نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی
1 دکترای فلسفه اسلامی، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکدهی فلسفه و مطالعات دینی، جامعة المصطفی العالمیة، قم، ایران (نویسندهی مسئول)
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکدهی الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه علّامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران،
عنوان مقاله [English]
Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts with the establishment of the intellectology. The purpose of this article is to prove the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. The question is whether the intellect is self-founded in Farabi's thought, or does it rely entirely on the bestowal of active intellect? If the intellect is self-founded, what kind of role will the active intellect play? In this regard, Is Farabi's diction clear or confused, and how his language can be interpreted in favor of the autonomy of intellect. Farabi's declaration is less vague and more explicit in his various works. As far as the author is concerned, most of the investigations on Farabi's theory of intellect has been reportable and descriptive, and less has been sought to interpret and present a theory. These researches have first reported the meanings of intellect. Secondly, they have discussed intellect according to psychology. Thirdly, they have centralize more on active intellect, and ultimately, they have discussed the relationship between intellect and religion (Reza Akbarian, 2009; Kamalizadeh, 2014, Baharnejad, Changi Ashtiani, 2011, Fazlur-Rehman, 2011, Khosravi, 2020), but the question about autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking has not been their problem.
Method and Matterial
The question of this research is whether intellect self-founded in Farabi’s thought. Along with the main question, the following sub-questions also raised. What is the difference between Farabi and Aristotle regarding intellect? In his field of semantics, which meaning is relate to practical reason and which to theoretical reason? To what extent is man and his intellect highlighted by giving originality to reason? What is the difference between the first noumenon that make the intellect actual and the noumenon at the higher levels of the intellect; That is, the intellect becomes actual with concepts only or with the proposition? Our approach answering these questions involves reporting, describing, analyzing, and finally interpreting. First, we explicitly or contently report Farabi's ideas and provide them to the reader. Then, we have turned to interpretation of his ideas to get the main point of understanding; finally, we have obtained the proof of the autonomy of intellect in his thinking. Here all of Farabi's thoughts on intellect studied in his various works. Therefore, according to the question of research and its method, the article has a theoretical framework and not an applied one. According to Farabi’s affirmation (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174), psychology based on intellectology. Accordingly, in terms of research and method, we have gone to the intellectology instead of psychology in analyzing and interpreting his thoughts.
Discussion and Results
Based on the main question, the main conclusion of this article is the self-foundation and autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking. First, Farabi authenticates the intellectology over the phsycology (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174) and speaks on the intellect as the main form of the soul (Farabi, 2008: 144-145). This idea is a source that provides an important perspective for the establishment of autonomy. Secondly, in explaining the meanings of reason in a certain opportunity (fi maani alaql), Farabi shows that all areas of life, from the public sphere to the more specific one, are embodied only by reason. However, the most important meaning that Farabi chooses to explain is the fifth meaning of intellect, which has four stages: potential intellect, actual intellect, used intellect, active intellect (ibid: 2012: 259). The question is how the intellect comes out of potential and go through these stages until to be compeer with the active intellect. It is true that al-Farabi also speaks of the role of the active intellect in the emergence from potentiality, but the role of the active intellect is inherently an ontological role in conferring the forms of beings. In addition, the explanation that expresses the relationship between the active intellect and the human intellect is a metaphor, and this metaphor shows difficulty of this relationship in terms of logic and clarity. Farabi believes that the potential intellect has the ability to abstract the essences and forms of beings and then to place the same forms as their essences (ibid: 223). Intellect, both through self-evident propositions (Al-Farabi, 1986: 103) or through the first noumenon (Al-Farabi, 1964: 37), becomes actual with its inherent effort and becomes one with the noumenon (Al-Farabi, 2012: 227-229). For him, even the active intellect itself is the subject of the human intellect (ibid: 1986: 103;, 1964: 35-36; Davidson, 1992: 50-51). In addition to these arguments, according to Farabi’s thinking, reason is the essence in which the truths of beings are occult (Farabi, 2008, 145). Eventually, the intellect becomes compeer to the active intellect (Farabi, 1964: 35) and man becomes the substance in which the active intellect seems to have dissolved under the ensign of the growth of intellect (Al-Farabi, 1986: 124-125). Al-Farabi's attempt to consolidate logic as an independent science (Al-Farabi, 1996, 27) means that logic for him is the stability of intellectual autonomy that does not need outside of itself and inspiration (Al-Jabri, 2011: 244-245).
All of Farabi's efforts centralizes on the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. Farabi does not claim just to connect with active intellect; He tries to prove the alignment of the human intellect with the active intellect. In his viewpoint, the intellect achieves all its evolutions in the question of being and the knowledge of the truths of beings, and this means that the intellect becomes autonomous to the extent of knowing the existence. From the viewpoint of the autonomy of reason, another perspective is to open for Farabi's reading. The denial or weakening of the autonomy of the intellect in Farabi’s philosophy makes the understanding of intellect experience of existence difficult in the epistemological and logical systems in many respects. Therefore, the author suggests that we study not only Farabi's thought but also philosophical thought from the perspective of the autonomy of Intellect.