Abstract
Problem: The problem of the World of Forms and the Imaginal World is a significant issue that has been present since the dawn of the history of philosophy. Some scholars consider the neglect of the intermediate world to be the cause of the crisis in Western thought. This issue gains double importance in comparative philosophy. This approach would not be possible without the dimension of the suprahistorical and the intermediate world.
Method: This study employs a descriptive-analytical method, drawing on library-based data collection and a comparative approach, to examine the Platonic Forms, the Imaginal World in Al-Suhrawardī's thought, and the realm of language in Heidegger's thought.
Findings: In Al-Suhrawardī's thought, the Imaginal World is an imaginal, real, and objective realm that—unlike the Forms—possesses quantity and form. Heidegger is a critic of the Platonic Forms; however, in relation to language, he speaks of an imaginal, real, and objective realm that possesses quantity and form. In certain instances, he refers to an even more real realm, such as the essence of art, which lacks quantity and form.
Conclusion: Heidegger, too, affirms something akin to the World of Forms and the Imaginal World; however, he critiques interpretations of it that emphasize its truth as correspondence. Heidegger views the mode of presence of the levels of being and their cognition as grounded in unconcealment. Suhrawardī, likewise, emphasizes light and considers cognition to be of the nature of presential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī), which is not based on correspondence.
Keywords: Platonic Forms, Imaginal World, language, al-Suhrawardī, Martin Heidegger.

Introduction
The problem of the World of Forms and the Imaginal World has long been one of the foundational topics in the history of philosophy. Its significance doubles in comparative philosophy, since the possibility of any meaningful comparison between thinkers from diverse intellectual and historical traditions hinges on the assumption of a suprahistorical dimension. This study undertakes a comparative examination of this concept in the thought of two eminent philosophers: Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, the founder of Illuminationist wisdom (ḥikmat al-ishrāq), and Martin Heidegger, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century.
In al-Suhrawardī's thought, the Imaginal World is a real and objective realm that possesses quantity and form, occupying an intermediate position between the World of Forms (the "conquering lights" or al-anwār al-qāhira) and the material world. In contrast, Martin Heidegger is recognized as one of the primary critics of the Platonic Forms. He maintains that Plato's doctrine marked the beginning of a deviation in the history of philosophy, reducing the meaning of truth from unconcealment (aletheia) to "correspondence" and paving the way for the oblivion of being. Nevertheless, in his later works, Heidegger speaks of a real, objective, and imaginal realm that bears clear similarities to al-Suhrawardī's Imaginal World.
This apparent contradiction forms the central question of this study: How can a connection be established between the thought of a philosopher who regards himself as the reviver of Plato's Eastern wisdom and a thinker who has leveled the most fundamental critiques against him? This article seeks to demonstrate that Heidegger's critique is not directed at the principle of an immaterial, hierarchical realm of being, but rather at a specific interpretation of it that emphasizes truth as correspondence. Despite valuable prior studies, including the works of Henry Corbin and Seyed Ahmad Fardid, no independent work addressing this issue has yet been found.
Materials and Methods
This study has been conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, based on the collection and analysis of library resources. The theoretical foundation of this research's methodology rests on "phenomenology" and unveiling the veiled (kashf al-maḥjūb). As Henry Corbin, a pioneer in this field, explains, authentic comparative philosophy becomes possible only by transcending a purely historical perspective (historicity).
Discussion and Findings
The comparative analysis of al-Suhrawardī's and Heidegger's thought yields noteworthy results that reveal a profound affinity in the structure of their philosophies.
1. Both thinkers affirm the existence of levels of truth beyond the material and sensible world. In al-Suhrawardī's view, these levels include the material world, the Imaginal World—which possesses quantity and form but is abstracted from matter—and the World of Forms, consisting of simple lights devoid of quantity and form. Heidegger, albeit with different terminology, establishes a similar distinction. In his phenomenological analysis of the artwork, he leads us into an imaginal realm where a dimension possessing quantity and form becomes manifest. This dimension, the locus of the occurrence of truth, bears resemblance to al-Suhrawardī's Imaginal World. Beyond that, when Heidegger inquires into the "essence of art," he points to a universal truth lacking quantity and form, which serves as the origin of the realization of particular works—a feature akin to the World of Forms.
2. The fundamental point of convergence between these two lies in their understanding of "truth." Heidegger's primary critique of the Western metaphysical tradition is the reduction of truth from unconcealment (aletheia) to correspondence. He seeks to recover an immediate encounter with truth, which occurs in language and poetry. This is precisely al-Suhrawardī's central concern. By prioritizing intuitive wisdom and presential knowledge, he regards true knowledge as direct intuition that requires no correspondence.
3. The path to this immediate truth, for both thinkers, is a process of journey and spiritual wayfaring. Al-Suhrawardī emphasizes that Illuminationist wisdom arises from the ascetic discipline and spiritual struggle of the soul, which is a temporal matter requiring the traversal of a path. Heidegger, likewise, regards authentic thinking as a kind of "wayfaring" (Weg) and poetry as a means of "dwelling" in truth.
4. The apparent difference between these two thinkers lies in their stance toward Plato. However, this study demonstrates that their disagreement is not over the very existence of the World of Forms, but rather over its interpretation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that, despite apparent and historical differences, there exists a profound affinity between al-Suhrawardī's Illuminationist wisdom and Heidegger's later thought. Both thinkers, in critiquing a merely conceptual and rational intellect, affirm levels of being beyond the material world that constitute objective and authentic truths. Although Heidegger does not employ al-Suhrawardī's terminology, in his phenomenology of art and language, he acknowledges an imaginal realm possessing quantity and form (akin to the Imaginal World) and a higher truth (akin to the World of Forms).
The most important shared aspect between these two is the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and the emphasis on truth as unconcealment, presence, and manifestation. For both, the relation between levels of being is immediate, direct, and luminous, in which the higher level exercises sovereignty and encompassment over the lower. The path to these truths is also not through argumentation, but through a wayfaring, temporal spiritual journey.
Their disagreement over Plato is also one of interpretation. Heidegger critiques an interpretation of the Forms that has led to the dominance of metaphysics and the forgetting of being, whereas al-Suhrawardī regards himself as the reviver of an Illuminationist interpretation of those same Forms. Ultimately, it can be said that both philosophers tread a common path toward recovering the possibility of an authentic encounter with truth—a truth that is not a mental concept, but an existential event that reveals itself to humanity in the realms of intuition and language.