Contemporary Wisdom

Abstract Hadi Sabzi[1]
Abstract
"Constructed (i'tibari) Concepts" is a widely used structure in various fields of humanities and Islamic studies. However, the difficulty of finding a concept that is inherently Constructed on the one hand, and Allamah Tabatabai's analysis of Constructed perceptions on the other, has led to the belief that proposition is inherently Constructed, and the concept is called constructed figuratively. In this paper, by descriptive-analytical method, we will discuss the possibility of independently formation of Constructed Concepts in various ways and present a new explanation in which truly Constructed Concepts can exist. to this end, various views on metaphor in Islamic thought have been studied and evaluated and based on them and their weakness, according to a theory that is derivable from some Allamah's phrases, we have established a new view that the concept itself is Constructed, while it's attribution is real (non-figurative). The result of the research shows that "Constructed" is not just a description of propositions, but a group of concepts are truly Constructed. Examples of these concepts have been presented and the impact of this approach in epistemological fields has been shown; and finally, we have clarified the wide range of Constructed Concepts, their function, and the criteria governing them, as well as their definition manner.
Keywords: metaphor, extension of meaning, independence of Constructed concepts, real truth, Allamah Tabatabai
 
1. Introduction
The Constructed (i'tibārī) concept is a common expression in various fields of the humanities and Islamic studies, especially in the writings of Allameh Tabataba'i. Some commentators and critics, with regard to Allameh's analysis of Constructed perceptions and its connection to intellectual figurative language (majāz 'aqlī) in metaphor, have maintained that what is inherently Constructed is the proposition, and that the concept is called Constructed figuratively. Within the field of metaphor, three views are notable among Muslim scholars of rhetoric: lexical figurative language, intellectual figurative language, and semantic expansion. Allameh defines Constructed perception as "giving the definition of one thing to something else through the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty (wahm)," and with this definition, it becomes clear that he draws upon the second view, in proposing his theory of Constructed perceptions. characteristic of intellectual figurative language is that in a metaphorical proposition, without alteration of the meaning of the predicate, the subject is posited the alleged instance of the predicate. Given the metaphorical nature of attribution, it must be said that the proposition itself is qualified with the attribute of Constructed, and not the subject or the predicate. The fundamental question of this research is whether we can offer a reasonable and satisfactory account in which the concepts themselves are inherently Constructed.
2. Materials & Methods   
In this article, through a descriptive-analytical method, and by examining Allameh's writings and some commentators and critics, as well as by evaluating views related to metaphor among Muslim scholars, we argue that it is possible to speak of concepts that are inherently Constructed.
3. Discussion & Result
3.1. The Problem of Inherently Constructed Concepts
If we place this analysis, which concludes that only propositions are Constructed, alongside Allameh's other view that the human mind does not independently create concepts, but rather obtains concepts as a result of connection with their real instances, this view is strengthened that Constructed is applied to concepts "leniently", and that what is truly Constructed is the proposition.
3.2. The Challenge Posed by "Constructed Concepts"
Nevertheless, the expression "Constructed concepts" or "Constructed meanings", are used in numerous instances in Allameh's writings. In some cases, he places these concepts as divisions alongside Real (or literal) concepts that have a cognitive function, meaning that these types of concepts do not have a cognitive function and are merely concepts pertaining to the realm of action. This point indicates that we cannot easily regard "Constructed concepts" as merely a matter of lenient expression, and at least at first glance, it seems that he genuinely believes that some concepts lack a cognitive role and serve only a practical function, and that the concept itself, and not the proposition, is constructed due to emotional factors and practical purposes.
 
3.3. Proposed Solutions for the occurrence of Inherently Constructed Concepts
3.3.1. Manipulation of The Estimative Faculty in Real (literal) Concept
One possible solution is the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty in Real concept to bring about inherently Constructed concepts. When we ascribe "lion" to jack, and regard him as an alleged instance of lion, we know that "lion" is ascribed to him with some kind of manipulation. What is meant is that "lion" is not ascribed to him with all of its conceptual precision. Therefore, the Estimative Faculty manipulates the meaning of the predicate and constructs a new meaning. drawback of this solution is that merely manipulating of Estimative Faculty in a concept and highlighting certain features while downplaying others doesn't cause the concept to lose its knowledge-generating nature and to be oriented toward the realm of action.
3.3.2. The Constructed Concept Arising from Constructed Propositions
A second solution is to consider the Constructed concept as arising from Constructed propositions. In other words, Constructed concepts are, first of all, composite concepts; that is, they inherently include a proposition or propositions; and secondly, the kind of propositions hidden within them are Constructed and practical Assertions. If a composite concept inherently includes Constructed propositions, this concept also loses its cognitive function and becomes a Constructed concept. Here, one can draw upon Sakaki's notion of metaphor as semantic expansion. The Constructed concept of "Head" has two instances, one customary and the other uncommon; but both are considered its real instances. drawback of this view is that, based on Sakaki's perspective, we ultimately expand the concept in such a way that it truly includes both customary and uncommon instances. The new concept constructed based on Sakaki's view is an expansion of the previous Real Concept, rather than the emergence of a new and Constructed concept. Moreover, the expanded concept must apply truly (non-figuratively) to both the customary and uncommon instances; whereas, in inherently Constructed concepts, application to the uncommon instance is metaphorical.
3.3.3. The Author's Chosen View: Constructed Concept and real (literal) truth
The preferred view is that the real concept does not contradict its being Constructed. A real concept and A Constructed concept can each have real or Constructed (figurative) truth, which together form four states:

real concept and real truth. 2. real concept and Constructed truth. 3. Constructed concept and real truth. 4. Constructed concept and Constructed truth.

Case 3 is a concept that is truly Constructed, but its truth is real. With this account, the two aforementioned problems with Sakaki's view also disappear; because the new concept is entirely Constructed and not an expansion of the previous real concept; and furthermore, its application to something that is not its instance is a Constructed application.
3.4. Categories of Concepts
Thus, we can now categorize concepts into two types: concepts that are knowledge-generating, and concepts that have a practical function and are related to emotional motivations and practical purposes. The nature of this latter kind of concepts is such that no cognitive or epistemic function can be attributed to them.
4. Conclusion
in Allameh's viewpoint, one can defend inherently Constructed concepts. By analyzing their formation process, we can show that none of the views of metaphor among Muslim rhetoricians are fully successful in explaining the formation of these concepts. Although these concepts are inherently Constructed, they have real application to their primary instances and figurative application to others. By finding concepts related to the realm of action, we can also explain how social systems are formed. Corresponding to real or literal concepts, there are Constructed concepts, and corresponding to the real world, there is a Constructed world consisting of positions and institutions. Moreover, the mechanism of defining Constructed concepts is distinct from that of defining real concepts, just as argumentation in Constructed propositions is distinct from logical proof.

Abstract Abstract
Transcendent Wisdom, which aims at the reformation and perfection of practical reason, is actualized solely within a socio‑existential framework. Mullā Ṣadrā, as a social philosopher, regarded the critical engagement with the historical and socio‑political conditions of his epoch as an essential duty of the philosopher—a commitment embodied in his treatises Kashr al‑Aṣnām al‑Jāhiliyyah (The Demolition of the Idols of Ignorance) and Risālah‑yi Seh Aṣl (The Treatise on the Three Principles). Research Problem: The formation of non‑governmental power groups that generate what he terms “sanctified ignorance” (jahl‑i muqaddas) within society, thereby precipitating a profound crisis and potentially instigating socio‑political upheavals. Methodology: Utilizing thematic analysis, this study examines the defining characteristics of these power groups. Findings: The analysis reveals a triangular structure comprising “deception” (tazwīr – non‑governmental elites), “wealth” (zar – economic elites), and “coercion” (zūr – governmental elites). Through elite circulation, this nascent power bloc displaces the authentic spiritual authority (ʿārifān‑i rāstīn), resulting in social disequilibrium, a predatory relationship of exploitation, and systemic oppression of subaltern classes. Conclusions: The “deception” axis, employing instruments such as performative monotheism, ostentatious pseudo‑Sufism, demagoguery, character assassination, and a deficit of self‑knowledge (maʿrifat‑i nafs), precipitates socio‑political transformations rooted in the transmutation of values. Consequently, the social philosopher’s mission is to dismantle the idols of jāhiliyyah (pre‑Islamic ignorance), unmask these power structures before the public, and cultivate societal consciousness regarding elite circulation—thereby forestalling calamities of such magnitude that they could even culminate in events as consequential as the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn (AS).
Keywords: Mullā Ṣadrā, Risālah-yi Seh Aṣl (Three Principles Treatise), Kashr al-Aṣnām al-Jāhiliyya, Jāhiliyya (Ignorance), non-governmental reference groups.
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction
Isfahan during Mulla Sadra’s era represented the cultural, social, and political dynamics of Iran, shaped by the decisions and thoughts of the ruling intellectuals. Beyond being a metaphysician, Mulla Sadra emerged as a social and cultural philosopher within the framework of Transcendent Philosophy (Hikmat al-Muta’aliyah), addressing the crises of his time and proposing practical solutions to social and political challenges. He defined social philosophy as “a way of living with specific social, political, and civilizational objectives” and expanded Islamic practical philosophy by analyzing power structures and social crises. Two of his major treatises, Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah and Resaleh-ye Se Asl, examine ignorance (jahiliyyah) as a socio-historical crisis. Resaleh-ye Se Asl focuses on self-knowledge and establishes socio-political ethics based on three epistemic principles, while Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah analyzes the role of power groups in fostering social crises. This study employs qualitative thematic analysis to explore these two treatises and elucidate the characteristics of the non-governmental elites and reference groups that Mulla Sadra highlights.
Materials & Methods
This study was conducted using a qualitative approach and the method of Theme Analysis, a systematic technique for transforming scattered textual data into coherent and rich themes. The purpose of theme analysis is to identify patterns and extract themes that emerge from the data itself. In this research, Stirling’s (2001) thematic network framework was employed, which is based on three levels of themes: Basic Theme, Organizing Theme, and Global Theme. These themes are structured as web-like maps to reveal the relationships between them.The data collection tool consisted of analyzing two books by Mulla Sadra: Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah and Resaleh-ye Se Asl. The research process involved several steps: first, the texts were segmented into meaningful units, and key words and phrases were coded. Second, meaningful units were labeled, followed by the refinement and review of data to identify the main themes. Third, the relationships between themes were analyzed, and core themes were extracted. To ensure the validity of the findings, peer review and expert feedback were utilized, and the results were repeatedly reviewed and approved.Finally, the main themes were presented in a coherent manner, accompanied by direct quotations and clear examples from the texts to enhance the depth and richness of the interpretation.
Discussion & Result: In his treatises Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah and Risālah-ye Seh Asl, Mulla Sadra employs thematic analysis to enumerate and critique nine pervasive characteristics central to the non-governmental referential groups of his time. These traits reveal the essence of the “axis of deceit” (tazwir) within the tripartite structure of power—comprising wealth (zar), force (zur), and deceit (tazwir)—which establishes dominance over society. The deceitful elite, constituting the tazwir axis, collude with political and economic elites to perpetuate the dominion of this sinister alliance. Sadra’s critique transcends personal censure; it carries a social mission aimed at exposing the mechanism of this deceptive power and delineating a path to liberation.
Core Characteristics of the Tazwir Axis:

Intellectual Stagnation and Deficient Self-Knowledge: This group remains stagnant in delusion, imagination, and sensory perception, rather than engaging in rational inquiry and the discovery of metaphysical truths. The root cause of all their subsequent deviations is ignorance of the self and neglect of ethical cultivation.
Rejection of Religious Law and a Narcotizing Interpretation of Religion: Under pretexts such as “God’s independence from worship,” they transgress religious ordinances. Their interpretation of religion is a dangerous amalgam of superficial literalism and unregulated, extreme esotericism, which transforms religion into an instrument of sedation.
Sufi Pretense and Performative Monotheism: Their primary instrument is the pretense of mysticism and imitation of genuine Sufis. Without genuine spiritual wayfaring, they claim guidance through populist displays, reducing monotheism (tawhid) to verbal invocations and hypocrisy (riya’).
Demagoguery and the Denigration of Rivals: By assuming the position of spiritual masters and claiming fabricated miracles, this group entraps the gullible masses. To consolidate their status, they demean and repudiate genuine mystics, philosophers, and scholars.
State of Perdition: The ultimate consequence of this life based on deceit and carnal desire is loss and perdition. According to Mulla Sadra, they warrant punishment, divine wrath, and deprivation of true guidance.

The Path to Salvation: The True Elite and Social Insight In opposition to this corrupt network, Mulla Sadra posits his antidote: the “true elite” or “guiding mystics” (Ārifān-e Rahbar). These individuals are the antithesis of the tazwir axis: possessing profound self-knowledge, adhering to religious law as a manifestation of truth, sincere in action, and endowed with moral virtues. They govern hearts through wisdom and ethics, not through coercion.
However, Mulla Sadra emphasizes that the emergence of these true elites alone is insufficient for salvation. An essential condition is the “social insight” (basirat-e ejtemā’i) of the people. Society must be endowed from within with a collective wisdom capable of distinguishing between the “fabricated Sufi” and the “genuine mystic,” as well as between “sacred ignorance” (jahiliyyat-e moqaddas)—the use of sacred appearances to justify falsehood—and “transcendent truth.” Therefore, Sadra’s project is simultaneously an effort to cultivate a virtuous elite and to awaken public consciousness for their recognition. This constitutes the meaning of liberation from the tripartite structure of wealth, force, and deceit in Mulla Sadra’s socio-philosophical thought.
 
Conclusion
During Mulla Sadra’s era, non-governmental reference groups, including jurists (fuqaha), theologians (mutakallimun), mystics (ʿurafa), and philosophers, gained significant power and influence through their social authority and status among the people. However, Mulla Sadra demonstrates that many of these groups, lacking moral virtues and self-knowledge, failed to guide society effectively. Instead, driven by ambition, hypocrisy, and populism, they contributed to the reinforcement of unjust power structures. These groups formed the “hypocrisy” (tazwir) side of the triangle of power (wealth, coercion, and hypocrisy), aligning themselves with economic and political powers, thereby exacerbating social inequalities. In contrast, Mulla Sadra identifies another group of non-governmental elites who, through their moral virtues and self-knowledge, have the potential to transform society and disrupt the balance of power in favor of the people. These true leaders and mystics, endowed with innate purity and ethical integrity, can guide society toward justice and the ideal city (madinah al-fadilah). However, this transformation is contingent upon the people’s ability to achieve social awareness, distinguish genuine elites from hypocritical ones, and liberate themselves from what Mulla Sadra refers to as “sacred ignorance.”

Abstract Abstract
Proving the foundational tenets of belief in Islam is possible only through sound rational arguments. The Holy Quran, in its call to monotheism and description of divine attributes, employs rational reasoning, with demonstrative proof (burhan) holding a special place in Quranic arguments due to its soundness in both form and content.
Issue: What types of arguments for theology are present in the Quran? Have a priori (limmi) arguments been used in the Quran to prove and introduce God?
Method: This research, using a descriptive-analytical method and through a study of Quranic verses and authoritative exegeses, examines and analyzes the various types of theological arguments in the Holy Quran.
Findings: The majority of theological arguments in the Quran are a posteriori (inni), proceeding from effect to cause—an approach compatible with the general level of understanding of the Quran's audience. However, considering the definition of an a priori argument and due to the absence of a cause for God, the Quran does not employ strictly a priori arguments. Nonetheless, in explaining and proving God's affirmative and negative attributes, the Quran employs a type of non-a posteriori reasoning, termed "quasi-a priori" arguments in this research.
Conclusion: Contrary to the belief of some researchers, not all theological arguments in the Quran are a posteriori; non-a posteriori (quasi-a priori) arguments are also used for theology. These arguments are primarily structured based on inherent concomitances and essential implications.
Keywords: The Holy Quran, A Posteriori Argument (Burhan Inni), A Priori Argument (Burhan Limmi), Quasi-A Priori Argument, Theology.
 
Introduction
The Holy Qur’an presents itself as a guide for all people and, in order to realize this guidance, calls its audience to reflection and contemplation upon its verses. Accordingly, when addressing people—and especially when arguing for truths—it fully adheres to the general rules of reasoning and logic, and does not put forward anything contrary to intellect and rationality. For this reason, the guidance-oriented verses of the Holy Qur’an are often accompanied by diverse rational arguments in terms of both their material and formal aspects. Philosophers and logicians maintain that among the various types of arguments, demonstration (burhān), due to its reliance on certain premises and syllogistic form, is the most rigorous type of reasoning. Therefore, the Holy Qur’an has also employed numerous demonstrations to prove the existence of God and His essential and active attributes.
This study has been conducted using a descriptive–analytical method through an examination of the verses of the Holy Qur’an, authoritative Qur’anic commentaries, and by drawing upon narrations from the Infallibles (peace be upon them).
 
Materials & Methods
This research has been conducted using a descriptive–analytical method, through the study of the verses of the Holy Qur’an and authoritative exegeses, and by drawing upon the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them).
 
Discussion and Results
The main questions addressed in this research are: Why are most of the Qur’anic theistic demonstrations of the innī type? Why has the Qur’an not employed limmī demonstration for knowing God Almighty, and what is the reason for designating some theistic demonstrations as quasi-limmī? The findings of the present study indicate that the widespread use of innī demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an is due to the greater ease with which this type of argument can be understood by the general public, who constitute the primary audience of the Qur’an. The reason for this ease of understanding is that, in innī demonstrations, one of the premises usually has an experiential or innate aspect, the comprehension of which does not require extensive reflection or contemplation. In the Holy Qur’an, this type of demonstration is employed for two main purposes:
Proving the existence of God as the First Cause of all that is other than God;
Proving the affirmative attributes of God Almighty on the basis of the principle “the giver of a thing cannot be devoid of it” (muʿṭī al-shayʾ lā yakūnu fāqidan lahu).
The innī demonstrations of theistic knowledge in the Holy Qur’an are divided into two general categories: cosmic (āfāqī) demonstrations and anthropological or inner (anfusī) demonstrations. In cosmic demonstrations, through reflection on external phenomena (the horizons), the existence of God Almighty and His attributes of beauty and majesty are established. The most important and well-known of these demonstrations is the demonstration of the perfection of creation (burhān itqān al-ṣunʿ). In this demonstration, from the order and astonishing, purposeful creation governing the universe, the existence of an ordering, knowing, powerful, and wise Creator is inferred. A clear example of the demonstration of the perfection of creation in the Holy Qur’an is the argument for the Lordship-based unity of God Almighty in verse 22 of Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ. This demonstration is expressed with utmost brevity in the form of a conditional syllogism with the negation of the consequent: “Had there been gods in the heavens and the earth other than Allah, both would surely have fallen into ruin.” Since such corruption is not observed, it follows that only one God Almighty rules over the universe.
In the inner demonstrations of theistic knowledge, the human being comes to know the existence of God Almighty by turning inward to his own self. The most important inner demonstration in the Holy Qur’an is the demonstration of fiṭrah (innate nature), which is emphasized in numerous verses. One of the findings of the present research is that, given the definition provided for limmī demonstration, it is not possible to prove the existence of God Almighty through this type of argument, since it is impossible to conceive of a cause that could mediate in proving Him.
However, the Holy Qur’an contains arguments in which reasoning proceeds from one necessary correlate to its necessary consequence, or from one concomitant to another concomitant. Because this method more closely resembles limmī demonstration, it has been termed quasi-limmī demonstration. A clear example of quasi-limmī demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an is reasoning from the Divine Name Allah to His attributes of beauty and majesty—such as His oneness and His having no partner—in the verse “Allah bears witness that there is no deity except Him”, which is known as the Verse of Testimony.
 
Conclusion
Most of the demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an for proving the existence of God Almighty are of the innī type, and these demonstrations are divided into cosmic and inner demonstrations. The most important cosmic demonstration is the demonstration of the perfection of creation, or the argument from order, in which from the order of the phenomena of the world one infers the existence of an ordering, knowing, powerful, and generous Creator. The most important inner demonstration in the Holy Qur’an is that which is referred to as the demonstration of fiṭrah.
Contrary to the view of some researchers, not all theistic demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an are innī; rather, some of the most rigorous Qur’anic demonstrations established for the knowledge of God are of the quasi-limmī type, in which reasoning proceeds from a necessary correlate to its consequence or from one concomitant to another concomitant.
The most important quasi-limmī demonstration of theistic knowledge found in the Holy Qur’an is the demonstration in which the concept of the Divine Name Allah serves as the middle term for establishing His other affirmative and negative attributes.

Abstract Abstract
This study adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the interaction between philosophy and modern science in understanding reality, aiming to demonstrate that reality is neither merely a mental construct nor entirely independent of the mind, but rather the result of a dynamic interplay between authentic existence and mental modeling. Drawing on Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy and the principle of the primacy of existence, it first clarifies the fundamental distinction between existence as a unified and dynamic reality and quiddity as a mental representation. Findings from cognitive neuroscience, particularly predictive processing theory, indicate that the human brain constructs reality based on internal models and predictions, making perceptual experience inherently prone to errors and limitations. In parallel, modern physics, through theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, has destabilized traditional notions of time, space, and matter, highlighting the observer’s role in shaping reality. The synthesis of these perspectives provides a framework in which quiddities are understood as mental reflections of independent existence. This convergence suggests that reality is a multilayered and dynamic network, dependent both on objective being and subjective representation. Such a view opens new pathways for dialogue between philosophy and science and contributes to practical applications in areas such as philosophy of mind and cognitive technologies.International
Keywords
Primacy of Existence, Predictive Processing, Transcendent Philosophy, Quantum Mechanics, Relativity, Epistemology, Loop Quantum Gravity
Introduction
The traditional notion of reality as an objectively knowable and stable entity has been increasingly challenged by developments in cognitive neuroscience and modern physics. Neuroscientists such as Donald Hoffman argue that what we perceive is not reality itself, but a species-specific user interface constructed for evolutionary advantage. Predictive processing models, pioneered by Karl Friston, claim that perception is a brain-driven hypothesis-testing mechanism rather than passive reception of stimuli. At the same time, modern physics—especially through the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics—undermines the classical notions of time, space, and material substance.
Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system provides a unique lens to synthesize these developments. His theory of the Primacy of Existence postulates that existence—not essence—is the fundamental reality. Our mental representations (mahiyyat, or "quiddities") are constructed from, and reflect, this independent and dynamic existence, but are not themselves foundational.
Materials and Methods
This research employs a multi-method approach:

Philosophical Analysis: We examine the epistemological foundations of Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics, including substantial motion and the ontological status of essence vs. existence.
Systematic Review of Scientific Literature: Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience (e.g., predictive coding, perceptual illusions, synesthesia, fMRI studies) and modern physics (e.g., relativity, quantum entanglement, and loop quantum gravity) are critically reviewed.
Theoretical Synthesis: A triadic comparison model is used to align philosophical and scientific perspectives. This includes:

Identifying structural analogies between neuroscience and metaphysics (e.g., predictive models ≈ mahiyyat)
Validating explanatory power across domains (e.g., perception ≠ reality)
Testing cross-disciplinary coherence (e.g., fMRI data ≈ Sadrian ontology)


Discussion
Findings suggest that human perception is not a mirror of reality but a predictive, brain-generated model constrained by biology and context. Empirical data—including illusions (e.g., McGurk effect, selective attention), brain imaging, and altered states (e.g., LSD studies)—support the view that perception constructs rather than detects reality.
Meanwhile, general and special relativity reframe time and space as relative and observer-dependent, rather than fixed backdrops. Experiments such as the Hafele–Keating atomic clock test and Eddington’s gravitational lensing confirm these relativistic predictions. Furthermore, quantum mechanics (e.g., the double-slit experiment, Bell tests, entanglement) and emerging theories like loop quantum gravity reveal that matter itself may not be fundamental but emergent from probabilistic and observer-participatory interactions.
These scientific shifts mirror Mulla Sadra’s ontological assertions. He emphasized that existence is fundamental, singular in its essence yet manifold in appearance. This aligns with quantum superposition and wave-particle duality. In Sadrian terms, mental constructs are mere shadows of the ontologically independent existence.
Results

Constructed Reality: Neuroscientific models demonstrate that perception is a cognitive construct, not a direct access to the real.
Observer-Dependence in Physics: Relativity and quantum theory show that space, time, and matter behave differently depending on the observer—implying no "absolute" physical reality.
Metaphysical Convergence: The principle of Aṣālat al-Wujūd echoes the findings of modern science in recognizing a unified, dynamic substratum beneath perceptual and physical diversity.

Conclusion
Reality is neither fully objective nor purely subjective. Instead, it emerges from the interplay between an ontologically grounded existence and cognitively generated mental models. This perspective bridges ancient philosophical insight and contemporary scientific knowledge, offering a pluralistic but unified model of reality. Such a model encourages further interdisciplinary dialogue and contributes to fields as diverse as philosophy of mind, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and quantum epistemology.

Abstract Abstract:
In another article, I showed that in Aristo-Avicennan logic, a distinction was made between the matter (māddat) of propositions and their modality (jihat), and that there are at least two different approaches to this distinction in the history of Avicennan logic: 1) Avicenna was the first to consider matter as a non-verbal entity and defined it as “the state of the predicate in relation to the subject.” 2) However, Suhrawardī considered matter to be the proposition itself minus modality (or minus modality and negation). In this article, I have followed this subject matter from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā. The Problem: What characteristics each of of the two different approaches to matter and modality had after Suhrawardī and why this semantic transfer occurred. The Method: Analytiical-historical.  The Findings: Although in their early works, Khūnajī and Abharī followed Suhrawardī’s approach, in their later works, in accordance with Avicenna’s approach, they defined matter as “the quality of the relation of the predicate to the subject” and considered modality as denoting or indicating matter, and they incorporated this definition into the Avicennan logic. After Khūnajī and Abharī, almost all Muslim logicians accepted Avicenna’s approach and followed Khūnajī’s and Abharī’s definitions of matter and modality, and hence Suhrawardī’s approach was completely forgotten, to the extent that today, almost no one knows that a verbal definition of matter once existed. The Conclusion: In sum, I will show that many Muslim logicians in few works followed Suhrawardī’s approach and in most of their various works followed Avicenna’s approach.
 
Keywords:
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Khūnajī, Abharī, Ṭūsī, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī
 
Extended Abstract:
 
1. Introduction

This article explores the conceptual distinction between “matter” and “modality” in the context of Arabic logic, particularly in the works of notable philosophers like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and later thinkers. The author highlights two main approaches to this distinction throughout the history of Islamic logic.
 
1) Avicenna was the first to conceptualize “matter” as a non-verbal entity, defining it as the “state of the predicate in relation to the subject.” 2) In contrast, Suhrawardī viewed matter as the proposition itself without modality or negation. This paper traces the evolution of these ideas from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī through Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā, highlighting how many Muslim logicians oscillated between these two approaches in their works.
 
Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical approach based on library sources.
 
Discussion & Result
Key Contributions of Major Scholars
In the following, I recall the major scoloars’s contributions on the matter and modality.
2. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī:
In his seminal work Al-Mulakhkhaṣ, al-Rāzī posits that the matter of a proposition is both its subject and predicate. This interpretation aligns with Suhrawardī’s view, suggesting that modality can be seen as a description of matter’s attributes. Al-Rāzī does not explicitly differentiate between matter and modality in his discussions on propositions, indicating a reliance on earlier thinkers like Al-Fārābī.
 
3. Zayn al-Dīn al-Kashi and Afḍal al-Dīn Khūnajī:
Both scholars initially follow Suhrawardī’s descriptive approach but later adopt Avicenna’s perspective, defining matter as the “quality of the relation of the predicate to the subject.” This shift reflects a broader acceptance of the approach to matter and modality in Arabic logic. Khūnajī’s later works introduce a nuanced understanding that separates four types of material propositions, demonstrating a significant evolution in thought.
 
4. Athīr al-Dīn Abharī:
Abharī initially conflates matter and modality but later, influenced by Khūnajī, articulates a clear distinction, identifying matter as the quality of relation and modality as the verbal expression of that quality. His works reveal a growing complexity in the understanding of logical propositions and their components.
5. Nasir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī:
Ṭūsī critiques the views of Abharī and Khūnajī, emphasizing that the number of matters should be limited to three: necessity, impossibility, and contingency (= special possibility = imkān khāṣṣ). He argues against the inclusion of possibility (= general possibility = imkān ‘āmm) or general universality (= general perpetuality = dawām) as a matter, reinforcing a more structured classification system.
 
6. Ibn Kammūna and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī:
Ibn Kammūna’s commentary highlights the dual nature of propositions, while Quṭb al-Dīn emphasizes that the quality of relation is not fixed to a specific number, reflecting the fluidity of logical categories in Arabic logic.
 
7. Mullā Ṣadrā:
In his reflections on the works of Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā posits that both matter and modality are intrinsic states of existence, arguing that they represent the conditions of entities rather than mere verbal constructs.
 
8. Conclusion
The historical evolution of the concepts of matter and modality reveals a complex interplay of linguistic, philosophical, and logical considerations in Islamic thought. The transition from a descriptive to a referential understanding of these terms, particularly through the works of influential scholars such as al-Rāzī, al-Khūnajī, and al-Abharī, illustrates the dynamic nature of Arabic logic. Furthermore, the distinctions made by these scholars were not merely academic; they had significant implications for the development of logical reasoning in the Islamic intellectual tradition.
Through this analysis, I aim to shed light on the intricate developments in Arabic logic regarding matter and modality, paving the way for further exploration of these concepts in contemporary philosophical discourse.

Abstract Abstract Research Problem: This article does not aim to explain or justify the arrangement of topics in the book al-Asfār al-Arbaʿa or to force it into conformity with the logic of the four journeys; rather, through an independent study, after identifying the methodological considerations of the mode of the four journeys (al-asfār al-arbaʿa) and demonstrating its efficiency in the domain of rational cognition of phenomena, it endeavors to innovatively situate the principal topics of Islamic philosophy within this framework in a fresh manner. Method: Signification inquiry. Findings: In this redesign, we are not merely dealing with a formal change; rather, in numerous instances, important innovations in the presentation of philosophical issues arise in accordance with the logic of the Four Journeys. Such substantive changes encompass special attention to the duality of “the direction of the Truth” and “the direction of the creation,” along with pursuing its multiple implications in philosophical issues—including the issue of the primacy of existence (asālat al-wujūd)—drawing on the potential of the narrative of the Fall, the problem of evil, and the reality of the material world, as well as attention to social ontology and pursuing its multiple implications, and a clearer linkage between theoretical and practical philosophy. Furthermore, in this scheme, the journey-like order of topics makes the attractiveness, efficiency, and ease of transmitting philosophical teachings more feasible from an educational perspective. Conclusion: The model of the Four Journeys offers a novel and efficient framework for presenting philosophical issues that, in addition to its appeal and educational advantages, also leads, in terms of its content, to much greater development and actualization of the potentials of Islamic philosophy in analyzing ontological issues. Keywords: The Four Journeys, al-Asfār al-Arbaʿa, Mullā Ṣadrā, ontology, system of issues in Islamic philosophy, teaching philosophy.       Introduction In an era when dozens of modern and postmodern philosophical schools, with their diverse attractions, influence not only elites but also public opinion, efforts to preserve and sustain the social life of the Islamic philosophical heritage require attention to modern demands. Among these, the structure and organization of philosophical issues sometimes necessitate changes, given the needs and requirements of the time. Moreover, regardless of such requirements, creativity in redesigning the system and format for presenting philosophical problems is itself one of the causes of growth and dynamism in Islamic philosophy; indeed, one of the foremost characteristics of the great Islamic philosophers is their innovation in precisely this area. In this context, Mullā Ṣadrā, in composing his most important philosophical work, proposed a completely innovative and interesting format, and inspired by the mystical model of the four journeys, spoke of the four intellectual journeys and the arrangement of philosophical topics within that framework. Yet in reality, this idea has not received sufficient attention—neither from Mullā Ṣadrā nor from his commentators. This is despite the fact that, in my doctoral dissertation and two other peer-reviewed articles, I have demonstrated in detail that the mystical model of the Four Journeys goes beyond a merely ascetic/sufi framework: it is a highly precise, clear, comprehensive, logical, efficient, and era-appropriate cognitive model, and exploiting its methodological potentials for understanding various phenomena can be highly fruitful. However, before employing this pattern as a means of understanding other phenomena, it is fitting—in order to complete Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea—to actualize the capacities of this pattern by reconfiguring and reorganizing philosophical discussions. Accordingly, the main question of this article is to provide a methodical account of the significant formal and substantive transformations that occur when the model of the Four Journeys is taken seriously and efforts are made to maximize its use in the presentation and teaching of philosophical topics. Materials and Methods The method of this research is signification inquiry. This method, inspired by the article “Methodology of Signification Inquiry in Social and Human Sciences: Foundations, Definitions, Importance, Approaches, and Stages of Implementation” by Dr. Hassan Danaeifard, seeks to apply the fundamental concepts and theories of one discipline to research topics in other domains. Specifically, in this article, the mystical-spiritual implications of the Four Journeys model have been utilized to delineate and reconstruct the stages of philosophical thinking in Islamic philosophy. Discussion and Results The logic of the first journey consists of purifying and distilling the subject from all extraneous elements. With this consideration, if the subject of philosophy is “being qua being,” then the first journey must involve purifying the truth of existence from all extraneous elements. From this perspective, one can very attractively and innovatively locate major sections of the history of philosophical thought within the first journey. In the second journey, the wayfarer, by passing through the veil of created determinations (taʿayyunāt-i khalqī), becomes immersed in the direction of the Truth and the direction of creation. Accordingly, explaining the second journey in philosophy depends on understanding a duality known as the “the direction of truth and the direction of creation.” Unlike in mysticism, this duality has not received attention among the conventional philosophical dualities. Efforts to provide a philosophical explanation of it and to pursue its implications within the system of philosophical discussions can lead to profound transformations. The third journey is the appointed time for returning to the abode of created multiplicities, but not a regressive return; rather, it is a return aimed at uniting the true direction and the created direction. Now, from the perspective of ontological issues as well, this stage is the turn for the ontological analysis of the manner of creation and the levels of origination. According to the logic of the Four Journeys, after the wayfarer’s knowledge is perfected in the previous three journeys, the time arrives for guiding and assisting others. By the same token, the fourth journey in ontology should be devoted to practical wisdom and the pursuit of the normative implications of theoretical wisdom in the domain of individual and social human action. Conclusion The article concludes by offering a novel system for the presentation and teaching of Islamic philosophical wisdom. In this redesign, we were not merely confronted with a single formal or superficial change; rather, in numerous places, significant innovations in the formulation of philosophical issues emerged in accordance with the logic of the Four Journeys. Special attention to the duality of “the direction of the Truth and the direction of creation” and the pursuit of its multiple implications in the formulation of philosophical issues—including the issue of the primacy of existence, drawing on the capacities of the narrative of the Fall in analyzing the arc of descent, the problem of evils, the nature of matter, as well as attention to social ontology and the pursuit of its numerous implications in examining the arc of ascent of creation, and a clearer linkage between theoretical and practical wisdom—were among these substantive changes.

Abstract Abstract
Mūlla Sādra, according to his three philosophical journeys, or in other words, the early, middle, and later Sādra, has explained the coexistence of God with His, which is interpreted as scientifical, existential, and qayūmi coexistence, respectively. Research Problem: This article attempts to explain Mūlla Sādra's explanations in his three philosophical journeys in explaining God's coexistence with His creatures. Methodology: This article was conducted by using a descriptive-analytical method and library references. Findings: Middle Mūlla Sādra, by criticizing the scientific coexistence, believed that scientifical coexistence would require some problems. In the later Mūlla Sādra, with the help of the personal oneness of existence, he defended the qayūmi coexistence, and showed that God is not distinct from His creatures. The reason for this is that, first, God is simple and unlimited and is present in creatures with His simple and unlimited Essence. Second, He is the Originator of all His creatures. Third, the existence of no effect is separate from its cause. Conclusion: Although the early Mūlla Sādra is incompatible with the middle and later Mūlla Sādra, the middle and later Mūlla Sādra are not incompatible with each other, but rather they are in line with each other.
Key Words: The Early, Middle, and Later Mūlla Sādra, Scientifical, Existential, and Qayūmi Coexistence of God, Distinction or Lack of Distinction of God with His Creatures



1. Introduction
The issue of God's coexistence with creatures, or His distinction or non-distinction from His creatures, is one of the fundamental issues in Islamic philosophy and theology, and various explanations have been offered for it. If we consider the conception of God to have three components: 1. God's distinction or non-distinction from His Attributes and creatures; 2. God's conceptual, epistemic, logical, ethical, and aesthetic transcendence or non-transcendence; and 3. God's personhood or non-personhood (Bayat, 1402: 59-68), then God's distinction or non-distinction from His creatures can be considered another interpretation of the issue of God's coexistence with creatures, or His distinction or non-distinction from His creatures. It can be said that any view regarding God's coexistence with His creatures implies His existential and numerical distinction or non-distinction from His creatures. Therefore, the issue of God's coexistence is solely concerned with His distinction or non-distinction from His creatures, and it differs from the relationship between God and His Attributes. The overwhelming majority of Muslim theologians and philosophers have not understood God's coexistence with creatures to mean temporal or spatial proximity, or the coexistence of one body with another. Rather, they have interpreted it as God's metaphysical or spiritual proximity, considering Him present everywhere, witnessing His creatures and their actions, with nothing hidden from Him. According to Allameh Tabataba'i (1281-1360) and Javadi Amoli (b. 1312), Mūlla Sādra experienced three philosophical journeys in his intellectual life (Mūlla Sādra, 1368: Vol. 1, 49; Tabataba'i, 1387: 152; Javadi Amoli, 1394: Vol. 13, 11).
Although Mūlla Sādra considers words and phrases inadequate to describe the coexistence of God, he has endeavored to offer explanations consistent with the philosophical journeys of his life (Mūlla Sādra, 1383: Vol.3, 65). This article, by dissecting the three journeys of Mūlla Sādra's philosophical life into early, middle, and later Mūlla Sādra, will demonstrate that in his first philosophical journey, or early Mūlla Sādra, which is characterized by the originality of nature, he accepted multiplicity in beings and defended scientifical coexistence. However, in his second philosophical journey, or the middle Mūlla Sādra, he defended existential coexistence through the gradational oneness of existence. This is because, by accepting the originality of existence, he supported oneness in the multiplicity of beings. Finally, in his third philosophical journey, or the later Mūlla Sādra, referred to as the personal oneness of existence, he defended guardian coexistence by relying on principles and concepts such as tāshūn, absolute oneness, and connective being (Mūlla Sādra, 1368: Vol.2, 293). Therefore, this article elucidates the issue of coexistence across three philosophical journeys of Mūlla Sādra, presenting and evaluating his explanations and underlying arguments.
2. Materials & Methods
This article endeavors, through a descriptive-analytical method, to elucidate and investigate the issue of coexistence within the three philosophical journeys of Mūlla Sādra, drawing upon Mūlla Sādra's own works, commentaries on his works, and the insights of other Sadrian philosophers.
3. Discussion & Result
3-1. The Explanation of Early Mūlla Sādra on Coexistence or Scientifical Coexistence
Early Mūlla Sādra embraced the views of theologians and peripatetics concerning the originality of nature, acknowledging the existence of diverse species and natures in the realm of being, ultimately defending their inherent disparity. The originality of nature was the prevailing paradigm among theologians and peripatetics, especially Ibn Sina, which is why Mūlla Sādra referred to it as “the foundation of qávm”. Mūlla Sādra also used the term “qávm” when discussing Sheikh al-Ishraq, whenever the Sheikh's discussions predominantly focused on his peripatetic views. However, whenever his work turns to the specific discussions of his illuminated philosophy, perhaps due to the concomitance of existence with light from Mūlla Sādra 's perspective and the truth of oneness and gradation in lights, he sets Sheikh al-Ishraq apart from the qávm (Mūlla Sādra, 1368: Vol.2, 44). Early Mūlla Sādra aligns with the qávm view and explicates the issue of God's coexistence with His creatures as the foundation of divine wisdom (Mūlla Sādra, 1354: Vol. 1, 147) in this manner: on the one hand, God's existence is pure, infinite, and simple, admitting no multiplicity whatsoever; on the other hand, according to the theory of the originality of nature, the beings of the world are also accepted in existence as various natures. Mūlla Sādra, in elucidating the issue of coexistence, has defended scientifical coexistence with the following premises. In his view, firstly, God is the cause of the emergence of all existents; secondly, God is inherently omniscient; thirdly, knowledge of the cause entails knowledge of the effect. Therefore, God possesses eternal and immediate knowledge of all things and, consequently, scientifical coexistence (Mūlla Sādra, 1981: Vol.6, 190).

3-2. The Explanation of Middle Mūlla Sādra on Coexistence or Existential Coexistence
Although there are allusions in the works of Muslim philosophers, such as Suhrawardi's Hikmat al-Ishraq, regarding God's existential coexistence with His creatures, and he considered God to be the farthest of the nearest and the highest of the lowest (Suhrawardi, 1372: Vol.2, 153). However, prior to Mūlla Sādra, there had been no independent philosophical defense of God's existential coexistence. The middle Mūlla Sādra, shifting his view from the originality of nature to the originality of existence, defended God's existential coexistence with His creatures. He posited, firstly, that according to the theory of the originality of existence, the universe is nothing but existence, and various natures are measures and limits of existence. Secondly, God's existence fully and perfectly possesses the characteristics of existence and is infinite, encompassing all His beings or creatures, for infinite existence has no bounds or limits. Consequently, none of His creatures are outside His Essence and Existence. Thirdly, all beings share a singular essence, manifesting in various degrees or, in his words, possessing a “gradated oneness of existence”. Thus, a unifying principle governs the multiplicity of diverse natures (Mūlla Sādra, 1368: Vol.2, 381; Vol.1, 35; Haeri Yazdi, 1361: 10; Babaei and Mousavi, 1401: 124). Middle Mūlla Sādra believes that infinite existence necessitates existential coexistence with all creatures, and through the “gradational oneness of existence”, he has attempted to explain the observed multiplicity in beings.
3-3. The Explanation of Later Mūlla Sādra on Coexistence or Qayūmi Coexistence
Later Mūlla Sādra, despite his belief in the theory of the originality of existence, transitioned from the gradational oneness to the personal oneness, and elucidated some of his discussions based on this perspective; (for example, a different explanation of causality as manifestation with all its implications, see: Mūlla Sādra, 1360: 50; Babaei, 1402: 500-510). Although, in the later Mūlla Sādra, the originality of existence is still accepted, the gradation of existence has transformed into a gradation in its manifestations. In other words, in the later Mūlla Sādra, the gradation of existence is made a prelude to the gradation in the manifestations of existence (Samadi Amoli, 1386: 252). Thus, although the early Mūlla Sādra is inconsistent with the middle and later Mūlla Sādra, the middle and later Mūlla Sādra are not inconsistent with each other. Rather, a more profound explanation of the theory of the originality of existence has been presented in the later Mūlla Sādra. The later Mūlla Sādra, through his exposition of the theory of the originality of existence of personal oneness, stemming from qayūmi coexistence.
4. Conclusion
Mūlla Sādra, in elucidating many philosophical issues, went through three philosophical journeys: the originality of nature, and the originality of existence with two interpretations – gradational oneness and personal oneness. Mūlla Sādra's three philosophical journeys have also influenced his explanation of the issue of God coexistence with creatures or distinction or lack of distinction of God from His creatures. On early Mūlla Sādra, the coexistence between God and creatures is scientifical coexistence, meaning that God's coexistence is understood as His Knowledge over all creatures. On the middle Mūlla Sādra, by accepting the theory of the originality of existence, he defended existential coexistence and believed that none of the things are outside the essence and existence of God, and the separation of other beings from God arises from the limitations and deficiencies of His creatures. According to early Mūlla Sādra, the coexistence between God and His creatures is scientifical coexistence i.e. God has comprehensive knowledge on His creatures. On the middle Mūlla Sādra, by accepting the theory of the originality of existence, he defends existential coexistene and believes that none of the objects are outside the essence and existence of God, and that the separation of other beings from God arises from the limitations and imperfections of His creatures. Despite accepting the theory of the originality of existence, the later Mūlla Sādra defended qayūmi coexistence by relying on the personal oneness of existence and explained it with the help of concepts such as tashảun, relational existence, manifestation, limited presence in absolute existence and absolute oneness. He believes that God, with His infinity, has filled all stages of possibility without becoming one with creatures or taking on their possible defects. He is not separate from His creatures and has qayūmi coexistence with them. Although, the middle and later Mūlla Sādra are not incompatible with each other and are in line with each other, it seems that the later Mūlla Sādra is more defensible because, as Mūlla Sādra himself has acknowledged, both the gradational oneness of existence and the personal oneness of existence are defensible. However, the personal oneness of existence is more precise and profound. In the issue of coexistence, in existential coexistence, or in other words, from the perspective of the middle Mūlla Sādra, the existence of pluralities is accepted and existence means a two-way relationship between God and His creatures. However, in the qayūmi coexistence of the later Mūlla Sādra, the existence of pluralities is set aside and the Original and Single Existence that flows and permeates all of existence is proven to be present in the existence of every creature.

Abstract Abstract
The acceptance of the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity has given rise to certain questions and, at times, modifications in discussions founded upon quiddity. Among these are the introduction of mental existence by philosophers and the explanation of the process of knowing reality on the basis of the quidditative identity of mind and external reality. The problem addressed in this research is this: how can one affirm mental existence and the quidditative identity of mind and external reality after abandoning the primacy of quiddity and accepting its contingency, especially when quiddity, according to the accidental account of its contingency, has no share in external reality? To resolve this problem, some thinkers while maintaining the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity have proposed the theory of correspondence of worlds; another group has put forward the theory of the phantom, in a new formulation; and some others have advocated the principiality of the phenomenality of meaning. This research, through the analysis of data concerning the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity, and by adopting a critical approach to post-Sadrian views, seeks to explain the process of knowing reality on the basis of quiddative objectivity. The main axis of this paper, and its proposed solution to the above dilemma, is the belief in the accidental realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality. The findings of the research are: proving the accidental realization of quiddity in these two domains, explaining the quidditative identity of mind and external reality in light of it, and critiquing the three views mentioned above.
Keywords
Preservation of Quiddity, Preservation of Essence and Essential Attributes, Contingency of Quiddity, Correspondence of Worlds, Theory of Phantom.
Introduction
The introduction of the primacy of existence in Transcendental Philosophy and the transformations this doctrine has brought about in most philosophical discussions require a re-reading of the theory of “preservation of quiddity” on the basis of the primacy of existence and its various interpretations.
To explain: regarding the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity, there are two well-known interpretations. According to one interpretation, while the primacy of existence is accepted, quiddity is still considered to exist in external reality; however, it is clarified that quiddity exists dependently on existence, not independently. According to the other interpretation, belief in the primacy of existence entails denying the external existence of quiddity altogether, and at most allows only for its accidental and metaphorical existence.
Now, if the theory of “preservation of quiddity” by positing quiddity as a common boundary between mind and external reality, that is, by asserting that quiddity is found both in the mind and in external reality aims to resolve the problem of correspondence between mind and external reality, how can it be reconciled with the second interpretation of the primacy of existence? If quiddity is not found in external reality, how can it be regarded as a common boundary between mind and external reality?




Materials and Methods
This research, using data-analysis methods concerning the primacy of existence and the contingency of quiddity, and adopting a critical approach to post-Sadrian views, seeks to explain the process of knowing reality on the basis of quidditative objectivity.
Discussion and Results
Some thinkers, by proposing the theory of correspondence of worlds, argue that the contingency of quiddity and the primacy of existence require the correspondence between mind and external reality to be explained on the basis of existence as well. Others regard the theory of phantom, in a new formulation, as the way out of the above dilemma. Another group, adopting an existential view of mental forms, has attempted to provide an existential interpretation of knowledge of reality while preserving the primacy of existence and quiddity in the domain of mind.
This paper, however, maintains that although the contingency of quiddity, according to its accidental account, negates quiddity’s existence at the core of external reality, it does not invalidate its accidental realization in the two domains of mind and external reality. The accidental realization of quiddity in these two domains may be taken as a common boundary between them, through which human beings can gain knowledge of external reality.
According to the view proposed here, first, the three rival positions are rejected; and second, the belief in the accidental realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality, on the one hand, explains the connection between mind and external reality within the domain of quiddative concepts, and on the other hand, resolves the contradiction between the belief in the preservation of quiddity and the belief in the contingency of quiddity by emphasizing the contingency of quiddity.
Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper are as follows:
The accidental realization of quiddity in the external domain, although it does not admit quiddity’s real existence alongside existence in the core of external reality, does not negate its truth in relation to external reality.
Just as quiddity applies to external reality, it also corresponds to the mental form. It is at this point that a person apprehends one thing in two domains.
The accidental realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality may be regarded as a common boundary between them and can connect the human mind to objective realities. This view, referred to as the realization of quiddity in the two domains of mind and external reality, is the preferred theory and can explain the challenge of the quidditative identity of mind and external reality on the basis of the belief in the contingency of quiddity.

Abstract Abstract
The present study investigates the existential boundaries between the artificial teacher and the wise teacher, offering a critique of reductionism in technological education. Employing a descriptive-analytical and deductive methodology grounded in Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy, this study examines the possibility or impossibility of machines fulfilling an educational role. The findings indicate that despite its efficiency in information processing and behavioral simulation, artificial intelligence remains ontologically situated at the level of inanimate matter due to its lack of a rational soul and knowledge by presence, rendering it incapable of comprehending semantic meaning. Since upbringing within Transcendent Philosophy is defined as the existential intensification of the learner, replacing the human teacher with an artificial agent is philosophically impossible because machines lack spiritual and moral perfections. Furthermore, based on the philosophical maxim "one who lacks a thing cannot bestow it", the artificial teacher—being inherently void of spiritual life, wisdom, and moral virtue—is unable to impart these qualities to the learner and cannot serve as an agent of the student's spiritual self-actualization. Ultimately, the study concludes that AI should function solely as a cognitive support tool, while the status of existential guidance and moral upbringing must remain the exclusive prerogative of the human teacher.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Transcendent Philosophy, Gradation of Being, Wise Teacher, Substantial Motion, Technological Education.

Introduction
The rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence and the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) have brought profound transformations to educational ecosystems. Amidst these developments, a form of techno-optimism has emerged, asserting that intelligent artificial teachers can replace human educators or reduce their role to that of mere data transmitters. This reductionist perspective equates the human mind with a computational device and reduces the complex, multi-dimensional process of upbringing to mere information exchange. Conversely, Islamic philosophy—specifically Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy—views upbringing not as the mere horizontal transmission of concepts, but as a vertical, existential movement toward perfection. The central problem of this study is to elucidate the ontological gap between the artificial teacher and the wise teacher to determine whether a computational system devoid of life and consciousness can facilitate the spiritual and moral self-actualization of the student. To address this issue, the study seeks to answer three pivotal questions:
What are the existential boundaries between the artificial teacher and the wise teacher based on the principle of the gradation of being?
How does reducing the teacher’s role to an algorithmic function conflict with the Sadrian conception of upbringing as substantial motion?
Why is the artificial teacher, despite its epistemological efficiency, ontologically incapable of fulfilling the role of an educator?
Materials and Methods
This study was conducted using a qualitative approach, employing descriptive-analytical and deductive methods. To analyze concepts and draw logical conclusions, a conceptual analysis framework was utilized to examine the ontological status of the teacher. Primary data sources consist of foundational texts of Transcendent Philosophy by Mulla Sadra, such as Al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah fi al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arba'ah (particularly volumes concerning general existence, the soul, and resurrection), supplemented by secondary Neo-Sadrian commentaries, including the works of Allameh Tabataba'i and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. To characterize the artificial teacher, contemporary literature in the philosophy of technology and critiques of artificial intelligence (specifically the theories of Hubert Dreyfus, John Searle, and Don Ihde) were consulted. The data analysis was performed in three progressive stages: first, deconstructing the concepts of the artificial teacher and the wise teacher into their essential and accidental properties (dhatiyyat and aradiyyat); second, applying the principle of the gradation of being (tashkik al-wujud) as the core analytical lens; and finally, deriving logical inferences based on the philosophical maxim "one who lacks a thing cannot bestow it."
Discussion and Result
The findings of this study are categorized into three main themes:
Existential Reduction (The Hierarchy of Being): Based on the principle of the gradation of being, the ontological level of a machine is fundamentally distinct from that of a human. Humans, by virtue of possessing a rational soul, exist at the level of immateriality and spiritual life. Conversely, despite its computational complexity, artificial intelligence lacks the essence of a soul and remains confined to the domain of inanimate matter. An analysis of Sadra's six types of agency reveals that the agency of a machine is ultimately natural or constrained, whereas true upbringing requires superior modes of human agency, such as intentional agency and providential agency.
Violation of the Maxim "One Who Lacks a Thing Cannot Bestow It": The primary objective of moral and spiritual upbringing is to bestow virtue and wisdom upon the learner. According to this philosophical maxim, an artificial intelligence that is inherently void of spiritual life, free will, and knowledge by presence cannot impart these perfecting qualities to the student, nor can it serve as the catalyst for their transcendent progression.
Educational Reductionism: Replacing the human teacher with an artificial agent reduces the multi-dimensional process of upbringing to mere technical skill training and data transmission. This poses a fundamental challenge to genuine learning, which inherently requires the presence of an exemplary mentor.
Conclusion

The analyses presented in this study indicate that attempts to replace human teachers with artificial intelligence rest on a category mistake and represent a philosophically impossible premise. While AI can simulate instructional behaviors—such as presenting concepts, conducting assessments, and tailoring adaptive learning paths—it is incapable of actualizing the essence of upbringing, which involves spiritual influence, moral modeling, and existential guidance. Neglecting this fundamental distinction between simulation and reality threatens to steer the educational ecosystem toward a cold and spiritless determinism. Consequently, this study recommends that educational policies clearly delineate the functional boundaries between machine and human. AI should be utilized solely as a supportive tool to facilitate basic cognitive functions and improve instructional efficiency, whereas the authority of existential and moral guidance, along with socio-emotional development, must remain the exclusive responsibility of human educators.

Abstract Abstract The Ontological Levels of the Human Body and Their Formation According to Mulla Sadra Abstract Problem: One of the major challenges in philosophical anthropology and eschatology is to explain the relationship between soul and body and to offer a rational account of bodily resurrection. In this context, Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of the existential levels of the body raises important questions concerning personal identity and the ontological unity of the worldly and otherworldly body. Method: This study employs a descriptive-analytical method and relies on Mullā Ṣadrā’s original texts, especially the foundational works of Transcendent Philosophy, to examine the existential levels of the body and analyze their theoretical foundations within the Sadrian philosophical framework Findings: The findings show that Mullā Ṣadrā, through his fourfold theory of the body—elemental, vaporous, imaginal, and eschatological—and on the basis of such principles as the primacy of existence, the gradational unity of being, and substantial motion, presents a gradual ontological account of the human body. The elemental body is the material and natural body; the vaporous body mediates natural life and vital faculties; the imaginal body is shaped by actions and moral dispositions and serves as the link between soul and body; and the eschatological body is the imaginal body at a more intense level of existence appropriate to the Hereafter. Conclusion: This theory provides a coherent model for reconciling bodily and spiritual resurrection and offers a rational explanation of personal identity after death. Keywords: Mulla Sadra, ontological levels of the body, imaginal body, eschatological body, corporeal resurrection. Introduction The nature of human existence and the reality of the soul–body relationship have remained among the most enduring questions in philosophy and theology. A central issue within these discussions concerns whether the human being is a purely material entity, a purely immaterial substance, or a composite reality possessing multiple existential dimensions. Classical dualist theories, such as those advanced by Descartes and later defended by thinkers like Swinburne, posit a strict distinction between soul and body as two independent substances. In contrast, monist and integrative approaches attempt to explain their unity but often fail to account for post-mortem existence and bodily resurrection. In Islamic philosophy and theology, debates over resurrection, barzakh, and the persistence of personal identity reveal a significant conceptual gap: the insufficient analysis of the body’s ontological status. Many theologians assume that the body, both in this world and in the hereafter, is the same elemental and material body. This assumption leads to unresolved problems, such as explaining how an immaterial soul can essentially relate to a material body, how bodily resurrection is possible after physical decay, and what kind of body accompanies the soul in the intermediate realm. Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din Shirazi), through his Transcendent Philosophy (al-Hikmah al-Muta‘aliyah), proposes a fundamentally different framework. By introducing the doctrines of the principality of existence, gradational unity of being, and substantial motion, he reconceptualizes both the soul and the body as dynamic and multi-leveled realities. This study seeks to examine whether Sadra’s theory of the ontological levels of the body can provide a coherent solution to the soul–body problem and offer a philosophically robust account of bodily resurrection. Materials & Methods This research adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology grounded in library-based study. The primary sources consist of Mulla Sadra’s authentic philosophical works, including al-Asfar al-Arba‘ah, al-Shawahid al-Rububiyyah, al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma‘ad, and Mafatih al-Ghayb. Secondary sources include commentaries, comparative studies, and contemporary philosophical analyses related to the mind–body problem and Islamic eschatology. The research process involves several stages: Collecting and categorizing Sadra’s explicit statements regarding the nature and levels of the body. Analyzing the metaphysical principles underpinning his theory, particularly the principality of existence, substantial motion, and the abstraction of the imaginative faculty. Examining the defining characteristics of each bodily level (elemental, vaporous, imaginal, and eschatological). Investigating the manner of the soul’s attachment to each level of the body. Comparing Sadra’s approach with alternative philosophical and theological views on the soul–body relationship. Discussion & Result The findings of this study indicate that Mulla Sadra does not restrict the concept of “body” to the elemental and material form. Instead, he conceives the body as possessing multiple ontological levels that correspond to different stages of the soul’s existential journey. The elemental body is composed of material elements and characterized by temporality, composition, change, and decay. Although there is a real unity between the soul and this body, the soul does not have an essential attachment to it due to its purely material nature. The vaporous body (ruh bukhari) functions as a subtle intermediary arising from the refinement of the elements. It carries perceptual and vital faculties and mediates between the soul and the elemental body, enabling life and sensation. The imaginal body is formed through the soul’s imaginative power and is shaped by human intentions, actions, and beliefs. Because it originates from the soul itself, it possesses inherent life and remains with the soul after death. This body constitutes the true personal body of the human being and serves as the primary locus of reward and punishment in barzakh. The eschatological body represents the intensified and perfected form of the imaginal body in the hereafter. Its identity with the worldly body is preserved not through material continuity but through the soul’s existential accompaniment. In this framework, bodily resurrection becomes intelligible without requiring the reassembly of decayed matter. Sadra’s theory establishes the soul–body relationship as one of existential unity rather than external interaction, thereby resolving the central difficulties of dualism. Conclusion This study concludes that Mulla Sadra’s theory of the ontological levels of the body provides a comprehensive and philosophically coherent solution to the soul–body problem and the challenge of bodily resurrection. By recognizing multiple degrees of corporeality and grounding their unity in existence itself, Sadra reconciles bodily and spiritual dimensions of human identity while preserving continuity across worldly life, barzakh, and the hereafter. Moreover, this theory highlights the ethical and existential significance of human actions, as each individual actively shapes their imaginal and eschatological body through moral and spiritual conduct. Consequently, Sadra’s framework not only resolves classical metaphysical issues but also offers profound insights into the nature of human responsibility and the meaning of life beyond death.

Abstract
Abstract
The main problem of this research is that evidentialism, as an epistemological theory, emphasizes the necessity of sufficient evidence for belief; however, the variety of its types and its relationship with al-Farabi's thought requires investigation. Using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on Anthony Robert Booth's reading, this research examines the types of evidentialism and their relationship with al-Farabi's epistemological foundations. The findings show that Booth considers al-Farabi to advocate "Islamic moderate evidentialism," whereby absolute certainty is exclusive to prophets, and only in their case does complete evidentialism find meaning; other individuals have access only to a lower degree of evidentialism, and their evidence, unlike the universal evidence of prophets, contains gaps that undermine epistemic certainty. In this regard, the role of prophethood in epistemic guidance and the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic evidence are explained. Finally, one consequence of this moderate evidentialism is the identification of extremist beliefs, meaning that non-elite individuals who hold certain beliefs without definitive evidence are considered extremist and must always accept the possibility of error; based on this view, there is no conflict between revelation and reason or religion and philosophy, and the necessity of prophetic guidance for human perfection becomes clear.

Keywords: al-Farabi, Anthony Robert Booth, evidentialism, anti-evidentialism, moderatism, normativity
1. Introduction
This research examines the position of "evidentialism" in al-Farabi's philosophy. Evidentialism, as an epistemological theory, considers belief justification contingent upon sufficient evidence, deeming mere faith or emotional inclination insufficient. The main question is whether al-Farabi can be counted among evidentialists, and if so, what characterizes this evidentialism? The study focuses on Anthony Booth's theory, which coins "Islamic moderate evidentialism," introducing al-Farabi as a moderate approach representative. Booth claims al-Farabi distinguished between absolute certainty (exclusive to prophets) and relative certainty (exclusive to philosophers and the general public). While accepting Booth's general framework, this research argues his analysis, rather than being directly extracted from al-Farabi's texts, is influenced by commentators such as Deborah Black and Leo Strauss. Therefore, the present study systematizes this theory through direct reference to al-Farabi's works. Reviews indicate that although numerous articles address reason and revelation, imagination, and prophethood in al-Farabi's philosophy, "moderate evidentialism" with focus on Booth's views lacks sufficient background. This article's distinction lies in direct reference to "Conditions of Certainty" (Sharā'iṭ al-Yaqīn), "The Principles of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City" (Mabādi' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila), and "The Attainment of Happiness" (Taḥṣīl al-Sa'āda) to test Booth's claims.


2. Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical method, relying on direct reference to al-Farabi's primary texts to systematize and evaluate Booth's theoretical framework of Islamic moderate evidentialism. The primary sources include "Conditions of Certainty" (Sharā'iṭ al-Yaqīn), "The Principles of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City" (Mabādi' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila), and "The Attainment of Happiness" (Taḥṣīl al-Sa'āda). By engaging directly with these works, the study examines Booth's claims and evaluates whether his interpretations derive from al-Farabi's texts or are influenced by secondary commentators.
3. Discussion & Result
This research begins by delineating the Islamic world's intellectual atmosphere. From Booth's perspective, Mu'tazilites represent evidentialism, insisting on independent rational argumentation for justifying religious belief. Conversely, Ash'arites, through their theory of "acquisition" (kasb) and prioritizing divine will, represent "anti-evidentialism," where God's command alone suffices for belief justification. Al-Farabi went beyond Mu'tazilite theology and turned to philosophy to offer knowledge certain and superior to theological dialectics.
Based on Booth's reading of al-Farabi's "Conditions of Certainty," certainty possesses six fundamental conditions, most importantly "being essential" and "actual and complete correspondence with reality." Booth concludes this absolute certainty is exclusively available to prophets. This exclusivity lies in the supreme imaginative faculty and the prophet's complete connection with the Active Intellect. Since non-elites lack this imaginative faculty, their certainty remains relative and mixed with doubt and probability. In this system, religion transmits truths to the masses. The masses lack capacity to comprehend pure rational demonstrations; therefore, they must be guided through rhetorical, representational, and persuasive methods. Consequently, religious beliefs of common people, though not philosophical demonstrations, are not false; rather, they are "imitations" (muḥākāt) and "representations" of truth.
An important result of al-Farabi's moderate evidentialism is resolving the apparent conflict between religious and philosophical propositions. First, the metaphorical aspect of religious teachings for masses: these are imaginative and representational forms of philosophical truths. Although their epistemic evidence is weaker than demonstration, they are true and necessary within their domain and do not conflict with philosophy. Second, the practical aspect of certain religious beliefs: these must be accepted based on practical evidence. Validity conditions for such beliefs differ from truth conditions of theoretical philosophical knowledge.
This research addresses that belief in absolute certainty for non-prophets is itself "extremist belief" and deviation. Human perfection for ordinary people consists in following laws and representations brought by the prophet and moving toward happiness according to their existential capacity. Since we lack voluntary control over our certainty, extremist belief is deficient due to "non-correspondence with available evidence." With this provision, al-Farabi justifies the political and epistemic order of the virtuous city based on epistemological hierarchy (the prophet at the apex, the philosopher in the middle, and common people at the base).
4. Conclusion
This research demonstrates that Booth's effort to formulate "moderate evidentialism" in al-Farabi's thought provides a useful framework for understanding the complex relationship between reason and faith in Islamic philosophy. According to this reading, al-Farabi is neither an absolute rationalist nor an Ash'arite fideist, but a philosopher granting distinguished epistemological status to "absolute prophetic certainty." Non-elites are bound to live in religious representations' shadow, while the philosopher operates at the boundary between philosophical demonstration and practical necessity of guiding society. Thus, philosophy and religion are both justified and necessary, with no inherent conflict, although their epistemological levels are not identical. The author emphasizes that, contrary to Booth, who remained confined within the Straussian interpretive framework, direct examination of al-Farabi's texts reveals profound coherence between the soul's faculties and the ultimate goal of human happiness.

Abstract Abstract The problem of the possibility and quality of the sensory vision of God in the material world has long been a fundamental question in the field of comparative philosophy and mysticism. The main research question in this paper is as follows: Can and how can the vision of God be interpreted as a this-worldly and objective experience within the framework of Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliya) and Meister Eckhart's mysticism? This research has been conducted using a descriptive-analytical method with a comparative approach. Data were collected by referring to the primary texts of the two thinkers, and then the ontological and epistemological principles they uphold regarding the problem of sensory vision were analyzed and compared. The findings indicate that, despite differences in language and intellectual tradition, both thinkers emphasize the centrality of several common principles: God is not beyond the world, but present within it; the material world is not a veil over God, but rather a mirror and manifestation of Him. In Transcendent Philosophy, concepts such as the existential poverty (faqr wujūdī) of possible existents, the personal unity (waḥdat shakhṣiyya) of existence, transcendent sense, and certain other rules provide the philosophical basis for the sensory vision of God in this very world. Eckhart, too, with concepts such as ground (Grund), the birth of God in the soul, and the single eye, considers vision contingent upon the human being emptying themselves of self and intuiting the divine presence at the heart of all creatures, including sensible things. The article concludes that the vision of God in the material world is possible, but it is neither a simple sensory-physical observation nor a purely mental affair; rather, it is an existential experience in which sense, reason, and intuition unite in the light of a transcendent truth. In this experience, the duality of "seer" and "seen" dissolves into unity, and the world is read as a book in which every word manifests the immediate presence of the Divine. Keywords: sensory vision of God, Mulla Sadra, Meister Eckhart, existential poverty, foundational principles, transcendent sense. Introduction The problem of the vision of God (or seeing God) is one of the most long-standing and yet most complex issues in the history of religious, philosophical, and mystical thought. In theological traditions, especially in apophatic theology, the emphasis on the simplicity, immateriality, and unlimitedness of the divine essence has often led to the negation of the possibility of sensory vision of God in the material world. Accordingly, any kind of vision has been deemed either entirely impossible or deferred to a non-material and otherworldly realm. In contrast, mystical traditions, despite admitting the possibility of divine intuition, have generally limited this intuition to the inner and non-sensory realm, and have not clearly explicated its relation to the objective and sensible experience of humans in the material world. The common consequence of these two approaches is the formation of a kind of conceptual rift between God and the sensible world—a rift that either leads to the negation of the divine presence in the material realm or reduces the world merely to a veil and an obstacle in the path of perceiving God. Nevertheless, in some philosophical and mystical traditions, especially in Islamic Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliya) and late Christian mysticism, efforts have been made to rethink the relationship between God and the world—efforts that seek to interpret the divine presence not outside the world, but within its very essence. In this regard, the ideas of Mulla Sadra and Meister Eckhart offer noteworthy theoretical potentials for reconsidering the problem of the divine vision. Previous research has primarily examined the metaphysical foundations of Transcendent Philosophy or analyzed the mystical aspects of Eckhart's thought, but have less directly provided a comparative examination of the possibility of the this-worldly vision of God as an existential and objective experience. Therefore, the present research seeks to fill this gap. Materials and Methods This research was conducted using the descriptive-analytic approach and based on library resources. Discussion and Results The research findings indicate that in Transcendent Philosophy, the possibility of seeing God can only be explained in light of the specific ontological foundations of this school. 1. The principle of the existential poverty of possible existents expresses that no being in the universe possesses existential independence of its own, and all beings, in their essence and actualization, are identical to dependence upon God. Accordingly, the world is not a collection of independent beings standing in opposition to God, but rather a network of existential aspects and relations, all of which signify the unitary truth of existence. 2. This conception is supplemented with the principle of the personal unity of existence, according to which existence is a unitary and simple (basīṭ) reality, and the multiplicities (katharāt) of the world are degrees and determinations of that very reality. In such a horizon, the observation of any being, at a certain degree among the degrees of perception, is the observation of a manifestation of the truth of existence. Mulla Sadra, by proposing the theory of "transcendent sense," demonstrates that sensory perception can, in the light of the substantial motion (ḥaraka jawhariyya) of the soul and its existential transcendence, go beyond the merely physical level and become aligned with intellect (or reason) and intuition. In this state, sense functions not as a raw apparatus of material perception, but as a conduit for the manifestation of meaning and truth. 3. In Meister Eckhart’s mysticism as well, the material world is understood not in opposition to God, but in a fundamental relation to Him. The concept of "ground" in Eckhart refers to a divine depth that is both the source of God's existence at the level of manifestation and the source of the existence of creatures. From this perspective, creatures do not possess existence independent from God, and the divine presence flows through all of them. The doctrine of "the birth of God in the soul" indicates that the vision of God requires the emptying of the human from self-centeredness and an existential openness toward the presence of the Truth. The metaphor of "the single eye" also shows that in the experience of seeing God, the distinction between the seer and the seen fades away, and perception reaches a kind of existential unity. 4. The comparative study of these two intellectual traditions shows that both, despite verbal and theological differences, are in agreement in negating the dualism of God and the world and in interpreting the universe as the locus of divine manifestation. In both views, the vision of God is not meant as the physical observation of the divine essence, but rather as an existential experience in which the human apprehends the divine presence within the sensible world. Conclusion The research findings suggest that the vision of God in the material world, within the framework of Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy and Meister Eckhart's mysticism, is possible and meaningful, provided that one distances oneself from simplistic sensory and reductionist mental conceptions. On this account, matter is not a veil over God, but rather the form of His manifestation, and sense, in the event of the existential transcendence of the soul, itself becomes a conduit for divine intuition. The vision of God in this framework leads neither to anthropomorphism (tajsīm) and corporealism (tajsīm) about God nor to pantheism, but rather culminates in an existential experience in which sense, intellect, and intuition attain unity. Thus, the article demonstrates that one can speak of the this-worldly presence and vision of God, without conceding to the independence of the world from God or to the dissolution of God in the world.