Asghar Mohammadi; sahar kavandi; Mohsen Jahed
Abstract
AbstractThe root of “A M A N A”, "أ م ن" is one of the most central and fundamental concepts of the Qur'an and religious issues. According to Islamic theologians, multiple and conflicting interpretations of faith have caused some to accuse others of disbelief - the opposite of faith. Considering ...
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AbstractThe root of “A M A N A”, "أ م ن" is one of the most central and fundamental concepts of the Qur'an and religious issues. According to Islamic theologians, multiple and conflicting interpretations of faith have caused some to accuse others of disbelief - the opposite of faith. Considering faith as an epistemological-cognitive matter is used in two semantic areas: firstly, faith is achieved through reason and rational arguments; Second basically, the nature of faith is knowledge. The current research does not consider any of these two views to be correct and aims to explain the issue that faith can be achieved without any rational and epistemological reasoning. In order to prove this claim, first, a brief review of the theologians' understanding of faith has been done, to show that the lack of knowledge of faith and the necessity of obtaining it through rational reasoning is a theory that has its roots among Islamic theologians and is considered It seems that the arguments of this group are more defensible than the rival group. Then, with a brief look at some verses, evidences have been given that faith, from the perspective of the Qur'an, is related to the emotional-emotional sphere of a person. IntroductionSince the compilation of the Qur'an, this holy book has been exposed to views and opinions among Muslim thinkers, including commentators, theologians, philosophers, jurists and mystics. Ambiguity in some key words of the Qur'an has caused disputes and, as a result, categories that plague Muslims to this day. Although this is not specific to Muslims and is more or less seen in all religions and rituals, it is going on in an acute and double way in the case of Islam and the Qur'an. One of these concepts is the concept of faith, which despite the detailed discussions of Islamic commentators and theologians, but it seems that the truth of faith is still in the aura of ambiguity and there have been detailed disputes over it throughout the history of Islam. There have been researches in this field, where the viewpoints of Islamic theologians, commentators and philosophers have been explained and criticized. What is the truth and nature of the heart's acknowledgment that is stated in most of the views and what is the main role in it is the focus of this research and it seeks to discover the connection between science and faith and accordingly find the truth and the main pillar of faith. Therefore, in order to reduce the differences and apparent conflicts of the verses, there is no other choice but to return to the text and carefully review the views of Muslim thinkers. The structure of the Qur'an's worldview about God, man and nature must be obtained from the heart of the Qur'an's text, and this is important through the analysis of the main and flow-forming words, terms, and concepts of the Qur'an, taking into account the cultural and geographical background of the Qur'an's revelation. It is possible.Discussion and ResultsSince the perfection of a person and his salvation from the perspective of the Qur'an, as will be explained, is dependent on faith, and the lack of faith causes a person to fall, and on the other hand, as Islamic thinkers had already accepted that the happiness of a person depends on the realization of reason and its activity. Therefore, without paying enough attention to the logic of the Qur'an, they considered faith as a rational concept related to the power of cognition. In the books of Islamic ethics and Kalam, special attention has been paid to the development of reason and rationality, but almost no attention has been paid to the development of feelings and emotions. In this article, I would like to say that the concept of faith in the Qur'an, contrary to the general view of theologians, is not a matter of knowledge of the type of belief and opinion. Rather, it is related to human feelings and emotions. In the Islamic tradition, due to the predominance of Aristotle's view of man and the definition of man, they usually summed up the criterion of man's superiority in his intellect and rationality, and did not attach much importance to other aspects of man's existence. It was that in examining the key concepts of the Qur'an, the discussion was unintentionally going on intellectual matters. Another point is that the realm of human feelings and emotions was unknown at that time, and feelings and emotions were usually considered a subset of human will. Since Tetens, who was a contemporary of Kant, the field of feelings and emotions was recognized and emphasized as the independent field of a person. The theologians defined the word faith based on the definition given by lexicographers and made many efforts to analyze and interpret it, but none of them paid attention to the fact that faith may fundamentally belong to another area of human existence. The theologians considered faith as confirmation, and in this regard, they included both intellectual confirmation and heart confirmation in the definition of faith. Some people believed that faith is the same as science and it can be achieved based on rational arguments, but others believed that faith can be obtained through the heart. But they all had one thing in common, and that is that faith is a category of science and knowledge. Of course, this does not mean that faith has no connection with knowledge. Knowledge is a condition of faith, but it is not its camel. In the sense that knowledge is not a part of the essence and the core of faith, but it has the dignity and status of an introduction to it; Just as knowledge can be the prelude to any act or state or desire of a person. When we get angry or envious, we must be aware of the person we are angry or envious of, even though we have great knowledge; But this does not mean that anger and envy belong to the category of knowledge. A closer examination of the verses of the Qur'an can understand that faith belongs to the realm of feelings and emotions. That is, it belongs to the family of concepts such as gratitude, hope, hope, fear and the like. The opposite point of faith should also be emotional. Therefore, in understanding faith, we need to understand the mentioned concepts. As Izutsu had come to it in his books and showed it well.ConclusionThis article was intended to express the attitude of Islamic theologians about faith as briefly as possible and to find the correct meaning of faith. By examining the opinions of Islamic theologians, it became clear that faith is not just knowledge or practice, and it is not even possible to consider faith as a combination of both. What is clear is that faith requires knowledge and without it faith cannot be realized, but the truth of faith will not be knowledge. According to the point of view that faith is the confirmation of the heart, the conclusion was reached that faith is the actions of the practical intellect and the work of the heart, and it is one of human tendencies, not perceptions. According to this view, the verses related to faith can be interpreted and by looking at the verses collectively, there will be no ambiguity in this regard. According to the authors, no external model or paradigm is responsible for understanding faith. It is acceptable to have a model and paradigm in the understanding of faith that can provide a reasonable and justified interpretation of most - if not all - of the verses that contain the word faith or its derivatives. Otherwise, we will go astray in understanding it. By referring to the Qur'an, it becomes clear that faith is related to the non-cognitive domain of man, which is associated with reassurance, trust, and loyalty, and living faithfully means having trust and loyalty in God, the unseen, the angels, the prophets, and the book of the Qur'an
MOHAMMAD SMAILE ABDOLLAHY
Abstract
IntroductionThis study aims to investigate the relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality based on Quranic reading and tries to reject the rival theory and the hypothesis of "establishing a relationship between unity and plurality based on the personal unity of existence" based ...
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IntroductionThis study aims to investigate the relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality based on Quranic reading and tries to reject the rival theory and the hypothesis of "establishing a relationship between unity and plurality based on the personal unity of existence" based on studies and analyzes. Examine the basic Qur'an. The body of research consists of: explaining the personal unity of existence and critique of rival theories and reciting and explaining the Qur'an the chosen theory. By studying the relative interactions of the world of plurality with the world of unity, several studies have been conducted, including: the article "The possibility of personal unity of existence in transcendent wisdom" by Hossein Suzanchi; The article "A method and in proving the content of the personal unity of existence" written by Vahid Vahed Javan et al .; Article "Unity and plurality of existence in transcendent wisdom and mysticism" by Seyyed Hamid Reza Hassani; The article "Reflections on the Evidence of Personal Unity of Existence" written by Mohammad Ali Mohiti Ardakan and Mohammad Fanaei Eshkevari. Although these articles have somehow dealt with the relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality and the analysis of the personal unity of existence, they have never targeted the basic and documented reading of the Qur'an, which is the mission of this research. MaterialThe present research is a research, theoretical and its method is descriptive-analytical. The research approach is also qualitative; Qualitative research requires identifying sources related to the research topic, studying texts, understanding the meaning of the text and extracting the desired content from these sources, establishing a relationship between the content and describing and analyzing them, and discussing and concluding the collected information. ResultsBased on research and referring to the Holy Quran, it was found that the relationship between the world of plurality and the world of unity is of the type of relationship "was" and "appearance" or the relationship of "truth of existence" and "manifestation of existence" called "personal unity of existence" Is summarized. There are many verses to prove this mystical approach in relation to the world of plurality and the world of unity. With the mystical analysis of the relevant verses, the strategic statement "Existence is unique in the Almighty and the world of possibilities is its manifestations, manifestations and events" was extracted, which can be the basis for further research on the system of Qur'anic mysticism. ConclusionIn mystical ontology, how the world of plurality relates to the world of unity is one of the main axes. The relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality has long been the subject of controversy among philosophers and sages. Different views are presented in this regard. What has been considered most of all is the theory of the personal unity of existence in these proportions. Mystics try to develop this theory with rational and intuitive analysis and base it on other scientific theories. Based on research and referring to the Holy Quran, it was found that the relationship between the world of plurality and the world of unity is of the type of relationship "was" and "appearance" or the relationship of "truth of existence" and "manifestation of existence".
Majid Mollayousefi; Ahmad Allahyari; Maryam Eskandari
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 119-140
Abstract
The term of ethics of belief is appeared for the first time in Clifford's well-known essay by the same title in 1876.According to Clifford's saying that became known afterwards as Clifford's Credo or Principle "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence". ...
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The term of ethics of belief is appeared for the first time in Clifford's well-known essay by the same title in 1876.According to Clifford's saying that became known afterwards as Clifford's Credo or Principle "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence". This debate from the time of its presentation by Clifford has been the subject of different controversies. The main problem behind these controversies was that whether human beliefs are principally under the will of human beings to be evaluated morally or they are, like many of mental states, involuntary and passive and so excused of any moral evaluation. Some say that our beliefs are involuntary and are not under our control. In contrast, some believe in the impact of the will on our beliefs or the doxastic voluntarism. Depending on the amount of influence of the will on our beliefs, doxastic voluntarism is divided into two general kinds: direct voluntarism and indirect voluntarism. The doxastic voluntarism (direct/indirect), on the other hand, can divide into descriptive voluntarism and normative voluntarism. In normative voluntarism, we can say about a kind of epistemic deontologism in our beliefs and it is this epistemic deontologism that entails the ethics of belief. In effect, only when we can say about the ethics of belief that we believe in the epistemic deontologism in our beliefs. Martyr Motahhari believes that the reasoning (ta‘aqqul) and the thinking (tafakkur) as mental actions are in direct control of our will. For him, there is a difference between opinion (‘aqida) and thinking (tafakkur).In his view, thinking is the opinion based on a rational process which can bring about the knowledge. Taking in consideration the process of forming knowledge from him, shows that he believes in a kind of epistemic deontologism. Thus he gives some advices about the ways of acquiring the knowledge that we can place them under the title ethics of belief such as avoidance of intellectual stagnation, distinguishing between belief and the owner of belief and like that.
sayyed mohammad hosain naghibi; abdolah nasri
Abstract
During the sensory perception, two stages occur, one is the sensation of the sensory member and the other is the perception of the soul. The first stage is material and the second stage is single. Based on the union of the soul and the body, the soul has knowledge of the material influences that are ...
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During the sensory perception, two stages occur, one is the sensation of the sensory member and the other is the perception of the soul. The first stage is material and the second stage is single. Based on the union of the soul and the body, the soul has knowledge of the material influences that are present in the senses, and this science is of the nature of knowledge. Allameh Tabatabai and Martyr Motahhari tend to this viewpoint on the epistemological properties of this theory, the ability to explain the cause of the emergence There are some sensory errors. The acceptance of the presence of science in the material affection of the sensory member is commensurate with the promise of the acquisition of sensory perception. Ibn Sina and Sadrà believe in the achievement of sensory perception, they consider themselves to be in front of Suhrawardi and Sabzevari. According to the recent viewpoint, it finds its own soul, so the inaccuracy of perception can not be realized externally, while in the face of an external sensory instrument, in some cases the face appears inconsistent with the self, thus, it can not be The presence of sensory perception
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
Khunaji’s logic deal with the logical novelties Afzal al-din al-Khunaji in his Kashf al-asrar an ghawamiz al-afkar. Among all the novelties of Kashf on concepts, defintion, propositons, and categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, Khunaji’s logic just deals with the following titles: real ...
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Khunaji’s logic deal with the logical novelties Afzal al-din al-Khunaji in his Kashf al-asrar an ghawamiz al-afkar. Among all the novelties of Kashf on concepts, defintion, propositons, and categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, Khunaji’s logic just deals with the following titles: real and external (haqiqi and khariji) propositions (five chapters), tautologies (five chapters), modalities (three chapters), and convesion (three chapters). In Khunaji’s logic, his points of views have been compared with those of his predessesors such as Avicenna and Fakhr al-din al-Razi. All these have been acomplished using methods of the modern mathematical logic.
Takeshi AOKI
Abstract
This is a 392-page, extensive Persian book published in Tehran in November 2021. The biography, achievements, and ideologies of Azar Kayvan (1533–1618), who lived in Safavid Iran and Mughal India in the 16th and 17th centuries are covered, as the title of the book implies. First, I want to commend ...
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This is a 392-page, extensive Persian book published in Tehran in November 2021. The biography, achievements, and ideologies of Azar Kayvan (1533–1618), who lived in Safavid Iran and Mughal India in the 16th and 17th centuries are covered, as the title of the book implies. First, I want to commend the author for having the courage to write a book about a mystical philosopher who falls into a rather minor category in the intellectual history of the contemporary Persian world. I hope that this achievement will elevate a minor to a position where people in Iran and India will realize his significance. The author is Farzaneh Goshtasb (1973–), who is currently an Associate Professor at the Institute of Humanities and Culture in Iran. She is a Zoroastrian lady with only 0.03% of Iran's population. The author’s possible research motivation is the fact that Azar Kayvan was regarded as a Zoroastrian priest-thinker in the history of modern Zoroastrianism in the research stage of the 20th century, which is why the issue is important. Nevertheless, the more the author researched, the more she is forced to come to conclude that Azar Kayvan was not a Zoroastrian.
Hadi Vakili; Parisa Goudarzi; Mahbube Amani
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 141-152
Abstract
The study of Two Minds scholar and Imam Khomeini's views on Four Journeys, given the similarities between the two views at the same time, there are also differences. Imam and Qomshei both see the origin of the first trip as the created existents but unlike Qomshei who introduced the destination of the ...
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The study of Two Minds scholar and Imam Khomeini's views on Four Journeys, given the similarities between the two views at the same time, there are also differences. Imam and Qomshei both see the origin of the first trip as the created existents but unlike Qomshei who introduced the destination of the trip as the absolute Reality, Imam cosiders it as the qualified Reality. At the second trip, the Imam like Qomshei believe in similar provisions in the tour, vanishing intrinsic qualities and actions, including the necessity of divine grace to withdraw and return to Ananyt destruction of Leishmaniasis, a seeker's journey is outlined. However, as noted in tour, the site of the Imam against Qomshei who knows loss of mortals, for the traveler on this journey, just as the show is doomed. Instead, the trip to visit Imam's absolute right to know and secondly. However real nature and destination of the trip with created clear interpretation are consistent with this interpretation, traveler departing on the trip, his destination as the One and it is his justification for destination variable is the fourth trip. Both believe that the prophecy for the traveler on the trip is a prophetic other legislation because the seeker still no better field facility, descent and has not returned. Imam and Qomshei have most closely resembles in the interpretation of the nature and characteristics of their fourth trip. In terms of both, at first this trip is from created existents to created existents with along with the Real and secondly legislation prophecy has been obtained on this trip fully for the seeker
fereshte abolhassani niaraki
Abstract
By accepting the principle of human mutability, Mulla Sadra considers ethics as something between nature and intellectual will. In other words, he sees the origin of ethics in both nature (creation) and will, and considers it something between these two. Although the forces of human nature have an impact ...
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By accepting the principle of human mutability, Mulla Sadra considers ethics as something between nature and intellectual will. In other words, he sees the origin of ethics in both nature (creation) and will, and considers it something between these two. Although the forces of human nature have an impact on our creation, but they do not compel us to act in a certain way. Instead, humans perform ethical actions through their own intellectual will, and then through practice and habit, they acquire new ethical virtues. The ethical mechanism of humans involves a type of ethical thinking and reasoning that is stimulating to inclinations and emotional organization, which is influenced by the complex interplay of internal forces, external influences, and human will. Internal forces have various cognitive aspects (knowledge and beliefs), inclinations (emotions, feelings, natural tendencies, instincts), and even physical aspects (temperament, nutrition, brain, sensory tools, genetic backgrounds), as well as factors such as the faculties and secondary personality traits, self-purification, and so on, which are foundational and influential in this realm. Various environmental factors, such as the transmission of social or religious laws and norms (through religion/prophets) or modeling (with the influence of mentors, parents, etc.), and environmental consequences and socialization (socializing with others, associating with good people), affect human ethical growth, which is acquired in interaction with the internal-biological-acquired organism
Manouchehr Shaami Nezhad; Hosein Atrak; mohsen jahed
Abstract
The issue of death is one of the most important issues of human existence and one of his existential concerns. From birth to death, humans always carry the anxiety of death with them. Many thinkers have proposed solutions to reduce death anxiety. Yalom and Mulla Sadra have also discussed the nature of ...
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The issue of death is one of the most important issues of human existence and one of his existential concerns. From birth to death, humans always carry the anxiety of death with them. Many thinkers have proposed solutions to reduce death anxiety. Yalom and Mulla Sadra have also discussed the nature of death based on their foundations. Yalom considers death as a pure nothingness and based on a naturalistic approach presents some existential solutions like relying on human communication, creativity, and rippling. Mulla Sadra based on a supernaturalistic approach also considers death as an existentiale. By analyzing his philosophical foundations some solutions like having a transformational and procedural approach to death could be deduced from his philosophy for reducing the anxiety of death. In this research, the authors first compare the views of these two thinkers and then try to find an integrated solution to reducing death anxiety.
Philosophy
Hossein Atrak
Abstract
Introduction
One of the disputed stories in the Qur'an, which is related to the discussion of the infallibility of the prophets, is the story of Adam. Regardless of the controversies about whether this story is real or symbolic, the appearance of these verses indicate Adam's disobedience to God's command. ...
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Introduction
One of the disputed stories in the Qur'an, which is related to the discussion of the infallibility of the prophets, is the story of Adam. Regardless of the controversies about whether this story is real or symbolic, the appearance of these verses indicate Adam's disobedience to God's command. A group of Islamic theologians, who believe in the absolute infallibility of the prophets, did not consider this disobedience of Adam as a sin and tried to justify his disobedience based on the concept of Taki Awla (abandoning a better act and doing good one). The purpose of this article is to examine the strength of this justification and criticize it.
Methods and Materials
This article has been done by descriptive-analytical method and collecting information from library sources.
Results and Discussion
In this research, the most important justification of Islamic and Shiite theologians for Adam's disobedience in eating from the forbidden tree, i.e. Tarki Awla or disobeying God's advisory prohibition was investigated. First, it was pointed out that Adam's action was not an instance of Tarki Awla, but it was the commission of God's compulsory prohibition. And since according to the Usulian rules, divine prohibitions indicate the existence of corruption in the prohibited act, it should be concluded that committing God's prohibition in any case, whether it is a compulsory, advisory or Tanzihi prohibition, is intellectually wrong, and committing a wrong act is not compatible with the prophets' infallibility thought.
In the following, the claim that God's command to Adam was advisory was examined. By stating the definitions and criteria of advisory prohibition mentioned in ʿIlm al-Usūl and applying them to Adam's actions, I came to the conclusion that God's command to Adam was not advisory.
Then, by proposing another fundamental discussion in ʿIlm al-Usūl that the negative imperative verb has initial semantic appearance in forbiddance unless there were some evidences indicating that action is permissible, it was shown that God's command to Adam was compulsory prohibition. Then, the evidences mentioned in the verses 117-119 of Surah Taha that Shia theologians claimed for being God's prohibition advisory was investigated and it was shown that the divine warning to Adam for leaving paradise and falling into hardships cannot be the proofs of being God's prohibition of eating from the tree as advisory prohibition.
In addition, the words such as disobedience, misleading, and injustice used in the Quran about Adam's actions have initial appearance in violation of God's compulsory prohibition and committing a sin.
On the other hand, on the assumption of accepting the justification of Tarki awla regarding Adam's disobedience, it seems that this justification is still incompatible with the theory of the prophets' absolute infallibility in the Shi'ite tradition. Because accepting that Adam's action was an instance of Tarki awla is in the meaning of accepting that he committed a mistake and was tempted by Satan, which the reasons for infallibility in the Shia theory are against both.
Conclusion
The final result is that, according to the author's opinion, the justification of Tarki Awla and being God's command advisory is not successful in defending the infallibility of Prophet Adam, and it is better to carry these verses in the same apparent meaning according to the principle of apparent authenticity or use other justifications for Adam's action that are mentioned in theological sources, such as: committing the prohibition of God in heaven, or the omission of a noun i.e. the children of Adam, or disobedience due to forgetfulness or error, etc. Of course, deciding on their strengths and weaknesses requires another research.
Philosophy
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
Recently, Morteza Hajhosseini (2023) published his second edition of the book (2017) Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A new Outlook on Elements of Logic, where he developed various non-standard logical systems based on specific philosophical foundations. His systems consist of the following five:
A ...
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Recently, Morteza Hajhosseini (2023) published his second edition of the book (2017) Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A new Outlook on Elements of Logic, where he developed various non-standard logical systems based on specific philosophical foundations. His systems consist of the following five:
A truth-functional propositional system,
A non-truth-functional propositional system,
Adding the non-truth-functional implication of the second system to the whole first one,
Adding the truth-functional conjunction and disjunction of the first system to the whole second one,
Combining the whole two systems into a new comprehensive propositional.
In other papers, I reported extensively Hajhosseini’s logical systems and criticized them from a formal point of view only (Fallahi 2023a, 2023b, 2023c, 2023d). In a fifth paper, I regarded historical aspects of Hajhosseini’s logical systems and his claims of innovation (Fallahi 2023e). In the sixth paper, I delved into his epistemological incentives and showed that he confused logical and epistemological purposes (Fallahi 2023f). In this paper, eventually, I seek to criticize the philosophical foundations for Hajhosseini’s logical systems.
Some of the philosophical foundations of these logical systems are mentioned with some brief descriptions as follows:
Axioms and postulates are different.
What is to be used in logic are the axioms, not the postulates.
According to Hajhosseini, axioms and postulates are different from each other, and it is axioms that are useful for logic, not postulates; therefore, logical systems should have axioms and not postulates. I show that the traditional distinction between axioms and postulates is an epistemological one and is not useful for logic.
Hajhosseini considered postulates also to be different from logical truths and theorems. Although the difference of axioms/postulates with respect to theorems can be accepted in a way, the difference of axioms/postulates with respect to logical truths is not very acceptable because the axioms/postulates are true in all models and a fortiori, they are to be considered logical truths.
Also, Hajhosseini’s arguments that axioms cannot be deduced from other theorems are epistemological arguments and not logical ones. Also, Hajhosseini’s claim that the axioms are not even based on themselves is a claim that conflicts with some of Hajhosseini’s other words. Also, his claim that adding axioms or inconsistent propositions does not make arguments incorrect or invalid is in conflict with the definitions of "correctness" and "validity" in the book.
It is impossible to infer a formula and its negation from the same premises.
Hajhosseini’s arguments that impossible premises do not entail a proposition as well as its negation are epistemological arguments and not logical ones.
A contrafactual conditional is actually a bi-conditional.
Hajhosseini uses his logical systems to explain contrafactual conditional, but what I understand from his explanations, it seems to me that he interprets them as biconditionals. However, interpreting the counterfactual conditional as a biconditional is not consistent with the commonplace counterfactual conditional examples.
Many well-formed formulas in mathematical logic are not meaningful.
Hajhosseini claims sentences such as “if I am typing then two is even”, although well-formed in modern logic, are meaningless. It should be noted that the well-formed formulas of the language of the modern logics (both classical and non-classical) are all meaningful. The most that can be said about them is that some of them are very complicated or (very) false, but complicatedness—or even falsehood—does not mean meaningless. Also, some of these complex formulas are not logical theorems or logical truths, but some of them are even contradictory to logical theorems and therefore are logical falsehoods, but these do not mean nonsense.
The antecedent and consequent of a conditional must be consistent.
This is familiar under the name “Boethius rule” in the history of logic, which Hajhosseini named it “Hajhosseini's rule”. I think it is generally incorrect and must be conditioned by "consistency of the antecedent", otherwise it conflicts with numerous examples of conditionals whose antecedent and consequent are incompatible.
Natural intuition (= our innate intuition of natural language) is the only (or the most important) criterion for evaluating logics.
Hajhosseini has claimed in many places that his systems agree with intuition; and as a result, the existing classical and non-classical logics are all counter-intuitive. I show that the concept of "intuitiveness" is not so simple and accessible that he claims for himself with such intensity and severity and with this abundance and denial for others. I put forth the possibility that perhaps the logical concepts used (including, the concept of "implication" and "inference") are fundamentally vague and indeterminate, and the intuitions of classical and non-classical logicians, including Hajhosseini himself, are a kind of conventional but unconscious precision and not Intuition in the strict sense of the word. Despite such a possibility, one should be much more cautious in using the word "intuitive".
Classical logic assumes that “rationality” is included in “extensionality”.
Hajhosseini claims that the classical logic intentional or non-truth-functional languages are rational ones. I show that this philosophical premise of "confining “rationality” in “extensionality”" has not been well explained in the book and has not been referred to the sources in classical logicians’ works.
Implication must be explained by causation.
Contrary to this, I show that the analysis of the metaphysical issue of "causation" has nothing to do with the logical issue of "implication" and the two should not be compared. For example, circularity is impossible in "causation" but possible in "implication". Of course, when metaphysical causation is established, logical implication is also established, but the opposite is not true because every proposition implies itself, but it is not its own cause. Also, the implication can be symmetric but causation is not.
Traditional logic as a source of inspiration.
Hajhosseini often refers to traditional logic as if it were his source of inspiration. But it is debatable because the difference between the viewpoints of traditional logicians is so wide and surprising that without extensive familiarity with the history of traditional logic, it is impossible to understand that most of the objections of the new logic to the traditional logic were already raised in the traditional logic itself.
Philosophy
seyede Zeynab Hosseini; Ebrahim Noei; Mohsen Jahed
Abstract
Abstract
Determining the reason for legislating worships and their role in other human affairs provides the opportunity for perceptions such as the intrinsic purpose, negative dignity or positive and preparatory dignity of worships. The present research is trying to answer this question that in the ...
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Abstract
Determining the reason for legislating worships and their role in other human affairs provides the opportunity for perceptions such as the intrinsic purpose, negative dignity or positive and preparatory dignity of worships. The present research is trying to answer this question that in the eyes of Sadr al-Mutalahin Shirazi, what is the status of worship in the origin, evolution or emergence of human conditions and knowledge? The purpose of this research is to discover the functions of worship in this process, which is followed by descriptive-analytical method. Sadra considers the rulings to be subject to the criteria of self-determination and considers the purpose of legislating rulings to be to provide general benefit and general expediency to humans. Based on the findings of this research, in explaining the relationship between actions, circumstances and knowledge, the existence of real criteria for worship should be accepted and focused on the interaction between human affairs and the process of the two ascending and descending arcs of the voluntary course of man. According to Sadra, the aforementioned three authorities have a bilateral and multilateral relationship, and discovering this relationship is possible through understanding the interactive movement between the soul and the body and explaining the collective reality of human beings. Paying attention to the interactive relationship and the positive-preparatory interaction between the soul and the body, and the concession and escalation of the citizen of the two, shows that actions in the arc of ascent have non-existent, preparatory and preliminary status, and in the arc of descent, they have existential and fruitful status.
Introduction
Man is a being who has a benefit from the lower world, i.e. the world, and a share from the upper world, i.e. the hereafter. Every religious practice also has an external shell and an internal core; The shell is related to this world and its core is related to the hereafter, just as the Sharia's meaning of the purity of clothes and body is the purity of the heart, which is the inner core, and the purity of the heart is to purify it from religious pollution such as disbelief and reprehensible filth. Morality is like envy, miserliness, extravagance, similarly, the meaning of the Shariah of any worship is the effect it creates in the heart. (Sadr al-Din Shirazi, 1366 A: 1/279) If there are no real benefits and harms behind the acts of worship, then talking about the effect of action in the creation of knowledge will not have the same meaning.
Method
In the upcoming article, we will analyze the wisdom of the law of worship or commitment to worship (by relying on and analyzing the texts of the Sadras). Sadra believes in the basis of rulings on merits and demerits and documents Sharia rulings on merits and demerits. It is important to address this issue because it states whether the desired materials are genuine in essence and purpose or are they merely preparatory and preliminary? For this purpose, based on the thoughts of Sadrul Matalhin Shirazi, the following of the rulings is explained first, and then the nonexistent or existential dignity of the phrase, and in other words, their preparatory or positive dignity, is explained.
Discussion /Result
The results obtained from the above research can be summarized in the following axes:
Each religious authority has three components: science, present and action. The relationship between these three is one-sided and multilateral. The mechanism of the effect of each of these three things on the other is as follows. In the ascending arc, there is a movement from the side of action to the side of knowledge. Action by repetition creates the queen, and the queen causes the birth of knowledge. In the descending arc, science strengthens the properties and the properties produce a new action.
Each of the knowledge, conditions and actions are valid and reliable. Knowledge and knowledge are both the beginning of states and actions and the end of them. As science and knowledge are both subject and end.
Acts and acts of worship have both nonexistent and existential dignity. The lack of dignity of worship is related to the arc of the ascension, which causes the repetition of the deeds of the queens. Following the repetition of the action, the effect and state that arises in the soul, becomes solid and becomes a habit. The more the action is repeated, the more the current becomes the queen. Repetition of actions, in Sadra's eyes, removes obstacles and hijabs so that the soul can enjoy possessions; Therefore, repeating the actions is not from the appropriate Sunnah, but from the Sunnah of the removal of obstacles and hijab, which are non-existent matters. Also, when the soul reaches the level of possessing and being capable of possessing a conscience, it removes the veils of acquiring knowledge. Therefore, in Sadra's view, action is important due to the role it plays in self-fulfillment and knowledge acquisition, which is a secondary and transverse role.
Existential dignity of worship and actions finds its meaning in the arc of descent and movement from knowledge to states and then actions. In this movement, action is considered as the fruit of science, and knowledge is a prelude to action as required by science. With this knowledge, man performs worship and avoids sins.
Worships because of their role in reaching the knowledge of God. are ranked. Sins are also ranked due to the negative role they have in acquiring knowledge. Therefore, the greatest sin is to block the way to divine knowledge.
Philosophy
ali aqajani
Abstract
Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence ...
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Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence with related concepts such as religion, spirituality, government, secularism and other concepts and forms one of the challenges in the field of understanding politics.
Al-Farabi (870-950 A.H.) has occupied a very high and irreplaceable place in the history of Islamic philosophy. Farabi's coverage of various sciences in the realm of the Islamic world is amazing. The depth of thinking and the breadth of Farabi's intellectual horizon in terms of philosophy, especially political philosophy, is exemplary and rare. He is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to the world and scholars of thought, including in ethics, politics and their relationship. Based on this, the hypothesis of the article is that the practical manifestation and intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy should be found in some hybrid concepts. On this basis, why and how the relationship between ethics and politics is one of the problems and theoretical and practical issues of political science and ethics science, which various approaches and different viewpoints have been used to celebrate it. One of the most important efforts is related to the prominent Muslim political philosopher Abu Nasr Farabi. The hypothesis of the article seeks to answer the question of Farabi's approach to the relationship between ethics and politics based on the theoretical framework that the concepts of utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights are the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy.
Method:Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of the article is a combination of three questions and four approaches. which the article measures and clarifies Farabi's point of view towards them:
1: Three questions: The relationship between ethics and politics can be questioned in three ways. (Kechoyan 1382: 14). The first direction is whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, can basically pursue moral goals in the private sphere? The second question is whether the field of politics, ethics, or in more general terms, has its own prescriptive requirements in distinction from ethics and individual prescriptions or not? The third question refers to the field of tools and methods or the way of pursuing and applying the policies and goals of the public domain (ibid. 15). Do we necessarily have to use ethical methods in politics, or is the way of achieving and pursuing goals in politics independent of moral judgments (ibid., 15).
Four theories: On another level, the relationship between ethics and politics can be gathered and analyzed in four theories. Theories of separation of ethics from politics, compliance of ethics with politics, two-level ethics and the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). The fourth theory is the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). According to this theory, ethics is individual politics and politics is collective ethics. Ethics and politics are both branches of practical wisdom and seek to ensure human happiness.
Discussion:
Farabi has divided civil science into two theoretical and practical parts. He considers ethics as a theoretical part and politics as a practical part. In Farabi's commentary, Ibn Rushd clearly spoke about the separation of the two sciences. But Farabi himself did not try to separate the theoretical aspect from the practical aspect. The relationship between ethics and politics was considered from several angles. From one point of view, several questions were raised to which Farabi's answer should be received. The first question was whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, should pursue moral goals in the private sphere or not? Farabi's answer to this question is positive. Unlike today's political philosophy in the West, they do not believe in the separation of public and private spheres and consider them to be the same. Therefore, it should be said that according to him, ethics and politics are a science that has a single subject and goal. According to him, the goal of ethics and politics is happiness.
The second question was whether politics, as a public sphere, morally creates a sphere independent of the private sphere with its own special logic or not? According to Farabi, the individual moral sphere is not separate from the social moral sphere, and the principles governing them and the goals and objectives of both are common. The complexity of social issues is more than individual issues, but this cannot create a distinct morality.
Another question was whether ethical methods must be used in politics or whether having ethical goals is enough and whether a politician should act ethically. From Farabi's point of view, the science of ethics is not limited to individual moral reform, but also includes social reform, and the duty of the ruler and government in the society is to develop moral values, which must necessarily be attributed to it. On this basis, from Farabi's point of view, the theories of separation of ethics from politics, subordination of ethics to politics, are completely rejected; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics, in the sense of subordination of politics to ethics (in the sense of consistent moral standards).
Farabi considers the necessity of community to be certain, but what does he consider its origin? Is it natural, natural, voluntary or rational or instinctive? Farabi, except for the first point of view, which considered social life not natural but caused by external emergency. It accepts the rest of the approaches. But in general, he has an instrumental attitude towards society and considers it a means to achieve perfection and happiness.
Farabi introduces will as having three branches. The first branch of passion comes from feeling. The second category of excitement is caused by imagination. The third branch of passion comes from speech and thinking, which Farabi calls this kind of free will. Like Aristotle, Farabi believes that moderation is a virtue.
Conclusion:
Farabi is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to scholars and scholars of thought, including ethics, politics and their relationship, which is one of the ancient and very broad concepts. The article measures Farabi's view on the relationship between ethics and politics (issue) based on the theoretical framework of the article, which is a combination of three questions and four approaches: the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, two-level ethics, and the unity of ethics and politics (method). The hypothesis of the article, which is the second innovation of the article compared to homogeneous articles, considers some concepts such as utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights as the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy. (innovation) Based on this, Farabi considers the goal of ethics and politics to be the same; Ethics has a political nature and politics has a moral nature. The theories of the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, have been completely ruled out; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics in the sense of following politics from ethics (in the sense of compatible ethical standards). (Findings) According to this, Farabi is a philosopher who does not find force and domination, conquest and the sword as a way to build an ethical culture. It considers happiness both in terms of belief and in relation to society. The government is morally based on public opinion and will. He based his utopia on voluntary justice based on virtue and rejects natural justice, and in his opinion, all citizens have rights and have a fair share in society. (Result)
Philosophy
Morteza Motavalli; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the ...
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AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the testimony of others for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God. Another line of study were philosophers and logicians, who regarded testimony as one of the principles of judgement. At the same time that he was participating in these two lines of studies, Suhrawardī initiated a third line of study in his theology. In this paper, we will show Suhrawardī's contribution in this topic with two analytical and historical approaches.Suhrawardī's Epistemology of TestimonySuhrawardī has spoken about testimony in three places of his works: in logic when enumerating the principles of judgements, in methodology of jurisprudence when discussing religious proofs, and in theology when talking about the doctrine of the nobler contingent to prove platonic forms.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Logical-Fārābī and Avicenna had talked about propositions taken from the testimony of others in their logic when discussing the first principles. With this in his hand, Suhrawardī begins to contemplate on the issue. He identifies two kinds of propositions that are related to testimony: accepted premises (maqbūlāt) and widely transmitted propositions (mutawātirāt). Accepted premises are propositions that we accept from someone we have good opinion of. In al-Talwīhāt, he adds that this good opinion is because of something celestial in that person or because he is more intelligent or religious. Widely transmitted premises are propositions that we become certain of because of the plethora of the testimonies of others. He, against others, does not require for what is testified to be perceptual/sensible. This is a smart move because he demonstrates the credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer using exactly the widely transmitted propositions.Suhrawardī makes four important movements that are contrary to the Avicennan peripatetic tradition-four movements that cannot be simply passed by. They become clearer only when they are considered in the historical context and with regard to al-Ghazālī's statements. First of all, he eliminates Peripatetics’ intuitive propositions and innate propositions from the list of certain principles. Second, he brings widely transmitted and experiential propositions under one title. Thirdly, he gives them the name of intuitive propositions, while what he means by intuition is its literal meaning, not its peripatetic terminological meaning. And the fourth is that he attends to the role of evidences in them.It seems, from what we have said so far in addition to what will come in the next section from al-Ghazālī and his influence on Suhrawardī, that he thinks of the accumulated opinions as the reason why widely transmitted propositions are certain.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Methodology of JurisprudenceOne of religious proofs for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God is what is transmitted by testimony. Here, Suhrawardī takes one of al-Ghazālī's books-i.e., al-Mustaṣfā-and writes accordingly. One of al-Ghazālī's contributions in this discussion is that he eliminates intuitive propositions from the six self-evident propositions and introduces another sixth way to knowledge base on evidences. Suhrawardī takes the idea of evidences and their role in knowledge firmly. It is from here that we can see the idea of evidences in his philosophical works.He also mentions some requirements for the one who gives testimony such as being just and having good vision. This, and other things, could show that he is not totally individualist and internalist about testimony.Testimony in Suhrawardī's TheologyIn theology, Suhrawardī, innovatively and for the first time, brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer. Sometimes, testimony is in important matters and by experts. When that is the case, Suhrawardī says, one or two testimony is enough to become certain about what is testified. For example, when one or two astronomers testify about something related to their specialty, that brings us knowledge and certainty about that thing. This is the way of science. He continues that when this is so, the testimony of religious experiencers should also bring us knowledge. Here, testimony is as valuable as testimony in science, and even more valuable. This is because the number of testifiers here are more, they are sages and prophets that moral truth is certain in them, and their testimony is about what they have seen directly not what they have inferred from their observations.ConclusionAlthough Suhrawardī relies heavily on al-Fārābi, Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī, he makes a great contribution to the epistemology of testimony. His point that the certainty of widely transmitted propositions is because of the accumulated opinions developed by Shahīd Ṣadr later on. His brilliant innovation is that he brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer.
Philosophy
Mansour Imanpour
Abstract
Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential ...
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Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential realms. This has faced them with puzzling questions, including the one pertaining to the relationship between constant (thābit) and changeable (mutaghayyir) existents.
To illustrate, it should be noted that, in Islamic philosophy, existential realms are generally divided into the realm of purely immaterial entities and that of material entities. On another division, they are partitioned into three realms: intellectual (ʿaqlī), imaginal (mithāl), and natural. The relations between entities existing in these realms is explained in terms of the principle of causation. Now, the question arises: given one of the implications of this principle, namely impossibility of the deviation of an effect from its cause, how could actual changeable entities in the natural world be issued forth from a constant immaterial entity? Let us elaborate the question as follows: in the natural world, there are various types of changes, including “generation” (kawn) and “corruption” (fisād), accidental changes (that is, changes in accidents or properties [aʿrāḍ]), and as per Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, substantial changes (changes in substance or jawhar). It goes without saying that if the changeable entity in question is attributed to a constant unchanging complete cause, then the effect has indeed deviated from its cause in two ways: (a) Why, despite the existence of the cause, does the changing effect, which is a part or stage of the motion, become nonexistent and deviate from its complete cause? (b) Why, despite the existence of the complete cause, does the effect (namely, the motion with all its parts) fail to become existent and deviate from its cause?
Muslim philosophers have offered various theories to solve this predicament. These theories were subject to debates over the history of Islamic philosophy. Many articles and books have been written in this regard, each tackling a dimension or some dimensions of this problem.
This article does not aim to reiterate or provide a literature review of these solutions. Instead, it provides a brief classification and analysis of these theories and then yields a novel theory by drawing upon the philosophical principles of Mullā Ṣadrā.
Research Methodology
This article begins with a classification and analysis of the accounts provided by the main books and studies on this question by deploying the descriptive and analytical method. Finally, it makes a case for a novel theory in terms of a final formulation of the theory of substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya).
Discussion and Results
The problem of the relation between changeable and constant entities is proposed within the framework of Islamic philosophy, particularly its rendition of the law of causation and its implications. To address this formidable challenge, Muslim philosophers have proposed various accounts in terms of their philosophical principles and structures. However, these solutions have often faced challenges, either based on their assumptions in natural sciences or due to the structure and content of their solutions.
The finding of this article regarding the problem of relation between constant and changeable entities in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy is that, in final analysis, the problem involves two types of an effect’s deviation from its cause: (1) Despite the constancy of the cause, one part or stage of the effect becomes nonexistent, and (2) despite the existence of the constant cause, all parts or stages of the cause fail to become existent.
As for (1), it may be suggested that the renewed effect emanating from the constant cause does not lose any perfection. This way, it does not deviate from its cause. What becomes nonexistent in this process is not an existential perfection but an imperfection or flaw, the negation of which amounts to some sort of affirmation. Accordingly, in this process of continuous flourishing, the moving existence does not come to lack a perfection or an actuality, and hence, the effect does not deviate from its cause by losing part of it despite the cause’s existence. However, it is not straightforward to address (2), since it may be said that the realization of a subsequent part or stage of something depends on the realization of its preceding part or stage. That being the case, the failure of the subsequent parts and stages to come to existence in the first stage is not a deviation of the effect from its cause, but is because its condition or its preparatory cause has failed to exist. This means that, in this case too, the effect has not indeed deviated from its complete cause.
Conclusion
“Substantial motion” ultimately goes back to the evolution of a substantial existence. This perfection-seeking existence does not drive itself from potentiality to actuality; that is, it does not bestow perfection upon itself. It always has an emanating, perfection-giving entity that continuously emanates forms upon it, compensating its deficiencies and promoting its existence. During this continuous emanation, what happens to the changing effect is that its existence is constructed and becomes thriving. In this process, none of its parts or perfections disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs. Moreover, the emanating cause is not an absolute unconstrained for the subsequent parts or stages. Thus, their absence in the realm of the first part or stage does not count as deviation from the complete cause. On this account, the constant entity emanates an existence that inherently involves change, in light of which the existential perfection does not disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs.
Philosophy
fateme soleimani
Abstract
Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. ...
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Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. Several factors, such as the imaginative faculty, the faculty of theoretical and practical reason, the craving faculty, and will, contribute to this process. Accordingly, various types of human action are formed given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties. Hence, the existence of various possibilities and circumstances for the interactions of these principles demand different models for human action. A consideration and comparison of these factors can play a role in analyzing and explaining the human action as well as presenting various solutions to change, modify, or even reinforce human behaviors. To do so, a survey was conducted in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā deploying the descriptive-analytic method to identify various models of human action and pinpoint their differences and the conditions in which they occur. The main problem of this research is:
What is the fundamental and basic model of the human action and what are the models branching from them?
The secondary questions include the following:
How do models of human action differ from each other and from the model of action in animals?
What is the role of temperament in the model of human actions?
Research Background
Thus far, several studies have been carried out concerning the philosophy of action and how an action is produced within the framework of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Rezaee and Houshangi (2013) in “The process of the production of human voluntary action,” Shahgoli (2019) in “Principles of action in the views of Fārābī and Mullā Ṣadrā,” and Mirhadi (2018) in “Philosophy of action in Transcendent philosophy” aim to introduce the principles and preliminaries of action and the stages of the production of an action from the perspective of Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā. Vafaeian and Gharamaleki (2017) in “An ontological analysis of the process of the production of actions from the perspectives of Avicenna and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn” assert that they are concerned with the ontological status of the principles of the production of action. Soleimani (2020) in “The place of action in human existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view” provides an account of the formation of action and the longitudinal relationship between its principles, stating that Mullā Ṣadrā views the inner reality of an action as its longitudinal principles, while external action is solely a manifestation and expression of this longitudinal chain of the functioning of perceptual and motive faculties of the soul. Varzdar and Ketabchi (2022) in “The study of the function of practical reason in the process of action production in Transcendent philosophy” are focused on the role of practical reason in the process of the production of actions.
The contribution of the present research, which sets it apart from the above-mentioned studies, is that it addresses the numerous models and schemas of the order and mode of the functioning of the formative principles and elements of action.
Conclusion
When doing an action, the human individual employs the numerous faculties and powers of their soul, including perceptual and motive faculties. Given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties, various types of human action are formed. Thus, a model and schema can be determined for each type of human action. All conceivable models of human action involve a transition from the cognitive principle to determination, will, and production of the outer overt action. In other words, all varieties of human actions are formed based on a basic model. This foundational model shows the general course of the soul’s linear motion from the highest to the lowest principles that contribute to the actualization of action.
Regarding the basic fundamental model of human action, stages can be devised as follows:
In the first stage, the desired goal and objective are determined by theoretical reason. In the second, the proper action to fulfil the goal is selected and confirmed by practical reason. In the third, the requisite proper urge and motivation are produced by the craving faculty under the governance of practical reason. In the fourth, rational urge prevails and intensifies and then determination and will are formed for doing the action.
In the model of deterministic action, the urge resulting from the confirmation by practical reason is not agreeable to nature, but the action is selected and preferred by the cognitive system and then confirmed by reason. Accordingly, an action not being agreeable is compatible with its volitional and free character.
In the model of animal action, humans just like animals have a presence-based comprehension of an instinctive impulse and need within themselves, then conceive a particular action in their imaginative faculty as well as the pleasure or pain associated with the action, and then through appetitive or irascible faculties, an urge or repulsion towards the action ill be produced in the individual. If the urge is bolstered and prevails, the will to do or omit the action will be formed.
In any event, Ṣadrā believes that urge and will in humans are governed by reason. It is only in this case that the will can be rational and human. However, if the urge and will are governed by instincts, senses, and imagination, which yields a speculative judgment by reason, the will is animal.
When the action occurs, its wanted or unwanted consequences can have an effect on the constitutive elements of the action. This means that they have a reinforcing or undermining effect on instincts and inner impulses, knowledge, desire, and will. Nevertheless, this effect is only indirect. In case there is a positive effect, which reinforces the principles of an action, the action will be repeated frequently. This will lead to a particular psychological habit in the individual, which is called a “temperament” or “character.” According to the principles of Sadraean philosophy, a soul that possesses a temperament changes its substantial form, and given the new stage of its psychological forms, it comes to have new and stronger faculties and powers. Later, the principles of the action will be further solidified and their functioning in inducing actions will be quicker, such that the actions associated with that stage of the soul will be produced more easily.
Philosophy
Nadia MAFTOUNI; Fataneh TavanaPanah; ghasemali koucnnani
Abstract
ملکات نقشهای متعددی در فلسفه اسلامی دارند. گاهی در مبادی صدور فعل از حیث مبادی خلقی، گاهی از جهات انسانشناسانه و در مواردی در مبناشناسی احوالات روانشناختی، امیال ...
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ملکات نقشهای متعددی در فلسفه اسلامی دارند. گاهی در مبادی صدور فعل از حیث مبادی خلقی، گاهی از جهات انسانشناسانه و در مواردی در مبناشناسی احوالات روانشناختی، امیال و گرایشات نفسانی ملکات مورد توجه هستند. مساله این تحقیق بررسی ابعاد شناختی و روانشناختی ملکات است که در ارتباط با ساختارهای ادراکی و سازمانیافتگی ادراک محسوب میشود. آیا علاوه بر نقشهای خلقی، از تاثیر ملکات در سطح اندیشه و احساس نیز میتوان سخن گفت؟ در این تحقیق با روشی توصیفی- تحلیلی به مساله حاضر پاسخ داده میشود. یافتههای این تحقیق حاکی از آن است که تعابیری همچون ملکات نطقی و عقلی ناظر به ابعاد شناختی ملکات است. نقش ملکات در جهتدهی و هدایت ادراکات و احوالات روانی و نیز معنابخشی و پردازش اطلاعات از سویی و اهمیت آنها به عنوان عوامل غیرشناختی شکل گیری باورها از سویی دیگر از نتایج این تحقیق محسوب میشود. تفکیک «معارف متمکن» حاصل از ملکات و «معارف غیر متمکن» و تحلیل هر یک در نفس، ناظر به جایگاه شناختی و روانشناختی ملکات است. نظم در ناحیه افکار و ارائه ایدههای از پیش تعیین شده و نیز فرضهای معین متناسب با ساختار در ارتباط با ملکات تبیینپذیر است. در بعد شناختی فارابی به نقش عادت و ملکات در تعیین و تعین مواضع اندیشهورزی و جایگاه مغالطی ملکات عطف توجه میکند و در بعد روانشناختی تاثیر ملکات بر امیال و گرایشات، تصمیم و انتخاب محل تامل است.
Philosophy
Keramat Varzdar; Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi
Abstract
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent ...
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Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
Philosophy
ali asghar jafari valani
Abstract
Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept ...
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Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept in an epistemological context, asserting that Avicenna’s flying man not only exists, but also knows that he exists. Such an interpretation of the flying man argument seems to be at odds with his own principles, his passages throughout his works, and what he pursued to establish through this scenario.
Method
Deploying a descriptive and analytical method, it may be said that
Findings: Avicenna believes that perception begins from senses, and the first stage of the human reason is material or hylic reason or pure potentiality. Moreover, there is a difference between consciousness (shuʿūr) that is actually obtained by humans since the beginning of their existence and consciousness of consciousness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-shuʿūr), which he believes to be a potential character that needs to be acquired, while our primary consciousness of the soul is the existence of our soul. Thus, the flying man is solely the existence and presence of the soul before any actual consciousness.
Results
In view of the fact that man was suspended in space at the beginning of his creation and Ibn Sina considers the human soul to be the event of the body and in the order of the beast intellect and pure power, which lacks any perception and becomes actual through sensory perception, it should be said : The human being suspended in Ibn Sina's space can have an existential quality and in fact, he is observing the position of presence, existence, and mere existence. In addition, Ibn Sina, emphasizing the two positions of consciousness and consciousness to consciousness, believes that consciousness is actually and permanently suspended in man, but consciousness to consciousness is potential in him. Therefore, it seems that the soul at the beginning of creation, although it is present and proven, but it cannot be said that it has knowledge of itself; That is, the soul initially lacks attention to itself, and this lack of attention prevents any self-perception of the soul.
Innovation: In fact, regarding "Avicenna's suspended human being in space", it can only be said that "a human being is conscious (without any actual awareness)", but it cannot be said: "In addition, because this human being is conscious, he knows that he is like this." ».
Islamic mysticism
mohammad javad dakami; Akbar orvatimovaffagh
Abstract
Introduction
Muslim theologians and philosophers debate the manner in which the world was created by God. Theologians assert that God’s role in creation is characterized in terms of agency-by-intention (fāʿiliyya bi-l-qaṣd), while Peripatetic philosophers argue for agency-by-providence (fāʿiliyya ...
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Introduction
Muslim theologians and philosophers debate the manner in which the world was created by God. Theologians assert that God’s role in creation is characterized in terms of agency-by-intention (fāʿiliyya bi-l-qaṣd), while Peripatetic philosophers argue for agency-by-providence (fāʿiliyya bi-l-ʿināya), and Illuminationist (Ishrāqī) philosophers propose agency-by-agreement (fāʿiliyya bi-l-riḍā). Mullā Ṣadrā and his adherents advocate for agency-by-providence, where their definition of this kind of agency closely aligns with the concept of agency-by-manifestation (fāʿiliyya bi-l-tajallī) as suggested by Muslim mystics. Twentieth-century Muslim philosopher Mahdi Elahi Ghomshei introduced another form of agency, which he calls agency-by-love (fāʿiliyya bi-l-ʿishq). He posits that the primary impetus behind the creation of the world by the necessary existent is His love and delight for His own essence, serving as the source from which all things emanate. Elahi Ghomshei pioneered this concept to explain God’s agency. The central question of this study is whether this concept has precedent in the works of earlier Muslim philosophers and, if so, how it was addressed within those works.
Research Methodology
This research employs the analytic-descriptive method by examining library sources. Initially, we investigate the perspectives of the scholars concerning the agency of the necessary existent, and subsequently, we draw our conclusions.
Discussion and Results
An examination of the writings of philosophers and intellectuals predating Elahi Ghomshei reveals that they did not neglect the significance of love in God’s agency. Indeed, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, the role of love in the agency of the necessary existent has been consistently emphasized. Furthermore, certain philosophers contended that the creation of the world without love is inconceivable. However, instead of employing the term "agency by love," they utilized alternative expressions such as attraction force, natural magnetism, love-based motion, and others, as will be elucidated below.
Plato and Aristotle delved into the concept of the love of the demiurge—the creator of the world—or the unmoving mover for its own essence, highlighting its significance in imparting order and motion to worldly affairs. Among thinkers, Muslim philosophers and mystics stand out for their emphasis on God''s love and delight in His essence. Al-Fārābī offers a nuanced definition of love and delight, positing that the love of the necessary existent for its essence represents the pinnacle of love. He contends that God possesses the utmost perception, directed at the highest perceivable entity—His own essence. Thus, in the realm of the divine, the distinction between lover and beloved collapses, as they are one and the same.
Avicenna contends that the ultimate form of delight is found in the necessary existent''s delight in its own essence. This arises from its perfect perception of all beings, making it impervious to the realm of possibility and nonexistence. Avicenna posits that God is loved for His essence and is the object of love for all beings, suggesting that their very existence is sustained through their love for God. Shaykh al-Ishrāq Suhrawardī and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn also emphasize God''s profound inherent love for His essence, depicting Him as the most delighted being by its essence, and asserting that this fundamental love and delight are the primary impetuses behind the creation of the world.
Ibn al-ʿArabī asserts that all motion in this world, culminating in the existence of the universe, emanates from love—primarily the love possessed by God and also by other beings and natural causes through divine love. Without such affection, the world would remain unmanifest. Similarly, Imam Khomeini contends that divine love serves as the guiding and directing force in both the natural and supernatural realms (Imam Khomeini 1989, 76). He argues that existence and the sustenance of existence stem from essential love, which acts as both the existence-conferring and sustaining causes of beings. Referring to these two realms as the facilitators of creation and the pathways to perfection, he emphasizes that without this love, no entity could come into being, and no individual or object could attain perfection; thus, the heavens themselves are erected by love.
Conclusion
We conclude that although Mahdi Elahi Ghomshei was the first philosopher to employ the term "agency-by-love" to explain the agency of the necessary existent, discussions regarding God''s love for His own essence trace back to ancient times. Plato, Aristotle, and several other ancient Greek philosophers explored the notion of the creator''s love for its essence. In the Islamic world, mystics, philosophers, and theologians engaged with and endeavored to explain the notion of God''s agency within their respective frameworks. While they present various explanations for God''s agency—such as agency-by-intention, agency-by-providence, agency-by-agreement, or agency-by-manifestation—they unanimously affirm God''s possession of agency-by-love. These philosophers argue that perception is the source of love, with the intensity of love corresponding to the brilliance and beauty of the perceived entity. As God''s essence epitomizes beauty and brilliance, and He is both the perceiver and the perceived by His essence, He possesses the utmost love and delight for His essence.
mostafa momeni; MOHAMAD JAVAD AKHGARI; yaser Salari
Abstract
Introduction: Knowledge by presence (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) is a problem explicitly discussed by Suhrawardī (Shaykh al-Ishrāq). This issue has since become a significant topic in Islamic epistemology. More recently, Allameh Tabatabai has examined this problem and drawn noteworthy conclusions. According ...
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Introduction: Knowledge by presence (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) is a problem explicitly discussed by Suhrawardī (Shaykh al-Ishrāq). This issue has since become a significant topic in Islamic epistemology. More recently, Allameh Tabatabai has examined this problem and drawn noteworthy conclusions. According to him, knowledge by presence is an existential concept, and is detached from matter. He establishes the existence of such knowledge by appealing to human self-consciousness, which manifests the presence of the existence of our own selves to us. In his view, the criterion for knowledge by presence consists in the real presence of something (the known) to another thing (the knower). Accordingly, he broadens the instances of knowledge by presence to encompass self-knowledge, a cause’s knowledge of its own effects, the effect’s knowledge of its cause, an effect’s knowledge of other effects of its cause, and human knowledge of his own sensory impressions. As for the reduction of knowledge by acquisition (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) to knowledge by presence, Allameh Tabatabai believes that each instance of the former is indeed an instance of the latter. In fact, knowledge by acquisition always involves knowledge by presence. It follows that all human knowledge is by presence through and through. This is because it is always an instance of knowledge by presence that turns into an instance of knowledge by acquisition. This transformation is done through the imaginative faculty, which he dubs the faculty of transforming knowledge by presence to knowledge by acquisition. According to Allameh Tabatabai’s view of knowledge by presence and its transformation into knowledge by acquisition, the soul has an effective agential role with respect to epistemic forms or images, obtaining both universal and particular epistemic forms via “unification.” This implies that the process of perception consists in the “strengthening of the detached (immaterial) existence of the world” and its unification with the intellectual level of existence. Another corollary of his view is that, since knowledge is in fact something existential that cannot be subsumed under any of the quiddity-based categories, it cannot be characterized as corresponding or failing to correspond to the reality, whereas knowledge by acquisition can be thus characterized. Furthermore, his view of knowledge by presence implies that knowledge by acquisition is restricted to the material world, since material entities can neither know, nor be known. Of course, material entities involve immaterial dimensions such as change and ignorance in virtue of which knowledge applies to them.
Method: This research was carried out with the library-analytical method.
Discussion and results: The main conclusion to be drawn from Allameh Tabatabai’s discussion of the nature of knowledge by presence and its corollaries is that it can be used to determine the ground of distinction between real (ḥaqīqī) and constructed (iʿtibārī) perceptions and how they relate to knowledge by presence. Since an instance of knowledge by presence is involved in any instance of knowledge by acquisition, it follows that when knowledge is divided, what is actually divided is knowledge by presence. That is, there are two types of knowledge by presence: pure knowledge by presence and knowledge presence that can be transformed into knowledge by acquisition. Moreover, given the account of the process through which the former is transformed into the latter and how constructed perceptions emerge from real perceptions with the aid of the estimative (wahmiyya) faculty, it can be concluded that the criterion for the division of perceptions into real and constructed, on Allameh Tabatabai’s account, is the same criterion depicted in the distinction between knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition. In other words, just as the mind draws on the activities of the estimative faculty to transform knowledge by presence into knowledge by acquisition for purposes of convenience in ordinary life, it utilizes the same activities to derive constructed perceptions from real perceptions.
Conclusion: According to Allameh Tabatabai, it is knowledge by presence that is transformed into knowledge by acquisition through the activities of the imaginative faculty. The activities of the estimative faculty concerning real entities result in the formation of constructed perceptions. The criterion proposed by him for the division of perceptions into constructed and real is the one depicted in the distinction between knowledge by acquisition and knowledge by presence.
This clarifies the ground of the distinction between real and constructed perceptions, as well as its relationship with knowledge by presence. The ground of real perceptions is pure knowledge by presence, while the ground of constructed perceptions is the type of knowledge by presence that can be transformed into knowledge by acquisition. The distinction between these two kinds of perceptions lies in the difference of the knowledge by presence involved in them.
mahdiyeh seyyed nurani
Abstract
Introduction
Futuwwa (as spiritual chivalry) holds a significant place as a creedal and ethical framework among those who have written futuwwat-nāma, or letters on futuwwa. According to the comprehensive definition provided by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī in his book Tuḥfat al-ikhwān fī ...
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Introduction
Futuwwa (as spiritual chivalry) holds a significant place as a creedal and ethical framework among those who have written futuwwat-nāma, or letters on futuwwa. According to the comprehensive definition provided by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī in his book Tuḥfat al-ikhwān fī khaṣāʾiṣ al-fityān, futuwwa is deeply connected to the light of one's innate nature (fiṭra). It is through this light that chivalrous rituals and virtues are cultivated, and all the components involved in its rituals are portrayed as enigmatic symbols.
Topic and the Main Question
This research delves into the enigmas of futuwwa as explored in the writings of Shahāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, also known as Shaykh al-Ishrāq. The objective is to draw comparisons between the enigmas and symbols employed in his works and the rituals and virtues associated with chivalry. While al-Suhrawardī did not explicitly pen a book on futuwwa, the definitions of futuwwa and the enigmatic elements present in his works suggest that he may be regarded as part of the chivalrous circle, viewing futuwwa as the initial step towards attaining innate knowledge and transcendent realms.
The primary question of this research is to uncover and decipher the enigmatic aspects of chivalry found within the works of al-Suhrawardī. This is achieved by comparing the customary rituals and beliefs of the chivalrous as documented in Islamic literature on futuwwa. These symbols emerge prominently in relation to the central theme of chivalry, which is the illumination of one's innate nature. Al-Suhrawardī explores this theme in a scattered manner throughout his writings. By comparing the key symbols of chivalrous creeds and enigmas found in al-Suhrawardī's works, it becomes evident that he aligned himself with the idea of futuwwa, defining it as an embellishment within the path of “illumination” (ishrāq).
Research Background
The background of this research can be traced back to articles such as Kateb and Shamili’s “The creed of spiritual chivalry and the educational system of arts and industries” (2012) and Mousavi Gilani and Shakibadel’s “The mystical wayfaring in the master-pupil tradition of the literature on spiritual chivalry and its impact on the artist’s creativity” (2016). These articles provide an elaborate account of spiritual chivalry, tracing all such creeds to the archangel Gabriel. There are also articles devoted only to the history if ʿayyārs (warriors) and heros, such as Mohammad Jafar Mahjoub’s “Chivalry in Islamic Iran” (1992), which addresses the historical background of chivalry. However, there is no study of the enigmatic and innate aspects of futuwwa. Moreover, there is a paucity of sources that tackle with al-Suhrawardī’s works from the perspective of spiritual chivalry. The relevant articles such as “The hermeneutics of the ‘romantic return’ in Suhrawardī’s al-Ibrāj essay with Henry Corbin’s illuminationist phenomenological approach” solely deal with the romantic return of the soul to its origin.
The present article focuses on the innate nature (fiṭra), heart, and enigmas pertaining to spiritual chivalry. It makes a comparative study of two groups of works by al-Suhrawardī: the ones related to futuwwa and the ones about illumination, which nonetheless align with the idea of futuwwa.
The Main Body of the Article
This article addresses three definitions of futuwwa, offered in the relevant Islamic literature, in terms of morality, the pre-eternal divine covenant known as “alast,” and the innate nature. It then discusses Shaykh al-Ishrāq’s definition of futuwwa. It then deals with topics related to the creeds of spiritual chivalry, the characters of the chivalrous, their enigmatic elements such as garments, drinking, rituals, and tools, as well as psychological virtues. Throughout the enigmas found in the Islamic literature on futuwwa, we identify al-Suhrawardī’s remarks in his works, comparing them with such enigmas. Prominent among these enigmas are the symbols of childhood, the innate nature, and the heart.
Research Methodology
The methodology of this research is comparative and phenomenological. By discussing the enigmas pertaining to rituals, creeds, and tools within the chivalrous circle, we provide a comparative study of the symbols implicitly mentioned by al-Suhrawardī, analyzing the essence of these symbols in creedal, innate, and instrumental terms.
Discussion and Conclusions
Al-Suhrawardī is not widely recognized as an author specifically focused on futuwwa. Establishing a direct correlation between his works and the literature on futuwwa proves challenging. Nevertheless, scattered indications can be found throughout his writings that allude to spiritual chivalry and the enigmas associated with its creeds, tools, garments, beverages, and even the teachings allegedly impacted by Gabriel. It could therefore be argued that he secretly believed in the circle of the chivalrous and was well aware of its rituals. Through our comparative analysis of the enigmas present in al-Suhrawardī's works and the literature on futuwwa, we can discern shared elements between spiritual chivalry and illumination. This observation lends support to the hypothesis of a potential connection between the creed of futuwwa and the path of illumination.
Conclusion
An examination of the various enigmas associated with futuwwa as depicted in both the literature on futuwwa and al-Suhrawardī's works reveals that, at its core, futuwwa pertains to the innate nature and the innate light. This concept encompasses the "alast" covenant, as well as the psychological virtues of chivalry rooted in the innate nature. In both literatures, the innate nature counts as the core of the chivalrous, although these symbols are not much evident in al-Suhrawardī’s works. In contrast to the Islamic literature on futuwwa, al-Suhrawardī does not view futuwwa as the ultimate culmination of the path of illumination. Alongside scholars such as ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, al-Suhrawardī regards futuwwa as an initial stage leading towards transcendent realms. Furthermore, throughout his works like Bustān al-qulūb (The orchard of the hearts) and Āwāz parr Jabraʾīl (The sound of Gabriel’s wing), al-Suhrawardī makes occasional references to virtuous qualities that bear resemblance to the virtues associated with chivalry.
Philosophy
gholamali moghaddam
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
Only few philosophical works, such as Hadi Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma (literally, commentary on verses concerning philosophy), are used as textbooks. Consisting of didactic verses composed and explained by Sabzavari, the book is regarded as one of his valuable works ...
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Abstract
Introduction
Only few philosophical works, such as Hadi Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma (literally, commentary on verses concerning philosophy), are used as textbooks. Consisting of didactic verses composed and explained by Sabzavari, the book is regarded as one of his valuable works and a main textbook on Islamic philosophy. The research question is how we can examine and evaluate this work as a textbook, or how we can re-write it to provide a more useful textbook.
I aim to foster a discourse of critique and evaluation of existing textbooks, encouraging and motivating the academic community to enhance and supplement these texts, and to provide up-to-date and useful versions of philosophical textbooks. Some critical views of Sharḥ al-manẓūma have been proposed in a number of books and articles, including Teaching philosophy: a comparative study of Sharḥ al-manẓūma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma (Izadi 2013, 59), “Haj Mulla Hadi Sabzavari and his Sharḥ al-manẓūma” (Fani 1983, 44), “A Comparative Study of Sharḥ al-manẓūma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma” (Taba’i Izadi 2001, 58), “Teaching Transcendent Philosophy or obfuscating and destroying it?” (Shijari 2016, 51).
Given its significance, Sharḥ al-manẓūma merits thorough examination and review to capitalize on its strengths and mitigate its weaknesses. The present article contributes by discussing specific passages of Sharḥ al-manẓūma to illustrate certain educational difficulties within the text in a tangible manner. In light of these challenges, suggestions are put forth for the improvement of this and other philosophy textbooks.
Research method
This article addresses a theoretical question using the library research method. In this method, after formulating the question and developing schematic and detailed plans, sources were provided, notes were taken, and an initial edit was conducted through thematic categorization of the notes. Subsequently, the finalized version was prepared after further reconsiderations.
Discussion
Apart from its strengths, Sharḥ al-Manẓūma, like all human creations, has weaknesses that are analyzed in detail in the article. One such weakness is its explanation of the content through versification and commentary mixed with the text. This has placed Sabzavari in a challenging position, making it difficult for him to clarify phrases and shape the structure of sentences, resulting in the complexity and difficulty of understanding phrases in Sharḥ al-manẓūma. Furthermore, other drawbacks of Sharḥ al-manẓūma include theoretical complications, criticisms of other views, and elaboration of objections. At times, Sabzavari unexpectedly adds fuel to the fire of lengthy theoretical debates and controversies, which do not align with the structure of the discussion and the reader’s capacity.
Among other issues with Sharḥ al-manẓūma is its excessive optimism towards views, a tendency to justify them, and taking a charitable stance towards them without due regard for the facts of the history of philosophy. Moreover, Sabzavari attributes and justifies various views in terms of religious teachings. This approach has cast doubts on some of the citations in the book (Mutahhari 2011, 304). Furthermore, the prominence of Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent philosophical approach in Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma, and latter’s alignment with mystical principles and discussions, have sometimes led Sabzavari to make intricate mystical remarks. However, understanding these remarks requires a beginner in philosophy to be relatively or even fully familiar with the issues of theoretical mysticism.
Conclusion and Suggestions
Although sharing many outstanding characteristics of standard textbooks, Sharḥ al-Manẓūma suffers from issues such as the complication of its versification, difficulties arising from the blending of texts and commentaries, literary digressions, inclusion of mystical allusions, excessive justification and a charitable stance, neglect of historical context, digressions in explanations of reasons, and personal interpretations of Quranic verses and hadiths. In these respects, the book lacks some characteristics of a textbook. A contribution of this article is its content analysis of some parts of the text in a concrete and tangible way. Finally, this study suggests that Sharḥ al-manẓūma should be re-written preserve its authenticity and yet be transformed to an up-to-date and useful textbook with as many faults removed as possible.
Philosophy
Abstract
Abstract: Mullasadra in Asfar attributes to Suhrawardi an argument against the existence of existence as follows: To exist means to have existence; now, if existence exists, it has existence, and by repeating this argument a vicious regress arises; then existence does not exist. The followers of transcendent ...
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Abstract: Mullasadra in Asfar attributes to Suhrawardi an argument against the existence of existence as follows: To exist means to have existence; now, if existence exists, it has existence, and by repeating this argument a vicious regress arises; then existence does not exist. The followers of transcendent philosophy after Mullasadra and almost all contemporary researchers attribute such an argument to him. I give some reasons against this attribution. Suhrawardi himself attributes versions of this argument to the opponents of the followers of the Peripatetics, namely Ibn Sahlan. Moreover, he claims that the followers of the Peripatetics have their own response to this argument. I provide some evidence for his claim. I then analyze his real regress arguments and show that none of them rests on a semantic premise about 'to exist'. Instead, they have metaphysical assumptions, as they should. I conclude that the said regress argument is a misinterpretation of his texts in Hihmat al-Ishragh. This misinterpretation goes back at least to Qutb al-Din Shirazi's commentary. Finally, I present a proper interpretation of Suhrawardi's real regress argument in Hihmat al-Ishragh. I argue that the struggle with this argument is harder than it seems: there is no easy way out of the argument other than to admit the unity of existence.
Philosophy
hasan abasi hasan Abadi
Abstract
Introduction
In Islamic religious texts and Islamic thought, humans are often described as the noblest of creations or God’s successors, owing to their superior faculties of thought and will, capacity for gratitude, and their responsibility to uphold the Trust. These Quranic perspectives are evident ...
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Introduction
In Islamic religious texts and Islamic thought, humans are often described as the noblest of creations or God’s successors, owing to their superior faculties of thought and will, capacity for gratitude, and their responsibility to uphold the Trust. These Quranic perspectives are evident in the works of Muslim philosophers, notably Averroes or Ibn Rushd. Averroes delves into the religious construction of humanity, employing terms such as "the noblest of creation," "God’s successor," "encompassing the universe," and "image of God." This article seeks to explore Averroes's approach to and explanation of this religious perspective, particularly focusing on the concept of human beings as the noblest of creation. Rather than delving into the nature of humanity itself, this inquiry revolves around the position of humans among all creatures and within the broader system of creation. Averroes's philosophy is analyzed to understand his conception of human beings within the religious realm, incorporating Quranic notions such as "God’s successor" and "the sensory world being dominated by humans." Notably, there has been a dearth of research on Averroes's religious approach to humanity, making this article a significant contribution to scholarship in the field.
Research Approach or Method
This research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology coupled with a critical approach.
Discussion and Results
The question of humanity being the noblest of creation and other related religious notions can be examined from two perspectives. Firstly, from a teleological standpoint, wherein the entire creation and all beings are believed to have purposes, humanity's purpose is considered superior to that of other sensory creatures. This perspective posits that humanity holds the highest status among sensory creations due to possessing a rational soul, which grants it superiority over other sensory beings. This reason is based on God's invention of the universe. Secondly, humanity's elevated status can be understood through the lens of grace, wherein humanity is seen as encompassing and dominating the entirety of creation, with everything created ultimately for humanity. This "grace-based" reason underscores humanity's position as the noblest of creation.
In terms of Averroes's own principles, the concept of humanity as the noblest of creation can be subjected to criticism, as it appears to contradict other statements made by him. For instance, in his work Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (Incoherence of the incoherence), Averroes suggests that it is impossible for a superior being to be created for an inferior one. Rather, it is the inferior being that is created for the superior one to attain perfection and eliminate its imperfections. According to this view, within the hierarchy of beings, celestial bodies hold a higher degree than humans, and humans serve as intermediaries between the intelligible and sensory realms, being closest to celestial bodies. Consequently, humans are deemed inferior to the heavens and celestial spheres. If it were posited that the universe is created for humanity, it would imply that a superior being is created for an inferior one, contradicting Averroes's own philosophical principles. Thus, according to the tenets of Averroes's philosophy, humanity cannot be regarded as the noblest of creation.
Conclusion
Averroes draws a distinction between the concepts of the "noblest of beings" and the "noblest of creation." According to his framework, God is the noblest of beings, being the most esteemed and perfect entity. However, among created beings, separate immaterial intellects hold the status of the noblest of creation, being pure actualities. Within the realm of sensory entities, humanity emerges as the noblest of beings and creation, primarily due to its possession of the rational soul, which serves as the purpose behind all forms of vegetative, animal, and human existence. From a religious standpoint, Averroes adheres to the idea of humanity as the noblest of creation, as evidenced by his reliance on transmitted religious texts. However, his philosophical perspective introduces the teleological aspect of the universe and humanity. He contends that nothing within the cosmos is futile or purposeless; rather, all beings have inherent purposes. Humanity, in particular, is characterized by its purposefulness, rationality, and essential progression towards perfection. In terms of the power of its rational soul and its capacity for reason, humanity stands as superior to all other beings.
