Philosophy
Hossein Atrak
Abstract
Introduction
One of the disputed stories in the Qur'an, which is related to the discussion of the infallibility of the prophets, is the story of Adam. Regardless of the controversies about whether this story is real or symbolic, the appearance of these verses indicate Adam's disobedience to God's command. ...
Read More
Introduction
One of the disputed stories in the Qur'an, which is related to the discussion of the infallibility of the prophets, is the story of Adam. Regardless of the controversies about whether this story is real or symbolic, the appearance of these verses indicate Adam's disobedience to God's command. A group of Islamic theologians, who believe in the absolute infallibility of the prophets, did not consider this disobedience of Adam as a sin and tried to justify his disobedience based on the concept of Taki Awla (abandoning a better act and doing good one). The purpose of this article is to examine the strength of this justification and criticize it.
Methods and Materials
This article has been done by descriptive-analytical method and collecting information from library sources.
Results and Discussion
In this research, the most important justification of Islamic and Shiite theologians for Adam's disobedience in eating from the forbidden tree, i.e. Tarki Awla or disobeying God's advisory prohibition was investigated. First, it was pointed out that Adam's action was not an instance of Tarki Awla, but it was the commission of God's compulsory prohibition. And since according to the Usulian rules, divine prohibitions indicate the existence of corruption in the prohibited act, it should be concluded that committing God's prohibition in any case, whether it is a compulsory, advisory or Tanzihi prohibition, is intellectually wrong, and committing a wrong act is not compatible with the prophets' infallibility thought.
In the following, the claim that God's command to Adam was advisory was examined. By stating the definitions and criteria of advisory prohibition mentioned in ʿIlm al-Usūl and applying them to Adam's actions, I came to the conclusion that God's command to Adam was not advisory.
Then, by proposing another fundamental discussion in ʿIlm al-Usūl that the negative imperative verb has initial semantic appearance in forbiddance unless there were some evidences indicating that action is permissible, it was shown that God's command to Adam was compulsory prohibition. Then, the evidences mentioned in the verses 117-119 of Surah Taha that Shia theologians claimed for being God's prohibition advisory was investigated and it was shown that the divine warning to Adam for leaving paradise and falling into hardships cannot be the proofs of being God's prohibition of eating from the tree as advisory prohibition.
In addition, the words such as disobedience, misleading, and injustice used in the Quran about Adam's actions have initial appearance in violation of God's compulsory prohibition and committing a sin.
On the other hand, on the assumption of accepting the justification of Tarki awla regarding Adam's disobedience, it seems that this justification is still incompatible with the theory of the prophets' absolute infallibility in the Shi'ite tradition. Because accepting that Adam's action was an instance of Tarki awla is in the meaning of accepting that he committed a mistake and was tempted by Satan, which the reasons for infallibility in the Shia theory are against both.
Conclusion
The final result is that, according to the author's opinion, the justification of Tarki Awla and being God's command advisory is not successful in defending the infallibility of Prophet Adam, and it is better to carry these verses in the same apparent meaning according to the principle of apparent authenticity or use other justifications for Adam's action that are mentioned in theological sources, such as: committing the prohibition of God in heaven, or the omission of a noun i.e. the children of Adam, or disobedience due to forgetfulness or error, etc. Of course, deciding on their strengths and weaknesses requires another research.
Philosophy
seyede Zeynab Hosseini; Ebrahim Noei; Mohsen Jahed
Abstract
Abstract
Determining the reason for legislating worships and their role in other human affairs provides the opportunity for perceptions such as the intrinsic purpose, negative dignity or positive and preparatory dignity of worships. The present research is trying to answer this question that in the ...
Read More
Abstract
Determining the reason for legislating worships and their role in other human affairs provides the opportunity for perceptions such as the intrinsic purpose, negative dignity or positive and preparatory dignity of worships. The present research is trying to answer this question that in the eyes of Sadr al-Mutalahin Shirazi, what is the status of worship in the origin, evolution or emergence of human conditions and knowledge? The purpose of this research is to discover the functions of worship in this process, which is followed by descriptive-analytical method. Sadra considers the rulings to be subject to the criteria of self-determination and considers the purpose of legislating rulings to be to provide general benefit and general expediency to humans. Based on the findings of this research, in explaining the relationship between actions, circumstances and knowledge, the existence of real criteria for worship should be accepted and focused on the interaction between human affairs and the process of the two ascending and descending arcs of the voluntary course of man. According to Sadra, the aforementioned three authorities have a bilateral and multilateral relationship, and discovering this relationship is possible through understanding the interactive movement between the soul and the body and explaining the collective reality of human beings. Paying attention to the interactive relationship and the positive-preparatory interaction between the soul and the body, and the concession and escalation of the citizen of the two, shows that actions in the arc of ascent have non-existent, preparatory and preliminary status, and in the arc of descent, they have existential and fruitful status.
Introduction
Man is a being who has a benefit from the lower world, i.e. the world, and a share from the upper world, i.e. the hereafter. Every religious practice also has an external shell and an internal core; The shell is related to this world and its core is related to the hereafter, just as the Sharia's meaning of the purity of clothes and body is the purity of the heart, which is the inner core, and the purity of the heart is to purify it from religious pollution such as disbelief and reprehensible filth. Morality is like envy, miserliness, extravagance, similarly, the meaning of the Shariah of any worship is the effect it creates in the heart. (Sadr al-Din Shirazi, 1366 A: 1/279) If there are no real benefits and harms behind the acts of worship, then talking about the effect of action in the creation of knowledge will not have the same meaning.
Method
In the upcoming article, we will analyze the wisdom of the law of worship or commitment to worship (by relying on and analyzing the texts of the Sadras). Sadra believes in the basis of rulings on merits and demerits and documents Sharia rulings on merits and demerits. It is important to address this issue because it states whether the desired materials are genuine in essence and purpose or are they merely preparatory and preliminary? For this purpose, based on the thoughts of Sadrul Matalhin Shirazi, the following of the rulings is explained first, and then the nonexistent or existential dignity of the phrase, and in other words, their preparatory or positive dignity, is explained.
Discussion /Result
The results obtained from the above research can be summarized in the following axes:
Each religious authority has three components: science, present and action. The relationship between these three is one-sided and multilateral. The mechanism of the effect of each of these three things on the other is as follows. In the ascending arc, there is a movement from the side of action to the side of knowledge. Action by repetition creates the queen, and the queen causes the birth of knowledge. In the descending arc, science strengthens the properties and the properties produce a new action.
Each of the knowledge, conditions and actions are valid and reliable. Knowledge and knowledge are both the beginning of states and actions and the end of them. As science and knowledge are both subject and end.
Acts and acts of worship have both nonexistent and existential dignity. The lack of dignity of worship is related to the arc of the ascension, which causes the repetition of the deeds of the queens. Following the repetition of the action, the effect and state that arises in the soul, becomes solid and becomes a habit. The more the action is repeated, the more the current becomes the queen. Repetition of actions, in Sadra's eyes, removes obstacles and hijabs so that the soul can enjoy possessions; Therefore, repeating the actions is not from the appropriate Sunnah, but from the Sunnah of the removal of obstacles and hijab, which are non-existent matters. Also, when the soul reaches the level of possessing and being capable of possessing a conscience, it removes the veils of acquiring knowledge. Therefore, in Sadra's view, action is important due to the role it plays in self-fulfillment and knowledge acquisition, which is a secondary and transverse role.
Existential dignity of worship and actions finds its meaning in the arc of descent and movement from knowledge to states and then actions. In this movement, action is considered as the fruit of science, and knowledge is a prelude to action as required by science. With this knowledge, man performs worship and avoids sins.
Worships because of their role in reaching the knowledge of God. are ranked. Sins are also ranked due to the negative role they have in acquiring knowledge. Therefore, the greatest sin is to block the way to divine knowledge.
Philosophy
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
Recently, Morteza Hajhosseini (2023) published his second edition of the book (2017) Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A new Outlook on Elements of Logic, where he developed various non-standard logical systems based on specific philosophical foundations. His systems consist of the following five:
A ...
Read More
Recently, Morteza Hajhosseini (2023) published his second edition of the book (2017) Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A new Outlook on Elements of Logic, where he developed various non-standard logical systems based on specific philosophical foundations. His systems consist of the following five:
A truth-functional propositional system,
A non-truth-functional propositional system,
Adding the non-truth-functional implication of the second system to the whole first one,
Adding the truth-functional conjunction and disjunction of the first system to the whole second one,
Combining the whole two systems into a new comprehensive propositional.
In other papers, I reported extensively Hajhosseini’s logical systems and criticized them from a formal point of view only (Fallahi 2023a, 2023b, 2023c, 2023d). In a fifth paper, I regarded historical aspects of Hajhosseini’s logical systems and his claims of innovation (Fallahi 2023e). In the sixth paper, I delved into his epistemological incentives and showed that he confused logical and epistemological purposes (Fallahi 2023f). In this paper, eventually, I seek to criticize the philosophical foundations for Hajhosseini’s logical systems.
Some of the philosophical foundations of these logical systems are mentioned with some brief descriptions as follows:
Axioms and postulates are different.
What is to be used in logic are the axioms, not the postulates.
According to Hajhosseini, axioms and postulates are different from each other, and it is axioms that are useful for logic, not postulates; therefore, logical systems should have axioms and not postulates. I show that the traditional distinction between axioms and postulates is an epistemological one and is not useful for logic.
Hajhosseini considered postulates also to be different from logical truths and theorems. Although the difference of axioms/postulates with respect to theorems can be accepted in a way, the difference of axioms/postulates with respect to logical truths is not very acceptable because the axioms/postulates are true in all models and a fortiori, they are to be considered logical truths.
Also, Hajhosseini’s arguments that axioms cannot be deduced from other theorems are epistemological arguments and not logical ones. Also, Hajhosseini’s claim that the axioms are not even based on themselves is a claim that conflicts with some of Hajhosseini’s other words. Also, his claim that adding axioms or inconsistent propositions does not make arguments incorrect or invalid is in conflict with the definitions of "correctness" and "validity" in the book.
It is impossible to infer a formula and its negation from the same premises.
Hajhosseini’s arguments that impossible premises do not entail a proposition as well as its negation are epistemological arguments and not logical ones.
A contrafactual conditional is actually a bi-conditional.
Hajhosseini uses his logical systems to explain contrafactual conditional, but what I understand from his explanations, it seems to me that he interprets them as biconditionals. However, interpreting the counterfactual conditional as a biconditional is not consistent with the commonplace counterfactual conditional examples.
Many well-formed formulas in mathematical logic are not meaningful.
Hajhosseini claims sentences such as “if I am typing then two is even”, although well-formed in modern logic, are meaningless. It should be noted that the well-formed formulas of the language of the modern logics (both classical and non-classical) are all meaningful. The most that can be said about them is that some of them are very complicated or (very) false, but complicatedness—or even falsehood—does not mean meaningless. Also, some of these complex formulas are not logical theorems or logical truths, but some of them are even contradictory to logical theorems and therefore are logical falsehoods, but these do not mean nonsense.
The antecedent and consequent of a conditional must be consistent.
This is familiar under the name “Boethius rule” in the history of logic, which Hajhosseini named it “Hajhosseini's rule”. I think it is generally incorrect and must be conditioned by "consistency of the antecedent", otherwise it conflicts with numerous examples of conditionals whose antecedent and consequent are incompatible.
Natural intuition (= our innate intuition of natural language) is the only (or the most important) criterion for evaluating logics.
Hajhosseini has claimed in many places that his systems agree with intuition; and as a result, the existing classical and non-classical logics are all counter-intuitive. I show that the concept of "intuitiveness" is not so simple and accessible that he claims for himself with such intensity and severity and with this abundance and denial for others. I put forth the possibility that perhaps the logical concepts used (including, the concept of "implication" and "inference") are fundamentally vague and indeterminate, and the intuitions of classical and non-classical logicians, including Hajhosseini himself, are a kind of conventional but unconscious precision and not Intuition in the strict sense of the word. Despite such a possibility, one should be much more cautious in using the word "intuitive".
Classical logic assumes that “rationality” is included in “extensionality”.
Hajhosseini claims that the classical logic intentional or non-truth-functional languages are rational ones. I show that this philosophical premise of "confining “rationality” in “extensionality”" has not been well explained in the book and has not been referred to the sources in classical logicians’ works.
Implication must be explained by causation.
Contrary to this, I show that the analysis of the metaphysical issue of "causation" has nothing to do with the logical issue of "implication" and the two should not be compared. For example, circularity is impossible in "causation" but possible in "implication". Of course, when metaphysical causation is established, logical implication is also established, but the opposite is not true because every proposition implies itself, but it is not its own cause. Also, the implication can be symmetric but causation is not.
Traditional logic as a source of inspiration.
Hajhosseini often refers to traditional logic as if it were his source of inspiration. But it is debatable because the difference between the viewpoints of traditional logicians is so wide and surprising that without extensive familiarity with the history of traditional logic, it is impossible to understand that most of the objections of the new logic to the traditional logic were already raised in the traditional logic itself.
Philosophy
Morteza Motavalli; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the ...
Read More
AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the testimony of others for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God. Another line of study were philosophers and logicians, who regarded testimony as one of the principles of judgement. At the same time that he was participating in these two lines of studies, Suhrawardī initiated a third line of study in his theology. In this paper, we will show Suhrawardī's contribution in this topic with two analytical and historical approaches.Suhrawardī's Epistemology of TestimonySuhrawardī has spoken about testimony in three places of his works: in logic when enumerating the principles of judgements, in methodology of jurisprudence when discussing religious proofs, and in theology when talking about the doctrine of the nobler contingent to prove platonic forms.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Logical-Fārābī and Avicenna had talked about propositions taken from the testimony of others in their logic when discussing the first principles. With this in his hand, Suhrawardī begins to contemplate on the issue. He identifies two kinds of propositions that are related to testimony: accepted premises (maqbūlāt) and widely transmitted propositions (mutawātirāt). Accepted premises are propositions that we accept from someone we have good opinion of. In al-Talwīhāt, he adds that this good opinion is because of something celestial in that person or because he is more intelligent or religious. Widely transmitted premises are propositions that we become certain of because of the plethora of the testimonies of others. He, against others, does not require for what is testified to be perceptual/sensible. This is a smart move because he demonstrates the credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer using exactly the widely transmitted propositions.Suhrawardī makes four important movements that are contrary to the Avicennan peripatetic tradition-four movements that cannot be simply passed by. They become clearer only when they are considered in the historical context and with regard to al-Ghazālī's statements. First of all, he eliminates Peripatetics’ intuitive propositions and innate propositions from the list of certain principles. Second, he brings widely transmitted and experiential propositions under one title. Thirdly, he gives them the name of intuitive propositions, while what he means by intuition is its literal meaning, not its peripatetic terminological meaning. And the fourth is that he attends to the role of evidences in them.It seems, from what we have said so far in addition to what will come in the next section from al-Ghazālī and his influence on Suhrawardī, that he thinks of the accumulated opinions as the reason why widely transmitted propositions are certain.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Methodology of JurisprudenceOne of religious proofs for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God is what is transmitted by testimony. Here, Suhrawardī takes one of al-Ghazālī's books-i.e., al-Mustaṣfā-and writes accordingly. One of al-Ghazālī's contributions in this discussion is that he eliminates intuitive propositions from the six self-evident propositions and introduces another sixth way to knowledge base on evidences. Suhrawardī takes the idea of evidences and their role in knowledge firmly. It is from here that we can see the idea of evidences in his philosophical works.He also mentions some requirements for the one who gives testimony such as being just and having good vision. This, and other things, could show that he is not totally individualist and internalist about testimony.Testimony in Suhrawardī's TheologyIn theology, Suhrawardī, innovatively and for the first time, brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer. Sometimes, testimony is in important matters and by experts. When that is the case, Suhrawardī says, one or two testimony is enough to become certain about what is testified. For example, when one or two astronomers testify about something related to their specialty, that brings us knowledge and certainty about that thing. This is the way of science. He continues that when this is so, the testimony of religious experiencers should also bring us knowledge. Here, testimony is as valuable as testimony in science, and even more valuable. This is because the number of testifiers here are more, they are sages and prophets that moral truth is certain in them, and their testimony is about what they have seen directly not what they have inferred from their observations.ConclusionAlthough Suhrawardī relies heavily on al-Fārābi, Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī, he makes a great contribution to the epistemology of testimony. His point that the certainty of widely transmitted propositions is because of the accumulated opinions developed by Shahīd Ṣadr later on. His brilliant innovation is that he brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer.
Philosophy
fateme soleimani
Abstract
Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. ...
Read More
Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. Several factors, such as the imaginative faculty, the faculty of theoretical and practical reason, the craving faculty, and will, contribute to this process. Accordingly, various types of human action are formed given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties. Hence, the existence of various possibilities and circumstances for the interactions of these principles demand different models for human action. A consideration and comparison of these factors can play a role in analyzing and explaining the human action as well as presenting various solutions to change, modify, or even reinforce human behaviors. To do so, a survey was conducted in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā deploying the descriptive-analytic method to identify various models of human action and pinpoint their differences and the conditions in which they occur. The main problem of this research is:
What is the fundamental and basic model of the human action and what are the models branching from them?
The secondary questions include the following:
How do models of human action differ from each other and from the model of action in animals?
What is the role of temperament in the model of human actions?
Research Background
Thus far, several studies have been carried out concerning the philosophy of action and how an action is produced within the framework of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Rezaee and Houshangi (2013) in “The process of the production of human voluntary action,” Shahgoli (2019) in “Principles of action in the views of Fārābī and Mullā Ṣadrā,” and Mirhadi (2018) in “Philosophy of action in Transcendent philosophy” aim to introduce the principles and preliminaries of action and the stages of the production of an action from the perspective of Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā. Vafaeian and Gharamaleki (2017) in “An ontological analysis of the process of the production of actions from the perspectives of Avicenna and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn” assert that they are concerned with the ontological status of the principles of the production of action. Soleimani (2020) in “The place of action in human existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view” provides an account of the formation of action and the longitudinal relationship between its principles, stating that Mullā Ṣadrā views the inner reality of an action as its longitudinal principles, while external action is solely a manifestation and expression of this longitudinal chain of the functioning of perceptual and motive faculties of the soul. Varzdar and Ketabchi (2022) in “The study of the function of practical reason in the process of action production in Transcendent philosophy” are focused on the role of practical reason in the process of the production of actions.
The contribution of the present research, which sets it apart from the above-mentioned studies, is that it addresses the numerous models and schemas of the order and mode of the functioning of the formative principles and elements of action.
Conclusion
When doing an action, the human individual employs the numerous faculties and powers of their soul, including perceptual and motive faculties. Given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties, various types of human action are formed. Thus, a model and schema can be determined for each type of human action. All conceivable models of human action involve a transition from the cognitive principle to determination, will, and production of the outer overt action. In other words, all varieties of human actions are formed based on a basic model. This foundational model shows the general course of the soul’s linear motion from the highest to the lowest principles that contribute to the actualization of action.
Regarding the basic fundamental model of human action, stages can be devised as follows:
In the first stage, the desired goal and objective are determined by theoretical reason. In the second, the proper action to fulfil the goal is selected and confirmed by practical reason. In the third, the requisite proper urge and motivation are produced by the craving faculty under the governance of practical reason. In the fourth, rational urge prevails and intensifies and then determination and will are formed for doing the action.
In the model of deterministic action, the urge resulting from the confirmation by practical reason is not agreeable to nature, but the action is selected and preferred by the cognitive system and then confirmed by reason. Accordingly, an action not being agreeable is compatible with its volitional and free character.
In the model of animal action, humans just like animals have a presence-based comprehension of an instinctive impulse and need within themselves, then conceive a particular action in their imaginative faculty as well as the pleasure or pain associated with the action, and then through appetitive or irascible faculties, an urge or repulsion towards the action ill be produced in the individual. If the urge is bolstered and prevails, the will to do or omit the action will be formed.
In any event, Ṣadrā believes that urge and will in humans are governed by reason. It is only in this case that the will can be rational and human. However, if the urge and will are governed by instincts, senses, and imagination, which yields a speculative judgment by reason, the will is animal.
When the action occurs, its wanted or unwanted consequences can have an effect on the constitutive elements of the action. This means that they have a reinforcing or undermining effect on instincts and inner impulses, knowledge, desire, and will. Nevertheless, this effect is only indirect. In case there is a positive effect, which reinforces the principles of an action, the action will be repeated frequently. This will lead to a particular psychological habit in the individual, which is called a “temperament” or “character.” According to the principles of Sadraean philosophy, a soul that possesses a temperament changes its substantial form, and given the new stage of its psychological forms, it comes to have new and stronger faculties and powers. Later, the principles of the action will be further solidified and their functioning in inducing actions will be quicker, such that the actions associated with that stage of the soul will be produced more easily.
Philosophy
Keramat Varzdar; Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi
Abstract
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent ...
Read More
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
Philosophy
Abstract
Abstract: Mullasadra in Asfar attributes to Suhrawardi an argument against the existence of existence as follows: To exist means to have existence; now, if existence exists, it has existence, and by repeating this argument a vicious regress arises; then existence does not exist. The followers of transcendent ...
Read More
Abstract: Mullasadra in Asfar attributes to Suhrawardi an argument against the existence of existence as follows: To exist means to have existence; now, if existence exists, it has existence, and by repeating this argument a vicious regress arises; then existence does not exist. The followers of transcendent philosophy after Mullasadra and almost all contemporary researchers attribute such an argument to him. I give some reasons against this attribution. Suhrawardi himself attributes versions of this argument to the opponents of the followers of the Peripatetics, namely Ibn Sahlan. Moreover, he claims that the followers of the Peripatetics have their own response to this argument. I provide some evidence for his claim. I then analyze his real regress arguments and show that none of them rests on a semantic premise about 'to exist'. Instead, they have metaphysical assumptions, as they should. I conclude that the said regress argument is a misinterpretation of his texts in Hihmat al-Ishragh. This misinterpretation goes back at least to Qutb al-Din Shirazi's commentary. Finally, I present a proper interpretation of Suhrawardi's real regress argument in Hihmat al-Ishragh. I argue that the struggle with this argument is harder than it seems: there is no easy way out of the argument other than to admit the unity of existence.
Philosophy
ali aqajani
Abstract
Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence ...
Read More
Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence with related concepts such as religion, spirituality, government, secularism and other concepts and forms one of the challenges in the field of understanding politics.
Al-Farabi (870-950 A.H.) has occupied a very high and irreplaceable place in the history of Islamic philosophy. Farabi's coverage of various sciences in the realm of the Islamic world is amazing. The depth of thinking and the breadth of Farabi's intellectual horizon in terms of philosophy, especially political philosophy, is exemplary and rare. He is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to the world and scholars of thought, including in ethics, politics and their relationship. Based on this, the hypothesis of the article is that the practical manifestation and intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy should be found in some hybrid concepts. On this basis, why and how the relationship between ethics and politics is one of the problems and theoretical and practical issues of political science and ethics science, which various approaches and different viewpoints have been used to celebrate it. One of the most important efforts is related to the prominent Muslim political philosopher Abu Nasr Farabi. The hypothesis of the article seeks to answer the question of Farabi's approach to the relationship between ethics and politics based on the theoretical framework that the concepts of utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights are the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy.
Method:Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of the article is a combination of three questions and four approaches. which the article measures and clarifies Farabi's point of view towards them:
1: Three questions: The relationship between ethics and politics can be questioned in three ways. (Kechoyan 1382: 14). The first direction is whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, can basically pursue moral goals in the private sphere? The second question is whether the field of politics, ethics, or in more general terms, has its own prescriptive requirements in distinction from ethics and individual prescriptions or not? The third question refers to the field of tools and methods or the way of pursuing and applying the policies and goals of the public domain (ibid. 15). Do we necessarily have to use ethical methods in politics, or is the way of achieving and pursuing goals in politics independent of moral judgments (ibid., 15).
Four theories: On another level, the relationship between ethics and politics can be gathered and analyzed in four theories. Theories of separation of ethics from politics, compliance of ethics with politics, two-level ethics and the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). The fourth theory is the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). According to this theory, ethics is individual politics and politics is collective ethics. Ethics and politics are both branches of practical wisdom and seek to ensure human happiness.
Discussion:
Farabi has divided civil science into two theoretical and practical parts. He considers ethics as a theoretical part and politics as a practical part. In Farabi's commentary, Ibn Rushd clearly spoke about the separation of the two sciences. But Farabi himself did not try to separate the theoretical aspect from the practical aspect. The relationship between ethics and politics was considered from several angles. From one point of view, several questions were raised to which Farabi's answer should be received. The first question was whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, should pursue moral goals in the private sphere or not? Farabi's answer to this question is positive. Unlike today's political philosophy in the West, they do not believe in the separation of public and private spheres and consider them to be the same. Therefore, it should be said that according to him, ethics and politics are a science that has a single subject and goal. According to him, the goal of ethics and politics is happiness.
The second question was whether politics, as a public sphere, morally creates a sphere independent of the private sphere with its own special logic or not? According to Farabi, the individual moral sphere is not separate from the social moral sphere, and the principles governing them and the goals and objectives of both are common. The complexity of social issues is more than individual issues, but this cannot create a distinct morality.
Another question was whether ethical methods must be used in politics or whether having ethical goals is enough and whether a politician should act ethically. From Farabi's point of view, the science of ethics is not limited to individual moral reform, but also includes social reform, and the duty of the ruler and government in the society is to develop moral values, which must necessarily be attributed to it. On this basis, from Farabi's point of view, the theories of separation of ethics from politics, subordination of ethics to politics, are completely rejected; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics, in the sense of subordination of politics to ethics (in the sense of consistent moral standards).
Farabi considers the necessity of community to be certain, but what does he consider its origin? Is it natural, natural, voluntary or rational or instinctive? Farabi, except for the first point of view, which considered social life not natural but caused by external emergency. It accepts the rest of the approaches. But in general, he has an instrumental attitude towards society and considers it a means to achieve perfection and happiness.
Farabi introduces will as having three branches. The first branch of passion comes from feeling. The second category of excitement is caused by imagination. The third branch of passion comes from speech and thinking, which Farabi calls this kind of free will. Like Aristotle, Farabi believes that moderation is a virtue.
Conclusion:
Farabi is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to scholars and scholars of thought, including ethics, politics and their relationship, which is one of the ancient and very broad concepts. The article measures Farabi's view on the relationship between ethics and politics (issue) based on the theoretical framework of the article, which is a combination of three questions and four approaches: the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, two-level ethics, and the unity of ethics and politics (method). The hypothesis of the article, which is the second innovation of the article compared to homogeneous articles, considers some concepts such as utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights as the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy. (innovation) Based on this, Farabi considers the goal of ethics and politics to be the same; Ethics has a political nature and politics has a moral nature. The theories of the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, have been completely ruled out; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics in the sense of following politics from ethics (in the sense of compatible ethical standards). (Findings) According to this, Farabi is a philosopher who does not find force and domination, conquest and the sword as a way to build an ethical culture. It considers happiness both in terms of belief and in relation to society. The government is morally based on public opinion and will. He based his utopia on voluntary justice based on virtue and rejects natural justice, and in his opinion, all citizens have rights and have a fair share in society. (Result)
Philosophy
Mansour Imanpour
Abstract
Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential ...
Read More
Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential realms. This has faced them with puzzling questions, including the one pertaining to the relationship between constant (thābit) and changeable (mutaghayyir) existents.
To illustrate, it should be noted that, in Islamic philosophy, existential realms are generally divided into the realm of purely immaterial entities and that of material entities. On another division, they are partitioned into three realms: intellectual (ʿaqlī), imaginal (mithāl), and natural. The relations between entities existing in these realms is explained in terms of the principle of causation. Now, the question arises: given one of the implications of this principle, namely impossibility of the deviation of an effect from its cause, how could actual changeable entities in the natural world be issued forth from a constant immaterial entity? Let us elaborate the question as follows: in the natural world, there are various types of changes, including “generation” (kawn) and “corruption” (fisād), accidental changes (that is, changes in accidents or properties [aʿrāḍ]), and as per Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, substantial changes (changes in substance or jawhar). It goes without saying that if the changeable entity in question is attributed to a constant unchanging complete cause, then the effect has indeed deviated from its cause in two ways: (a) Why, despite the existence of the cause, does the changing effect, which is a part or stage of the motion, become nonexistent and deviate from its complete cause? (b) Why, despite the existence of the complete cause, does the effect (namely, the motion with all its parts) fail to become existent and deviate from its cause?
Muslim philosophers have offered various theories to solve this predicament. These theories were subject to debates over the history of Islamic philosophy. Many articles and books have been written in this regard, each tackling a dimension or some dimensions of this problem.
This article does not aim to reiterate or provide a literature review of these solutions. Instead, it provides a brief classification and analysis of these theories and then yields a novel theory by drawing upon the philosophical principles of Mullā Ṣadrā.
Research Methodology
This article begins with a classification and analysis of the accounts provided by the main books and studies on this question by deploying the descriptive and analytical method. Finally, it makes a case for a novel theory in terms of a final formulation of the theory of substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya).
Discussion and Results
The problem of the relation between changeable and constant entities is proposed within the framework of Islamic philosophy, particularly its rendition of the law of causation and its implications. To address this formidable challenge, Muslim philosophers have proposed various accounts in terms of their philosophical principles and structures. However, these solutions have often faced challenges, either based on their assumptions in natural sciences or due to the structure and content of their solutions.
The finding of this article regarding the problem of relation between constant and changeable entities in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy is that, in final analysis, the problem involves two types of an effect’s deviation from its cause: (1) Despite the constancy of the cause, one part or stage of the effect becomes nonexistent, and (2) despite the existence of the constant cause, all parts or stages of the cause fail to become existent.
As for (1), it may be suggested that the renewed effect emanating from the constant cause does not lose any perfection. This way, it does not deviate from its cause. What becomes nonexistent in this process is not an existential perfection but an imperfection or flaw, the negation of which amounts to some sort of affirmation. Accordingly, in this process of continuous flourishing, the moving existence does not come to lack a perfection or an actuality, and hence, the effect does not deviate from its cause by losing part of it despite the cause’s existence. However, it is not straightforward to address (2), since it may be said that the realization of a subsequent part or stage of something depends on the realization of its preceding part or stage. That being the case, the failure of the subsequent parts and stages to come to existence in the first stage is not a deviation of the effect from its cause, but is because its condition or its preparatory cause has failed to exist. This means that, in this case too, the effect has not indeed deviated from its complete cause.
Conclusion
“Substantial motion” ultimately goes back to the evolution of a substantial existence. This perfection-seeking existence does not drive itself from potentiality to actuality; that is, it does not bestow perfection upon itself. It always has an emanating, perfection-giving entity that continuously emanates forms upon it, compensating its deficiencies and promoting its existence. During this continuous emanation, what happens to the changing effect is that its existence is constructed and becomes thriving. In this process, none of its parts or perfections disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs. Moreover, the emanating cause is not an absolute unconstrained for the subsequent parts or stages. Thus, their absence in the realm of the first part or stage does not count as deviation from the complete cause. On this account, the constant entity emanates an existence that inherently involves change, in light of which the existential perfection does not disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs.
Philosophy
Nadia MAFTOUNI; Fataneh TavanaPanah; ghasemali koucnnani
Abstract
ملکات نقشهای متعددی در فلسفه اسلامی دارند. گاهی در مبادی صدور فعل از حیث مبادی خلقی، گاهی از جهات انسانشناسانه و در مواردی در مبناشناسی احوالات روانشناختی، امیال ...
Read More
ملکات نقشهای متعددی در فلسفه اسلامی دارند. گاهی در مبادی صدور فعل از حیث مبادی خلقی، گاهی از جهات انسانشناسانه و در مواردی در مبناشناسی احوالات روانشناختی، امیال و گرایشات نفسانی ملکات مورد توجه هستند. مساله این تحقیق بررسی ابعاد شناختی و روانشناختی ملکات است که در ارتباط با ساختارهای ادراکی و سازمانیافتگی ادراک محسوب میشود. آیا علاوه بر نقشهای خلقی، از تاثیر ملکات در سطح اندیشه و احساس نیز میتوان سخن گفت؟ در این تحقیق با روشی توصیفی- تحلیلی به مساله حاضر پاسخ داده میشود. یافتههای این تحقیق حاکی از آن است که تعابیری همچون ملکات نطقی و عقلی ناظر به ابعاد شناختی ملکات است. نقش ملکات در جهتدهی و هدایت ادراکات و احوالات روانی و نیز معنابخشی و پردازش اطلاعات از سویی و اهمیت آنها به عنوان عوامل غیرشناختی شکل گیری باورها از سویی دیگر از نتایج این تحقیق محسوب میشود. تفکیک «معارف متمکن» حاصل از ملکات و «معارف غیر متمکن» و تحلیل هر یک در نفس، ناظر به جایگاه شناختی و روانشناختی ملکات است. نظم در ناحیه افکار و ارائه ایدههای از پیش تعیین شده و نیز فرضهای معین متناسب با ساختار در ارتباط با ملکات تبیینپذیر است. در بعد شناختی فارابی به نقش عادت و ملکات در تعیین و تعین مواضع اندیشهورزی و جایگاه مغالطی ملکات عطف توجه میکند و در بعد روانشناختی تاثیر ملکات بر امیال و گرایشات، تصمیم و انتخاب محل تامل است.
Philosophy
ali asghar jafari valani
Abstract
Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept ...
Read More
Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept in an epistemological context, asserting that Avicenna’s flying man not only exists, but also knows that he exists. Such an interpretation of the flying man argument seems to be at odds with his own principles, his passages throughout his works, and what he pursued to establish through this scenario.
Method
Deploying a descriptive and analytical method, it may be said that
Findings: Avicenna believes that perception begins from senses, and the first stage of the human reason is material or hylic reason or pure potentiality. Moreover, there is a difference between consciousness (shuʿūr) that is actually obtained by humans since the beginning of their existence and consciousness of consciousness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-shuʿūr), which he believes to be a potential character that needs to be acquired, while our primary consciousness of the soul is the existence of our soul. Thus, the flying man is solely the existence and presence of the soul before any actual consciousness.
Results
In view of the fact that man was suspended in space at the beginning of his creation and Ibn Sina considers the human soul to be the event of the body and in the order of the beast intellect and pure power, which lacks any perception and becomes actual through sensory perception, it should be said : The human being suspended in Ibn Sina's space can have an existential quality and in fact, he is observing the position of presence, existence, and mere existence. In addition, Ibn Sina, emphasizing the two positions of consciousness and consciousness to consciousness, believes that consciousness is actually and permanently suspended in man, but consciousness to consciousness is potential in him. Therefore, it seems that the soul at the beginning of creation, although it is present and proven, but it cannot be said that it has knowledge of itself; That is, the soul initially lacks attention to itself, and this lack of attention prevents any self-perception of the soul.
Innovation: In fact, regarding "Avicenna's suspended human being in space", it can only be said that "a human being is conscious (without any actual awareness)", but it cannot be said: "In addition, because this human being is conscious, he knows that he is like this." ».
Philosophy
gholamali moghaddam
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
Only few philosophical works, such as Hadi Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma (literally, commentary on verses concerning philosophy), are used as textbooks. Consisting of didactic verses composed and explained by Sabzavari, the book is regarded as one of his valuable works ...
Read More
Abstract
Introduction
Only few philosophical works, such as Hadi Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma (literally, commentary on verses concerning philosophy), are used as textbooks. Consisting of didactic verses composed and explained by Sabzavari, the book is regarded as one of his valuable works and a main textbook on Islamic philosophy. The research question is how we can examine and evaluate this work as a textbook, or how we can re-write it to provide a more useful textbook.
I aim to foster a discourse of critique and evaluation of existing textbooks, encouraging and motivating the academic community to enhance and supplement these texts, and to provide up-to-date and useful versions of philosophical textbooks. Some critical views of Sharḥ al-manẓūma have been proposed in a number of books and articles, including Teaching philosophy: a comparative study of Sharḥ al-manẓūma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma (Izadi 2013, 59), “Haj Mulla Hadi Sabzavari and his Sharḥ al-manẓūma” (Fani 1983, 44), “A Comparative Study of Sharḥ al-manẓūma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma” (Taba’i Izadi 2001, 58), “Teaching Transcendent Philosophy or obfuscating and destroying it?” (Shijari 2016, 51).
Given its significance, Sharḥ al-manẓūma merits thorough examination and review to capitalize on its strengths and mitigate its weaknesses. The present article contributes by discussing specific passages of Sharḥ al-manẓūma to illustrate certain educational difficulties within the text in a tangible manner. In light of these challenges, suggestions are put forth for the improvement of this and other philosophy textbooks.
Research method
This article addresses a theoretical question using the library research method. In this method, after formulating the question and developing schematic and detailed plans, sources were provided, notes were taken, and an initial edit was conducted through thematic categorization of the notes. Subsequently, the finalized version was prepared after further reconsiderations.
Discussion
Apart from its strengths, Sharḥ al-Manẓūma, like all human creations, has weaknesses that are analyzed in detail in the article. One such weakness is its explanation of the content through versification and commentary mixed with the text. This has placed Sabzavari in a challenging position, making it difficult for him to clarify phrases and shape the structure of sentences, resulting in the complexity and difficulty of understanding phrases in Sharḥ al-manẓūma. Furthermore, other drawbacks of Sharḥ al-manẓūma include theoretical complications, criticisms of other views, and elaboration of objections. At times, Sabzavari unexpectedly adds fuel to the fire of lengthy theoretical debates and controversies, which do not align with the structure of the discussion and the reader’s capacity.
Among other issues with Sharḥ al-manẓūma is its excessive optimism towards views, a tendency to justify them, and taking a charitable stance towards them without due regard for the facts of the history of philosophy. Moreover, Sabzavari attributes and justifies various views in terms of religious teachings. This approach has cast doubts on some of the citations in the book (Mutahhari 2011, 304). Furthermore, the prominence of Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent philosophical approach in Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma, and latter’s alignment with mystical principles and discussions, have sometimes led Sabzavari to make intricate mystical remarks. However, understanding these remarks requires a beginner in philosophy to be relatively or even fully familiar with the issues of theoretical mysticism.
Conclusion and Suggestions
Although sharing many outstanding characteristics of standard textbooks, Sharḥ al-Manẓūma suffers from issues such as the complication of its versification, difficulties arising from the blending of texts and commentaries, literary digressions, inclusion of mystical allusions, excessive justification and a charitable stance, neglect of historical context, digressions in explanations of reasons, and personal interpretations of Quranic verses and hadiths. In these respects, the book lacks some characteristics of a textbook. A contribution of this article is its content analysis of some parts of the text in a concrete and tangible way. Finally, this study suggests that Sharḥ al-manẓūma should be re-written preserve its authenticity and yet be transformed to an up-to-date and useful textbook with as many faults removed as possible.
Philosophy
Mahdi Baniasadi Baghmirani; Sayed Behshid Hosseini; Azadeh Shahcheraghi
Abstract
Epistemological issues in architecture are related to the movement of people in space. According to the philosophical concept of movement and MullāṢadrā's theory of substantial motion, perception refers to people's gradual perception of architectural spaces. Deep understanding of mosque-school spaces ...
Read More
Epistemological issues in architecture are related to the movement of people in space. According to the philosophical concept of movement and MullāṢadrā's theory of substantial motion, perception refers to people's gradual perception of architectural spaces. Deep understanding of mosque-school spaces is not possible without movement. In order to achieve a deep understanding of these spaces, the observer must move in the space, and after experiencing physical and mental movements, he should promotes his perception level. The question of this research in the form of a case study is that, considering the variety of accesses in the Agha Bozor Mosque-School of Kashan; How does movement promote perception from the material level to the spiritual level? This research is descriptive-analytical and case study, and its results show that, despite the existence of separate paths (for prayer and educational performance) in the spaces of the mosque-school, the observer experiences three orders of movement (visual, physical and mental) by moving in each of these paths; in the form of four pillars in the mosque and three pillars in the school; It guides the observer's perception (in line with MullāṢadrā's perceptual hierarchy) from the sensory level to the imagination, and then to the intellectual level.
Philosophy
Maryam Tahmasebi; Abbas Zahabi; Ahmad Beheshti
Abstract
Shihab al-Din yahya Suhrawardi, illuminationist philosopher, explaining his epistemological views, proposed a new point of view that known as illuminationist relation and in this way he considers the acquisition of many perceptions, including vision, of through of intuitive knowledge.The present research ...
Read More
Shihab al-Din yahya Suhrawardi, illuminationist philosopher, explaining his epistemological views, proposed a new point of view that known as illuminationist relation and in this way he considers the acquisition of many perceptions, including vision, of through of intuitive knowledge.The present research focuses on the nature of knowledge by presence and its role in the problem of “vision.” It considers the following key question: Does Suhrawardī mean the same thing by “knowledge by presence” in all degrees of perception from the most primitive external levels—that is, vision—to the deeper levels? Then, given his epistemic model, can we treat him as a phenomenologist? The present article considers the nature of knowledge by presence in the process of vision according to Suhrawardī and presents a different approach to it. By reference to Suhrawardī’s discussion of issues of vision and a conceptual clarification of “presence,” we show that Suhrawardī could not have used the term “knowledge by presence” in the case of vision in its common sense as opposed to “knowledge by acquisition” (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). Instead, this is a different notion, and thus the term is equivocally used in his work. Moreover, we argue that his epistemological model for vision is phenomenological. The method of research in the present article is qualitative and analytic
Philosophy
Razie Sadat amiri; Reza Akbarian; ali fallahrafie
Abstract
Examining the subject of philosophy shows that philosophers have had different views of the scope of the subject. In this article, we seek to answer the question whether Allama Tabataba’i widened the scope of philosophy in comparison to his two great predecessors. If the answer is positive, what ...
Read More
Examining the subject of philosophy shows that philosophers have had different views of the scope of the subject. In this article, we seek to answer the question whether Allama Tabataba’i widened the scope of philosophy in comparison to his two great predecessors. If the answer is positive, what impact does the difference in scope have on the function of philosophy in sciences? To answer fundamental questions and therefore to advance and progress, various sciences - including natural and human sciences and even mathematics - require general principles and rational and ontological presumptions relevant to individual particulars, provision of which falls on philosophy. The question is whether the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabataba’i’s view has the required scope to propose these principles and presumptions. There are some researches about the subject of philosophy in his view, but they have not examined whether it includes mathematical and natural limited existents (wujūdat-i muqayyad). To answer the above formulated questions, first the subject of philosophy for Allama is reread and his different stated views on the topic are analyzed. Then, the domain of the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabataba’i’s, Avicenna’s, and Mulla Sadra’s views are compared and analyzed. Having assessed the relation between the three philosophers’ views of the subject of philosophy, some of the functions of philosophy in sciences are explained in brief. Finally, the impact of widening the scope of philosophy on formation of new philosophical branches and development of philosophy’s function is examined. Research methodThis research has been conducted through the analytic-descriptive method with an emphasis on the subject of philosophy in the works of three Islamic philosophers, namely Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Tabataba’i. The data have been collected, extracted and then compared with the library research method. Finally, through analysis of the data it is examined to what extent the scope of the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabatabai’s view functions in and is effective on sciences.Discussion and resultsBeing as being, or absolute being, is the title that all the three philosophers have chosen for the subject of philosophy, but the term has different meanings and examples in their works. In initial stages, Mulla Sadra chose the universal concept of existence - which is among the secondary intelligibles (ma’qūlat-i sanaviyyi) – as the meaning of being, but in next stages he regards existent in its factual sense as an example of existence. As such, the unified graded existence flowing through all existents in contrast to limited existents is the subject of philosophy. The question is whether the most specific types of existents can be the subject of a philosophical discussion. Through pursuing this question the following results were obtained: No matter whether the universal concept of existence or unified graded factual existence constitutes the subject of philosophy, the types of the universal concept of existence or limited existents that are at some level of the graded unified factual existence can be deemed a subject of philosophy. However, in Avicenna’s and Mulla Sadra’s views, it is required that the types in question should not be peculiar to mathematics and natural sciences, or, to put it more precisely, should not be peculiar to the subjects of the sciences of the individual. In philosophy, only those types of existence are discussed which are the attribute of existent things without mathematical and natural limitations.Allama Tabataba’i too believes that existence as absolute and universal is the subject of philosophy, but also that the most specific types of existents can unconditionally be the subject of philosophical discussions.In addition to the term being as being, Allama Tabataba’i also uses the term reality, and from his explanations it becomes clear that individual realities are not only part of discussions of categorization in philosophy, but can be the subject of a more universal philosophical knowledge than divine philosophy.To enhance the functioning of philosophy in sciences, it is essential that the domain of philosophy be delimited in a way that it incorporates such specific phenomena related to other sciences as justice, freedom, beauty, life, individual and social behaviors, etc. (i.e. phenomena whose ontological analysis provides presumptions and principles that sciences need). It seems that Allama’ Tabataba’i’s expansion of the scope of philosophy makes this possible through forming new philosophical branches pivoting on ontological analysis of all phenomena. ConclusionIf the subject of philosophy is confined to universal existence and its primary categories, it won’t be able to respond to an important part of ontological questions of natural and mathematical sciences dealing with individual beings. This causes both stagnation of philosophical knowledge and impedes development and growth of sciences. It seems that through expanding the scope of philosophy Allama Tabataba’i provided the capacity required for the formation of new philosophical branches - the types of knowledge that based on the universal philosophy and its demonstrated principles both develop the function of philosophy and lay the ground for validation of other sciences.
Philosophy
vahid khademzadeh; Fatemeh Kanaani
Abstract
Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our ...
Read More
Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our understanding and even our behavior are based on such metaphors. In this theory, metaphors are inseparable parts of scientific and philosophical theories.The human mind and how it works has been one of the greatest philosophical and scientific mysteries in the history of thought. Various theories have been offered throughout history about the nature of the mind. In the context of conceptual metaphor theory, it can be said that these theories are based on various conceptual metaphors; Some of these metaphors have been universal and some have belonged to a particular culture and age. For example, "mind as a container" is a common metaphor among different ages and cultures. In the context of this metaphor, the mind has a definite boundary that distinguishes the mind world from the outside world. Metaphors such as "mind as machine" and "mind as computer" were considered in contemporary analytical philosophy. Each of these metaphors highlights only one aspect of the concept of mind and inevitably hides the others. The mind can not be reduced to any of these metaphors.One of the functions of the mind is to acquire knowledge. Various metaphors have been proposed to describe this mind function. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has roots in human common experience in the childhood period. So, this metaphor is accepted in different cultures and Languages. In addition to its existence in everyday and customary language, this metaphor has also found its way into philosophical and mystical texts.One of the Muslim philosophical innovations is to introduce intuitive knowledge as one of the types of knowledge. Since intuitive knowledge is not available to ordinary people, the linguistic systems have not developed specific words and terms to describe such knowledge. This makes it impossible to describe and explain such knowledge literally. Therefore, Mulla Sadra has used conceptual metaphors to describe intuitive knowledge. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has been developed in Sadra's system and many sub-metaphors have been formed under this metaphor.In this study, the role of this metaphor in Sadra's philosophical system and its various dimensions are examined.Methods and MaterialsWords literally refer to one of the elements related to the act of seeing, which were discovered and extracted in Sadra's texts. Most of these words have been used to describe intuitive knowledge. Then, these words were categorized and the conceptual metaphors, associated with them, were introduced.Results and discussionIn the act of seeing, three elements are distinguishable: seer, seeable, and relation between them. Each of the three elements is used to explain intuitive knowledge by other sub-metaphors; “Knower as Seer”, “Known as Seeable” and “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphors are defined below the “Knowing as Seeing” metaphor. The “Knower as Seer” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "the quality of the knower as the purity or pollution of the seer" and "ignorance as blindness". The “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "obstacles to acquiring knowledge as obstacles to seeing", "intensity and weakness of knowledge as the seer's proximity, and remoteness from the seeable".ConclusionsThe "knowing as seeing" metaphor is an inseparable part of the theory of knowledge in Mulla Sadra's philosophy; In Sadra's thought, knowledge of the essence of God is not possible, and on the other hand, God is described as the light of lights, which is the most visible being. Mulla Sadra uses one of the conventional human experiences to reconcile these two propositions. In conventional human experience, the sun is the brightest object, but the intensity of light in the sun prevents man from seeing it directly. Mulla Sadra maps this conventional experience into the supernatural world and introduces the intensity of divine light as an obstacle to the intuitive observation of the divine essence.In the popular view among Muslim philosophers, rational perception is the understanding of general concepts, but Mulla Sadra considered rational perception as the observation of beings who are present in the intellectual world. However, Mulla Sadra has used this conceptual metaphor to adapt his theory to the popular view. He introduces the distant observation of intellectual beings as the cause of the formation of general concepts in the human mind; because, in conventional human experience, distant observation is accompanied by ambiguity. This ambiguity causes the concept formed in the mind to be able to adapt to several instances.Blindness due to light intensity and distant observation clearly shows the vital role of the "knowing as seeing" metaphor in Mulla Sadra's epistemological system.
Philosophy
neda salour; Mahin Sohrabi nasirabadi; Narges Nazarnejad
Abstract
IntroductionTraditional Persian arts, with all their aesthetic and semantic aspects, are derived from the Iranian culture, thought, and beliefs and are eminent manifestations of the notion of tradition for Iranians. Traditional designs with symbolic motifs and patterns constitute the foundation of traditional ...
Read More
IntroductionTraditional Persian arts, with all their aesthetic and semantic aspects, are derived from the Iranian culture, thought, and beliefs and are eminent manifestations of the notion of tradition for Iranians. Traditional designs with symbolic motifs and patterns constitute the foundation of traditional arts. Such arts are mainly characterized by the artist’s reluctance to imitate the nature and his or her focus on abstraction and expression of symbolic concepts. If traditional motifs are measured and appraised in terms of the right criteria and principles, it turns out that they are not only non-repetitive but also fully ingenious and creative, and display themselves in the design through a refinement made in the artist’s mind. Such intellectual analyses prevailed in line with rationalistic theories that relied on reasoning and arguments since fourth century AH (tenth century CE) along with the prevalence of the rationalistic Peripatetic philosophy and then Avicenna’s theories of psychological faculties, particularly the human-specific rational or intellectual faculty. For Avicenna, the human intellect has degrees and it has the potential to move toward perfection. One comes to obtain the ability to connect to the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) or the Bestower of Forms (wāhib al-ṣuwar) by developing one’s intellect, and then enjoys its grace and emanation, in virtue of which one knows and understands the world and finds the ability for reasoning and acquisition of knowledge. Avicenna believes that imagination is directed at the intellect or reason, and the artist’s perceptions are of the same kind as intellectual intuition.Avicenna enumerates certain principles for the beauty of a work of art, suggesting that its beauty results from reason or intellect. The principles include good moderation, good synthesis (proportions), and good order. On the other hand, the method of drawing traditional motifs were transmitted to us through generations. The superficial aspects of traditional motifs are addressed in Dr. Ali Hasouri’s Foundations of traditional design, Dr. Abolghasem Dadvar’s Theoretical foundations of traditional arts (a collection of the views and theories of Muslim intellectuals about art and aesthetics from the perspective of Islamic philosophy and mysticism), and Dr. Yaghoub Azhand’s Seven decorative principles of Persian art (all in Persian). However, they fail to formulate the rules of formation in the method of drawing the motifs and the scientific criteria they involve. Perhaps they have taken these for granted, while an analysis and formulation of the roots and rational dimensions of the principles and rules of the traditional design can lead to creative motifs. Accordingly, preservation, revival, development, promotion, innovation, and a new discourse in the domain of traditional designs require a scientific and artistic underpinning, saturated with philosophical and intellectual grounds.Method of ResearchThe present research draws on the method of theory evaluation and an assessment of how Avicenna’s aesthetic principles corresponds to the rules of drawing the traditional motifs to present a theory about the rationalistic design of the rational traditional Persian vegetal motifs as the most fundamental and widespread motifs. The data were collected through a library-documentary method, and finally the findings are presented through a descriptive-analytic method.Discussion and ResultsThe method of drawing traditional vegetal motifs alone or alongside each other follows certain principles and rules, each of which is separately matched with Avicenna’s aesthetic principles, including:With respect to their aversion of nature, their abstraction, simplification, symbolism, and centripetalism (manifestation of unity and multiplicity), the motifs are expressive and have “good order”; that is, their parts are proportionate to, and harmonious with, the whole.The motion and dynamic of the motifs, their generativity and reproduction in varieties of frames and directions, the balance, proposition, and symmetry in design, the existence of a geometrical order among the parts, the existence of rhythm and harmony between the motifs and the design, variety in composition and frame, collation and replacement relations between motifs, and the correspondence with varieties of backgrounds, frames, and materials in the performance context are all in line with Avicenna’s definition of “good moderation” and order.Line value (intensity and mildness), which gives an impression of perspective in the two-dimensional space, equivalence of the positive and negative spaces (over and cover spaces), and the existence of the element of timelessness and placelessness in traditional designs indicate the “good synthesis” as well as the order and coherence in the design.For Avicenna, the principles of aesthetics (good synthesis, order, and moderation) are formulated based on knowledge, which is in turn a consequence of reason or intellect. Since the Avicenna’s aesthetic rules of traditional motifs are also in conformity with mathematical and geometrical proportions, it can be said to follow scientific criteria.ConclusionOur study shows that, first, the existence of order, coherence, and harmony between motifs as well as the proportion and balance within the design come from scientific criteria, which are induced by the intellectual faculty. Accordingly, once connected to the Active Intellect, the artist obtains an intuition, and after the stage of the imaginative faculty, he or she can reason by means of the intellectual faculty. Since the contribution and function of the imaginative and intellectual faculties vary at each stage of creating the design, the artist begins with senses, and then reaches the stage of imagination and abstraction until he or she attains the degree of intellection and reasoning to the point of innovation and invention in the field of art, particularly in drawing traditional vegetal motifs. This sort of intuition, which Avicenna calls “intellectual intuition,” as well as the match between the rules of the traditional design and Avicenna’s aesthetic principles, indicate the rationalistic character of the course of traditional motifs and the predominance of the intellectual faculty in the creation of innovative motifs.
Philosophy
zohre salahshur sefidsangi
Abstract
AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception ...
Read More
AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception occurs in the human soul, while neuroscience provides a fully material account of all perceptions, including auditory perception. From a neuroscientific viewpoint, sounds pass through interior layers of the ear to reach auditory neurons, in the course of which they undergo a complicated process leading to auditory perception.However, Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the whole process occurring in the auditory system is just preparatory for perception of sounds by the human soul. This is the soul that creates the true nature of sounds. On his account, the relation between sounds and the inner self is like that between actions and their agents, where actions are done by their agents, rather than that between a passive entity and what it receives.For this reason, Mullā Ṣadrā holds that the account of auditory perception offered by natural scientists is objectionable, since they involve a confusion between preparatory causes and efficient causes. The accounts provided by natural sciences rest content with an elaboration of material stages of auditory perception, while Mullā Ṣadrā believes that perception is non-material in nature, which is just enabled and prepared by those material processes. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā offers the following account: when the soul has a relation with the natural external world through its attachment to the body, it creates a similar image of the external object, where that image is both caused and known by the soul.After the auditory perception, the human soul draws on the images derived from physical entities or those received from the spiritual world (the imaginal world, or ʿālam al-mithāl) creates images in its imaginary perception as well. Contrary to senses that are limited to material entities, imagination extends to the supernatural world as well. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, imagination includes a number of perceptions, such as perception of sensible entities while no matter is present, their perception in dreams, and imaginal perceptions. Perception of sounds in the absence of any external material sources does not require material tools or organs, since many material features do not exist in that realm. This is comparable to memory in neuroscience, although it has not yet offered a plausible account of conscious selection of memories.Moreover, the hearing that occurs in dreams does not involve an environmental system. Although some people still perceive the waves of the material world in their sleep, this is a very different process from that of sensory audition. In the hearing that occurs in dreams, one might hear an intense sound like thunders, which affects one’s soul just like hearing in the waking state, although it was not perceived by the material organ of hearing; that is, one’s ears. Hearing in dreams is indeed one piece of evidence adduced by Mullā Ṣadrā as an argument for the immateriality of perceptions, but this type of hearing is investigated in neuroscience as a kind of dream. Despite their accuracy, the findings of neuroscience here merely demonstrate that perception occurs with the stimulation of certain cells in the body, but the stimulation does not show whether the area in question is a center for processing and storing information or a pathway through which information is transferred.Also in imaginal hearing, only external sounds of the imaginal world are heard, without being mixed with inner secretions, and the sound in the imaginal world does not require material factors such as waves and frequencies. For Mullā Ṣadrā, if the human imaginative faculty is strong, the relation with the imaginal world can occur in the waking state such that hidden imaginal forms are presented to the person, who will thus be able to hear sounds from the imaginal world. Because of its non-material character, this stage of auditory perception is not subject to neuroscientific investigations.The final stage of auditory perception is intellectual hearing, which is the highest degree of auditory perception, which has degrees of intensity and weakness, just like light. Intellectual hearing has degrees, the lowest of which has traces of imaginal sounds, but the higher we go on the scale of intellectual hearing, we come closer to a realm in which no imaginal properties are involved, a realm of pure perception. In its evolutionary course, intellectual hearing reaches a degree where it perceives profound supernatural ideas in the most translucent form. This is a hearing that emerges with the rise of the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād) and then gradually grows.
Philosophy
nader shokrollahi; خدیجه amiri; Shaker Lavaei
Abstract
The study of the nature of prophetic revelation (waḥy risālī) is a tenet of any study of revelatory religions; that is, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. There are different ways to study and know the revelation. One such way is to make recourse to similar capacities possessed by ordinary people; ...
Read More
The study of the nature of prophetic revelation (waḥy risālī) is a tenet of any study of revelatory religions; that is, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. There are different ways to study and know the revelation. One such way is to make recourse to similar capacities possessed by ordinary people; that is, those who are not prophets. True dreams are a case in point. Indeed, non-revelatory true dreams are significant things occurring to humans, and they have been studied by Muslim philosophers. One relevant question here is: are true dreams of the same category as prophetic revelation, and thus, can we learn more about the latter by knowing about the former? If they have an identical nature, then knowledge of one might lead to knowledge of the other, in which case, the method of knowing prophetic revelation based on true dreams, and vice versa, will be rendered rational, opening the path toward expansive future research. On the other hand, if they are just partially similar, without being of an identical nature, then although knowledge of one might partially help knowledge of the other, it cannot yield full-fledged knowledge thereof. Crucially, there are religious texts in which true dreams and prophetic revelations are said to be related to each other—e.g. the former is said to be one-fortieth or one-seventieth of the latter. This has prepared the ground for philosophical reflections on the relation between the two notions by Muslim philosophers. In this research, we aim to examine the similarities and distinctions between non-revelatory true dreams and prophetic revelations according to an influential philosopher in the history of Islamic philosophy: Fārābī. Some points about the background of the issue are in order. To begin with, although Fārābī dealt with an analysis of revelation as well as dreams, he was not primarily concerned with the similarities and distinctions between the two, and hence, no direct answer to the above question might be found in his work. Second, although his commentators have considered his account of revelation and sometimes dreams, they were not primarily concerned with the similarities and distinctions between the two. Third, contemporary scholars and authors have sought to account for prophetic revelation in terms of dreams from a phenomenological viewpoint, independently of Fārābī’s account. However, this is founded on the wrong assumption that we adequately know dreams, and thus, we can draw on such knowledge to know prophetic revelation. The present article seeks to consider whether we can properly know prophetic revelation in terms of dreams, and vice versa. This means that we are not concerned with an independent study of either of these phenomena. The method of the article is as follows: it cites the work by Fārābī and his commentators, derives the characteristics of true dreams and prophetic revelation, and having analyzed their similarities and differences, it provides an answer to the main question above. Roughly speaking, a consideration and analysis of the work by Fārābī and his commentators leads us to the conclusion that the two phenomena are remarkably similar in his view, and on account of such similarities, one might subsume prophetic revelation and true dreams under one and the same category. This means that knowledge of one might lead to an understanding of the other, although there are distinctions between the two, which preclude their identification. As to the similarities between the two phenomena, we have found the following in Fārābī’s work: (1) in both prophetic revelation and true dreams, the rational human soul is connected to the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl), and in this way, it receives universal and particular fragments of knowledge, without any reflections or education—which are often necessary for other kinds of knowledge, (2) both of these phenomena involve the imaginative faculty, which has the function of representation. That is, when receiving fragments of knowledge from the Active Intellect or other supernatural sources, the knowledge in question is sometimes formless, in which case the imaginative faculty functions to give a particular form to this formless entity, and sometimes it gives another form to a truth that already has a form, and (3) since the imaginative faculty is involved, both true dreams and revelations are sometimes in need of interpretations. Nevertheless, a prophet is discriminated from a dreamer due to his sacred power, acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād), strong imaginative faculty, and immunity to errors in receiving the revelation. We conclude that while we might make partial inferences from one phenomenon to the other, knowledge of one is not tantamount to that of the other. The distinction between true dreams and prophethood is a matter of degrees; that is, while they share certain characteristics, each has its own peculiarities as well. On the whole, it is plausible to make inferences from dreams to revelation and vice versa, but the limitations of such inferences, because of their differences, must be taken into consideration
Philosophy
ali mostajeran; ali arshad Riahi
Abstract
Introduction Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the followers of the school of Tafkik and had been strongly influenced by the thoughts of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and Sheikh Hadi Tehrani. According to school of Tafkik, the use of rational and philosophical methods has no place in proving or explaining ...
Read More
Introduction Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the followers of the school of Tafkik and had been strongly influenced by the thoughts of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and Sheikh Hadi Tehrani. According to school of Tafkik, the use of rational and philosophical methods has no place in proving or explaining religious teachings. Also, one of the reasons, given by the deniers of the Sadra's philosophy is that this philosophy takes contradictory approach, and therefore they accuse the transcendent philosophy of methodological eclecticism. But Tehrani by proving the fundamental reality of quiddity and using it for the issue of monotheism, has confirmed the use of philosophical and rational discussions in the religious teachings. Tehrani by proposing eight critiques, he has criticized the principles and arguments of the fundamental reality of existence, and consequently, he considers the issue of essential monotheism to be provable only by the principles of the fundamental reality of quiddity. As for the background of the present research, the only article that has been published on this subject is "Critique of the arguments of the fundamental reality of existence in the thought of Mirza Javad Tehrani" by Hossein Soheili (Soheili and others، 1398) in the journal of Hikmat Muaser. The present research is structurally, contently and basically, from four aspects, different from this research.Research MethodIn this article the authors, firstly, relying on the descriptive method and analysis of the content, have studied and evaluated eight Tehrani’s critiques on the fundamental reality of existence. Consequently, it is specified that the origin of Tehrani's attitude to explaining the provable characteristic of the Essence of the Necessary Being, in order to support the principles of the fundamental reality of quiddity, is that he did not distinguish between acceptance of requirement and acceptance of causality regarding the Essence of the Necessary Being. On the other hand, it has been cleared that, relying on the Tehrani’s view -criticizing the fundamental reality of existence and strengthening the fundamental reality of quiddity- it is not possible to give a convincing answer to Ibn Kamuna's doubt and the arguments of the monotheism of Essence, attributes and actions envisage problem. But relying on the Sadra's fundamental reality of existence, although God is not a special being of any quiddity, to require His possibility, the supreme Divine Existence possesses all perfect entities. Accordingly, firstly, the existential attributes of creatures are attributed to God in the status of the act, not in the status of the Essence. Secondly, they are attributed to God in that they are existences. Therefore, it can be acknowledged that although creatures have perfections, there is no perfection other than the perfection of God. According to this interpretation, philosophical purification will not be in conflict with the appearance of verses and hadiths that limit existential attributes as well as activity and influence in God alone or attributed the actions of the creature to God.According to Tehrani, the adherents of the fundamental reality of existence believe that the truth of external objects is existence and the truth of existence is not something like other objects, so it cannot be perceived by the five senses, but its perception is possible with intuition. According to the authors' research, Tehrani, since he could not perceive the truth of existence with empirical knowledge, inevitably considered what he perceives with his five senses as truth, and finally came to believe that what exists externally is quiddity.Consequences These consequences are resulted from this article: 1- Tehrani’s criticisms on the fundamental reality of existence are not correct. In some positions, he quoted the words of the predecessors of the adherents of the fundamental reality of quiddity, and in other cases, he did not accept the principles of the adherents of the fundamental reality of quiddity. There are two central points in most of Tehran's criticisms: Firstly, he did not have a correct idea of how the object and the subject correspond to each other, because he considered the concrete to be a container-like reality in which external beings have taken place, while the subject and the subjective are the same thing, as well as object and objective are the same thing. Secondly, in most cases, he has meant what the adherents of the fundamental reality of existence mean, but in order to escape from this thesis, he has adhered to the fundamental reality of quiddity. 2- Considering the difference between requirement and causality, which is based on the fundamental reality of existence, the Essence of the Necessary Being can be considered as possessor of requirement, without any causality, because considering the issue of causality, the Essence of the Necessary Being will have caused and otherness of existence and quiddity in the contingents indicates the essential dependence of the contingent on the cause, but the sameness of existence and quiddity in the Necessary Being indicates the non-dependence of the Essence of Necessary Being on the cause, since His Essence is His Existence. But according to the fundamental reality of quiddity, relying on the unification of requirement and causality, in the Essence of the Necessary Being, the main problem is that the Essence of the Necessary Being can no longer be considered the Necessary Being of all aspects.
Philosophy
Nafiseh Nojaba; Mahdi Qiasvand
Abstract
Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the ...
Read More
Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the laws of nature". What the following paper examines among these assumptions, is the first commitment or assumption. Neo-Thomism poses a serious challenge to the premises of incompatibilism within the frame of contemporary scientific theories and the only solution is to present alternative model. Nevertheless, the duality of nature and the supernatural as a common facet of compatibilism and incompatibilism is a berrier to both models providing a plausible explanation. Although, neo-Thomism s argument about longitudinal God–nature relationship fails to meet all expectations and they are faced with the dilemma between Deism and the denial of non-divine agency. Breaking the ontological boundaries between nature and the supernatural, there seem to be a possible solution to the dilemma. It seems monistic approach of Sadra developed two systems of unity “Tashkiky” and “Shakhsi” can be a solution to this problem. Thus, this essay examines Sadra argument to address the problem arised by “compatibilism” approach. MethodThis article is written in a descriptive-analytical method based on Mulla Sadra's principles.Results and DiscussionIn what follows, to address the issue by relying on Sadra s argument, firstly, double causality, causal closure and the difficulty of explanation of the supernatural effect on nature which makes difficult to explain “special divine action” in the frame of “compatibilism” approach, will be analysed. Sadra theory and Thomistic view have tried to solve the problem through rejecting causal duality, that is, they deny the adequacy of physical causes. The possibility of the supernatural effect on nature by excluding the ontological aspects between them is one of the significant components provided by this paper. Given the key role of the concept of “existence” and “essence” in Sadra and Thomistic view in explanation of the supernatural and nature, by appealing to different versions of Sadra s argument about “Asalat al-wujud” and Thomistic view, analysis of the relationships between these two concepts has been done. Finally, it is argued that the dualistic approach of Thomistic view and one of the version of “Asalat al-wujud” which is the identity of “existence” and “essence” fail to prove the possibility of the effect of the supernatural on nature. However, there are two other versions of “Asala al-wujud” can provide the solution to this problem.ConclusionWhat is suggested in this paper is only to show the power of Sadra s theory in breaking of the ontological boundaries between nature and Supernatural. Even two systems of “tashkiky unity” and “shakhsi unity” support this possibility. To solve the problem of “special divine action” through the breaking of the ontological aspects requires to be committed to components such as, the adequacy of the natural sciences, the laws of nature and noninterventionism commitment.
Philosophy
efat alsadat hashemi; Alireza Kohansal; seyed morteza hoseini shahrudi,
Abstract
There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. ...
Read More
There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. Another group of verses of a similar vein are those concerning “treasuries of Allah” (khazāʾin Allāh). The predicament is that people tend to collect valuable things in treasuries only because they have a limited power and cannot have what they want whenever they do, but this is not true of God, because of His unlimited, unconstrained power and knowledge.
According to Quranic exegetes, there are two types of “divine treasuries”:
Worldly treasuries
Otherworldly treasuries (those of the absolute hidden world)
There are different views of the nature of “divine treasuries” proposed by exegetes of the Quran and Muslim philosophers. We begin with views propounded by Quranic exegetes in philosophical-theological exegeses of the Quran. Major views of this sort have been offered in the exegesis of verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr in the Quran. These views might be classified into four:
Rains
Material elements and occasions of creation
Divine predestinations
Divine knowledge
In a number of his exegetical and philosophical works, Mullā Ṣadrā has presented his account of “divine treasuries.” In line with his philosophical principles, he construes divine treasuries as intellectual entities; that is, as a particular stage of divine knowledge (after that of divine grace or ʿināyat), which mediates the emanation of divine blessings or grace to creatures—a stage in which the forms of everything inheres in an intellectual way. A systematic, rational rendering of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of divine treasuries requires a proper elaboration of his philosophical principles associated with divine knowledge, including the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), objectivity of knowledge and existence, etc.
The following are the questions we consider in this paper:
How do theological exegeses of the Quran account for the notion of “divine treasuries”? What problems do they face?
What are Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles underlying his account of divine treasuries? How does his account treat the problems faced by other accounts?
What other account of divine treasuries might be yielded, which is still compatible with the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy?
To answer these questions, we begin with a literal definition of “treasuries of Allah” and then overview the accounts provided by exegetes and their problems. Next, we offer a detailed account of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles as preliminary to a proper account of “divine treasuries.”
Articles have been published about “divine treasuries,” including “Divine treasuries” by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḥishmatpūr (2005), “A critical analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of treasuries in light of structural semantics” by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2018) and “A critical application of the theory of conceptual mixture in al-Mīzān’s reading of divine treasuries” again by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2017).
We conclude that, of the four accounts outlined in this paper, the first three suffer from numerous problems, and thus they fail to yield an adequate account of the Quranic notion of divine treasuries. In our view, the fourth view—that is, Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical account—has failed to offer a full-fledged account of instances of divine treasuries. Accordingly, we propounded a fourth view, which is an extension of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account. We argue how a proper, reasonable account of the notion of divine treasuries can be made possible by an elaboration of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles concerning divine knowledge and its degrees, and by drawing on characteristics of divine treasuries as outlined in the Quran, particularly verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr. We show that this revised Sadraean account is immune to the objections raised against other theories. On this account, divine treasuries suggest God’s knowledge of the measures of everything before its descent; that is, its creation. Moreover, on Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles, treasuries are of two sorts: worldly and otherworldly, where the latter is of two kinds in turn: objective and subjective (or cognitive). Objective treasuries are entities existing in imaginal (mithāl) and intellectual (ʿaql) worlds, and subjective treasuries are entities existing in the world of divine names and attributes. This is an “existential account of divine treasuries,” which might apply to all degrees of existence and creation.
Philosophy
mohammad ali vatandoost; mahdi Chanaani
Abstract
AbstractA major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars ...
Read More
AbstractA major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy: some have endorsed and defended his view, and others have criticized the account. In this article, we draw on a descriptive-analytic method and adopt a critical approach to assess the two responses. We conclude that, notwithstanding its novelties, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account rests on problematic grounds. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of demonstrations propter quid and quiatic demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-inniyya), which go against the common conception of these demonstrations in Islamic logic.Keywords: ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, critique, propter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī), quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī), general implications IntroductionPropter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī) and quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī) are major issues in Islamic logic, which are deployed in other fields of study, including Islamic philosophy. In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī was the first to propound the idea that propter quid demonstrations are not legitimate in dealing with philosophical problems. On his account, the demonstrations or proofs used in coping with philosophical questions are general implications (al-mulāzamāt al-ʿamma), as it is indeed impossible to use propter quid demonstrations in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has been criticized by some of his students and contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy. Some have endorsed and defended his view, whereas others have criticized its foundations or raised objections against it by its own merits.The basic question of the present research is as follows: How to assess the arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view of the deployment of propter quid demonstrations in philosophy?Method of ResearchIn this research, we provide an accurate rereading of the definitions of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations in Islamic logic, and then assess the views of both camps. We begin with an account of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view as well as the positions of his proponents and opponents. Finally, having evaluated both views, we elaborate upon our espoused account. This research is done with a descriptive-analytic method and a critical approach.DiscussionIn some of his works, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī suggests that propter quid demonstrations do not apply to philosophy. Indeed, all demonstrations or proofs in philosophy are quiatic demonstrations based on general implications. In his view, propter quid demonstrations cannot be deployed in dealing with philosophical problems. This is because the absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq) as the subject-matter of philosophy is general, and since there is nothing beyond the absolute existence, it cannot have a cause, which implies that it cannot be subject to propter quid demonstrations, in which causes are adduced.With a survey of the debates over ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account among contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy, we find two major approaches: some have criticized ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, and some have defended and justified the view.Javadi Amoli raises two objections against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s position. He holds that the predicate of existence is predicated of both absolute and qualified (muqayyad) existences, and when it is predicated of the latter, it can be subject to propter quid demonstrations, since qualified existence needs a cause. In addition, if propter quid demonstrations did not apply to philosophical problems, then all demonstrations in philosophy would be undermined and there would be no conclusive argument in philosophy, because quiatic demonstrations are grounded indeed in propter quid demonstrations. Given ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s response to Javadi Amoli’s objections, it turns out that his view presupposes his own account of the “criterion of philosophical problems.” However, the second objection raised by Javadi Amoli seems to go through.Mesbah Yazdi has also criticized ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view based on its incompatibility with the conditions of propter quid demonstrations in logic. He argues that causation in such demonstrations is not confined to external causation, but includes analytic causation as well. Accordingly, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is objectionable. In this research, we endorse Mesbah Yazdi’s critique of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view.Gholam-Reza Fayyazi believes that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view should be examined in terms of his own assumptions. One such assumption is that all predicates that are more specific than the absolute existence equal existence when taken together with their complement notions. Moreover, in propter quid demonstrations, the middle term is indeed an external cause for the predication of the major premise on the minor premise. In Fayyazi’s view, the first assumption—equality of the “essential accident” (al-‘araḍ al-dhātī) with the subject-matter of a science—finds counterexamples in many philosophical problems, and the second contradicts the views of logicians, since they believe that the causation of the middle term in propter quid demonstrations includes both external and mental causation. In this research, we criticize Fayyazi’s first objection against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, but we agree with the second objection, which is a reformulation of Mesbah Yazdi’s view.Yazdanpanah endorses ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s assumptions, but he argues that they have their source in the idea of a cause beyond the existent qua existent. However, since this idea is problematic, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is challenged. A reflection on Yazdanpanah’s remarks makes it obvious that they are reformulations the objections raised by Mesbah Yazdi and Javadi Amoli.Finally, people such as Samadi Amoli believe that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view should be deemed intuitive (shuhūdī), while all the objections raised against his view assume that philosophy is confined to reflective or intellectual knowledge. In this research, we criticize Samadi Amoli because it does not square with ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account to take it as pertaining to intuitive, rather than acquired, knowledge.ConclusionHaving assessed and examined the arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account, we conclude that, despite its novel contributions, his view rests on problematic assumptions. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations that goes against the standard view in logic. Thus, we should either modify the standard logic definition of propter quid demonstrations or believe that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is a novel view based on new principles, which can be criticized.
Philosophy
Afra Khakzad; Hadi Rabiei; Mohammad Akvan
Abstract
AbstractIntroduction: Avicenna has discussed the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties in several of his works. Avicenna's views on the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties are often expressed under the more general concept of pleasure and are scattered in works with various subjects such as ...
Read More
AbstractIntroduction: Avicenna has discussed the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties in several of his works. Avicenna's views on the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties are often expressed under the more general concept of pleasure and are scattered in works with various subjects such as theological, logical, natural and mathematical works. He also discusses pleasure in relation to the perception and the perceptual faculties of the soul. In addition, an important and significant part of Avicenna's discussions about pleasure is devoted to pleasure of the arts, especially the representative arts.Since the work of art is considered sensible, the question arises as to which perceptual faculties of man the pleasure of the work of art depends? Does the mere fact that a work of art is a sensible thing, means that the pleasure of a work of art is considered a sensible pleasure? Do other perceptual faculties, including the internal sensory faculties and the rational faculties, also contribute to the perception of the work of art, and does the pleasure of the work of art also depend on them? In the case of each of these faculties, including the external and internal sensory faculties and the rational faculty, the question can be asked how important and effective they are in perceiving the beauty of the work of art? In the present article, an attempt has been made to answer these questions from Avicenna's point of view. Methods and Materials:The research method of this article is fundamental. This research was conducted using a library research method, and the method of describing and analyzing information in this research is qualitative. The claim of this research is that according to Avicenna's views, the pleasure that is obtained from works of art, as a kind of sensible things, is not merely sensory pleasure and dependent on the five external sensory faculties.Results and Discussions:To examine this claim, the characteristics of aesthetic pleasure and its subjects as well as the epistemological status of this pleasure are studied and the pleasure of the arts of poetry, painting and music is explained from Avicenna's point of view. Finally, it is shown that the aesthetic pleasure of works of art is first of all a rational pleasure and depends on the faculty of reason and then, respectively, is an imaginary pleasure and depends on the faculty of imagination, and finally, is a sensible pleasure and depends on the perceptual faculties. Among the faculties of external perception, the faculties of sight and hearing have the greatest ability to obtain aesthetic pleasure from the arts, respectively.Conclusion:The findings of this study show that from Avicenna's point of view, each of the external and internal sensory faculties, and to a higher degree, the rational faculty, have their own aesthetic pleasure. External sensory faculties, namely sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, each have limitations. In this way they can only enjoy what they can comprehend. But the range of pleasure of the internal faculties is much greater than the pleasures of the external faculties. Because all the sensory forms perceived by the external perceptual faculties are grouped together and interconnected, there is more pleasure for the internal faculties. This is why the imaginative faculty enjoys the perception of images preserved in the imagination. For example, the imagination, by preserving and storing sensible auditory forms of musical notes, makes it possible that the audience's pleasure is not limited to single notes and sound type, but can understand the sequence of musical notes and enjoy them. Ultimately, it is the faculty of reason that in the strict sense of the word can enjoy the pleasure of perceiving beauty. Because from Avicenna's point of view, beauty lies in features such as proportion, composition and symmetry, and although the audience first perceives data from a sensible object through sensory perception, but the perception of features such as proportion is specific to reason. Accordingly, aesthetic pleasure is at its highest dependent on rational perception.According to Avicenna, irrational pleasure is a pleasure that is aroused, but without thought and reflection, and is appropriate to nature and the senses, but hearing and sight give pleasures to the soul that are not merely by nature, but are rational, because they refer to nonsensible meanings, for example, when one sees a beautiful work of art, one is drawn to it and tends to liken it.The results of this study show that according to Avicenna, since the external and internal senses present the works of art to the human intellect and the intellect recognizes their beauty, the perception of beauty encompasses all levels of human cognitive faculties. Also, since aesthetic pleasure follows the perception of beauty, the perception of beauty produces different levels of pleasure, at least as much as it involves perceptual levels.
Philosophy
Ali Sayyah; Shams-ol-Molouk Mostafavi; Reza Davari Ardakani
Abstract
IntroductionHaving rooted in Islamic doctrines and Greek philosophy -specially Plato and Aristotle-, Al-farabi gave central role to Happiness in his philosophy, locating it at the heart of his political thought. His unflagging effort to conceptualize the notion of happiness ended up bringing to the scene ...
Read More
IntroductionHaving rooted in Islamic doctrines and Greek philosophy -specially Plato and Aristotle-, Al-farabi gave central role to Happiness in his philosophy, locating it at the heart of his political thought. His unflagging effort to conceptualize the notion of happiness ended up bringing to the scene a new theoretical view on happiness, which has been circulated throughout the Islamic philosophy by his disciples. In this paper, I would tend to reconsider this key concept in Al-Farabi’s philosophy, by looking at it in relation to Imagination. The key question, therefore, would be “what is the role of imagination in the process of achieving happiness”; in other word, “How Imagination can participate a role in the attainment of happiness?”. To approach this question, first, I will look at how Al-Farabi deals with the notion of happiness in his works and how he puts this notion at the heart of his political view. Thereby, it will be discussed that happiness is being attained through existing in the society (virtuous city), which means, happiness can be attained collectively, not individually. Finally, by exploring Imagination in Al-Farabi’s happiness theory, I will discuss the significant role and statue of artists, who deal with the public’s imagination, in the virtuous city. Literature ReviewThe views of Al-Farabi on the subject in question have been discussed to some extent in books such as Al-Farabi, Imagination, and Artistic Creativity and Al-Farabi and Conceptualization of Religious Art. In addition, in Al-Farabi, a Strange Philosopher, Nasrollah Hekmat tries to open new horizons in this field, criticizing dominant readings of Al-Farabi’s views. In third section of this book, titled “Philosophy of Imagination in Al-Farabi’s thought”, author introduces the notion of “imaginary rationality” that plays an important role in Al-Farabi’s prophecy theory and paves the human way towards happiness. Going beyond a merely explanatory view, The Political Thought of Al-Farabi by Reza Davari Ardakani, provides a comprehensive reading of Al-Farabi’s thought, drawing connections between the notion of happiness and his political views. Moreover, in Politics and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Al-Farabi, Miriam Galston considers relations between Politics and Excellence in a broader philosophic context. And finally, it is totally worth to talk about Al-Farabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, written by Muhsin Mahdi, that deals with key concepts of Al-Farabi’s philosophy through reading his works. Methods and MaterialGathered the information from Al-Farabi’s own books, as well as the second literature and commentaries on his works, this paper is completely library research. Firstly, I made an outline to keep our research focused. After gathering information, in the second step, I would be able to narrow down the research area. By analyzing, deducing, and reconsidering data, in the last phase, the study would come to conclusion. Results and DiscussionAlthough Al-Farabi enumerates theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts as conditions of possessing happiness, according to his works, theoretical contemplation is a necessary condition of reaching happiness. The theoretical contemplation, however, is the property of the elect, and the vulgar are deprived of this activity. Since he is aiming at happiness for all citizens of the society, Al-Farabi appeals to a faculty that is common between all human beings: Imagination. What is important in this context is that, in Al-Farabi’s view, Imagination- which contributes to his prophecy theory- has the capacity of imitating not only the sensible, but also the intelligible. (this latter function of Imagination -imitating of the intelligible- has not been considered in his antecedents, specially Plato and Aristotle, and seems it is his own innovation). The supreme ruler of virtuous city (philosopher-prophet) and the elect -specially the artist among them- can project the representations of the intelligible on the public’s minds which are able to imitate them. It gives the opportunity to the public that find their way to happiness. In other word, Imagination -its ability to imitate the intelligible- paves the way of happiness for all citizens of virtuous city. ConclusionIn a way of conclusion, Happiness plays an important role in Al-Farabi’s political thinking, in a way that he articulates his political theory around this notion. As we mentioned above, while the theoretical contemplation is necessary for reaching happiness, this ability merely belongs to the elect. By taking advantage of their Imagination, which is capable of imitating abstract concepts, the public can reach the highest good, the happiness. Since the artists, among the elect, deals directly with the public’s imagination and can project theoretical virtues on their minds, Al-Farabi puts a high value on them in the second highest level of virtuous city (His view stands in stark contrast to Plato who believed artists -specially poets- must be banished from his ideal society).
