Contemporary Wisdom

Abstract Introduction: transcendent wisdom has three aspects, include the sage, the system of transcendent wisdom, and its cultural-social determination. The issue of this research is its third aspect is cultural-social determination. Cultural-social determination does not mean the inference of society and culture from the perspective of transcendent wisdom rather includes the foundations, background and time of the formation of transcendent wisdom and Sadra's actions towards them and his time as a philosopher. This determination is, in fact, a dimension of transcendent wisdom, in which Mulla Sadra considered the fields of knowledge and tried to collect them in a philosophical model.  Method: It is descriptive-analytical in order to obtain a clearer understanding of our current situation while examining the background, Consequences and present of the transcendent wisdom in the past and analyzing his epistemological action in those conditions. The importance and necessity of this research is due to the fact that it tries to link the originality of the heritage of Islamic philosophy to our contemporaneity and has walked and shown the way ahead and diagnosed its obstacles.  Discussion: Mulla Sadra had a multi-dimensional personality and in his philosophy, he was able to create a comprehensive philosophical system in which different sciences, centered on existence, have a methodical dialogue and connection with each other. In addition, the cultural-social determination of transcendent wisdom shows the concerns and political and religio-cultural dimensions of Sadra's time in regard to Shiite wisdom and religious science and integrationism in intra-cultural epistemological flows and that he was able to systematically connect and collect those sciences in an epistemic geometry in the third model, in addition to collecting different sciences within himself. In fact, the background of this philosophical system is from the Helleh/Maragheh school and the philosophical tradition of Shiraz to the policy of integrationism in territorial unity and the Shia approach in the culture of the Safavid period. After this philosophical system, there is the philosophical tradition of Tehran and Qom. Mulla Sadra's effort has been in the direction of philosophical reinterpretation and integrationism regarding the diversity of intra-cultural epistemological currents including theology, mysticism and philosophy in an epistemological geometry and with a religious approach to science. But his incompatibility with the political establishment and the power of that time and his distance during his isolation from the scientific circles of that day, as well as the lack of attention of his first-rate students to expand his creative philosophical system, did not give him the opportunity to transform his schema as a concrete worldview to be transferred to the public culture of the society. But now, by avoiding the general rejection and negation of philosophical others such as the philosophy of the West or the Far East, as well as avoiding self-centeredness and mere imitation of the legacy of the past, he can achieve an active wisdom that also participates in the intellectual discourse of the world. Conclusion; Our new interpretation of Mulla Sadra's philosophy, while preserving his great efforts and merits, considers a more open approach to science and a more open educational system. Also, in paying attention to cultural-intellectual others, he can use Mirfendersky's attitude to sciences and industries and his lived experiences during his trip to India. and find its way in a correct method of comparative philosophy to re-examine this unity and plurality in the historical-cultural context and time and the concrete place of the land in our current time. Because the discussion of time and history is empty in Sadra's philosophy. In the component of place, the lack of a concrete place in the sense of community and culture is noticeable, because Islamic sages have either thought of an ideal utopia without a place, or have depicted a religious cosmopolitanism, or have followed a mystical homeland.  Also in bringing together the two transcendental and worldly trends for philosophy, in addition to the hereafter happiness, worldly happiness and besides theology, consider the dimensions of the concrete life of this world. Because the prominence of the theological side, with all its importance, has gradually taken the place to pay attention to other philosophical branches and concrete matters of this-worldly life and cultural dimensions and issues from transcendent wisdom. In summing up the aforementioned components, it can be said that by rereading the transcendent wisdom in relation to the present, we should be able to recognize our existing cultural diversity and at the same time, follow the appropriate theory of their integration. This is our current project, and of course, it should be done through philosophical thinking and our local self becomes a global self, so that we can think in connection with cultural-intellectual others and participate in the intellectual discourse of the world. Of course, this participation with selfishness against the alien does not lead anywhere. In fact, these cases are among the important components in understanding and restoring the Sadrai schema and its relationship with our contemporary situation so that it becomes self-aware and relying on that original heritage, it can also think about its contemporaneity.

Abstract Abstract:
Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and his Transcendent Wisdom (Hikmat al-Muta‘aliyah) are deeply interwoven with the doctrines of the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud), the unity of existence (wahdat al-wujud), and the gradation of existence (tashkik al-wujud). Consequently, any subject or issue within his philosophical system must be examined with reference to these fundamental principles.
The central question of this study is how Mulla Sadra’s ontological interpretation of knowledge, based on his fundamental philosophical principles, can provide a justification for knowledge in its general sense and for the correspondence theory of truth. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and drawing upon Mulla Sadra’s works and those of his commentators, this study aims to demonstrate that a precise interpretation of knowledge in Mulla Sadra’s thought, considering the novel ideas and concepts introduced in his philosophical system (Hikmat al-Muta‘aliyah), leads to a new understanding of knowledge. According to this reading, all forms of knowledge ultimately possess an existential status. Through this perspective, knowledge and cognition, within the framework of his philosophy, are justified and explained in accordance with the correspondence theory, in a manner that is in harmony with the foundational elements of his philosophical thought.

Introduction

The problem of knowledge and its justification has been one of the fundamental issues in philosophy and has been particularly emphasized in Islamic philosophy. Among the philosophical traditions, the Transcendent Wisdom (Hikmat al-Muta‘aliyah) of Mulla Sadra provides an ontological interpretation of knowledge, attempting to explain it based on the principles of the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud) and the gradation of existence (tashkik al-wujud). In this system, knowledge is considered coextensive with existence, and thus, the attributes of existence apply to it. This study aims to investigate how Mulla Sadra’s ontological interpretation of knowledge can serve as a justification for the correspondence theory of truth.

Materials & Methods

Employing a descriptive-analytical method and through an extensive examination of Sadra’s works and those of his commentators, this research argues that, unlike classical theories, Sadra’s correspondence theory is not based on the mere conformity of mental forms with external objects but rather on the principle of the subsumption of the lower reality under the higher reality (ḥaml al-ḥaqīqah ʻala al-raqīqah).

Discussion & Result

The Nature and Types of Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy



The issue of knowledge has been a central topic in philosophical discourse from Plato to contemporary times. In modern philosophy, figures such as Descartes, Hume, and Kant have given special attention to epistemology. In Islamic philosophy, although epistemology was not traditionally treated as an independent discipline, discussions on topics such as mental existence (wujud dhihni) have addressed fundamental epistemological concerns. Philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Suhrawardi, and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi explicitly distinguished between ilm huduri (immediate or presential knowledge) and ilm husuli (acquired or representational knowledge).

Knowledge in Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Wisdom

Mulla Sadra does not consider knowledge as an independent category but rather as an ontological reality. According to his doctrine of the primacy of existence, knowledge is a mode of existence and follows the same hierarchical structure as existence itself. This perspective challenges conventional epistemological interpretations of acquired and presential knowledge, proposing that knowledge is not merely a cognitive representation but an existential phenomenon.

The Primacy and Gradation of Existence and Their Implications for Knowledge

One of the fundamental principles of Transcendent Wisdom is the asalat al-wujud, which asserts that entities derive their reality from existence rather than essence (mahiyya). Consequently, knowledge, as a form of existence, is actualized not through mental concepts but through presence and unveiling (kashf). Additionally, the principle of tashkik al-wujud (gradation of existence) states that all beings exist within a spectrum of intensity and weakness. This principle extends to knowledge, implying that cognition also possesses degrees of intensity corresponding to the ontological rank of the knower.

Presential and Acquired Knowledge and Their Relation to the Correspondence Theory

In Transcendent Wisdom, ilm huduri (presential knowledge) is understood as the direct and immediate presence of the known object to the knower. Due to the existential unity between the knower and the known, presential knowledge is infallible and does not require epistemological justification. In contrast, ilm husuli (acquired knowledge), which involves mental representations of external objects, is susceptible to error and necessitates an examination of its correspondence to external reality.
Islamic philosophers have proposed two main theories to explain this correspondence:

The Theory of Mimetic Shadows (Ashbah Muhaki): According to this theory, mental representations are akin to shadows of external realities, and their correspondence is based on their resemblance to real objects.
The Theory of Essential Identity (Ayniyyat Mahuwiyya): This view holds that mental forms share the same essence as external objects but exist with a different ontological modality.

Both theories face challenges in explaining how mental representations genuinely correspond to external objects. Mulla Sadra addresses these challenges by proposing the return of acquired knowledge to presential knowledge, arguing that even representational knowledge is ultimately rooted in existential presence and unity between the knower and the known.

The Relationship Between Knowledge and the Unity of Being

A key principle in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is the wahdat al-wujud (unity of being), which posits that all entities are manifestations of a single existential reality. This principle extends to knowledge, suggesting that cognition is fundamentally an existential connection between the soul and the reality of being. The higher the ontological rank of the knower, the deeper and more profound their knowledge.

The Theory of the Contraction of Reality (Haml al-Haqiqah ‘ala al-Raqiqah) and a New Interpretation of the Correspondence Theory

In his interpretation of the correspondence theory, Mulla Sadra utilizes the principle of haml al-haqiqa ‘ala al-raqiqah, which is derived from the gradational nature of existence. According to this principle, a reality that exists in a lower ontological level is a weaker manifestation of the same reality in a higher ontological plane. In epistemology, this means that a mental form is a lower-grade manifestation of an external object, ensuring an existential correspondence between mind and reality. This view not only provides a justification for the correspondence theory but also offers a solution to the classical epistemological problem of how the mind relates to external reality.

Gradational Knowledge and the Hierarchy of Cognition

Like existence, knowledge is structured in a hierarchical manner within Transcendent Wisdom. The more elevated the ontological rank of the knower, the more complete their knowledge. In this framework, knowledge progresses through a hierarchical continuum from sensory perception to imagination (khayal), intellect (‘aql), and finally, intuitive or mystical knowledge (ma‘rifa shuhudiyya). Human cognitive development is thus viewed as a gradual ascent from lower to higher forms of knowledge. Importantly, the susceptibility to error in acquired knowledge is not due to its inherent nature but rather to its lower ontological standing in the epistemic hierarchy.

Conclusion

Mulla Sadra’s ontological interpretation of knowledge redefines it not as an abstract epistemological category but as a mode of existence. In this framework, presential knowledge is regarded as the foundational form of knowledge, while acquired knowledge is ultimately reducible to presential knowledge. The correspondence theory, rather than being treated as a mere semantic relation between propositions and reality, is reformulated within the context of haml al-haqiqa ‘ala al-raqiqah, wherein mental representations are seen as weaker existential reflections of external objects. This ontological approach to knowledge, combined with the doctrine of the unity of being, establishes a tashkik (gradation-based) system of epistemology in which knowledge and reality are intrinsically linked. Consequently, cognition is not merely a mental process but an existential unveiling of reality, occurring progressively across the different planes of being.

Abstract Abstract
The importance of investigating between priority and posteriority with concomitance is in the representation of the relationship between their following issues. These concepts are related to the fundamental issues in different philosophical approaches. The question of the article is: with the change in the philosophical view from the originality of essence to the originality of existence of gradational oneness and then the originality of existence of personal oneness, what is the relation between priority and posteriority with concomitance? According to the originality of essence  the principle is with the priority and posteriority in many types. But according to the originality of existence, the existential concomitance becomes original. In the second journey, according to the gradation in existence, priority and posteriority are meant at the same time as existential stages, while in personal oneness only among the manifestations of Hāqq, emergence gradation occurs. The result of this research shows: The third journey, which is dominated by absolute oneness, is called the “qayyūmiyyā concomitance” and Because of this feature, priority and posteriority give way to concomitance.
KeyWords: Priority and Posteriority, Concomitance, The Originality of Essence, Gradational Oneness, Personal Oneness
priority and posteriority are intellectual and mental meanings and are the result of a comparison that the intellect makes between two things. The compatibility of priority and posteriority with pluralistic philosophical schools and concomitance with monistic ideas is clear. This compatibility is a motivation for answering the question: How does the relationship between priority and posteriority change with concomitance, in proportion to the change in philosophical approach from the originality of essence to the originality and gradation unity of existence and then the personal unity of existence? This issue has been examined with the focus on Sadra'i's transcendental wisdom.
    The third stage is the manifestation of the one existence of truth (haqq), which causes another type of “Superior Priority”. Based on which, beyond the existence of truth, there is truly nothing that can be placed on its side and find a relationship with it, even if it is posterior. Only between the manifestations of truth itself is a kind of manifestational gradation conceivable, which replaces existential gradation in the second stage.
 
Conclusion
In the essential stage, concomitance is a non-existent, invalid, relatives concept, and subject to priority and posteriority. Therefore, originality and gradation are characteristics of priority and posteriority, While in the gradational unity of existence, this role is entrusted to  concomitance, although priority and posteriority are also valid as a consequence of the existential concomitance. finally, with the unity of the personality, pure originality is achieved to the concomitance, and any priority or  posteriority becomes meaningless, because the concomitance is one with the unity, that is, the existence of the truth (haqq). We interpret this finding as " The transformation of »priority and posteriority « into » concomitance «. This is reflected in Mulla Sadra's statement with the term "Qayyumiyyah concomitance ", in which the manifestations are nothing other than the guardianship of haqq (God).

Abstract Abstract
This study presents a comparative philosophical analysis of two major thinkers who represent different historical and intellectual traditions: Mulla Sadra in the Islamic world and Immanuel Kant in modern Western philosophy. The central problem addressed in this research concerns the ways in which these two philosophers conceptualize reality and knowledge, and how their metaphysical foundations lead to distinct methodological frameworks. The hypothesis is that fundamental differences in ontological presuppositions result in different approaches to the structure and limits of knowledge. The research adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology based on textual analysis of primary philosophical works and secondary interpretations. Mulla Sadra, by emphasizing the primacy of existence, gradation of being, substantial motion, and knowledge by presence, considers reality as an autonomous, multi-layered and dynamic unity that can be grasped through both rational and intuitive means. Kant, by contrast, draws a strict distinction between noumenon and phenomenon and highlights the a priori structure of the mind, viewing reality as constructed and limited to human experience. The results indicate that although both thinkers engage with similar epistemological questions, their methodologies and underlying metaphysics produce sharply contrasting conceptions of knowledge and reality.
Keywords:Mulla Sadra; Immanuel Kant; philosophical methodology; epistemology; ontology; primacy of existence; transcendental idealism.
 
Introduction
The problem of how human beings relate to reality and how knowledge is formed has long occupied the center of philosophical reflection. Mulla Sadra, working in the intellectual environment of the Islamic world, and Immanuel Kant, situated in the Enlightenment of modern Europe, represent two powerful and divergent responses to this enduring question. Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy proposes an ontologically grounded framework in which existence is the ultimate foundation of both reality and knowledge. Kant’s transcendental idealism, on the other hand, proposes that knowledge is determined by the cognitive structures of the human mind rather than by reality as it is in itself. Both philosophers address similar questions about the nature and limits of human knowledge, but they do so within radically different metaphysical and methodological contexts. This study aims to identify and analyze those differences systematically, showing how each framework reflects a distinct philosophical worldview.
Materials and Methods
The research is based on a descriptive–analytical approach with a comparative methodology. It involves the close reading and structural analysis of philosophical texts by both Mulla Sadra and Kant. The analysis proceeds in three stages.
1.Identifying metaphysical foundations: Sadra’s ontological realism and Kant’s transcendental framework.
2.Examining epistemological consequences: participatory knowledge versus representational knowledge.
3.Comparing methodological approaches: intuitive–metaphysical synthesis versus transcendental–critical analysis.
This method allows for a systematic comparison of philosophical structures rather than a mere juxtaposition of concepts, revealing the deep methodological divergences between these two traditions.
Results
The comparative analysis yields several key findings. First, the two philosophers operate on fundamentally different ontological assumptions. Sadra regards existence as the ultimate ground of reality, independent of mental construction, characterized by gradation and intrinsic dynamism. Reality is accessible not only through rational argument but also through intuitive and spiritual insight. Kant, conversely, denies epistemic access to reality as it is in itself (noumenon) and confines knowledge to phenomena structured by space, time, and categories. Second, the two systems diverge in their understanding of knowledge. For Sadra, knowledge is a mode of existence itself; knowing is an ontological participation in reality. His notion of knowledge by presence reflects a direct, non-representational relation between the knower and the known. Kant views knowledge as representational, produced by the synthesis of sensory data and the mind’s a priori conceptual framework. Third, their methodological orientations reflect these metaphysical commitments. Sadra combines rational demonstration, mystical intuition, and theological insight, aiming for a holistic vision of reality. Kant applies a critical–transcendental method, analyzing the conditions of the possibility of experience without making ontological claims about what lies beyond.
 
Discussion
These differences reveal two contrasting philosophical attitudes toward the relation between mind and reality. Sadra works within an ontological realist paradigm in which reality precedes and grounds knowledge. Knowledge is not a construction but an uncovering, a direct participation in the fabric of being. His method integrates rational reasoning and intuitive unveiling, reflecting the close relationship between metaphysics, epistemology, and spiritual experience in classical Islamic philosophy. Kant represents a critical and modern paradigm in which epistemology precedes ontology. For him, what can be known is strictly determined by the structure of human cognition, and reality beyond experience is inaccessible. While Sadra’s framework extends knowledge to metaphysical and transcendent realms, Kant limits it to empirical phenomena and assigns metaphysical ideas to the realm of practical reason. Despite their profound differences, both philosophers share a concern with establishing a systematic methodology for understanding knowledge. Both reject naïve realism, though in different ways: Sadra through ontological gradation and union, Kant through transcendental structure and critical delimitation. This shared orientation toward methodological rigor makes their comparison philosophically productive, especially for contemporary debates on the nature and scope of human cognition.
Conclusion
The comparative analysis of Mulla Sadra and Immanuel Kant demonstrates that their divergent metaphysical foundations lead to fundamentally different epistemological and methodological positions. Sadra grounds knowledge in an ontological structure that transcends the limits of sensory experience and embraces intuition as a legitimate mode of knowing. Kant, in contrast, grounds knowledge in the structure of the human mind, restricting its reach to phenomena and establishing clear boundaries for human reason. These two approaches reveal not only two distinct philosophical systems but also two epistemic horizons: one expansive and participatory, the other critical and delimiting. By placing these two traditions in dialogue, this study highlights the possibility of integrating insights from both: the metaphysical depth of Sadrian philosophy and the epistemic clarity of Kantian critique. Such an integrative perspective may contribute to contemporary philosophical discussions on the nature of reality, the scope of human knowledge, and the role of methodology in bridging different intellectual traditions.

Abstract Problem: The World of Forms and Images (ʿālam al-muthul wa al-mithāl) has been a significant topic since the inception of philosophical history. Some argue that neglecting the intermediary world (ʿālam-e mīyāna) has led to a crisis in Western thought. This issue gains heightened importance in comparative philosophy, as such an approach remains impossible without acknowledging a transhistorical realm (sāḥat-e farātārīkh) and the intermediary world.

Method: This research employs a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library resources and a comparative approach to study Platonic Forms (muthul-e aflātūnī), the World of Images (ʿālam-e mithāl) in Suhrawardī’s thought, and the realm of language (sāḥat-e zabān) in Heidegger’s philosophy.

Findings: In Suhrawardī’s thought, the World of Images is an imaginal (khayālīn), real (ḥaqīqī), and objective (ʿaynī) realm that, unlike Forms, possesses quantity (miqdār) and shape (shakl). Heidegger, while critical of Platonic Forms, speaks of language as an imaginal, real, and objective realm that also has quantity and shape. However, he occasionally refers to a "truer" realm, such as the essence of art (dhāt-e honar), which lacks quantity and shape.

Conclusion: Heidegger, too, acknowledges something akin to the World of Forms and Images but critiques interpretations emphasizing truth as correspondence (muṭābaqa). Heidegger grounds the manifestation (āshkār-gī) of ontological and epistemological hierarchies in unconcealment. Similarly, Suhrawardī emphasizes light (nūr) and defines knowledge as presential knowledge (ʿilm-e ḥuḍūrī), which is not based on correspondence.

Abstract Abstract The present study seeks to discover the Known by essence (ma'lum bil-dhat) and known-by-accident (ma'lum bil-'aradh) relationship from Avicenna's perspective. The first assumption, namely the objectivity of the Known by essence, is incorrect. However, the second assumption, i.e. they are different, challenges the understanding of knowledge and cognition. Method: To find an answer, Avicenna’s views on knowledge have been collected and analyzed. Ultimately. Findings: Abstraction, form and connection are the most important concepts that create knowledge in the thought of Ibn Sina. And it seems that rather than being consistent with the Substantive view, it illuminates some facts of Avicenna's epistemological system in the context of existence. So that the answer to many issues in this field, including the present issue, is also. Argument: Basically, no relationship leads to unity except in the context of existence. Ultimately, the conclusion was that, Known by essence and Known-by-Accident would achieve unity by connecting in the realm of existence. Therefore, due to their existential connection, they have objectivity; But one is an effect and the other is effective, and in this respect they are different. Keywords: Knowledge, Abstraction, Known by essence, Known-by-Accident, Avicenna   Introduction The discussion of science and cognition is one of the important topics in philosophy and one of the current issues in this field. One of the major issues in Islamic philosophy is the discussion of science and epistemology. This issue has been considered and studied in various chapters by Islamic philosophers, including Avicenna. Analyzing Avicenna's theory of science helps us to accurately understand acquired knowledge and distinguish it from direct knowledge, and provides a precise criterion for these two types.   Materials & methods This article was conducted and analyzed using a descriptive-analytical method and collecting Avicenna's views on science from library sources.   Discussion & Result The issue raised here is what relationship does Known by essence have with Known-by-Accident? If these two truths are independent and disconnected, the reality of science faces a challenge. And if they are in fact one thing and one truth, then when we perceive a tree, the tree itself should be present in our minds, rather than its form. But obviously that is not the case. It seems that in the knowledge of a thing, there must be both objectivity and unity between the external object and the perceiver, and also otherness and separation. Avicenna has precise references to science in his works and he explained this issue with the language of his philosophy on the axis of existence. Therefore, paying attention to them can guide us to the answer to the problem. The theory of science in Avicenna's view is more existential. The truth of "knowledge" in Avicenna's thought is linked to concepts that cannot be properly understood without considering all of them. The most important of these concepts are: "Existence", "Contact", and "Immateriality".    Conclusion It is understood from the words of Avicenna that when perceiving something, between Known by essence and Known-by-Accident, there must be both objectivity and otherness, in such a way that neither contradiction nor sophistry arises. Without considering "Existence" as the truth present in the context of reality, both mental and objective and without considering the concept of "Contact " and how the truths of existence are related at all levels it is impossible to justify the way Known by essence and Known-by-Accident communicate. Therefore, the connection between the two is not of the quiddity type. Rather, for the realization of knowledge, a connection is established between them in their existential plane. Basically, no relationship leads to unity except in the context of existence. Therefore, it must be said that Known by essence and Known-by-Accident are two sides of the same existential truth. This means that one being has two sides, one called Known by essence and the other called Known-by-Accident. Known by essence is the abstract aspect of Known-by-Accident and its effect that is compatible with the abstract soul and can be known to the soul.

Abstract Abstract
With the expansion of capitalism and the proliferation of commodities, environmental degradation has intensified.
The central question of this study is that although this issue has received limited attention in Islamic thought,
certain aspects of it can be discerned in the works of Ibn ʿArabī. Through a deeper interpretation of his writings,
valuable insights can be gained regarding environmental preservation. This study focuses on the role of Ibn ʿArabī’s
anthropology and its relevance to addressing ecological crises. It adopt a descriptive-analytical approach.The
findings suggest that Ibn ʿArabī’s anthropology offers a mystical interpretation of Islam in which environmental
preservation is presented as a religious act. In his teachings, the human being possesses dignity due to the divine
spirit breathed into them and is considered the ultimate purpose of creation. On this basis, any form of disrespect or
discrimination among human beings is unjustifiable. On the other hand, although the human being is regarded as the
noblest of creatures, nature was not created solely for their sake; rather, like the human, it is a manifestation of
divine self-disclosure and does not possess intrinsic superiority over other beings. Since all creatures bear the divine
spirit, the human being is obligated to honor the divine presence that flows through all of creation. This conception
of the human being entails a responsibility for the protection of the environment.
Keywords: Environmental protection, mysticism, divine self-disclosure (tajallī), anthropology, Ibn ʿArabī 1 PhD student, Islamic Mysticism, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran. Email:
arabamery@gmail.com
2 * Professor, Department of Philosophy and Mysticism, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran,
Iran. Email: n.sophia1388@gmail.com
3 Professor, Department of Islamic Mysticism, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran, Iran.
Email: mazahri711@yahoo.com
Date received: 21 ⁄ 4 ⁄ 2025
, Date of acceptance: 11 ⁄ 9 ⁄ 2025 Introduction
Global warming and the current ecological crisis have prompted many scholars of religion to identify the ethical
factors that contribute to the depletion and waste of the planet’s limited natural resources. As such, a reading of
religion that aligns with efforts to solve this global challenge is of utmost importance. This form of thinking,
grounded in religious knowledge, urges Muslims to view their traditions differently and to apply religious texts and
principles to the pressing issues of the present day. Therefore, the works of Muslim thinkers—many of which were
written centuries ago—need to be revisited, with some of them speaking directly to the current problems facing
humanity. Thus, reinterpreting traditions and repurposing old teachings and concepts to address today’s challenges is
thus of great importance. Humanity is now confronted with the limitation of Earth’s resources and that humans bear
responsibility for their protection and preservation. This desire to establish a harmonious relationship with nature
can also be seen as a sign of spiritual awakening. Modern humans have come to understand that everything in nature
is interconnected; instead of viewing things as separate and unrelated entities, humanity has come to understand that
everything in nature is interrelated. In general, academic discourse on Sufism is still committed to a classical-
normative model—for example, Sufi concepts of divine love and manifestation (tajallī) have solely been discussed
within the framework of love for God, and their implications for human interaction with the environment have not
been explored. Scholars of theoretical mysticism have also given insufficient attention to this topic. The need to
expand the scope of Sufism by incorporating the concept of divine manifestation and applying it to environmental
issues is not an unfamiliar intellectual trend. Such an innovative approach—applying and incorporating traditional
concepts to modern issues—can redefine the relationships between God and humanity, between humans themselves,
and between humans and the environment. On the other hand, humans and their issues have always been central
concerns for thinkers. The definition of the human being is one of the topics that various intellectuals have
approached through their own insights. Ibn ʿArabī is one of the great thinkers of the Islamic world whose
perspective on human nature can help address environmental degradation. The core of Ibn ʿArabī’s view of human
nature lies in his important theory of the “Perfect Human” (al-insān al-kāmil).
Materials & Methods
This study is based on a descriptive-analytical method. It begins by examining the classical works of Ibn
ʿArabī, such as Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (The bezels of wisdom) and al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya (The Meccan
revelations), with a focus on the aspects of his mysticism, which relate to the study of human nature. Key
concepts such as the “Perfect Human,” “divine manifestation” (tajallī), and “unity of being” (waḥdat al-
wujūd) are analyzed as the theoretical framework. Data related to environmental crises have been drawn
from contemporary scientific sources in order to clarify the connection between Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical
teachings and environmental preservation.
Discussion & Result
From Ibn ʿArabī’s perspective, the human being is the goal and purpose of creation; yet at the same time,
nature—like humanity—is a manifestation of the Divine Spirit and bears divine attributes. This view implies that
human beings possess no essential superiority over other beings and are obligated to safeguard the Divine Spirit that
permeates all of existence. In Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical system, the distinction between the “Perfect Human” and the
“animalistic human” (al-insān al-ḥayawānī) forms the core of his view of human nature. The Perfect Human,
through faith in the unseen and a journey toward perfection, becomes God’s vicegerent (khalīfat Allāh) and assumes
the duty of protecting nature. Over time, and in response to emerging environmental crises, Muslims have begun to
rethink classical Islamic mystical texts in order to reform humanity’s interaction with nature. Ibn ʿArabī, for
instance, asserts that all aspects of nature are interconnected and that no entity is truly “inanimate”; rather, all of nature is alive and engaged in glorifying God (tasbīḥ). Such a view of nature as both living and sacred can provide
an ethical and spiritual foundation for environmental preservation. Meanwhile, Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of the unity of
being, which emphasizes the unity of all beings within the Divine Essence, plays a key role in shaping
environmental ethics. This theory encourages humans to take responsibility for all aspects of nature and reminds
them that harming nature is, in effect, a form of disrespect toward the sacred Divine Essence. Nevertheless,
contemporary academic discourse on Islamic mysticism has primarily focused on its spiritual and philosophical
dimensions, with insufficient attention to its relevance for environmental challenges. Scholars such as Mokhtari and
Gorjian (2021) and Irawan (2021), have highlighted the influence of mystical teachings on ethical attitudes;
however, the direct link between these concepts and environmental crises remains underexplored. This study seeks
to fill that gap by examining Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings on human nature and their role in safeguarding the environment.
Conclusion
A re-reading of Ibn ʿArabī’s view of human nature reveals that his mystical teachings contribute
not only to the cultivation of the human spirit but also to the protection of the natural
environment. Ibn ʿArabī regards the human being as a divine artist who, through faith in the
unseen and the Divine Spirit, can enhance not only their relationship with God and other people
but also their relationship with nature. Since nature is a manifestation of the Divine and is
constantly glorifying God, the human being is obligated to protect this sacred manifestation. This
study demonstrates that contemporary environmental crises—which stem from humanity’s loss
of spiritual connection with nature—can be addressed by revisiting mystical concepts such as the
Perfect Human and the unity of being. Belief in the aliveness of all elements of nature and
respect for the Divine Spirit that flows through them can not only promote environmental
preservation but also deepen the awakened spirituality of the modern human, where
environmental challenges can lead to a form of collective worship. By offering a new reading of
Ibn ʿArabī’s works, this study presents Sufism as an effective tool for redefining the
human–nature relationship. Therefore, Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical teachings can respond not only to
spiritual and religious concerns but also to critical environmental issues, preparing the ground for
ethical models aimed at protecting nature

Abstract Abstract
The issue discussed in this article is a comparative examination of the role of mortality awareness in achieving freedom from the perspectives of two great philosophers, Mulla Sadra and Heidegger. Mortality awareness, as conceptualized by Mulla Sadra and Heidegger, is among the most significant components of their philosophies and is closely related to the concept of freedom. Sadraean freedom is defined as "transcendence in elevation" and "approaching infinite truth through self-knowledge," while Heideggerian freedom is characterized as "ek-sistence and transcendence based on authenticity." Sadraean death is understood as "entry into inner and esoteric realms," whereas Heideggerian death is defined as "the negation of Dasein." The deficiencies in Heidegger’s philosophy can be summarized as follows: (1) Neglect of the immaterial dimensions of human existence and their supporting arguments, (2) a linear view of human truth (from thrownness to death), overlooking origin and return, (3) lack of a precise depiction of positive freedom, (4) absence of the issue of ethics and moral freedom, (5) failure to provide a practical program for realizing freedom, (6) lack of a correct conception of the afterlife as a realm for the manifestation of inner truth, rather than a realm of origination, and (7) lack of coherence in ontology, theology, and eschatology.
Keywords: death, mortality awareness, freedom, philosophy of freedom, Mulla Sadra, Heidegger, Henry Corbin.
 
Introduction
Freedom is one of the most significant issues that has been consistently raised throughout history, with philosophers exploring its reality. Death, as a pivotal event in human life, is also considered one of the most important philosophical matters. Both Mulla Sadra and Heidegger have presented discussions on the domains of freedom, death, and mortality awareness. In one respect, freedom is of two forms: voluntary freedom (meaning free will) and existential freedom (meaning the expansion of human existence). Both Mulla Sadra and Heidegger affirm human voluntary freedom and free will. The focus of this article is existential freedom. From Mulla Sadra’s perspective, a person with free will can pursue the path of existential transcendence and freedom, achieving existential expansion, or may choose the path of captivity and base desires. Similarly, in Heidegger’s view, Dasein has the freedom to follow the path of authenticity and freedom or to take the path of inauthenticity and captivity. Mortality awareness plays a prominent role in the intellectual frameworks of both Mulla Sadra and Heidegger in realizing existential freedom.
 
Materials and Methods
The data for this research has been gathered through library-based methods from the works of Mulla Sadra and Heidegger, as well as, in some cases, their prominent commentators. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, the study examines both perspectives and ultimately reaches its final conclusions through a comparative analysis of the two philosophies.
 
Discussion and Results
Sadraean freedom is defined as "transcendence in elevation" and "approaching infinite truth through self-knowledge," while Heideggerian freedom is characterized as "ek-sistence and transcendence based on authenticity." Sadraean death is understood as "entry into inner and esoteric realms," whereas Heideggerian death is defined as "the negation of Dasein." The inconsistencies in Heidegger’s philosophy, which on one hand portrays death as annihilation and on the other, in his later years, suggests that "only a god can save us," can be attributed to two factors: 1) the conceptual nature of conventional Western philosophy, and 2) the inability of Christian Trinitarianism to adequately explain theology and ontology. Consequently, Heidegger replaces the Christian God with the concept of Being. Sadraean freedom is gradational, possessing multiple layers and levels, with the measure of freedom determined by the degree of proximity to the infinite truth of God and the embodiment of His perfect attributes. The outcome of Sadraean freedom is existential expansion and the joy of existential proximity to divine unity and closeness to God. In contrast, Heideggerian freedom, within the realm of "freedom for," speaks of human authenticity and the question of Being, yet Heidegger’s human remains existentially neutral toward many matters.
With death, Heideggerian Dasein and Heidegger's philosophy reach a dead end, whereas in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, the transcendent and intensified identity of the human does not decay with death but rather emerges from its shell. During the brief worldly span of life, humans are constantly shaping their existential identity and undergoing becoming. The human is the sum of all their deeds, intentions, and inclinations, and the inner essence of the human is precisely the constructs built throughout their lifetime; the Barzakh and the Resurrection serve as the vessels for the manifestation of human actions, states, and inner essence, not as vessels for their origination. Sadra presents numerous philosophical, mystical, and revelatory arguments to prove the immaterial and eternal dimensions of the human, but Heidegger's philosophy, while silent on providing arguments, has not even offered any discussion or interpretation regarding empirical and intuitive matters such as voluntary death, the shedding of the body, out-of-body experiences, and autoscopy.
With death, the circle of Heideggerian Dasein closes, and Heidegger's philosophy comes to an end. However, Mulla Sadra, by maintaining the transcendent dimensions of the human, the inner realms of the human, and the degrees of existence, continues his philosophy toward elevation. The relationship between the outcomes of Sadraean mortality awareness and Heideggerian mortality awareness is one of absolute generality and specificity. Outcomes such as resisting absorption into the masses, independence, coherence, focus, and responsibility—all pertaining to the realm of "freedom from societal captivity"—are shared between the two perspectives. However, these shared outcomes differ in quality and manner of realization. The fruits of Sadraean mortality awareness are more comprehensive and encompass the following realms: "freedom from" societal constraints, "freedom from" material attachments, "freedom from" moral vices, "freedom from" everything other than God, as well as "freedom for" intellectual and practical rationality, "freedom for" transcendence beyond nature and the body, "freedom for" moral virtues, and "freedom for" annihilation in God and attaining the infinite truth, which encompasses all perfections.
 
Conclusion
Heidegger's perspective contains deficiencies that Mulla Sadra's viewpoint—bolstered by demonstrative proofs and corroborative mystical and revelatory evidence—lacks. The strengths in Mulla Sadra's philosophy can be enumerated as follows: (1) Provision of arguments for the immateriality of the human soul, (2) depiction of the origin of the stages of proximity and freedom, (3) elucidation of human truth in light of human origin and return (resurrection), (4) delineation of the goal of moral and mystical freedom, (5) extensive examination of ethics and moral freedom, (6) presentation of a practical program, (7) precise depiction of the truth of the afterlife, (8) coherence of the philosophical system in ontology, theology, and eschatology. In conclusion, Henry Corbin's analysis is presented as corroborating evidence for the findings of this article.

Abstract   Abstract: This study examines classical Iranian mystical narratives through the dialogic lens of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory. The primary aim is to investigate how time and space, the role of the narrator and audience, and the production of meaning are represented within Bakhtin’s narrative framework, and subsequently to analyze classical Iranian mystical narratives from a Bakhtinian perspective. Thus, the central research question is: How can Bakhtin’s dialogical theory be applied to analyze and interpret the narrative structure and meaning-making in classical Persian mystical texts, specifically the works of Rumi and Attar? The research adopts a descriptive-analytical method based on library studies. Findings reveal that the mystical narratives of Rumi and Attar, contrary to the common perception of them as monologic and linear texts, possess a profoundly dialogic, nonlinear, and multi-layered structure. In these texts, time and space are represented symbolically and cyclically, serving as tools for expressing inner spiritual journeys. The narrator appears in fluid, multifaceted, and metaphorical forms, creating a polyphonic space. Consequently, Bakhtin’s theoretical framework proves to be an effective tool for uncovering the dynamic, dialogic, and complex dimensions of narrative within the Iranian mystical tradition. Keywords: Narrative, Dialogic Imagination, Chronotope, Dialogism, Iranian Mystical Narratives, Bakhtin.   Introduction The present study investigates how Bakhtin’s dialogic framework can illuminate the narrative mechanisms of classical Persian mystical texts. Rather than pursuing a comparative or cross-cultural inquiry, this research employs Bakhtin’s theoretical model as an analytical instrument for understanding the structural and semantic organization of mystical storytelling in Rumi and Attar. In Bakhtin’s view, narrative is a living social act in which meaning arises from the interplay among text, author, and audience. Similarly, in Persian Sufi literature, meaning is not fixed but continually renewed through symbolic narration, layered voices, and the reader’s interpretive engagement. This convergence makes Bakhtin’s theory a fitting tool for analyzing mystical narratives that merge linguistic creativity with spiritual introspection. Materials & Methods The research adopts a descriptive-analytical methodology grounded in textual interpretation and conceptual application. The primary sources include Bakhtin’s theoretical works (The Dialogic Imagination, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics) and selected mystical narratives from Masnavi-ye Ma’navi and Mantiq al-Tayr.
The study proceeds in three analytical phases: 1.       Conceptual clarification of Bakhtin’s core notions—chronotope, dialogism, and polyphony—within the philosophy of narrative. 2.       Textual analysis of mystical narrative structures in Rumi and Attar, focusing on the representation of time and space, the fluidity of the narrator, and the interpretive participation of the audience. 3.       Interpretive synthesis, demonstrating how these concepts operate within the internal structure of the texts.
The approach is theoretical-analytical rather than comparative: Bakhtin’s concepts are used as a lens to dissect the inner logic of mystical narrative without extending the study to the domain of classical Islamic poetics. 4.         Discussion & Results The analysis reveals that Bakhtin’s dialogic concepts resonate deeply with the narrative strategies of Persian mystical literature. 1.       Chronotope (Time-Space Unity): In Mantiq al-Tayr, the journey of the birds unfolds across seven symbolic valleys that correspond to states of spiritual evolution rather than physical geography. This circular, inner temporality parallels Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope, in which time and space merge as a single experiential continuum. Similarly, in Masnavi, the recurrence of symbolic motifs—the reed flute, the tavern, the desert—transforms space into a psychological landscape of self-discovery. 2.       Narrator and Voice: Both Rumi and Attar construct multi-layered narrative voices that blur the boundaries between author, character, and symbol. The reed in Masnavi or the hoopoe in Mantiq al-Tayr act as mediating narrators through which mystical experience becomes dialogic. This polyphonic structure aligns with Bakhtin’s idea of narrative as a site of multiple consciousnesses rather than a single authoritative voice. 3.       Audience and Meaning: Iranian mystical narratives require the reader’s active participation in the discovery of meaning. Their non-linear and allegorical nature transforms reading into an interpretive act, consistent with Bakhtin’s belief that meaning emerges through ongoing dialogue between text and audience. These findings indicate that Bakhtin’s theoretical model, though born in Western modernity, provides a productive framework for unveiling the inherent dialogism of Persian mystical narrative traditions.   Conclusion This research concludes that Bakhtin’s dialogic theory, when employed as an interpretive framework rather than a comparative one, offers a profound understanding of Persian mystical storytelling. The structural dynamics of Rumi’s and Attar’s works demonstrate that meaning in mystical narrative is never static but continually negotiated through interplay among time, voice, and reader. The study highlights how the concepts of chronotope, dialogism, and polyphony can serve as effective analytical tools for exploring spiritual and linguistic complexity in Iranian mysticism. By applying a single theoretical lens consistently, the research preserves methodological coherence and avoids dispersing into broader historical or comparative discussions. Ultimately, the study affirms that mystical narrative—like Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue—reflects the living, open-ended nature of human understanding.  

Abstract Abstract Monotheism (tawḥīd) is the foundational principle of all Islamic teachings. This study examines how the principles of the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) and the simplicity of existence (basāṭat al-wujūd) shape the understanding of Qur’anic monotheism in the thought of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī. Using a descriptive–analytical method based on textual analysis, the research focuses on his Qur’anic exegesis, Tafsīr al-Mīzān. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (1902–1981), a leading exegete and philosopher of the school of Transcendent Wisdom (al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah), interprets Qur’anic monotheism as the oneness of the Divine Essence (aḥadiyyat al-dhāt). This denotes absolute non-composition of God’s Essence—whether external, mental, or analytical—rather than mere numerical unity. The study shows that Ṭabāṭabāʾī extensively employs metaphysical principles such as the primacy, simplicity, and absolute purity (ṣarāfah) of existence to explain divine unity, while viewing them as fully compatible with the Qur’an-by-Qur’an method of exegesis. It concludes that, within his intellectual framework, rational demonstration can deepen the understanding of revealed knowledge. Keywords: Primacy of existence, Simple reality (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqah), Numerical unity, Oneness of the Divine Essence                     Introduction In the field of hermeneutics, it is widely acknowledged that the interpreter's presuppositions and pre-understandings influence the interpretation of a text. At the beginning of Tafsīr al-Mīzān, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī introduces his exegetical approach as the Qur’an-by-Qur’an method. Nevertheless, this research demonstrates that, in explicating Qur’anic monotheism, he draws upon the principles of Sadrian philosophy—particularly the primacy of existence and the simplicity of the reality of existence—without considering this practice to be in conflict with the Qur’an-by-Qur’an approach. The reason lies in ʿAllāmah’s intellectual framework, which recognizes reason and rational demonstration as authoritative. The aim of this research is to explain and analyze ʿAllāmah’s interpretation of Qur’anic monotheism with reference to the foundations of Transcendent Wisdom. Method This study has been conducted using a descriptive–analytical method based on textual analysis. Results and Discussion According to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, the use of the term aḥad in the verse “Say: He is Allah, the One” (Qur’an 112:1), employed affirmatively and without qualification, addition, or description, conveys the meaning that the existence of God absolutely negates the possibility of any likeness or equivalent. Aḥad denotes an existence that does not admit any form of multiplicity and, because it cannot be counted or enumerated, does not fall within the category of number. This contrasts with wāḥid (one), for which multiplicity may be conceived either externally, mentally, or hypothetically by secondary rational consideration. The term aḥad is used positively and exclusively for God, who is free from any suspicion of composition—whether external, mental, or analytical. In analyzing this concept, God is presented as the Necessary Reality of existence, identical with the very reality of existence itself, from which all the effects of other levels of existence derive. In this sense, He is the remover of all need from the entirety of being and the invincible Lord and object of worship. The idea that what is realized externally is existence itself, that existence is the source of all effects, and that existence is a graded reality whose highest level is Necessary Existence—one for whom non-existence is inconceivable—is among the well-known doctrines of Transcendent Wisdom (the primacy and gradation of existence). Another point ʿAllāmah employs in interpreting the oneness of the Divine Essence is that the attributes of perfection ascribed to God in the Qur’an are either exclusive or expressed in an exclusive context. He specifically refers to the attribute al-Wāḥid al-Qahhār (the One, the All-Dominant), explaining that an entity which has no limit or boundary cannot admit multiplicity, since the absence of limitation precludes differentiation. There is nothing outside such an existence that could strengthen it by addition or weaken it by removal. Such unity is conceivable only if the reality in question is infinite. “Infinity,” understood as the absolute negation of all limits, is synonymous with complete purity and absolute simplicity, for limitation necessarily entails a composition of existence and non-existence and implies contingency. Embedded in the concept of infinity is the idea that nothing lies outside the encompassing scope of such an existence for a second to be supposed (the simplicity of the reality of existence). In this perspective, unity is an attribute of the Essence itself, and the Essence is such that it rejects all forms of multiplicity—whether arising from the Essence itself or from the relation between attributes. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s formulation of the principle “The simple reality is all things and nothing is outside it,” the denial of simplicity in the Necessary Being entails accepting composition, which implies need, negates simplicity, and introduces limitation. The negation of limitation, by contrast, entails the affirmation of infinite existence. The very conception of infinity prevents the supposition of a second, even at the level of rational hypothesis. This is precisely the meaning of the oneness of the Divine Essence. Therefore, from ʿAllāmah’s perspective, understanding Qur’anic monotheism—understood as the oneness of God’s Essence—is impossible without grasping the simplicity and absolute purity of existence, which in turn is inconceivable without the principle of the primacy of existence. Only a simple existence can be infinite, rendering the supposition of a second intrinsically impossible, as ʿAllāmah explains in his commentary on the opening verse of Sūrat al-Tawḥīd. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī interprets God’s attribute of dominance (qahhāriyyah) as signifying total existential encompassment and, consequently, invincibility—once again grounded in the primacy and simplicity of the reality of existence. Conclusion The application of the principles of the primacy and simplicity of existence in interpreting the oneness of the Divine Essence in Tafsīr al-Mīzān demonstrates one form of interaction between reason and revelation in opening new epistemic horizons of revealed knowledge for the intellect. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī holds that human beings, by employing sound demonstration—consisting of certain premises and correct logical form—can arrive at truths that correspond to reality and thereby uncover revealed knowledge. For this reason, he does not regard the use of the principles of Transcendent Wisdom as contradictory to the Qur’an-by-Qur’an exegetical method. An exegete never engages in interpretation without presuppositions that have been critically examined at the epistemological level. According to ʿAllāmah’s intellectual system, in which reason is authoritative, certain rational knowledge and revealed knowledge will share common insights. Reliance on demonstrative knowledge can therefore lead to a deeper understanding of revealed knowledge.

Abstract Abstract:
Explaining the purposes of jurisprudence has long been a topic of great interest among Islamic jurists, theologians, and philosophers. From the perspective of many theologians, God's actions and sayings are motivated by purposes; therefore, all the laws of the Sharia are established for a purpose. According to Shiite jurists, the preservation of the soul, religion, reason, lineage, and property are considered as the consideration of all laws.  The purposes of Sharia have also been considered in sciences such as theology and philosophy, and each has explained the main purposes and objectives of Sharia based on its own methodology. Some Muslim philosophers, due to the importance of the social and political approach to religion, have paid more attention to the philosophical analysis of the purposes of Sharia and its provisions in three areas: individual, political and legal, which require analysis and examination. Therefore, the issue of this article is: From the perspective of Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, as two Muslim philosophers, how have the purposes of Sharia and its role in regulating and developing the knowledge of jurisprudence, as well as establishing and deepening approaches such as governmental jurisprudence, been explained? In this article, the views of these two philosophers on this issue are expressed, and the results of the research are also presented below.
 
Keywords: maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, purposes of Sharia, philosophy of jurisprudential rulings, Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā.
Introduction
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa refers to the purposes and objectives that underpin the enactment of religious laws (Sharia), aimed at securing worldly and otherworldly benefits, promoting human welfare, and preventing harm and corruption. These objectives include the preservation of religion, life, intellect, progeny, and property. This study seeks to examine the purposes and objectives of Sharia (Islamic law) from the perspectives of Islamic philosophers. The central question of this research is: How have Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, as two prominent Muslim philosophers, interpreted the objectives of Sharia and their role in regulating and advancing the field of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), as well as in solidifying and deepening approaches such as governance-oriented jurisprudence?
 
Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical approach based on library sources.
 
Discussion and Results
Based on the findings presented in the study, the classification of the purposes of jurisprudence and the application of the rational method by Muslim philosophers such as Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā are rooted in their philosophical foundations. The philosophical principles of these Muslim philosophers have significantly contributed to the development of governance-oriented jurisprudence and the extraction of the systematic components of jurisprudence.

From the perspectives of Mullā Ṣadrā and Avicenna, the purposes of Sharia and the philosophy of jurisprudential rulings can be classified into three levels: devotional (ʿibādī) purposes, political purposes, and legal purposes. According to these Muslim philosophers, all these purposes aim at the perfection and elevation of the human soul, ultimately aligning with the definition of wisdom.
The purposes of devotional rulings are the objectives and aims of the laws and commandments that mandate worship of God in various forms, such as prayer, fasting, and hajj pilgrimage. These rulings are directly intended to promote growth and perfection, facilitate the journey toward God, cultivate a wholesome life, and elevate the human being from an animalistic state to an angelic (malakī) rank. Mullā Ṣadrā considers the purpose of establishing devotional rulings to be the remembrance and worship of God, fostering existential proximity (al-taqarrub al-wujūdī) to Him, and guiding the human soul toward the Divine. Devotional rulings serve as a means for the spiritual journey of the soul toward the ultimate end of existence, a journey that is realized through the knowledge and servitude of God. Avicenna, on the other hand, identifies two distinct dimensions in the philosophy behind devotional rulings. The first is the subjugation of base desires, the strengthening of the rational and immaterial aspect of the human being, and the cultivation of a transcendental disposition (al-hayʾat al-istiʿlāʾiyya) whereby the soul gains mastery over bodily impulses. In this framework, true happiness lies in attaining complete abstraction and absolute proximity to God.
In political rulings as well, concepts such as human felicity (saʿāda), drawing closer to God, and divine guidance cast their influence over the political philosophy and the purposes of political rulings. The establishment of governance and the creation of the madīna fāḍila (virtuous city), where the prophet possesses knowledge of true felicity, has attained the highest degree of nearness to God, and is capable of leading people toward divine proximity, are considered prerequisites for the perfection and elevation of the human soul, ultimately guiding humanity toward true felicity.

 
Conclusion
These two philosophers, drawing upon a virtue-based framework and employing their rational methodology, analyzed and classified the purposes of Sharia. The socio-political theory of Islamic philosophy can be utilized by Islamic jurists (fuqahāʾ) in the development of jurisprudence through a comprehensive approach to managing both the individual and society. The philosophical principles upheld by these thinkers, due to their proximity to governance-oriented jurisprudence in terms of ultimate goals—namely, the administration of society—serve as a solid foundation for the philosophy of governance-oriented jurisprudence. From this perspective, the journey toward God, existential proximity to Him, and the remembrance of God constitute the primary purpose behind the enactment of devotional rulings. Likewise, the establishment of governance, the implementation of divine policies to guide and perfect society toward God, and the regulation of social life by prophets represent the central objectives behind political rulings. Furthermore, the preservation of life, progeny, and property are regarded as the most fundamental principles in uncovering the purposes of Sharia in the domain of legal rulings

Abstract Abstract Analysis of mashhūrāt (widely accepted or well-known propositions) and their relation to certainties (yaqīniyyāt) in logic is the foundation and origin of many challenges in theology, ethics, jurisprudence, and legal theory, especially concerning value judgments. The problem addressed in this paper is: What is al-Fārābī’s conception of mashhūrāt, and what relation does he posit between such propositions and certain propositions? This paper seeks to answer this question by re-examining al-Fārābī’s works using a descriptive-analytical method. The findings of this inquiry indicate that, according to al-Fārābī, unlike certainties, which are decisive judgments, mashhūrāt are conjectural (ẓannī) judgments. Certainties possess truth and falsehood intrinsically in their correspondence with reality, whereas the truth and falsehood of mashhūrāt are accidental, based on their wide acceptance (shuhra). Mashhūrāt lead us to an assent that approximates certainty (muqārib li-l-yaqīn), which is a kind of accidental certainty, resulting from the causes of wide acceptance. Emphasizing the difference in respects (ḥaythiyyāt), al-Fārābī holds that by setting aside wide acceptance, one can examine whether a judgment corresponds to reality (ontological approach) and arrive at a decisive judgment, in which case such a proposition would not be among the mashhūrāt. However, if wide acceptance is taken as the criterion for accepting that judgment (epistemological approach), then it will be among the mashhūrāt. The conclusion is that, in al-Fārābī’s view, from an epistemological standpoint, mashhūrāt are the counterpart of certainties and cannot be subsumed under the same respect. Keywords: Al-Fārābī, Mashhūrāt (widely accepted propositions), Dialectic, Certainties, Accidental Certainty, Accidental Truth. Introduction The logical analysis of the relation between mashhūrāt and certainties plays a decisive role in the positions of scholars in many fields, including ethics and theology. If mashhūrāt can be subsumed under certainties, then propositions with predicates of goodness (ḥusn) and badness (qubḥ) would be certain, and the sciences based on them would be demonstrative (burhānī). But if not, then theological arguments based on goodness and badness would be dialectical, and ethics based on goodness and badness would fall outside the domain of wisdom (ḥikma), requiring another path to establish these sciences rigorously. This paper poses the question of the relation between mashhūrāt and certainties to al-Fārābī as the first great Muslim logician. Regarding mashhūrāt, Poursaleh Amiri has published several articles, some of which address al-Fārābī’s views, but her research has not specifically focused on the relation between certainties and mashhūrāt. Moreover, her articles are flawed due to a misinterpretation of the definition of mashhūrāt. Therefore, research on the problem of this paper remains necessary. This paper, by analyzing the definition of mashhūrāt and certainties based on al-Fārābī’s principles, examines the relation between these two types of propositions. Materials & methods To answer this question, al-Fārābī’s views on certainties and mashhūrāt were gathered from his works using a library method, and then described and analyzed along three main axes: truth, certainty, and difference in respects (ḥaythiyyāt). Discussion &Result Al-Fārābī’s analysis of mashhūrāt compared to certainties can be examined along three main axes: 1) Truth: Do mashhūrāt have an external reality or not? 2) Certainty: Can mashhūrāt be certain, and conversely, can certainties be mashhūr? 3) Difference in respects: What does it mean that a proposition can be mashhūr in one respect and certain in another? Truth – Al-Fārābī explains that truth means that what the soul believes corresponds to what exists outside the belief. In his view, certainty only attaches to true propositions. Essentially, truth-aptitude is the criterion distinguishing a report, proposition, or decisive statement from what is not. Because a decisive statement reports about reality and can either correspond to it (true) or not (false). Comparing certainties and mashhūrāt, al-Fārābī holds that the truth of certainties is intrinsic because, in affirming certainties, the opinions of others are not given weight, and their agreement or disagreement has no effect on belief. However, mashhūrāt are accepted because of the opinion of all or most people, not based on knowledge of the proposition’s correspondence with reality. Therefore, the truth of mashhūrāt is accidental. Consequently, mashhūrāt, insofar as they are affirmed due to wide acceptance (shuhra), fall outside the definition of certainty. Certainty – Since certainty belongs to the subject, al-Fārābī recognizes different levels of certainty. If a subject is aware that the content of their belief corresponds to external reality, certainty in the general sense is achieved. But when they do not deem non-correspondence possible, certainty in the specific sense occurs. A person’s awareness of the impossibility of non-correspondence of the proposition’s content with reality, either permanently or for a period, brings about a higher level of certainty, namely absolute certainty. Thus, the levels of certainty from strongest to weakest include: absolute certainty, then certainty in the specific sense, then certainty in the general sense. There are also other levels of belief that do not reach the level of certainty and remain at the level of conjecture (ẓann). Al-Fārābī also speaks of two levels: "that which approximates certainty" (muqārib l-il-yaqīn) and "tranquility of the soul" (sukūn al-nafs). Al-Fārābī divides both conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) into complete (tāmm) and incomplete (nāqis). He restricts complete assent to certain assent, and places other types of assent—namely, assent approximating certainty and assent of tranquility of the soul—under incomplete assent. Assent in which we have no awareness of the contrary of our belief, or we have awareness but the truth of the contrary is so hidden that we do not speak of it, or opposing it is difficult, is that which approximates certainty. According to al-Fārābī, mashhūrāt are instances of assent approximating certainty. Ultimately, al-Fārābī explains that if the conditions for certainty are absent, or if certainty is achieved through things like induction, wide acceptance, universal testimony, or the report of a trusted informant—rather than through one’s own insight—then accidental certainty (al-yaqīn bi-l-ʿaraḍ) results. It may even happen that a person, due to certain passive dispositions (infiʿālāt), thinks they are certain of an opinion. These passive dispositions include: attachment to that opinion, attachment to its holder, zeal or partisanship for it, anger, habituation to it over time, the greatness of the matter and the abhorrence of its contrary, the grandeur and majesty of the holder of the opinion or the informant in their eyes, and excessive trust and good opinion of them. All these can be among the causes of wide acceptance. Difference in Respects – According to al-Fārābī, any well-known or widely accepted proposition can be examined from an ontological perspective, without regard to its wide acceptance, and one can ask whether it corresponds to reality. In this case, the proposition is considered within the domain of demonstration (burhān). For this reason, al-Fārābī does not deny that mashhūrāt are truth-apt. However, from an epistemological perspective, he explains that accepting mashhūrāt because of popular opinion (wide acceptance), without considering their correspondence or non-correspondence with reality, places these propositions within the domain of dialectic. Al-Fārābī himself uses the language of truth and falsehood for mashhūrāt. Thus, he does not deny that these propositions have reality, but at the same time, he emphasizes that in dialectic, mashhūrāt must be taken precisely from the aspect of their wide acceptance. Therefore, although from al-Fārābī’s perspective mashhūrāt can have reality and their truth or falsehood can be examined in the art of demonstration (ṣanāʿat al-burhān), in dialectic their truth-aptness is entirely disregarded, and this never leads to an overlap between the arts of demonstration and dialectic. After al-Fārābī, Avicenna also accepted and emphasized this distinction in respects. This discussion continued to be followed in logic books until the 11th century AH. Conclusion: Because mashhūrāt have accidental truth and are that which approximates certainty, they fall outside the definition of certainties. However, a single proposition with the same content can be considered mashhūr or certain depending on whether it is accepted based on wide acceptance or not, by distinguishing between the epistemological and ontological approaches.