Abstract:
In another article, I showed that in Aristo-Avicennan logic, a distinction was made between the matter (māddat) of propositions and their modality (jihat), and that there are at least two different approaches to this distinction in the history of Avicennan logic: 1) Avicenna was the first to consider matter as a non-verbal entity and defined it as “the state of the predicate in relation to the subject.” 2) However, Suhrawardī considered matter to be the proposition itself minus modality (or minus modality and negation). In this article, I have followed this subject matter from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā. The Problem: What characteristics each of of the two different approaches to matter and modality had after Suhrawardī and why this semantic transfer occurred. The Method: Analytiical-historical.  The Findings: Although in their early works, Khūnajī and Abharī followed Suhrawardī’s approach, in their later works, in accordance with Avicenna’s approach, they defined matter as “the quality of the relation of the predicate to the subject” and considered modality as denoting or indicating matter, and they incorporated this definition into the Avicennan logic. After Khūnajī and Abharī, almost all Muslim logicians accepted Avicenna’s approach and followed Khūnajī’s and Abharī’s definitions of matter and modality, and hence Suhrawardī’s approach was completely forgotten, to the extent that today, almost no one knows that a verbal definition of matter once existed. The Conclusion: In sum, I will show that many Muslim logicians in few works followed Suhrawardī’s approach and in most of their various works followed Avicenna’s approach.
 
Keywords:
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Khūnajī, Abharī, Ṭūsī, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī
 
Extended Abstract:
 
1. Introduction

This article explores the conceptual distinction between “matter” and “modality” in the context of Arabic logic, particularly in the works of notable philosophers like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and later thinkers. The author highlights two main approaches to this distinction throughout the history of Islamic logic.
 
1) Avicenna was the first to conceptualize “matter” as a non-verbal entity, defining it as the “state of the predicate in relation to the subject.” 2) In contrast, Suhrawardī viewed matter as the proposition itself without modality or negation. This paper traces the evolution of these ideas from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī through Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā, highlighting how many Muslim logicians oscillated between these two approaches in their works.
 
Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical approach based on library sources.
 
Discussion & Result
Key Contributions of Major Scholars
In the following, I recall the major scoloars’s contributions on the matter and modality.
2. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī:
In his seminal work Al-Mulakhkhaṣ, al-Rāzī posits that the matter of a proposition is both its subject and predicate. This interpretation aligns with Suhrawardī’s view, suggesting that modality can be seen as a description of matter’s attributes. Al-Rāzī does not explicitly differentiate between matter and modality in his discussions on propositions, indicating a reliance on earlier thinkers like Al-Fārābī.
 
3. Zayn al-Dīn al-Kashi and Afḍal al-Dīn Khūnajī:
Both scholars initially follow Suhrawardī’s descriptive approach but later adopt Avicenna’s perspective, defining matter as the “quality of the relation of the predicate to the subject.” This shift reflects a broader acceptance of the approach to matter and modality in Arabic logic. Khūnajī’s later works introduce a nuanced understanding that separates four types of material propositions, demonstrating a significant evolution in thought.
 
4. Athīr al-Dīn Abharī:
Abharī initially conflates matter and modality but later, influenced by Khūnajī, articulates a clear distinction, identifying matter as the quality of relation and modality as the verbal expression of that quality. His works reveal a growing complexity in the understanding of logical propositions and their components.
5. Nasir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī:
Ṭūsī critiques the views of Abharī and Khūnajī, emphasizing that the number of matters should be limited to three: necessity, impossibility, and contingency (= special possibility = imkān khāṣṣ). He argues against the inclusion of possibility (= general possibility = imkān ‘āmm) or general universality (= general perpetuality = dawām) as a matter, reinforcing a more structured classification system.
 
6. Ibn Kammūna and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī:
Ibn Kammūna’s commentary highlights the dual nature of propositions, while Quṭb al-Dīn emphasizes that the quality of relation is not fixed to a specific number, reflecting the fluidity of logical categories in Arabic logic.
 
7. Mullā Ṣadrā:
In his reflections on the works of Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā posits that both matter and modality are intrinsic states of existence, arguing that they represent the conditions of entities rather than mere verbal constructs.
 
8. Conclusion
The historical evolution of the concepts of matter and modality reveals a complex interplay of linguistic, philosophical, and logical considerations in Islamic thought. The transition from a descriptive to a referential understanding of these terms, particularly through the works of influential scholars such as al-Rāzī, al-Khūnajī, and al-Abharī, illustrates the dynamic nature of Arabic logic. Furthermore, the distinctions made by these scholars were not merely academic; they had significant implications for the development of logical reasoning in the Islamic intellectual tradition.
Through this analysis, I aim to shed light on the intricate developments in Arabic logic regarding matter and modality, paving the way for further exploration of these concepts in contemporary philosophical discourse.