نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• زهرا یحیی‌پور ¹
• نعیمه پورمحمدی ²
• مالک حسینی ³

¹ دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، گروه فلسفه، دانشکده‌ی حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی،

² استادیار گروه فلسفه‌ی دین، دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب، قم، ایران.

³ استادیار گروه فلسفه، مؤسسه‌ی پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه‌ی ایران، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

چکیده
مسئلۀ دیرپای شر، که خود شامل مجموعه‌ای از مسائل است، به طور کلی، به سه طریق تقریر شده است: 1. مسئلۀ منطقی شر (ناسازگاری منطقی وجود خدا و صفات او با وجود شر)؛ 2. مسئلۀ شاهدمحور شر (قرینه دانستن شر علیه معقولیت خداباوری)؛ 3. مسئلۀ اگزیستانسیال شر (ناسازگاری باورهای دینی با تجربۀ زیستۀ شخص). مهم‌ترین دفاعیه‌های فلسفۀ اسلامی معاصر، که در پاسخ به مسئلۀ منطقی شر مطرح شده است، عبارت‌اند از 1. موهوم بودن شر؛ 2. عدمی بودن شر؛ 3. نسبی بودن شر؛ 4. ضرورت وجود موجودی که خیر آن بیش از شرش است (ضرورت شر قلیل در برابر خیر کثیر)؛ 5. ماده، منشأ اثر؛ 6. ضرورت شر برای تحقق خیر؛ 7. ضرورت شر برای درک خیر؛ 8. شر، حاصل جزء‌نگری؛ 9. شر، حاصل دیدگاه انسان؛ 10. شر، حاصل اختیار. از نظر فلسفۀ دین مدرن نقدهایی گفتمانی به دفاعیه‌ها و تئودیسه‌های سنتی وارد شده است که فلسفۀ اسلامی را نیز در بر می‌گیرد. نقدهای گفتمانی همچون: 1. از جهت شخص دفاعیه‌پرداز و تئودیسه‌پرداز: نظری، سوژه‌محور، و غیرتاریخی؛ 2. از جهت ماهیت شرور: انتزاعی، ذات‌گرایانه، ناظرمحور، و درجه دوم؛ 3. از جهت زبان دفاعیه و تئودیسه: غیرتراژیک؛ 4. از جهت عمل دفاعیه‌پردازی و تئودیسه‌پردازی: در پی حرفه‌ای‌سازی و نظام‌مندی؛ و ... . از این رو، پژوهش حاضر با روش توصیفی - تحلیلی و انتقادی، و با رویکردی متفاوت به بررسی پاسخ‌های علامه طباطبایی و شهید مطهری به مسئلۀ شر، و تحلیل و ارزیابی انتقادات پیش‌گفته می‌پردازد. بررسی این انتقادات لزوم اصلاح، تکمیل، ابداع و ارائۀ گونه‌های جدیدی از دفاعیه‌ها در فلسفۀ اسلامی را ضروری می‌سازد که به طور خاص به جنبۀ عملی شر نیز توجه داشته باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• نقد گفتمانی
• دفاعیه
• شر
• مسئله‌ی منطقی شر
• فلسفه‌ی اسلامی معاصر

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Discourse Criticism of Replies to the Problem of Evil in Contemporary Islamic Philosophy (ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari)

نویسندگان [English]

• Zahra Yahyapour ¹
• Naimeh Pourmohammadi ²
• Malek Hosseini ³

¹ Ph. D. Candidate in Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Law, Theology and Political Science, Science and Research branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.

² Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran.

³ Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran.

چکیده [English]

 
Abstract
Introduction
 
The perennial problem of evil, which includes a set of problems, was generally formulated in three ways: (1) the logical problem of evil (logical inconsistency of God’s existence and attributes with the existence of evil), (2) the evidential problem of evil (evil as evidence against the rationality of theism), and (3) the existential problem of evil (the inconsistency between religious beliefs and one’s lived experiences). The main apologetics provided in contemporary Islamic philosophy in reply to the logical problem of evil include (i) evil as illusory, (ii) evil as nonexistent, (iii) evil as relative, (iv) the necessary of there being an existing entity whose good outweighs its evil (or the necessity of little evil to perceive the good), (v) matter as the origin of evils, (vi) the necessity of evil for the realization of the good, (vii) the necessity of evil for perceiving the good, (viii) evil as what results from an atomistic view of the world, (ix) evil as existing only from the human perspective, and (x) evil as existing as a result of human free will. From the perspective of modern philosophy of religion, discourse criticisms were raised against the traditional apologetics and theodicies, which include Islamic philosophy as well. The criticisms include the following: (a) with respect to the proponent of the apologetics and theodicy: theoretical, subjective, and non-historical, (b) with respect to the nature of evils: abstract, essentialist, observer-related, and second-order, (c) with respect to the language of the apologetics and theodicy: non-tragic, (d) with respect to the practice of apologetics and theodicy: looking for professionalization and systematization. The present research considers the replies to the problem of evil offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, and analyzes and asses the above criticisms.
 
Method of the Research
 
The present research adopts a descriptive-analytic and critical method to consider the replies to the problem of evil offered in contemporary Islamic philosophy (ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari) as well as criticisms raised against them. It then deals with an analysis and elucidation of discourse criticisms of their replies from the perspective of modern philosophy of religion. Finally, it evaluates their criticisms and the extent to which they apply to the replies provided by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari. Moreover, it offers suggestions and solutions to revise or supplement their apologetics.
 
Discussion and Results
 

Islamic apologetics, particularly those of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, tend to adopt a subjective-theoretical approach. However, if we say that apologetics have practical commitments or approaches as well, then a particular approach will follow from such an interaction between theory and practice (theoretical and practical reason), which in addition to dealing with theoretical problems, will address the versions that are more specifically focused on practical concerns and solutions to the practical problems of evil. Moreover, the apologetics provided by Tabatabaʾi and Motahhari are subjective and are often focused on eliminating the feeling of evil in the subject’s mind. In this way, social and objective categorizations of the object will be warded off. Furthermore, their apologetics are non-historical, which might undermine their efficiency and might not deploy any social or political act. Evil is something non-conceptual, non-absolute, varied, and situation-dependent. For this reason, we need to think of providing practical, objective, and historical apologetics.

 

ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s and Ayatollah Motahhari’s apologetics tend to be abstract and conceptual, rather than objective. They justify the evils not individually, but abstractly. That is, they do not engage much with objective evils and the realities of evil in time and place and its victims or agents. In this perspective, evil is no longer a problem that needs a solution. Moreover, their apologetics make a universal, static, and common essence for evil. However, evil is indeed situation-dependent, temporal, spatial, and highly varied. It thus seems that apologetics overcome the concept or ghost of evil, rather than the real evil. Further, apologetics are often observer-relative; that is, the ways in which theologians encountered the narratives of suffering and pains come down to the theological question(s) they give importance to. Such pictures, positions, and perspective demarcate the boundary and form a logical space within which people seek their replies. In addition, proponents of the apologetics use a second-order language, in the sense that they theorize about evils, and evil is described by philosophers and theologians, while the narratives and language of victims are first-order languages that can serve as models and might be inspiring, and in fact, effective novel replies may come out of their narratives. For this reason, we need to create a discourse that can collapse the prevalent discourse and be concrete, objective, non-essentialist, and non-absolute.

 

The apologetics offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari avoid the tragic emotional language and are solely focused on eliminating logical inconsistencies. Apologetics can reply to the subjective and emotional problem of evil and at the same time sympathize, give consolations, and give meaning to the suffering so that they might not only be concerned with solving the theological and philosophical problem of evil, but also be concerned with solving the human problem of evil.

 

The apologetics or theodicy of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari tend to be a profession, chiefly focused on providing an intellectual system consistent with other elements of theology or philosophy. With mere focus on professionalization and systematization of apologetics and making theories about evil consistent with other philosophical and theological sections, apologetics might turn into a purely theoretical exercise and deviate from its goal of providing an answer to the person in pain and solving the problem of evil for the object. Furthermore, it hinders creative unproblematic answers, or those with a practical, objective, historical, concrete, structural, victim-centered, first-order, and tragic approach. Apologetics can have more liberal discourses with respect to philosophical and theological systems.

 
Conclusion
 
An overview of the replies offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, and a consideration of the above criticisms, require a reform, supplementation, invention, and presentation of new varieties of apologetics in Islamic philosophy, which particularly takes account of the practical dimension of evil as well. In that case, apologetics will be more responsive, more efficient, and more virtuous, and will face fewer criticisms and objections. On the other hand, apologetics should be consistent and compatible with the data from the religious tradition on which the apologetics is based and with the data about the world. Accordingly, in formulating and constructing theories, it is illuminating to consider the data from the transmitted tradition, reason, and experience at the same time.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• discourse criticism
• apologetics
• evil
• logical problem of evil
• contemporary Islamic philosophy
• ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi
• Ayatollah Motahhari