The problem addressed by this article is that the relation between Avicenna’s theory of self-awareness and Wittgenstein’s expressivist theory, despite their commonality in criticism of the observational model of self-awareness, has not been examined systematically. The main question is whether one could establish a philosophical relation between Wittgenstein’s ‘immediate expression’ and Avicenna’s ‘immediate presence’, and delineate boundaries of commonality and division. The study has been conducted with the method of comparative-conceptual analysis, and a phenomenological-interpretive approach. Six analytic criteria were derived from the theory of Avicenna: foundational presence, causal and conceptual immediacy, permanence by presence, identity of the subject with the object, independence from bodiliness, and the existential relation of self-awareness and the soul. The findings show that both theories accept the immediacy of self-awareness, but their foundations are different. In the expressivist theory, immediacy is a matter of instrumental function and rules of language. In the theory of self-awareness, it is based upon existential and pre-verbal presence of the soul. The expressivist theory has limitations in explaining the ontological foundation of self-awareness. In conclusion, the three-tiered model of presence, reflection, and interpretation indicates that Avicenna’s ‘self-awareness by presence’ can be the condition of the possibility of Wittgenstein’s expressivist self-awareness. The study’s innovation lies in its analytic reconstruction of the theory of self-awareness and derivation of criteria for a comparative assessment of the theories of self-awareness.