Philosophy
Keramat Varzdar; Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi
Abstract
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent ...
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Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
Fahime Shariati; Mohammadreza Akbarzade
Abstract
Intelligence has a wide range. Degrees of intelligence can be divided into primary and secondary intelligences..Examining the word intelligence with various words almost synonymous in transcendent wisdom such as intellect, science, wisdom, etc. shows that human intelligence is dependent on higher intelligence.Artificial ...
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Intelligence has a wide range. Degrees of intelligence can be divided into primary and secondary intelligences..Examining the word intelligence with various words almost synonymous in transcendent wisdom such as intellect, science, wisdom, etc. shows that human intelligence is dependent on higher intelligence.Artificial intelligence, which is the achievement of human intelligence, has very precise functions such as learning, optimization, generalizability.By describing, analyzing and comparing the intelligent machine with man, we can better understand the distance between human consciousness and the knowledge of the first causes and the entry of multiplicity and contradiction in the material world with the higher worlds.Traces of morality and will can be seen in different levels of reason, as well as in the types and varieties of intelligence in psychological issues...Although it seems that some of the human intelligence goes back to the way of performance in the field of ethics and voluntary actions, but due to the effects of external or previous conditions on human voluntary actions, the differences between these two types of secondary intelligence (human intelligence and artificial intelligence) It descends to a lower limit.Paying attention to the truth of the will and its effect on morality cannot explain the difference between human intelligence and the systemic functions of intelligent machines.Regardless of emotions, inner states or presence sciences, even the will cannot be the original distinction between human intelligence and artificial intelligence
Philosophy
vahid khademzadeh; Fatemeh Kanaani
Abstract
Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our ...
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Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our understanding and even our behavior are based on such metaphors. In this theory, metaphors are inseparable parts of scientific and philosophical theories.The human mind and how it works has been one of the greatest philosophical and scientific mysteries in the history of thought. Various theories have been offered throughout history about the nature of the mind. In the context of conceptual metaphor theory, it can be said that these theories are based on various conceptual metaphors; Some of these metaphors have been universal and some have belonged to a particular culture and age. For example, "mind as a container" is a common metaphor among different ages and cultures. In the context of this metaphor, the mind has a definite boundary that distinguishes the mind world from the outside world. Metaphors such as "mind as machine" and "mind as computer" were considered in contemporary analytical philosophy. Each of these metaphors highlights only one aspect of the concept of mind and inevitably hides the others. The mind can not be reduced to any of these metaphors.One of the functions of the mind is to acquire knowledge. Various metaphors have been proposed to describe this mind function. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has roots in human common experience in the childhood period. So, this metaphor is accepted in different cultures and Languages. In addition to its existence in everyday and customary language, this metaphor has also found its way into philosophical and mystical texts.One of the Muslim philosophical innovations is to introduce intuitive knowledge as one of the types of knowledge. Since intuitive knowledge is not available to ordinary people, the linguistic systems have not developed specific words and terms to describe such knowledge. This makes it impossible to describe and explain such knowledge literally. Therefore, Mulla Sadra has used conceptual metaphors to describe intuitive knowledge. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has been developed in Sadra's system and many sub-metaphors have been formed under this metaphor.In this study, the role of this metaphor in Sadra's philosophical system and its various dimensions are examined.Methods and MaterialsWords literally refer to one of the elements related to the act of seeing, which were discovered and extracted in Sadra's texts. Most of these words have been used to describe intuitive knowledge. Then, these words were categorized and the conceptual metaphors, associated with them, were introduced.Results and discussionIn the act of seeing, three elements are distinguishable: seer, seeable, and relation between them. Each of the three elements is used to explain intuitive knowledge by other sub-metaphors; “Knower as Seer”, “Known as Seeable” and “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphors are defined below the “Knowing as Seeing” metaphor. The “Knower as Seer” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "the quality of the knower as the purity or pollution of the seer" and "ignorance as blindness". The “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "obstacles to acquiring knowledge as obstacles to seeing", "intensity and weakness of knowledge as the seer's proximity, and remoteness from the seeable".ConclusionsThe "knowing as seeing" metaphor is an inseparable part of the theory of knowledge in Mulla Sadra's philosophy; In Sadra's thought, knowledge of the essence of God is not possible, and on the other hand, God is described as the light of lights, which is the most visible being. Mulla Sadra uses one of the conventional human experiences to reconcile these two propositions. In conventional human experience, the sun is the brightest object, but the intensity of light in the sun prevents man from seeing it directly. Mulla Sadra maps this conventional experience into the supernatural world and introduces the intensity of divine light as an obstacle to the intuitive observation of the divine essence.In the popular view among Muslim philosophers, rational perception is the understanding of general concepts, but Mulla Sadra considered rational perception as the observation of beings who are present in the intellectual world. However, Mulla Sadra has used this conceptual metaphor to adapt his theory to the popular view. He introduces the distant observation of intellectual beings as the cause of the formation of general concepts in the human mind; because, in conventional human experience, distant observation is accompanied by ambiguity. This ambiguity causes the concept formed in the mind to be able to adapt to several instances.Blindness due to light intensity and distant observation clearly shows the vital role of the "knowing as seeing" metaphor in Mulla Sadra's epistemological system.
Philosophy
zohre salahshur sefidsangi
Abstract
AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception ...
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AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception occurs in the human soul, while neuroscience provides a fully material account of all perceptions, including auditory perception. From a neuroscientific viewpoint, sounds pass through interior layers of the ear to reach auditory neurons, in the course of which they undergo a complicated process leading to auditory perception.However, Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the whole process occurring in the auditory system is just preparatory for perception of sounds by the human soul. This is the soul that creates the true nature of sounds. On his account, the relation between sounds and the inner self is like that between actions and their agents, where actions are done by their agents, rather than that between a passive entity and what it receives.For this reason, Mullā Ṣadrā holds that the account of auditory perception offered by natural scientists is objectionable, since they involve a confusion between preparatory causes and efficient causes. The accounts provided by natural sciences rest content with an elaboration of material stages of auditory perception, while Mullā Ṣadrā believes that perception is non-material in nature, which is just enabled and prepared by those material processes. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā offers the following account: when the soul has a relation with the natural external world through its attachment to the body, it creates a similar image of the external object, where that image is both caused and known by the soul.After the auditory perception, the human soul draws on the images derived from physical entities or those received from the spiritual world (the imaginal world, or ʿālam al-mithāl) creates images in its imaginary perception as well. Contrary to senses that are limited to material entities, imagination extends to the supernatural world as well. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, imagination includes a number of perceptions, such as perception of sensible entities while no matter is present, their perception in dreams, and imaginal perceptions. Perception of sounds in the absence of any external material sources does not require material tools or organs, since many material features do not exist in that realm. This is comparable to memory in neuroscience, although it has not yet offered a plausible account of conscious selection of memories.Moreover, the hearing that occurs in dreams does not involve an environmental system. Although some people still perceive the waves of the material world in their sleep, this is a very different process from that of sensory audition. In the hearing that occurs in dreams, one might hear an intense sound like thunders, which affects one’s soul just like hearing in the waking state, although it was not perceived by the material organ of hearing; that is, one’s ears. Hearing in dreams is indeed one piece of evidence adduced by Mullā Ṣadrā as an argument for the immateriality of perceptions, but this type of hearing is investigated in neuroscience as a kind of dream. Despite their accuracy, the findings of neuroscience here merely demonstrate that perception occurs with the stimulation of certain cells in the body, but the stimulation does not show whether the area in question is a center for processing and storing information or a pathway through which information is transferred.Also in imaginal hearing, only external sounds of the imaginal world are heard, without being mixed with inner secretions, and the sound in the imaginal world does not require material factors such as waves and frequencies. For Mullā Ṣadrā, if the human imaginative faculty is strong, the relation with the imaginal world can occur in the waking state such that hidden imaginal forms are presented to the person, who will thus be able to hear sounds from the imaginal world. Because of its non-material character, this stage of auditory perception is not subject to neuroscientific investigations.The final stage of auditory perception is intellectual hearing, which is the highest degree of auditory perception, which has degrees of intensity and weakness, just like light. Intellectual hearing has degrees, the lowest of which has traces of imaginal sounds, but the higher we go on the scale of intellectual hearing, we come closer to a realm in which no imaginal properties are involved, a realm of pure perception. In its evolutionary course, intellectual hearing reaches a degree where it perceives profound supernatural ideas in the most translucent form. This is a hearing that emerges with the rise of the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād) and then gradually grows.
maryam abbasabbadi arabi; Ali Haghi; Alireza Kohansal
Abstract
Philosophers and intellectuals have always been concerned with the problem of life. Many have considered it from different points of view. In ancient philosophy, life was attributed to the soul. Pythagoras was the first to treat the soul as the origin of life. He was followed by Anaxagoras who referred ...
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Philosophers and intellectuals have always been concerned with the problem of life. Many have considered it from different points of view. In ancient philosophy, life was attributed to the soul. Pythagoras was the first to treat the soul as the origin of life. He was followed by Anaxagoras who referred to the life force, which gave life to the material world, as Nous (intellect or spirit). Just like his predecessors, Plato believed that the soul was the origin of life, and in the case of real entities, life, spirit, motion, and reason are inseparable. Following Plato’s lead, Aristotle traced the cause or origin of life to the soul. These ideas left a great impact on Muslim philosophers. Avicenna—a prominent philosopher in the Islamic world—appealed to Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts to argue that life is essential to the soul, believing that the soul is by itself alive, and physical objects come to be alive by virtue of the soul. Accordingly, the criterion of life for Avicenna is perception and action. After Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā provided the same definition, developing it by drawing on his own philosophical principles.Mullā Ṣadrā argues that life is the origin of “perception” and “action,” incorporating the two notions in his definition of life. In his view, a living being is a perceiving acting entity; that is, an entity with knowledge and consciousness, which does certain actions. In other words, it should be such that it knowingly and consciously does the action. Given his philosophical principles such as the primacy of existence, its simplicity, and its gradation (tashkīk), he establishes the idea that life is a graded entity pervasive throughout all stages of existence. On this account, every living being’s life is the way of its existence, which determines its vital effects. The nobler and stronger the existence is, the more perfection the perception and the firmer the action will be. Hence, every being enjoys life as much as it enjoys existence. We refer to certain existing entities as non-living because we cannot perceive the effects of life in them. For volitional sensation and motion are indications of life, and beings that tangibly have such characteristics are living, and this is not to deny life in other beings. For instance, Quranic verses affirm that there is such a life in beings which cannot be perceived by human senses. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, all existing entities are ipso facto alive, whereas pre-Sadraean philosophies attributed life only to animals and humans on account of their perceptive and motive faculties, lacked by plants and solid objects, and thus they saw these entities as non-living. This is incompatible with Quranic verses and the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. There are Quranic verses referring to the exaltation of God by all beings—something not perceived by human senses. These verses indicate that all beings enjoy consciousness and life. Mullā Ṣadrā argued for such general consciousness and life by drawing on his philosophical principles. In this way, the widespread view that only some beings are alive is implausible in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy, and once life is proved for a stage of existence, it will be proved for all other stages of existence by dint of the principles of the primacy, simplicity, and gradation of existence. This is compatible with many Quranic verses and hadiths in which the power to talk, to hear, and to know is attributed to apparently non-living beings, which implies a degree of life in them.On this account, life is a graded reality that exists as an existential perfection in the necessary being, humans, animals, plants, and solid objects in different degrees. Thus, the necessary being is essentially alive, giving existence and life to other entities. Such existence is the same as life, and solid objects, plants, animals, and humans enjoy degrees of life to the extent that they enjoy degrees of existence. The view is confirmed by Quranic verses, denoting that all beings exalt God, which imply that all beings are alive. Mullā Ṣadrā cites the Quranic verse, “There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, but you do not understand their glorification,” and then comments that all beings prostrate for God and praise Him in a volitional conscious manner, and perfective attributes such as life, knowledge, and power are not separable from these beings.
Batool Ahmadi; Forouzan Rasekhi
Abstract
The question of the immortality of the soul – which is directly relevant to any discussion on the true nature of human being - is an important and even central theme of both Plotinus and Suhrawardi, the latter being known as the founder of the Perso-Islamic Illuminationistschool of philosophy.Plotinus ...
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The question of the immortality of the soul – which is directly relevant to any discussion on the true nature of human being - is an important and even central theme of both Plotinus and Suhrawardi, the latter being known as the founder of the Perso-Islamic Illuminationistschool of philosophy.Plotinus and Suhrawardiboth considered the soul to be the essence of the human being, hence,both thinkers engaged in some kind of ‘dualist anthropology’, although through two different approaches.In other words, they believed that man is not a simple thing, but a composite of ‘soul’ and ‘body’. Plotinus’ discussion of the relation of ‘soul’ to ‘body’ is a particular instance of his doctrine of participation, where higher is related to lower, intelligible to sensible, and form to matter.Individual human beings are composed of ‘soul’ and ‘body’, but body itself consists of ‘matter’ and ‘form’. Soul as the ‘form’ of the body, is a part of the World-Soul, but the individual soul is immaterial and immortal and linked with the ‘Intellect’ (nous).Suhrawardidid not concern himself with any kind of causal relation between ‘body’ and ‘soul’.In his teachings, the ‘Lordly Light’(nūr-iispahbad)- i.e. the vicegerent of the ‘Light of lights’ (nūr al-anwār)in the human soul – is connected with the body by means of the ‘animal soul’ (rūḥḥayawāniyya) and leaves the body for its original home in the angelic realm as soon as death destroys the equilibrium of the bodily elements.
Hossein Zamaniha; Tahereh Yavari
Abstract
Apart from the fact that the ‘corporeal body’ is a natural container for the origination and progression of the soul, Sadr al-DīnSīrāzī(1569-1640) distinguishes another ontological level of body, i.e. the ‘imaginal body’,predicated upon the existence of an ontological ...
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Apart from the fact that the ‘corporeal body’ is a natural container for the origination and progression of the soul, Sadr al-DīnSīrāzī(1569-1640) distinguishes another ontological level of body, i.e. the ‘imaginal body’,predicated upon the existence of an ontological state of being known as the ‘imaginal’ (mithālī) that mediates between an intelligible and the sensible realms.The ‘imaginal body’ or ‘body of the resurrection’is ‘perceiving’ (mudrik) and ‘living’ (hayy) and contrary to the ‘corporeal body’, is inseparable from the soul and it is through the intermediary function of this ‘imaginal body’ that the human ‘rational soul’ (al-nafs al-nātiqa)presides over the ‘corporeal body’. In fact, Sadr al-Dīn explains the relation between the ‘rational soul’ and the ‘corporeal body’ through two intermediaries, first the‘imaginal body’ and second, the ‘steam/animal spirit’. The ‘steam spirit’ is ontologically closer to the ‘corporeal body’ and the ‘imaginal body’ is ontologically closer to the ‘rational soul’. In other words, the ‘imaginal body’ presides over the ‘corporeal body’ through an intermediate link,i.e. a kind of ‘subtle mass’ known in the Peripatetic philosophy as the ‘steam spirit’.
Forough Rahimpour
Volume 5, Issue 3 , November 2014, , Pages 25-41
Abstract
Metempsychosis, in current philosophical terms, means transition of soul from its own body into another material body, either in this world or after death. This idea is absolutely rejected by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra through intellectual reasoning.
Each of these two great philosophers, depending on ...
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Metempsychosis, in current philosophical terms, means transition of soul from its own body into another material body, either in this world or after death. This idea is absolutely rejected by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra through intellectual reasoning.
Each of these two great philosophers, depending on their own principles, defend the unique relation between human soul and its body and negates the dependence of it to other body/bodies. Ibn Sina’s reasoning in the negation of metempsychosis is based on that believe that soul in respect of its essence is abstract, and in respect of its act is material.
So, although the cause of act and the donor of soul is immaterial intellect, but apt temperament and body substance is prone to this emanation. Additionally, Shaykh believes that the relation between each soul and its body substance is an intrinsically obligatory one.
Mulla Sadra on the other hand, believes in novel bases such as existence gradation and strengthening; evolutional substantial movement in all of the creatures (including soul and body parallel to each other); bodily occurrence of the soul at the beginning; and mingled composition of soul and body. Besides quoting and confirming the solution of Shaykh-alraies, he benefits from the bases of the transcendent philosophy, so he not only proposed a novel presentation of some proofs against metempsychosis, but presented a new solution to prove impossibility of metempsychosis, which is only explainable by the bases of the transcendent philosophy.
This article tries to explain and compare the chosen proofs of these two philosophers to reject metempsychosis, describe their particular bases, and show how in some cases, different bases are applied to attain a specific goal
