نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی
دکترای فلسفة اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران
عنوان مقاله [English]
This essay critically studies one of the important criticisms of the existence predicate, i.e. the referentiality/ non–referentiality proof. Also, it wants to show some of the weaknesses of the following views: (1) existence by no means is a predicate; (2) existence is not a logical predicate; and even, from some aspects, the more acceptable view that says that; (3) although existence by no means is a logical predicate in a subject–predicate way, it is a logical predicate in a non–subject–predicate way. Thus, the paper by means of the equivalence of referentiality and existence offers a strengthened version of existence predicate in Muslim philosophy and logic, and shows that in (1) and (2) Muslim philosophy and logic is defensible and in (3) the current views are not preferable to Muslim philosophy and logic. Again, by reconstructing the foundations of Muslim philosophy and logic it accepts the rational referentiality of nonbeing in an indirect way.