Abstract
The acceptance of the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity has given rise to certain questions and, at times, modifications in discussions founded upon quiddity. Among these are the introduction of mental existence by philosophers and the explanation of the process of knowing reality on the basis of the quidditative identity of mind and external reality. The problem addressed in this research is this: how can one affirm mental existence and the quidditative identity of mind and external reality after abandoning the primacy of quiddity and accepting its contingency, especially when quiddity, according to the accidental account of its contingency, has no share in external reality? To resolve this problem, some thinkers while maintaining the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity have proposed the theory of correspondence of worlds; another group has put forward the theory of the phantom, in a new formulation; and some others have advocated the principiality of the phenomenality of meaning. This research, through the analysis of data concerning the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity, and by adopting a critical approach to post-Sadrian views, seeks to explain the process of knowing reality on the basis of quiddative objectivity. The main axis of this paper, and its proposed solution to the above dilemma, is the belief in the accidental realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality. The findings of the research are: proving the accidental realization of quiddity in these two domains, explaining the quidditative identity of mind and external reality in light of it, and critiquing the three views mentioned above.
Keywords
Preservation of Quiddity, Preservation of Essence and Essential Attributes, Contingency of Quiddity, Correspondence of Worlds, Theory of Phantom.
Introduction
The introduction of the primacy of existence in Transcendental Philosophy and the transformations this doctrine has brought about in most philosophical discussions require a re-reading of the theory of “preservation of quiddity” on the basis of the primacy of existence and its various interpretations.
To explain: regarding the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity, there are two well-known interpretations. According to one interpretation, while the primacy of existence is accepted, quiddity is still considered to exist in external reality; however, it is clarified that quiddity exists dependently on existence, not independently. According to the other interpretation, belief in the primacy of existence entails denying the external existence of quiddity altogether, and at most allows only for its accidental and metaphorical existence.
Now, if the theory of “preservation of quiddity” by positing quiddity as a common boundary between mind and external reality, that is, by asserting that quiddity is found both in the mind and in external reality aims to resolve the problem of correspondence between mind and external reality, how can it be reconciled with the second interpretation of the primacy of existence? If quiddity is not found in external reality, how can it be regarded as a common boundary between mind and external reality?




Materials and Methods
This research, using data-analysis methods concerning the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity, and adopting a critical approach to post-Sadrian views, seeks to explain the process of knowing reality on the basis of quidditative objectivity.
Discussion and Results
Some thinkers, by proposing the theory of correspondence of worlds, argue that the contingency of quiddity and the primacy of existence require the correspondence between mind and external reality to be explained on the basis of existence as well. Others regard the theory of phantom, in a new formulation, as the way out of the above dilemma. Another group, adopting an existential view of mental forms, has attempted to provide an existential interpretation of knowledge of reality while preserving the primacy of existence and quiddity in the domain of mind.
This paper, however, maintains that although the contingency of quiddity, according to its accidental account, negates quiddity’s existence at the core of external reality, it does not invalidate its accidental realization in the two domains of mind and external reality. The accidental realization of quiddity in these two domains may be taken as a common boundary between them, through which human beings can gain knowledge of external reality.
According to the view proposed here, first, the three rival positions are rejected; and second, the belief in the accidental realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality, on the one hand, explains the connection between mind and external reality within the domain of quiddative concepts, and on the other hand, resolves the contradiction between the belief in the preservation of quiddity and the belief in the contingency of quiddity by emphasizing the contingency of quiddity.
Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper are as follows:
The accidental realization of quiddity in the external domain, although it does not admit quiddity’s real existence alongside existence in the core of external reality, does not negate its truth in relation to external reality.
Just as quiddity applies to external reality, it also corresponds to the mental form. It is at this point that a person apprehends one thing in two domains.
The accidental realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality may be regarded as a common boundary between them and can connect the human mind to objective realities. This view, referred to as the realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality, is the preferred theory and can explain the challenge of the quidditative identity of mind and external reality on the basis of the belief in the contingency of quiddity.