A Reconstruction of Alston’s Theory of Appearing Inspired by the Distinction between Copula Existence and Copulative Existence in Islamic Philosophy

Abstract
Introduction
One of the theories of perception is the Theory of Appearing based on which when we see, the physical objects appear to us. But like other direct realist theories, it faces many challenges, the most important among them are the illusion and hallucination challenge and the time-lag challenge. Alston presents the Theory of Appearing more clearly, more extensively, and more powerfully than others. But it can still be improved−which is what this article is about.
 
Methods and Materials
With an analytical approach, including linguistic analysis, and by using the ideas of copula existence (wujūd-e rābit) and copulative existence (wujūd-e rābitī) and two types of copula existence, I will bring up two types of appearing, and I will focus more on the objective aspect of appearing. Thus, the following facts will get a better explanation: time-lag, illusion, senses’ producing knowledge.
 
Discussion
Alston’s Theory of Appearing
According to this view, for S to see X is for X to appear/seem/be presented to S in some way (as so and so, as p). This appearing, seeming, being presented, in this view, is fundamental and unanalyzable. The very appearance provides us with a prima facie justification for the belief that comes from that perception. This justification will lead to unqualified justification if there is no rebutter (i.e., sufficient reason to think the belief false) or underminer (i.e., sufficient reason that the basis of belief lacks its usual justificatory power). An advantage, or rather an important difference, of the appearing theory over/from naïve realism is that the way in which an external physical object presents itself to perceiver may not be the same as the reality of that object.
 
A New Version Based on Alston’s View
In our view, appearance takes different forms depending on many external factors. The least elements involved in the formation of an appearance are the totality of the environment in which the object is, such as the object itself, water/air/etc., light with its different degrees and colors, and the place and angle of view. Different combinations of these elements cause different appearances−appearances that are where the object is and are not separated from it. According to this point, illusion is explained. In illusion, no error has actually occurred, but the object has appeared in a different way. We think that the object should always be such and such because we are accustomed to see certain appearance and because of its regularity. But this is not the whole story.
Another element that plays a role in the formation of an appearance is concepts, judgements, memories, expectations, culture, language, images, models, character traits, moods, and even the sense organs and genes of the knowing subject; in other words, the nature of the knowing subject. By adding this element, the appearance of the object no longer has only an objective aspect where the object is, but also finds a subjective dimension. Now it can be said that the appearance of an object for a person is a combination of the mental activity of the subject and the appearance of the environment containing the object exposed to consciousness.
Now the question is whether this appearance is relational and should there be a subject indeed for appearance to be realized? If the answer is yes, can this subject be something else besides animals and humans?  From our point of view, contrary to Whitehead and Alexander, only humans and animals can be parties to the relational connection of appearing in perception. But in this case, when humans and animals are not around to perceive the objects, the unperceived objects will suffer from a kind of emptiness, and with the coming of the subject, a kind of miracle will happen and the appearance for the subject will expose the reality itself to the subject.
This is where it seems that the solution should be found in the negative answer to the first question. It should be said that appearing is not relational and, for example, a book can appear without appearing to anything. Just as existence is sometimes copula existence and sometimes copulative existence, appearing can sometimes be copula and relational and sometimes copulative and non-relational. The first is realized between two things, but the second is a feature of one thing. It is also possible to express the meaning by introducing two types of copula existence: the one established between two things such as ratios and the indigent one dependent on one thing such as the existence of the effect compared to the cause in some philosophies. Similarly, there will be two kinds of appearing: the appearing of something for something and the appearing dependent on something. Our language also supports us in our claim. As we can see in English, the word “appear” is used in two different ways: “appear to” and “appear as”.
In our view, various appearances, at least to some extent, arise from reality itself; they confirm a relativism arising from reality. It is as if reality is a dark substance that manifests itself in different ways. Of course, the relativism arising from the subject is also added to it. 
 
Conclusion
In this article, we tried to empower the theory of appearing. In this way, illusion is easily explained, because it is nothing but a different appearance that we are not used to it. This appearance is as much rooted in reality as the veridical perception, but we constantly expect our other perceptions to be the same as the latter because of its regularity. It was also revealed that the irreducible hallucination to the veridical perception, assuming the truth of the phenomenal principle, is discernable and separate from the veridical perception. The time-lag difficulty is resolved in our version of the theory of appearing because the appearance of the destroyed/changed object remains as long as the light is in between. By coping with illusion and hallucination, the senses' knowledge-producing is readily established.