Document Type : Biannual Journal
Author
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Abstract
In his al-Asfār, Ṣadrā attributes an argument to al-Suhrawardī against the existence of existence, which goes as follows: “existent” means that which has existence. Now, if existence is existent, it will have existence. The repetition of this argument implies a regress of existences. Therefore, existence is not existent (Shīrāzī 1981, 39-40). Advocates of Transcendental Philosophy after Ṣadrā, such as al-Sabzawārī in his al-Manẓūma (1386 Sh/2007, 182), and all contemporary philosophers have attributed this argument to al-Suhrawardī, following Ṣadrā. Here is the question: Did al-Suhrawardī really present this argument? If not, who presented it? Furthermore, what is al-Suhrawardī’s real argument? The methodology employed by this research is a combination of historical and analytic methods. Research findings are as follows: I begin with historical evidence that this argument was not presented by al-Suhrawardī. By providing a classification of al-Suhrawardī’s arguments, I demonstrate that none of these arguments rest upon a premise regarding the concept of “existent.” Instead, they are all founded upon substantial metaphysical assumptions concerning existence: if existence is existent, then at least in some cases, it will be a contingent existent; possibility, unity, and necessity are objectively realized (that is, existent); and so on (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 1:340-364; 2:64-72). Moreover, al-Suhrawardī attributes various versions of these arguments to the opponents of the followers of Peripatetics, particularly Ibn Sahlān, asserting that they (the followers) already were aware of these arguments and presented plausible replies to them (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 1:354). I provide evidence from al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya (Rāzī 1411b AH/1990b, 29) and al-Maqāṣid (Taftāzānī 1409 AH/1988, 323-324) to show that al-Suhrawardī’s attributions to the followers of Peripatetics are correct, although there is no evidence for attributing the argument to Ibn Sahlān, except al-Suhrawardī’s own text. From these findings, I conclude that the regress argument mentioned by Ṣadrā is a misinterpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s text in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 2:64-65). This misinterpretation can be traced back to Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq (an exposition of al-Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq), where he mentions a similar argument, although he does not explicitly attribute it to al-Suhrawardī. It is not unlikely that, in his commentaries on Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s work, Ṣadrā was under the impression that Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s account was indeed an interpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s text, even though he does not explicitly mention this in his commentaries (Shīrāzī 1392 Sh/2013, 2:243-263). I then proceed to provide a plausible interpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s argument in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 2:64-65). I offer reasons to show that the argument is more complex than it initially seemed. In particular, in his reply to this argument, Ṣadrā argues that, first, existence does not fall under any category, although the necessary existent does not either (Shīrāzī 1392 Sh/1996, 2:250; Shīrāzī 1981, 52-53). Second, the criterion for being a category is, to some extent, epistemological (Shīrāzī 1981, 49). This implies that the class of existences cannot be considered a metaphysical categorization of things, and hence no shared metaphysical status could be assigned to them unless we acquiesce to the unity of existence. It seems that al-Suhrawardī’s regress argument compels advocates of “existence having existence” to believe in the unity of existence. Contrary to his usual practice, Ṣadrā ultimately acknowledges the unity of existence (Shīrāzī 1981, 71). However, al-Suhrawardī presents a third way: existence is not existent.
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