In another article, I showed that in Aristo-Avicennan logic, a distinction was made between the matter (māddat) of propositions and their modality (jihat), and that there are at least two different approaches to this distinction in the history of Avicennan logic: 1) Avicenna was the first to consider matter as a non-verbal entity and defined it as “the state of the predicate in relation to the subject.” 2) However, Suhrawardī considered matter to be the proposition itself minus modality (or minus modality and negation). In this article, I have followed this subject matter from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā. The Problem: What characteristics each of of the two different approaches to matter and modality had after Suhrawardī and why this semantic transfer occurred. The Method: Analytiical-historical. The Findings: Although in their early works, Khūnajī and Abharī followed Suhrawardī’s approach, in their later works, in accordance with Avicenna’s approach, they defined matter as “the quality of the relation of the predicate to the subject” and considered modality as denoting or indicating matter, and they incorporated this definition into the Avicennan logic. After Khūnajī and Abharī, almost all Muslim logicians accepted Avicenna’s approach and followed Khūnajī’s and Abharī’s definitions of matter and modality, and hence Suhrawardī’s approach was completely forgotten, to the extent that today, almost no one knows that a verbal definition of matter once existed. The Conclusion: In sum, I will show that many Muslim logicians in few works followed Suhrawardī’s approach and in most of their various works followed Avicenna’s approach.