حکمت معاصر
نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 کارشناس ارشد اخلاق از دانشگاه قم
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه وحکمت دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی (ره)
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Abstract
Practical reason/wisdom or phronesis, from Aristotle until Hume, meant virtuous action, in accordance with intellectual goods. Emphasizing on the role that our desires, motives and our passions, play in our ethical decisions, Hume endorsed the role of psychological factors in practical reason. Ascribing other features to practical reason, such as self-autonomy, and emphasizing on the will with more intensity, Kant presented a new definition of practical reason that posed serious challenges to Hume's views on this issue; he was struggling to eliminate the role of psychological desires and motives from the realm of moral decision. However Kant’s and his followers’ attempts to build Moral conscience, based merely on reason and will, were not so successful, and also there are some serious criticisms against Kant's purely rational interpretation of practical reason. Today, some ethical philosophers, including Philippa Foot and other new-Aristotelian, while criticizing the Kantian interpretation of practical reason by presenting a new definition of practical rationality, attempt to create a compromise between reason and other motivational elements, including intentions and motives. In this paper we discuss and examine some philosophers’ criticisms on Kant’s practical reason.
کلیدواژهها English
