Abstract
Plotinus, through his criticism of the Aristotelian conception of the Arche as lacking of transcendence and simplicity, emphasized on the Arche’s transcendence beyond both Intellect and being, thereby establishing it as the beyond-being. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, via his innovative doctrine of causality, articulated this transcendence by equating being with the singular essence of God as the One qua being. This article studies the problem of relation of God and the world in a conceptual-argumentative method. According to the findings of this study, despite apparent similarities, these two conceptions of transcendence yield radically different conclusions concerning the Arche’s relation to the world—specifically, its being knowable, describable, and its knowledge of the world. This divergence exposes their fundamental disagreement on the meaning of transcendence itself. As a result for Mulla Sadra, it denotes the Arche's absolute perfection, while for Plotinus, it implies the Arche's absolute distinction from the world, A difference which itself originates from a deeper ontological division: While for Plotinus, being is founded on a simpler, prior grade of reality, Mulla Sadra thinks of existence as self-subsistent and the single source of all perfection, rendering any transcendence beyond itself impossible.
Keywords: Arche, Perfection, Distinction, The One beyond being, The One qua being, Plotinus, Mulla Sadra

1. Introduction
The inquiry into the Arche (Principle) of the world, beyond its general significance in the history of philosophy, occupies a direct relationship with the foundational conceptions of the two philosophers within Neoplatonic philosophy and Transcendent Wisdom. According to a common interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā's explanation of the Principle as the True Cause, presented in the second volume of al-Asfār al-arbaʿah and emphasized by those commentators of Transcendent Wisdom who advocate a reading based on the personal unity of existence, is seen as analogous to the position of negative theology of Neoplatonic philosophers—an interpretation that, as will be shown, is challenged by the authors of this paper. Plotinus, emphasizing the necessity of the Principle's simplicity, spoke of the criterion of the Principle's absolute distinction from the world. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, by centering existence and reducing perfection and transcendence to a same reality—namely, existence—considered the most perfect being to be the most transcendent being. In Ṣadrā's explanation, God, as the sole True Cause and the sole True being or the One qua being, possesses a supremacy of the kind of perfection over other beings. In the Neoplatonic explanation, God as the One beyond-being is absolutely distinct from the entire chain of existent and intelligible beings. This discrepancy is rooted in a distinction within the ontological principles underlying the two philosophers' views: for one, the structure of the world is based on the duality of existence and non-existence, with existence being a self-subsistent reality that explains God's absolute perfection; for the other, existence is dependent upon and distinct from a higher plane that transcends all existential perfection, positive attribution, and knowability. Understanding this fundamental distinction, which has recurrently manifested throughout the history of philosophy between proponents of negative and positive theology, reveals a foundational divergence between two positions that invites reflection on their respective implications and consequences.

2. Materials & Methods
This paper pursues the problem of the transcendence of the Principle in the Neoplatonic Philosophy and the Transcendent Wisdom through a conceptual-argumentative method.

3. Discussion & Result
3.1 Transcendence as Absolute Distinction: The One Beyond-Being in Neoplatonic Philosophy
To criticize the Aristotelian conception of the Intellect as the Principle, Plotinus argues that the Intellect, due to a threefold composition (composition arising from the multiplicity of intelligible content, composition necessitated by the inherent duality in the act of self-thinking, and composition due to the Intellect's entanglement with the five supreme or universal Ideas), lacks simplicity and is interwoven with realities non-identical to itself, thus lacking absolute distinction and transcendence from the world. Consequently, to attain the Principle and First Origin of the world, one must transcend the Intellect and being. Plotinus calls this Principle the Good or the One beyond-being, maintaining that its being beyond existence implies its absolute transcendence and distinction from the totality of the chain of beings. The transcendence he speaks about, is not a gradable attribute but one which something either possesses completely or lacks entirely. Plotinus's specific position about the transcendence of the Principle entails three significant consequences: Firstly, it negates God's knowledge of the lower world and even His self-knowledge, since knowledge implies a composition and entanglement between the Principle and the world, negating its absolute distinction and transcendence. The second consequence of Plotinus's view is the absolute ineffability of the Principle, such that no positive attribute can be ascribed to it, and speaking of it is possible only through negation (via negativa). The third consequence of transcendence in the Neoplatonic conception is the intrinsic unknowability of the Principle, meaning that the Principle of the world, by virtue of its absolute transcendence and distinction from the realm of intelligibles, remains absolutely unknowable for any knower (even the First Intellect, and beyond that, the Principle itself).
3.2 Transcendence as Absolute Perfection: The One qua being in Transcendent Wisdom
By centering existence and offering a specific explanation of causality, Mullā Ṣadrā presents a completely different understanding of the Principle's transcendence, leading in all three aspects—knowledge, knowability, and describability—to results opposite those emphasized in Plotinus's philosophy. Through the theory of imkān faqrī and by emphasizing the relational existence of other beings, he argues that the only independent and self-subsistent existence is the essence of the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd). Contingent beings are essentially poverty, relation, and dependence upon this sole existence, considered as its manifestations, modes, and attributes. According to this explanation, God's transcendence means that He, as the sole true being and cause whose causality is identical with His essence, possesses absolute perfection. This perfection is gradable, and lower levels of existence participate in it to varying degrees. Such an explanation of transcendence leads to three outcomes entirely distinct from those in Plotinus's philosophy: Firstly, based on the Transcendent Wisdom, God, as the True Cause with complete existential encompassment over His manifestations, possesses intrinsic and detailed knowledge of the world and of what is other than Himself. Furthermore, the divine essence is identical with all perfect attributes, and these attributes are not superadded to His essence. Finally, God's essence, due to the intensity of its perfection of existence, is the most knowable being. What causes its concealment and hiddenness from human understanding is the deficiency of human mind in the face of this complete manifestation, not an intrinsic unknowability as proposed by Plotinus.
The distinction discussed in the two philosophers' approaches to the problem of the transcendence of the world's Principle reveals a discrepancy in the ontological principles of the two metaphysical systems. Contrary to the Plotinian ontology, in which existence is founded upon a simpler and higher plane that is beyond existence/non-existence and perfection/deficiency, Mullā Ṣadrā considers existence to be self-subsistent. Relying on the duality of existence and non-existence, he explains the relationship between God and the world, interprets all perfections by reference to existence, and regards God as the perfect instantiation of all perfections.

4. Conclusion
Thus, while a common interpretation judges there to be a proximity between the systems of Plotinus and Mullā Ṣadrā, this paper challenges that understanding and claims that within the two aforementioned metaphysical systems we encounter two entirely distinct conceptions of transcendence: transcendence as absolute perfection versus transcendence as absolute distinction. This difference itself stems from two completely distinct ontological approaches: in one, existence is self-subsistent, while in the other, it is dependent upon a reality beyond itself. This opposition is not confined to the philosophical systems of Plotinus and Ṣadrā but is traceable throughout the history of philosophy under the two traditions of positive and negative theology.