نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی
1 استاد گروه فلسفه و حکمت، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس
عنوان مقاله [English]
This paper tries to answer to these questions: what is Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s solution to state the problem of non-existent objects and what are their similarities and differences and, moreover, challenges of these views. Following affirmation to “being” and “thing” concomitance, Williamson brings forward “necessary existence” theory in which “possibility” is referred to properties, including concrete existence, of things. But “necessary” is referred to logical existence for the solution to state the non-existent problem. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra’s solution, following graded unity of existence theory, is based on “mental existence”. In this case, mental existence is one of the ontological stages of “equivocal unique truth” of existence and “quiddity” is preserved in mind and exterior of mind. Therefore, since we express some statements about external non-existents, they must be existent in mind and their quiddities are manifestations of their mental existence. But, each of these solutions has some philosophical challenges: Mulla Sadra has not said how non-existents can be conceived; moreover preserving of quiddity in philosophical structure of Mulla Sadra is unjustified. On the other hand, “necessary existence” theory can’t be an explanation of reality. Allameh Tabatabaii, notwithstanding Mulla Sadra’s point of view, says that reality is absolute or limited existence (not existence and quiddity) and quiddities are mental (not external) manifestations of limited existents. Then non-existence can be abstracted by human mind from limited existents. On this basis, we do a mental act related with reality, when we state a proposition with a non-existent subject. This paper shows that Allameh’s theory can obviate the challenges of Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s theory.