نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• کرامت ورزدار ¹
• فاطمه سادات کتابچی ²

¹ مدرّس گروه فلسفه و کلامِ اسلامی دانشگاه تهران (نویسنده‌ی مسئول).

² دانش‌آموختۀ دکتری، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

مسئله‌ی اساسیِ این پژوهش، بررسی و تحلیلِ انتقادیِ براهینِ هفت‌گانه‌ی ابن‌سینا در ردّ این‌همانیِ «نفس» و «مِزاج» و هدف از آن، نشان دادنِ ناتوانیِ این براهین در ردّ اینهمانی مزاج و نفسِ گیاهی و همچنین ناتمامیّتِ چهار برهان از این براهین است. ابن‌سینا در آثارِ خود، هفت برهان در اثباتِ ناایهنمانیِ مزاج و نفس اقامه کرده‌است. بر اساسِ این براهین مزاج به ترتیب با 1) جامع و حافظِ آن؛ 2) علّتِ فاعلی و غاییِ آن؛ 3) مبدأ حرکاتِ جانداران در جهاتِ متفاوت؛ 4) مقوّمِ جوهریِ انواعِ جاندارن؛ 5) مُدرِک ادراکاتِ حسّی؛ 6) مُدرِک ادراکاتِ عقلی و 7) مُدرِک خودآگاهیِ انسانی، نااینهمان است و از آنجا که نامزدی برای این امورِ هفت‌گانه جز نفس وجود ندارد؛ مزاج نااینهمانِ با نفس به مثابه تنها مصداقِ این امور است. بر اساسِ یافته‌های این پژوهش سه برهان اوّل بر اساسِ ابتنا بر مبانیِ فیزیکیِ باطل‌شده، در اثباتِ مدّعا تامّ نیست و برهانِ چهارم نیز دچار مغالطه‌ی مصادره به مطلوب است. برهان پنجم، ششم، هفتم تامّ و قابلِ دفاع هستند؛ امّا این براهین به دلیلِ تکیه بر تغایر «مزاج» با «مبدأ ادراکات»، صرفاً تواناییِ نشان دادنِ تغایر «مزاج» و نفسِ حیوانی و انسانی را دارند؛ در نتیجه مجموعه‌ی براهینِ هفت‌گانه‌ی بوعلی‌، تواناییِ اثباتِ تغایرِ «مزاج» و «نفسِ گیاهی» را ندارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• نفس
• مزاج
• بدن
• ادراک
• ابن‌سینا

موضوعات

• فلسفه

عنوان مقاله [English]

Critical analysis of Avicenna's seven Arguments in rejecting the identity of soul and temperament

نویسندگان [English]

• Keramat Varzdar ¹
• Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi ²

¹ Lecturer in the Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran (The First Author).

² PhD Graduate, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

Fateme Sadat Ketabchi^[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
 
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
 
 
 

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• Soul
• temperament
• body
• perception
• Avicenna