Hadi Sabzi[1]
Abstract
"Constructed (i'tibari) Concepts" is a widely used structure in various fields of humanities and Islamic studies. However, the difficulty of finding a concept that is inherently Constructed on the one hand, and Allamah Tabatabai's analysis of Constructed perceptions on the other, has led to the belief that proposition is inherently Constructed, and the concept is called constructed figuratively. In this paper, by descriptive-analytical method, we will discuss the possibility of independently formation of Constructed Concepts in various ways and present a new explanation in which truly Constructed Concepts can exist. to this end, various views on metaphor in Islamic thought have been studied and evaluated and based on them and their weakness, according to a theory that is derivable from some Allamah's phrases, we have established a new view that the concept itself is Constructed, while it's attribution is real (non-figurative). The result of the research shows that "Constructed" is not just a description of propositions, but a group of concepts are truly Constructed. Examples of these concepts have been presented and the impact of this approach in epistemological fields has been shown; and finally, we have clarified the wide range of Constructed Concepts, their function, and the criteria governing them, as well as their definition manner.
Keywords: metaphor, extension of meaning, independence of Constructed concepts, real truth, Allamah Tabatabai
 
1. Introduction
The Constructed (i'tibārī) concept is a common expression in various fields of the humanities and Islamic studies, especially in the writings of Allameh Tabataba'i. Some commentators and critics, with regard to Allameh's analysis of Constructed perceptions and its connection to intellectual figurative language (majāz 'aqlī) in metaphor, have maintained that what is inherently Constructed is the proposition, and that the concept is called Constructed figuratively. Within the field of metaphor, three views are notable among Muslim scholars of rhetoric: lexical figurative language, intellectual figurative language, and semantic expansion. Allameh defines Constructed perception as "giving the definition of one thing to something else through the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty (wahm)," and with this definition, it becomes clear that he draws upon the second view, in proposing his theory of Constructed perceptions. characteristic of intellectual figurative language is that in a metaphorical proposition, without alteration of the meaning of the predicate, the subject is posited the alleged instance of the predicate. Given the metaphorical nature of attribution, it must be said that the proposition itself is qualified with the attribute of Constructed, and not the subject or the predicate. The fundamental question of this research is whether we can offer a reasonable and satisfactory account in which the concepts themselves are inherently Constructed.
2. Materials & Methods   
In this article, through a descriptive-analytical method, and by examining Allameh's writings and some commentators and critics, as well as by evaluating views related to metaphor among Muslim scholars, we argue that it is possible to speak of concepts that are inherently Constructed.
3. Discussion & Result
3.1. The Problem of Inherently Constructed Concepts
If we place this analysis, which concludes that only propositions are Constructed, alongside Allameh's other view that the human mind does not independently create concepts, but rather obtains concepts as a result of connection with their real instances, this view is strengthened that Constructed is applied to concepts "leniently", and that what is truly Constructed is the proposition.
3.2. The Challenge Posed by "Constructed Concepts"
Nevertheless, the expression "Constructed concepts" or "Constructed meanings", are used in numerous instances in Allameh's writings. In some cases, he places these concepts as divisions alongside Real (or literal) concepts that have a cognitive function, meaning that these types of concepts do not have a cognitive function and are merely concepts pertaining to the realm of action. This point indicates that we cannot easily regard "Constructed concepts" as merely a matter of lenient expression, and at least at first glance, it seems that he genuinely believes that some concepts lack a cognitive role and serve only a practical function, and that the concept itself, and not the proposition, is constructed due to emotional factors and practical purposes.
 
3.3. Proposed Solutions for the occurrence of Inherently Constructed Concepts
3.3.1. Manipulation of The Estimative Faculty in Real (literal) Concept
One possible solution is the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty in Real concept to bring about inherently Constructed concepts. When we ascribe "lion" to jack, and regard him as an alleged instance of lion, we know that "lion" is ascribed to him with some kind of manipulation. What is meant is that "lion" is not ascribed to him with all of its conceptual precision. Therefore, the Estimative Faculty manipulates the meaning of the predicate and constructs a new meaning. drawback of this solution is that merely manipulating of Estimative Faculty in a concept and highlighting certain features while downplaying others doesn't cause the concept to lose its knowledge-generating nature and to be oriented toward the realm of action.
3.3.2. The Constructed Concept Arising from Constructed Propositions
A second solution is to consider the Constructed concept as arising from Constructed propositions. In other words, Constructed concepts are, first of all, composite concepts; that is, they inherently include a proposition or propositions; and secondly, the kind of propositions hidden within them are Constructed and practical Assertions. If a composite concept inherently includes Constructed propositions, this concept also loses its cognitive function and becomes a Constructed concept. Here, one can draw upon Sakaki's notion of metaphor as semantic expansion. The Constructed concept of "Head" has two instances, one customary and the other uncommon; but both are considered its real instances. drawback of this view is that, based on Sakaki's perspective, we ultimately expand the concept in such a way that it truly includes both customary and uncommon instances. The new concept constructed based on Sakaki's view is an expansion of the previous Real Concept, rather than the emergence of a new and Constructed concept. Moreover, the expanded concept must apply truly (non-figuratively) to both the customary and uncommon instances; whereas, in inherently Constructed concepts, application to the uncommon instance is metaphorical.
3.3.3. The Author's Chosen View: Constructed Concept and real (literal) truth
The preferred view is that the real concept does not contradict its being Constructed. A real concept and A Constructed concept can each have real or Constructed (figurative) truth, which together form four states:

real concept and real truth. 2. real concept and Constructed truth. 3. Constructed concept and real truth. 4. Constructed concept and Constructed truth.

Case 3 is a concept that is truly Constructed, but its truth is real. With this account, the two aforementioned problems with Sakaki's view also disappear; because the new concept is entirely Constructed and not an expansion of the previous real concept; and furthermore, its application to something that is not its instance is a Constructed application.
3.4. Categories of Concepts
Thus, we can now categorize concepts into two types: concepts that are knowledge-generating, and concepts that have a practical function and are related to emotional motivations and practical purposes. The nature of this latter kind of concepts is such that no cognitive or epistemic function can be attributed to them.
4. Conclusion
in Allameh's viewpoint, one can defend inherently Constructed concepts. By analyzing their formation process, we can show that none of the views of metaphor among Muslim rhetoricians are fully successful in explaining the formation of these concepts. Although these concepts are inherently Constructed, they have real application to their primary instances and figurative application to others. By finding concepts related to the realm of action, we can also explain how social systems are formed. Corresponding to real or literal concepts, there are Constructed concepts, and corresponding to the real world, there is a Constructed world consisting of positions and institutions. Moreover, the mechanism of defining Constructed concepts is distinct from that of defining real concepts, just as argumentation in Constructed propositions is distinct from logical proof.