Abstract
Analysis of mashhūrāt (widely accepted or well-known propositions) and their relation to certainties (yaqīniyyāt) in logic is the foundation and origin of many challenges in theology, ethics, jurisprudence, and legal theory, especially concerning value judgments. The problem addressed in this paper is: What is al-Fārābī’s conception of mashhūrāt, and what relation does he posit between such propositions and certain propositions? This paper seeks to answer this question by re-examining al-Fārābī’s works using a descriptive-analytical method. The findings of this inquiry indicate that, according to al-Fārābī, unlike certainties, which are decisive judgments, mashhūrāt are conjectural (ẓannī) judgments. Certainties possess truth and falsehood intrinsically in their correspondence with reality, whereas the truth and falsehood of mashhūrāt are accidental, based on their wide acceptance (shuhra). Mashhūrāt lead us to an assent that approximates certainty (muqārib li-l-yaqīn), which is a kind of accidental certainty, resulting from the causes of wide acceptance. Emphasizing the difference in respects (ḥaythiyyāt), al-Fārābī holds that by setting aside wide acceptance, one can examine whether a judgment corresponds to reality (ontological approach) and arrive at a decisive judgment, in which case such a proposition would not be among the mashhūrāt. However, if wide acceptance is taken as the criterion for accepting that judgment (epistemological approach), then it will be among the mashhūrāt. The conclusion is that, in al-Fārābī’s view, from an epistemological standpoint, mashhūrāt are the counterpart of certainties and cannot be subsumed under the same respect.
Keywords: Al-Fārābī, Mashhūrāt (widely accepted propositions), Dialectic, Certainties, Accidental Certainty, Accidental Truth.

Introduction
The logical analysis of the relation between mashhūrāt and certainties plays a decisive role in the positions of scholars in many fields, including ethics and theology. If mashhūrāt can be subsumed under certainties, then propositions with predicates of goodness (ḥusn) and badness (qubḥ) would be certain, and the sciences based on them would be demonstrative (burhānī). But if not, then theological arguments based on goodness and badness would be dialectical, and ethics based on goodness and badness would fall outside the domain of wisdom (ḥikma), requiring another path to establish these sciences rigorously. This paper poses the question of the relation between mashhūrāt and certainties to al-Fārābī as the first great Muslim logician. Regarding mashhūrāt, Poursaleh Amiri has published several articles, some of which address al-Fārābī’s views, but her research has not specifically focused on the relation between certainties and mashhūrāt. Moreover, her articles are flawed due to a misinterpretation of the definition of mashhūrāt. Therefore, research on the problem of this paper remains necessary. This paper, by analyzing the definition of mashhūrāt and certainties based on al-Fārābī’s principles, examines the relation between these two types of propositions.
Materials & methods
To answer this question, al-Fārābī’s views on certainties and mashhūrāt were gathered from his works using a library method, and then described and analyzed along three main axes: truth, certainty, and difference in respects (ḥaythiyyāt).
Discussion &Result
Al-Fārābī’s analysis of mashhūrāt compared to certainties can be examined along three main axes: 1) Truth: Do mashhūrāt have an external reality or not? 2) Certainty: Can mashhūrāt be certain, and conversely, can certainties be mashhūr? 3) Difference in respects: What does it mean that a proposition can be mashhūr in one respect and certain in another?
Truth – Al-Fārābī explains that truth means that what the soul believes corresponds to what exists outside the belief. In his view, certainty only attaches to true propositions. Essentially, truth-aptitude is the criterion distinguishing a report, proposition, or decisive statement from what is not. Because a decisive statement reports about reality and can either correspond to it (true) or not (false). Comparing certainties and mashhūrāt, al-Fārābī holds that the truth of certainties is intrinsic because, in affirming certainties, the opinions of others are not given weight, and their agreement or disagreement has no effect on belief. However, mashhūrāt are accepted because of the opinion of all or most people, not based on knowledge of the proposition’s correspondence with reality. Therefore, the truth of mashhūrāt is accidental. Consequently, mashhūrāt, insofar as they are affirmed due to wide acceptance (shuhra), fall outside the definition of certainty.
Certainty – Since certainty belongs to the subject, al-Fārābī recognizes different levels of certainty. If a subject is aware that the content of their belief corresponds to external reality, certainty in the general sense is achieved. But when they do not deem non-correspondence possible, certainty in the specific sense occurs. A person’s awareness of the impossibility of non-correspondence of the proposition’s content with reality, either permanently or for a period, brings about a higher level of certainty, namely absolute certainty. Thus, the levels of certainty from strongest to weakest include: absolute certainty, then certainty in the specific sense, then certainty in the general sense. There are also other levels of belief that do not reach the level of certainty and remain at the level of conjecture (ẓann). Al-Fārābī also speaks of two levels: "that which approximates certainty" (muqārib l-il-yaqīn) and "tranquility of the soul" (sukūn al-nafs).
Al-Fārābī divides both conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) into complete (tāmm) and incomplete (nāqis). He restricts complete assent to certain assent, and places other types of assent—namely, assent approximating certainty and assent of tranquility of the soul—under incomplete assent.
Assent in which we have no awareness of the contrary of our belief, or we have awareness but the truth of the contrary is so hidden that we do not speak of it, or opposing it is difficult, is that which approximates certainty. According to al-Fārābī, mashhūrāt are instances of assent approximating certainty.
Ultimately, al-Fārābī explains that if the conditions for certainty are absent, or if certainty is achieved through things like induction, wide acceptance, universal testimony, or the report of a trusted informant—rather than through one’s own insight—then accidental certainty (al-yaqīn bi-l-ʿaraḍ) results. It may even happen that a person, due to certain passive dispositions (infiʿālāt), thinks they are certain of an opinion. These passive dispositions include: attachment to that opinion, attachment to its holder, zeal or partisanship for it, anger, habituation to it over time, the greatness of the matter and the abhorrence of its contrary, the grandeur and majesty of the holder of the opinion or the informant in their eyes, and excessive trust and good opinion of them. All these can be among the causes of wide acceptance.
Difference in Respects – According to al-Fārābī, any well-known or widely accepted proposition can be examined from an ontological perspective, without regard to its wide acceptance, and one can ask whether it corresponds to reality. In this case, the proposition is considered within the domain of demonstration (burhān). For this reason, al-Fārābī does not deny that mashhūrāt are truth-apt. However, from an epistemological perspective, he explains that accepting mashhūrāt because of popular opinion (wide acceptance), without considering their correspondence or non-correspondence with reality, places these propositions within the domain of dialectic. Al-Fārābī himself uses the language of truth and falsehood for mashhūrāt. Thus, he does not deny that these propositions have reality, but at the same time, he emphasizes that in dialectic, mashhūrāt must be taken precisely from the aspect of their wide acceptance. Therefore, although from al-Fārābī’s perspective mashhūrāt can have reality and their truth or falsehood can be examined in the art of demonstration (ṣanāʿat al-burhān), in dialectic their truth-aptness is entirely disregarded, and this never leads to an overlap between the arts of demonstration and dialectic. After al-Fārābī, Avicenna also accepted and emphasized this distinction in respects. This discussion continued to be followed in logic books until the 11th century AH.
Conclusion: Because mashhūrāt have accidental truth and are that which approximates certainty, they fall outside the definition of certainties. However, a single proposition with the same content can be considered mashhūr or certain depending on whether it is accepted based on wide acceptance or not, by distinguishing between the epistemological and ontological approaches.