نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکترای فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، واحد سبزوار، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، سبزوار، ایران
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه حکیم سبزواری، سبزوار، ایران (نویسنده مسئول).
3 دانشیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران.
چکیده
مرجعیت معرفتی یا اعتماد و رجوع به دیگری/دیگران در کسب معرفت، از دیرباز مورد توجه فیلسوفان بودهاست. اما در دوره مدرن با محوریت خودآیینی در عقلانیت، به مسئله چالشبرانگیزی تبدیل گشت و مورد نقد قرار گرفت؛ لیندا زگزبسکی فیلسوف فضیلتاندیش معاصر، از کسانیست که به کاوش در این حوزه و بررسی نسبت آن با عقلانیت وخودآیینی میپردازد. کوشش او در تدقیق مفهوم خودآیینی و سپس توجیه نسبت آن با مرجعیت معرفتی از اهمیتی والا در سیر معرفتشناسی برخوردار است. از سوی دیگر در تأملات حکیم سهروردی موسس حکمت اشراق، عناصری مشترک با اندیشههای زگزبسکی مییابیم که در رویکرد کلی میتواند روشنگر وجوهی از عقلانیت در پذیرش مرجعیت معرفتی و ایجاد چشماندازی سودمند در کسب معرفت باشد.
نتایجی که از این پژوهش بهدست میآید، نشان میدهد مولفههای «دروننگری خودآگاهانه»، «حجیت اعتماد معرفتی» و «الگوی معرفتی» از ارکان مرجعیت معرفتی نزد زگزبسکی است و با مولفههای «معرفت نفس»، «اعتماد معرفتی برای احیای حکمت ازلی» و «الگوی حکیم متالّه» در تأملات سهروردی همخوانی دارد. رابطه معرفت وعقلانیت در این دو رویکرد، حقیقتجویی را در فرایندی حاصل از فضیلت، خودآگاهی و حکمت قرار میدهد، این امر به تکامل باورهای وحدتساز در فرهنگهای متفاوت کمک میکند.
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
The components of accepting the authority of knowledge according to Zagzebski and the related themes in Sohrevardi's reflections.
نویسندگان [English]
- Zahra Sadeghimanesh 1
- Seyed Mohammad Kazem Alavi 2
- Mohammadkazem Elmisola 3
1 Ph.D. Candidate in Kalam and Islamic Philosophy, Branch of Sabzevar, Islamic Azad University, Sabzevar, Iran.
2 Associate Professor in Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Hakim Sabzevari University, Sabzevar, Iran(corresponding author).
3 Associate Professor in Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran
چکیده [English]
Abstract
Problem: Epistemic authority or trust and reference to others in acquiring knowledge has long been a subject of interest for philosophers. However, this issue has been challenged and criticized in the modern era based on the concept of autonomy in rationality. This study examines the foundations of epistemic authority according to contemporary virtue philosopher, Linda Zagzebski, and compares them with similar themes in the reflections of Suhrawardi, the founder of Illuminationist philosophy. It can illuminate aspects of rationality in accepting epistemic authority and creating a beneficial perspective in acquiring knowledge in a general approach.
Method: The research methodology is descriptive-comparative, focusing on the analysis of key concepts in the works of both philosophers to identify their points of convergence and divergence.
Results: The findings indicate that the key components of epistemic authority in Zagzebski's thought—namely, "conscious self-reflection," "the legitimacy of epistemic trust," and "the epistemic exemplar model"—align with concepts such as "self-knowledge," "epistemic trust for the revival of eternal wisdom," and "the model of the divine sage" in Suhrawardi’s theosophy. The study demonstrates that, despite historical and cultural differences, both philosophers endeavor to situate the pursuit of truth within a contemplative process, enabling knowledge to follow a path of self-reflection aimed at promotion of unifying beliefs. This research offers a novel perspective on understanding the concept of epistemic authority and its relationship with autonomy across different philosophical traditions.
Keywords: Suhrawardi, Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, Autonomy, Introspection, Self-knowledge.
Introduction/
Modern rationality fostered autonomy development in its historical course, which was identical to "rationality" and opposed to epistemic authority in an unalterable sense. Zagzebski mentions this process as the autonomous conceptual turn. He ignores essential rational necessities that have high epistemological and virtuous significance. Therefore, Linda Zagzebski (1946) exposes this misconception and examines the concept of autonomy. She explains the necessities that have been ignored in acquiring knowledge.
The concept of autonomy states that humans should understand propositions by relying on their epistemic powers and prevailing views and not entrust the responsibility of justifying their beliefs to anyone. It faces the important questions as follows: 1) Is the goal of knowledge achieved by focusing solely on faithful belief? 2) Does autonomy pay attention to the rational necessities required for acquiring knowledge in this comprehensive sense? 3) In which rational ignored imperatives do the moral imperative understand and promote knowledge or accept the epistemic superiority of another being harmed? 4) Is the absolute negation of epistemic authority rational and feasible for these necessities? In the following research, we have analyzed Zagzebski's pillars of epistemic authority and its relationship with rationality. We find Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi's (549-587 AH/1155-1191 AD) critical and sympathetic components, which reflect the ordinary and original approaches in the thinking of these two thinkers in the approach of the illumination philosophies. Suhrawardi attempts to move beyond purely argumentative knowledge and change the evaluation focus from belief to the believer. He advances the true path of knowledge differently from his peripatetic philosophy. The themes of the illumination philosophy reveal the importance of forgotten angles, thoughtful coherence with Zagzebski's philosophy's pillars, and a deep understanding of the issue of epistemological authority.
Materials & Methods
This research was conducted using a comparative method between Linda Zagzebski and Suhrawardi. Although it is difficult to find common features and compare two philosophers who have viewed knowledge from different civilizational and temporal perspectives, this can be influential in gaining a broader understanding of some problematic philosophical issues. To understand Zagzebski's perspective, epistemic authority, a topic widely questioned in today's epistemology, contains important rational imperatives that become clear. Like Zagzebski's viewpoint, Suhrawardi's philosophy does not address the issue of epistemic authority, and his important epistemic themes contain some standard features that criticize the proposition-centered view and justify epistemic authority. It becomes increasingly apparent in comparison and analytical studies and is introduced as a unique example of Zagzebski's results.
This study is organized into three parts, with three common pillars between the two philosophers. The method proceeds in each section: First, we address the concept's pillars. Zagzebski places autonomy in its true meaning and makes it justifiable while compatible with epistemic authority. Then, from Suhrawardi's point of view, we compared his approach with Zagzebski's perspective by dwelling on consistent themes. Finally, we have reached a final summary and conclusion.
Discussion & Result
In the first section, we have shown that Zagzebski's central importance of reflective self-consciousness is consistent with Suhrawardi's theme of self-knowledge. Zagzebski recognizes the contemplative trust consciously to accept the sublime based on intellectual virtues. Suhrawardi also achieves knowledge by emphasizing the practical approach to self-knowledge and acquiring spiritual virtues to aid self-discipline.
In the second part, we have shown that Zagzebski focused on reflective reasons to explain the rationality of epistemic trust in the virtuous by achieving the foundation of trust's validity as a non-cognitive state. This component's coherence with the theme of companions of trust and truth opposes self-supremacy in Suhrawardi's revival of wisdom. It is worthy of consideration and provides the basis for tolerance and interaction in religions and cultures.
In the third section, we compare Zagzebski's epistemological model to the development of practical wisdom in Suhrawardi's divine model. We emphasize the transfer of personal and intuitive knowledge to increase humanity's cognitive reserve and the unity and cohesion of societies.
Conclusion
We can reach the following conclusion and summary based on the comparative nature of this research:
There is an understanding of seeking truth from two perspectives that reduce the distance between the other self and another. At the same time, he sees himself as similar and familiar to the other in that understanding. This self-cultivation and reflective attention reduce incorrect inference and, consequently, the incorrect tendency towards epistemic egotism.
Autonomy without a practical path of self-purification lacks the humility or intellectual courage necessary to acknowledge the epistemic superiority or another's authority.
Zagzebski and Suhrawardi have considered influencing the nature of knowledge and changing its relationship with rationality by proposing reviving wisdom and transmitting the legacy of sages and theologians.
Mere imitation and the pleasure of seeking resemblance are not conscious and virtuous. It must be taken not to lose self-confidence and self-awareness.
In Suhrawardi's philosophy, epistemic authority is compatible with the components of traditional culture, and its challenges in endangering self-awareness have not been considered. However, Zagzebski thinks about limiting it and is aware of the consequences of epistemic tyranny.
کلیدواژهها [English]
- Hakim Suhrawardi
- Linda Zagzebski
- Epistemic authority
- Self-introspection
- Self-knowledge
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