نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• رضا اسکندری ¹
• روح الله سوری ²

¹ دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه اسلامی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه خوارزمی تهران

² استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

مسئله پژوهش پیش‌رو کالبد شکافی و بازشناسی دوگونه تبیین از وحدت نفهته در تشکیک وجود بوده و در صدد نقد برداشت سنخی از آنف در مسئله تشکیک است؛ مصباح‌یزدی طبق تبیین سنخی از وحدت، تحقق خارجی برای او نمی‌بیند و وحدت را به وجودی بالقوه و بدون مابازاء خارجی، تقلیل می‌دهد؛ به‌گونه‌ای که تنها در ذهن مستقر بوده و صدق حقیقی‌ای بر خارج ندارد. اما آقاعلی مدرس به وحدت سریانی گرایش دارد و درنتیجه تحقق بالفعل وحدت، در خارج را می‌پذیرد. هستی از نگاه او فعل خداوند است که با وحدت سِعی و به‌گونه تشکیکی سریان می‌یابد. بنابراین کثرات در متن همین وجود منبسط پدید می‌آیند و درون همان می‌آرمند. پژوهش پیش‌رو با روش تحلیلی- انتقادی نخست به تبیین این‌دو دیدگاه پرداخته و سپس وحدت سنخی را برپایه وحدت سریانی نقد می‌کند. یافته‌های اصلی این پژوهش عبارتند از: 1. وحدت مفهوم وجود، به وحدت خارجی آن می‌انجامد که تنها به‌گونه سریانی تصورپذیر است. 2. اصرار بر وحدت سنخی، به تباین وجودها خواهد انجامید. 3. وحدت سنخی، ویژه ماهیت‌هاست و نمی‌تواند وصف ذاتی وجود باشد. 4. وحدت سنخی، به تجافی در عالم می‌انجامد که با نگاه میانی‌اندیشیِ حکمت متعالیه سازگار نیست. 5. وحدت سنخی، امکان جریان در تمایز تشکیکی را نداشته و انگاره‌ای خودمتناقض است. 6. وحدت سنخی با اصالت وجود سازگاری ندارد. در نتیجه، به نظر می‌آید نمی‌توان زیر بار معنای سنخی از وحدت رفته و تشکیک در وجود را وحدت سنخی معنا کنیم.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• تشکیک
• وحدت سنخی
• وحدت سریانی
• آقاعلی مدرس زنوزی
• مصباح یزدی

موضوعات

• فلسفه

عنوان مقاله [English]

A critical analysis of the Sankhi unity of existence based on the Syriac unity, with an emphasis on the views of Professor Misbah and Agha Ali Modares Zenozi

نویسندگان [English]

• Reza Eskandari ¹
• Rouhollah Souri ²

¹ Doctoral student of Islamic philosophy, faculty of literature and humanities, Khwarazmi University, Tehran

² Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

Abstract
The present article examines and critiques the concept of "generic unity" (al-waḥdat al-sinkhiyya) in Islamic philosophical thought, particularly in relation to the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd). Initially, the concept is precisely explained, and it is clarified that proponents of this type of unity do not accept any external realization of unity, considering it only as a mental construct that does not have true correspondence with external reality. In contrast, proponents of permeating unity (al-waḥdat al-sarayāniyya) affirm an external realization of unity, accepting all multiplicities within that singular, real, permeating unity. According to the findings of this study, this understanding of unity cannot be accepted due to its logically flawed consequences. There is a profound inconsistency between this notion of unity and key concepts in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, such as the criterion of gradation (tashkīk) in existence—the primacy of existence. The results of this research suggest that generic unity, particularly within the framework of the primacy of existence, faces serious contradictions that appear unacceptable in metaphysical explanations.
Keywords: generic unity, primacy of existence, gradation of existence, philosophical critique, secondary intelligibles, Mesbah Yazdi, Mudarris Zunūzī.
 
Introduction and Problem Statement
The concept of "generic unity" in Islamic philosophy is examined as an important principle in explaining the unity and multiplicity of the order of being. According to this concept, different beings, with a type of quiddity-based unity established in the mind (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1989, 6:20), are distinct and separate from each other in the external world, such that multiplicity is incompatible with this type of unity. While Ṣadrā explicitly states that external universality and commonality are not quiddity-based (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 2/328; 1375: 313; 1361: 6), proponents of this form of unity, such as Mesbah Yazdi, emphasize the primacy of existence, in which only existence is deemed fundamental, and quiddity-based and generic concepts are merely abstractions of it (Mesbah Yazdi, 1987, 1:342). This article critiques and analyzes generic unity and its inconsistency with other principles of Ṣadrā's philosophy, such as the primacy of existence, gradation in existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), and Ṣadrā's intermediate thinking (miyānī ʾandīshī). It demonstrates that these principles are incompatible with generic unity.
While research has been conducted on this topic, the distinguishing feature of this research is that none of the aforementioned articles have addressed the concept of permeating unity and its contrast with generic unity in a precise and detailed manner. Another distinguishing aspect is that none of the valuable studies mentioned have provided a critical analysis of the generic unity account. Therefore, this study, proves the falsity of the generic unity claim by presenting its flawed implications, such that the unity hidden within gradation can no longer be considered generic unity.
Material and Methodologies
This study primarily employs the method of conceptual and philosophical analysis, examining the works of various Islamic philosophers, including Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Mullā Ṣadrā, Mudarris Zunūzī, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, and Mesbah Yazdi. Using comparative and analytical methods, the study analyzes and evaluates different perspectives on generic unity and the primacy of existence, ultimately setting aside generic unity based on various arguments. To achieve this approach, a range of philosophical and logical texts has been utilized to elucidate different dimensions of the discussion.
Discussion
Generic unity generally seeks to justify the interconnectedness and harmony among beings. This perspective is based on the principle that different beings are identical in terms of their quiddities (māhiyya) but lack any true existential unity (Mesbah Yazdi, 2015, 1:158). In contrast, from the standpoint of Islamic philosophy, particularly in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought, the primacy of existence is considered the foundational principle, and the interconnectedness of beings is attributed to existence itself. This is inherently tied to the integrated realization (al-taḥaqquq al-indimājī) of attributes concomitant with existence, one of which is unity. In this framework, it is existence that holds primacy, while quiddities and the attributes of quiddities are merely conceptual constructs that do not have an independent external reality. Consequently, generic unity, which is based on quiddity, is incompatible with the primacy of existence.
Another problem with generic unity is its inconsistency with the criterion of gradation, which is the main foundation of the issue of gradation in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system. The criterion of gradation in Ṣadrā's framework is the "identity of the differentiating factor (mā bih al-imtiyāz) with the shared factor (mā bih al-ishtirāk)" (Mullā Ṣadrā 1989, 1:427–428; 1422: 356; Zunūzī 1999, 1:266; Ṭabāṭabāʾī 2004, 56; Mesbah Yazdi 1984, 45; Oboudiat 2008, 22). This criterion is fulfilled only when the context of realization for the shared factor is identical to the context of realization for the differentiating factor. However, according to the notion of generic unity, the unity resides in the mind while the multiplicity resides in the external realm.
Moreover, accepting generic unity might necessitate conceding to the absolute disjunction or divergence (tabāyun) among beings. However, accepting such disjunction among existents leads to inconsistencies within philosophical thought and results in numerous philosophical challenges.
Conclusion
The present study indicates that generic unity faces fundamental challenges in its connection with the primacy of existence and gradation in existence. The findings of this article demonstrate that, within Islamic philosophy—particularly considering the acceptance of the primacy of existence and the emphasis on gradation—generic unity is untenable, especially from the perspectives of philosophers such as Mullā Ṣadrā, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, and Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī. Specifically, the critiques leveled against this concept and its inability to account for a true unity among beings render it ineffective in explaining the structure of existence and in analyzing the multiplicities and unities within it. Ultimately, this study underscores the need for a reevaluation and more rigorous analysis of generic unity in relation to Islamic philosophy and its foundational principles.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• Tashkik
• Vahdat Sankhi
• Vahdat Siriani
• Agha Ali Modares Zenozi
• Misbah Yazdi