Biannual Journal
Ghodsyeh Habibi; Saeed Anvari; Seyd Sadr-aldin Tahery
Abstract
Various ideas have been presented on how to relate mental forms toexternal objects, among which one can refer to two theories: theory ofessence objectivity and the theory of apparition. Most scholars have attributed these theories to Ibn Sina and Taftazani respectively. Comparing the views of Ibn Sina ...
Read More
Various ideas have been presented on how to relate mental forms toexternal objects, among which one can refer to two theories: theory ofessence objectivity and the theory of apparition. Most scholars have attributed these theories to Ibn Sina and Taftazani respectively. Comparing the views of Ibn Sina and Taftazani,the present articleshows that they not only don’t follow two different approaches, but we can consider Taftazani's words as the confirmation of Ibn Sina's view. Also, referring to various interpretations of the theory of apparition, we will evaluate the attribution of the theory to Taftazani.
Biannual Journal
Davood Hosseini
Abstract
There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions ...
Read More
There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions concerning quiddity (namely, quiddity’s being an abstract entity and its being true of existence) when attached to his theses about abstraction and truth, entails that quiddity is in-the-World; though it exists just secondarily. If these arguments turn out to be sound, a question arises: what is the difference between existence’s being primarily existent and quiddity’s being secondarily so? In order to answer this question, I will propose that one can understand and explain primary and secondary existence and being in-the-World by means of effectiveness and mind-independence. I will give some textual evidence which show that this proposal is not far from Mullasadra’s own viewpoint.
Biannual Journal
Mohammad Saeedi Mehr
Abstract
From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, ...
Read More
From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, sonot only onecan define it, but should do so. In his book Al-Isharatva Al-Tanbihāt, he has provided a precise definition of pain,according to whichpain is the perception of what is perceived as a pest and evil qua pest and evil. Nasir al-Din Tusi, in his commentary on the book, has given a detailed analysis of this definition. In spite of its precision, it seems that Ibn Sina's definition suffers from someambiguities, for exampleit is not clear whether the pain is merely a subjective matter or has objective features. Moreover, the lack of clarity in the distinction between acquirable (mediated) knowledge and direct (unmediated) knowledge in Sheikh’s philosophy, has made it difficult to express the being directness feature of pain as a kind of perception, in this definition.
Biannual Journal
Hasan Abasi Hoseinabadi
Abstract
In Metaphysics Theta, Aristotle uses entelecheia (ἐντελέχεια) and energeia (ενέργεια) in contrast with dunamis (δύναμις, potency) in discussing the distinction between "actuality" and ...
Read More
In Metaphysics Theta, Aristotle uses entelecheia (ἐντελέχεια) and energeia (ενέργεια) in contrast with dunamis (δύναμις, potency) in discussing the distinction between "actuality" and "potentiality" (both Greek terms, entelecheia and energeia, are typically translated as "actuality" in English). Aristotle's most influential application of "actuality" (entelecheia) is his claim in the second book of De Anima (On the Soul) that the soul is the "actuality" of an organic body that makes it alive. Aristotle uses the notion of "first actuality" in his definition of the soul. In fact, the soul is the "first actuality" of a natural body that is potentially alive. The "first actuality" is a kind of potentiality, while its exercise of function is its fuller or "second actuality". Aristotle’s analogy of proportion is used to explain the nature of the soul, as the "first actuality" of a natural body, and its relation to the body. The present study aims to contribute to understanding of the meaning of "actuality" in Aristotle's definition of the soul, especially in its quality of being "first", i.e. the "first actuality", and its relation to the "second actuality", as well as the role of analogy (analogia) in Aristotle's definition of the soul.
Biannual Journal
Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ...
Read More
Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ‘no’. In Hekmat al-Ishehraq,Suhrawardihas three basic criticisms to the theory of completeessential definition, some of which can be generalized to the incomplete essential definition and also accidental definitions: (1) conflicts with the conventional use of language; (2) the incomprehensibility of the realdifferences; (3) the perpetual probability of neglect of one or more intrinsic features. The bold veins of these three critiques can be found in the treatise of Ibn Sina’sal-Hodoodva al-Ta'lighat, along with two other criticisms: (4) theperpetual probability of theacquisition ofrequisite rather than essence; and (5) the perpetual probability of the acquisition of remote genus instead of close genus. The only possible definition fromSuhrawardi point of view is the definition of quiddity through the combination of general accidents that are belonged to thatquiddity, provided that the definition proceeds in the epistemological trades between definiens and definiendum and on the basis ofdirect(unmediated) knowledge.This theory is also the extender of the line Ibn Sina has drawn in Al-Ta'lighatva Al-Isharat. Therefore, Suhrawardi'slogic of definition complementsthe Avicenna's logicofdefinition.
Biannual Journal
Hadi Vakili; Maryam Davarniya; Zeynab Barkhordari
Abstract
Spirituality is a concept that has been given special attention in the present era and is now also used in relation to children. Spirituality is one of the key religious concepts and is based on certain foundations, structures and religious methods. It also plays a central role in spiritual mysticism. ...
Read More
Spirituality is a concept that has been given special attention in the present era and is now also used in relation to children. Spirituality is one of the key religious concepts and is based on certain foundations, structures and religious methods. It also plays a central role in spiritual mysticism. Considering the specialized discussions in the field of spirituality, we seek to study the relationbetweenthe contemporaryteachings on spirituality for children and the teachings of Islamic mysticism. Limiting its scope of research to two mystics of Ayatollah ShahAbadiand Imam Khomeini, this paper studies the principles and teachings of spirituality for children, and the corresponding discussions of this concept in Islamicmysticism. Obviously, spirituality for children as anindependent topic has not been presented inworks of these sages, butthe study oftheir works showed that the definition of spirituality, the significance of spiritual teachings for children, its foundations and methods, can be derived from their works. In terms of its foundations and goals, spirituality for children in Islamic mysticism differs from what can bederived from non-Islamic principles, although one can find some similarities in methods and examples between them.
