al-ṣifātī), meaning the gathering of all perfectional attributes within a singular existence. According to this view, attributes such as knowledge, power, will, and life, while conceptually distinct, all exist within the Unique Essence. However, on other occasions, Mullā Ṣadrā addresses the Unique Essence and its relation to perfectional attributes in a different manner and at a higher level. He seeks to consider the Unique Essence in an absolute sense, devoid of any perfectional attribute. According to this view, the existence of the First Principle is such that all determinations and conceptual distinctions—such as attribute and subject, name and named, quiddity and concept—dissolve within it. At the level of the essence, all divine attributes, including knowledge, power, and will, are united and indistinguishable from one another. Thus, no reference to it is possible, and at the level of unique (aḥadī) identity, the essence has neither name nor designation. However, this latter view, which Ṣadrā presents only in rare instances within his works, is not as well-known as his first theory.
In some of his works, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, like other Muslim philosophers, elaborates on the theory of the identity of the essence and attributes. However, at times, he emphasizes the absoluteness of the level of uniqueness and the exclusion of perfectional attributes from this level, associating the theory of the identity of the essence and attributes with the level of oneness. According to this view, the reality of existence is, in and of itself and in all aspects, necessarily existent, possessing every real perfection while being free from all deficiencies and negations. On the other hand, every concept is inherently distinct from other concepts, and thus, the application of any concept to a referent imposes a form of limitation upon that referent. The application of a concept to the Necessary Existent, which is inherently absolute and unlimited, is therefore only possible at a level posterior to the essence. From ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s perspective, at the level of uniqueness, only the essence itself can be considered, while names and attributes—whether pertaining to the essence or to actions—are present only at a level subsequent to the essence.
Conclusion
It appears that in formulating the theory of the conceptual unity of divine attributes and insisting on the simplicity of the Necessary Existent—while ensuring that His attributes do not lead to composition or multiplicity in the essence—Ibn Sīnā implicitly acknowledged the level of the Unique Essence. Mullā Ṣadrā, and more explicitly ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, hold that any form of description—whether affirmative or negative—and the application of any of the Divine Names is only possible within the domain of divinity or the oneness of the essence. The Unique Essence is utterly transcendent, beyond all attributes and names. With its mysteries and secrets, the Unique Essence is not a realm for discourse and elaboration but rather a domain of awe and silence.
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