عنوان مقاله [English]
In this paper, I try to discuss about one of the important issues which have been discussed in the dialogue between Iranian contemporary philosophical thought and the philosophy of Kant. Many of Kant’s Iranian critics criticized innativism according to a special version of it. This special version, has been arisen for the first time in the essential encounter of Iranian contemporary islamic philosophy with the philosophy of Kant in Allāmeh Tābātabāyi’s “Osūle” Falsafeh va Raveshe Realism [= the principles of philosophy and the method of realism”. This version is still alive in Iran and forms the foundation of the criticism of Kant’s epistemology. According to this, in this paper, I will discuss, first, about the prevalence of believing in Kantian innativism among the Iranian scholars. Then, I will discuss about one of the current versions of Kantian innativism in the Iranian contemporary philosophical thought and will consider its elements. This version of Kantian innativism can be found in Mortazā Motahharī’s works. Finally, I will state Kant’s own view of innativism in order to clarify the similarities and differences of his view and his critics’ view of innativism.