In recent years, the concepts of Illuminationist philosophy (ḥikmat al-ishrāq), especially the imaginal world (ʿālam al-mithāl), have attracted attention in some contemporary film theories. However, in the process of immanentization, these concepts have sometimes moved away from their luminous, sacred, and ontological foundations. Problem: The present study examines how Illuminationist concepts, and especially the imaginal world, are reread in contemporary film theories and the extent to which their ontological foundations are preserved, asking what remains of their fundamental meaning in this process. In this regard, the question also arises whether preserving concepts such as the invisible, imagination, absence, and the openness of the image can still possess a distinct Illuminationist theoretical character without preserving the ontology of the imaginal world. Method: Using a descriptive-analytical method, the study examines the works and views of Christian Jambet, Laura U. Marks, and Joan Copjec and analyzes them in comparative relation to certain ontological and realist discussions of André Bazin. Findings: The findings show that Jambet, more than the other two theorists, preserves the link between the imaginal world and light, the sacred, and the possibility of the manifestation of truth. Marks, inspired by Mullā Ṣadrā, transfers this concept to the domain of perception, politics, and technology and redefines it within an immanent horizon. Copjec, despite her deep use of Corbin, rearranges the ontological components of the imaginal world within the structure of lack, fissure, and insufficiency of reality. Comparison with Bazin shows that many of the remaining components in these accounts—such as the ambiguity of the image, the invisible, absence, and the activation of the spectator’s imagination—could already be formulated in film theory without reliance on the metaphysics of the imaginal world. Hence the issue is not whether these theories preserve the invisible; the issue is whether they preserve the ontology of the invisible. Conclusion: The dialogue between Illuminationist philosophy and film theory has a genuine continuity with the Illuminationist tradition only when the imaginal world is not merely a metaphor for absence, imagination, or the openness of the image, but is preserved as a domain of being and in connection with light and the sacred. Otherwise, immanentization can lead to transferring Illuminationist structure and vocabulary to an immanent level without necessarily creating a distinct theoretical achievement compared with certain earlier accounts of film theory, including Bazin’s realism.