Biannual Journal
fereshte abolhassani niaraki
Abstract
By accepting the principle of human mutability, Mulla Sadra considers ethics as something between nature and intellectual will. In other words, he sees the origin of ethics in both nature (creation) and will, and considers it something between these two. Although the forces of human nature have an impact ...
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By accepting the principle of human mutability, Mulla Sadra considers ethics as something between nature and intellectual will. In other words, he sees the origin of ethics in both nature (creation) and will, and considers it something between these two. Although the forces of human nature have an impact on our creation, but they do not compel us to act in a certain way. Instead, humans perform ethical actions through their own intellectual will, and then through practice and habit, they acquire new ethical virtues. The ethical mechanism of humans involves a type of ethical thinking and reasoning that is stimulating to inclinations and emotional organization, which is influenced by the complex interplay of internal forces, external influences, and human will. Internal forces have various cognitive aspects (knowledge and beliefs), inclinations (emotions, feelings, natural tendencies, instincts), and even physical aspects (temperament, nutrition, brain, sensory tools, genetic backgrounds), as well as factors such as the faculties and secondary personality traits, self-purification, and so on, which are foundational and influential in this realm. Various environmental factors, such as the transmission of social or religious laws and norms (through religion/prophets) or modeling (with the influence of mentors, parents, etc.), and environmental consequences and socialization (socializing with others, associating with good people), affect human ethical growth, which is acquired in interaction with the internal-biological-acquired organism
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
ali aqajani
Abstract
Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence ...
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Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence with related concepts such as religion, spirituality, government, secularism and other concepts and forms one of the challenges in the field of understanding politics.
Al-Farabi (870-950 A.H.) has occupied a very high and irreplaceable place in the history of Islamic philosophy. Farabi's coverage of various sciences in the realm of the Islamic world is amazing. The depth of thinking and the breadth of Farabi's intellectual horizon in terms of philosophy, especially political philosophy, is exemplary and rare. He is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to the world and scholars of thought, including in ethics, politics and their relationship. Based on this, the hypothesis of the article is that the practical manifestation and intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy should be found in some hybrid concepts. On this basis, why and how the relationship between ethics and politics is one of the problems and theoretical and practical issues of political science and ethics science, which various approaches and different viewpoints have been used to celebrate it. One of the most important efforts is related to the prominent Muslim political philosopher Abu Nasr Farabi. The hypothesis of the article seeks to answer the question of Farabi's approach to the relationship between ethics and politics based on the theoretical framework that the concepts of utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights are the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy.
Method:Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of the article is a combination of three questions and four approaches. which the article measures and clarifies Farabi's point of view towards them:
1: Three questions: The relationship between ethics and politics can be questioned in three ways. (Kechoyan 1382: 14). The first direction is whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, can basically pursue moral goals in the private sphere? The second question is whether the field of politics, ethics, or in more general terms, has its own prescriptive requirements in distinction from ethics and individual prescriptions or not? The third question refers to the field of tools and methods or the way of pursuing and applying the policies and goals of the public domain (ibid. 15). Do we necessarily have to use ethical methods in politics, or is the way of achieving and pursuing goals in politics independent of moral judgments (ibid., 15).
Four theories: On another level, the relationship between ethics and politics can be gathered and analyzed in four theories. Theories of separation of ethics from politics, compliance of ethics with politics, two-level ethics and the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). The fourth theory is the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). According to this theory, ethics is individual politics and politics is collective ethics. Ethics and politics are both branches of practical wisdom and seek to ensure human happiness.
Discussion:
Farabi has divided civil science into two theoretical and practical parts. He considers ethics as a theoretical part and politics as a practical part. In Farabi's commentary, Ibn Rushd clearly spoke about the separation of the two sciences. But Farabi himself did not try to separate the theoretical aspect from the practical aspect. The relationship between ethics and politics was considered from several angles. From one point of view, several questions were raised to which Farabi's answer should be received. The first question was whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, should pursue moral goals in the private sphere or not? Farabi's answer to this question is positive. Unlike today's political philosophy in the West, they do not believe in the separation of public and private spheres and consider them to be the same. Therefore, it should be said that according to him, ethics and politics are a science that has a single subject and goal. According to him, the goal of ethics and politics is happiness.
The second question was whether politics, as a public sphere, morally creates a sphere independent of the private sphere with its own special logic or not? According to Farabi, the individual moral sphere is not separate from the social moral sphere, and the principles governing them and the goals and objectives of both are common. The complexity of social issues is more than individual issues, but this cannot create a distinct morality.
Another question was whether ethical methods must be used in politics or whether having ethical goals is enough and whether a politician should act ethically. From Farabi's point of view, the science of ethics is not limited to individual moral reform, but also includes social reform, and the duty of the ruler and government in the society is to develop moral values, which must necessarily be attributed to it. On this basis, from Farabi's point of view, the theories of separation of ethics from politics, subordination of ethics to politics, are completely rejected; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics, in the sense of subordination of politics to ethics (in the sense of consistent moral standards).
Farabi considers the necessity of community to be certain, but what does he consider its origin? Is it natural, natural, voluntary or rational or instinctive? Farabi, except for the first point of view, which considered social life not natural but caused by external emergency. It accepts the rest of the approaches. But in general, he has an instrumental attitude towards society and considers it a means to achieve perfection and happiness.
Farabi introduces will as having three branches. The first branch of passion comes from feeling. The second category of excitement is caused by imagination. The third branch of passion comes from speech and thinking, which Farabi calls this kind of free will. Like Aristotle, Farabi believes that moderation is a virtue.
Conclusion:
Farabi is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to scholars and scholars of thought, including ethics, politics and their relationship, which is one of the ancient and very broad concepts. The article measures Farabi's view on the relationship between ethics and politics (issue) based on the theoretical framework of the article, which is a combination of three questions and four approaches: the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, two-level ethics, and the unity of ethics and politics (method). The hypothesis of the article, which is the second innovation of the article compared to homogeneous articles, considers some concepts such as utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights as the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy. (innovation) Based on this, Farabi considers the goal of ethics and politics to be the same; Ethics has a political nature and politics has a moral nature. The theories of the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, have been completely ruled out; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics in the sense of following politics from ethics (in the sense of compatible ethical standards). (Findings) According to this, Farabi is a philosopher who does not find force and domination, conquest and the sword as a way to build an ethical culture. It considers happiness both in terms of belief and in relation to society. The government is morally based on public opinion and will. He based his utopia on voluntary justice based on virtue and rejects natural justice, and in his opinion, all citizens have rights and have a fair share in society. (Result)
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Mansour Imanpour
Abstract
Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential ...
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Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential realms. This has faced them with puzzling questions, including the one pertaining to the relationship between constant (thābit) and changeable (mutaghayyir) existents.
To illustrate, it should be noted that, in Islamic philosophy, existential realms are generally divided into the realm of purely immaterial entities and that of material entities. On another division, they are partitioned into three realms: intellectual (ʿaqlī), imaginal (mithāl), and natural. The relations between entities existing in these realms is explained in terms of the principle of causation. Now, the question arises: given one of the implications of this principle, namely impossibility of the deviation of an effect from its cause, how could actual changeable entities in the natural world be issued forth from a constant immaterial entity? Let us elaborate the question as follows: in the natural world, there are various types of changes, including “generation” (kawn) and “corruption” (fisād), accidental changes (that is, changes in accidents or properties [aʿrāḍ]), and as per Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, substantial changes (changes in substance or jawhar). It goes without saying that if the changeable entity in question is attributed to a constant unchanging complete cause, then the effect has indeed deviated from its cause in two ways: (a) Why, despite the existence of the cause, does the changing effect, which is a part or stage of the motion, become nonexistent and deviate from its complete cause? (b) Why, despite the existence of the complete cause, does the effect (namely, the motion with all its parts) fail to become existent and deviate from its cause?
Muslim philosophers have offered various theories to solve this predicament. These theories were subject to debates over the history of Islamic philosophy. Many articles and books have been written in this regard, each tackling a dimension or some dimensions of this problem.
This article does not aim to reiterate or provide a literature review of these solutions. Instead, it provides a brief classification and analysis of these theories and then yields a novel theory by drawing upon the philosophical principles of Mullā Ṣadrā.
Research Methodology
This article begins with a classification and analysis of the accounts provided by the main books and studies on this question by deploying the descriptive and analytical method. Finally, it makes a case for a novel theory in terms of a final formulation of the theory of substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya).
Discussion and Results
The problem of the relation between changeable and constant entities is proposed within the framework of Islamic philosophy, particularly its rendition of the law of causation and its implications. To address this formidable challenge, Muslim philosophers have proposed various accounts in terms of their philosophical principles and structures. However, these solutions have often faced challenges, either based on their assumptions in natural sciences or due to the structure and content of their solutions.
The finding of this article regarding the problem of relation between constant and changeable entities in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy is that, in final analysis, the problem involves two types of an effect’s deviation from its cause: (1) Despite the constancy of the cause, one part or stage of the effect becomes nonexistent, and (2) despite the existence of the constant cause, all parts or stages of the cause fail to become existent.
As for (1), it may be suggested that the renewed effect emanating from the constant cause does not lose any perfection. This way, it does not deviate from its cause. What becomes nonexistent in this process is not an existential perfection but an imperfection or flaw, the negation of which amounts to some sort of affirmation. Accordingly, in this process of continuous flourishing, the moving existence does not come to lack a perfection or an actuality, and hence, the effect does not deviate from its cause by losing part of it despite the cause’s existence. However, it is not straightforward to address (2), since it may be said that the realization of a subsequent part or stage of something depends on the realization of its preceding part or stage. That being the case, the failure of the subsequent parts and stages to come to existence in the first stage is not a deviation of the effect from its cause, but is because its condition or its preparatory cause has failed to exist. This means that, in this case too, the effect has not indeed deviated from its complete cause.
Conclusion
“Substantial motion” ultimately goes back to the evolution of a substantial existence. This perfection-seeking existence does not drive itself from potentiality to actuality; that is, it does not bestow perfection upon itself. It always has an emanating, perfection-giving entity that continuously emanates forms upon it, compensating its deficiencies and promoting its existence. During this continuous emanation, what happens to the changing effect is that its existence is constructed and becomes thriving. In this process, none of its parts or perfections disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs. Moreover, the emanating cause is not an absolute unconstrained for the subsequent parts or stages. Thus, their absence in the realm of the first part or stage does not count as deviation from the complete cause. On this account, the constant entity emanates an existence that inherently involves change, in light of which the existential perfection does not disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Nadia MAFTOUNI; Fataneh TavanaPanah; ghasemali koucnnani
Abstract
ملکات نقشهای متعددی در فلسفه اسلامی دارند. گاهی در مبادی صدور فعل از حیث مبادی خلقی، گاهی از جهات انسانشناسانه و در مواردی در مبناشناسی احوالات روانشناختی، امیال ...
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ملکات نقشهای متعددی در فلسفه اسلامی دارند. گاهی در مبادی صدور فعل از حیث مبادی خلقی، گاهی از جهات انسانشناسانه و در مواردی در مبناشناسی احوالات روانشناختی، امیال و گرایشات نفسانی ملکات مورد توجه هستند. مساله این تحقیق بررسی ابعاد شناختی و روانشناختی ملکات است که در ارتباط با ساختارهای ادراکی و سازمانیافتگی ادراک محسوب میشود. آیا علاوه بر نقشهای خلقی، از تاثیر ملکات در سطح اندیشه و احساس نیز میتوان سخن گفت؟ در این تحقیق با روشی توصیفی- تحلیلی به مساله حاضر پاسخ داده میشود. یافتههای این تحقیق حاکی از آن است که تعابیری همچون ملکات نطقی و عقلی ناظر به ابعاد شناختی ملکات است. نقش ملکات در جهتدهی و هدایت ادراکات و احوالات روانی و نیز معنابخشی و پردازش اطلاعات از سویی و اهمیت آنها به عنوان عوامل غیرشناختی شکل گیری باورها از سویی دیگر از نتایج این تحقیق محسوب میشود. تفکیک «معارف متمکن» حاصل از ملکات و «معارف غیر متمکن» و تحلیل هر یک در نفس، ناظر به جایگاه شناختی و روانشناختی ملکات است. نظم در ناحیه افکار و ارائه ایدههای از پیش تعیین شده و نیز فرضهای معین متناسب با ساختار در ارتباط با ملکات تبیینپذیر است. در بعد شناختی فارابی به نقش عادت و ملکات در تعیین و تعین مواضع اندیشهورزی و جایگاه مغالطی ملکات عطف توجه میکند و در بعد روانشناختی تاثیر ملکات بر امیال و گرایشات، تصمیم و انتخاب محل تامل است.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
ali asghar jafari valani
Abstract
Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept ...
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Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept in an epistemological context, asserting that Avicenna’s flying man not only exists, but also knows that he exists. Such an interpretation of the flying man argument seems to be at odds with his own principles, his passages throughout his works, and what he pursued to establish through this scenario.
Method
Deploying a descriptive and analytical method, it may be said that
Findings: Avicenna believes that perception begins from senses, and the first stage of the human reason is material or hylic reason or pure potentiality. Moreover, there is a difference between consciousness (shuʿūr) that is actually obtained by humans since the beginning of their existence and consciousness of consciousness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-shuʿūr), which he believes to be a potential character that needs to be acquired, while our primary consciousness of the soul is the existence of our soul. Thus, the flying man is solely the existence and presence of the soul before any actual consciousness.
Results
In view of the fact that man was suspended in space at the beginning of his creation and Ibn Sina considers the human soul to be the event of the body and in the order of the beast intellect and pure power, which lacks any perception and becomes actual through sensory perception, it should be said : The human being suspended in Ibn Sina's space can have an existential quality and in fact, he is observing the position of presence, existence, and mere existence. In addition, Ibn Sina, emphasizing the two positions of consciousness and consciousness to consciousness, believes that consciousness is actually and permanently suspended in man, but consciousness to consciousness is potential in him. Therefore, it seems that the soul at the beginning of creation, although it is present and proven, but it cannot be said that it has knowledge of itself; That is, the soul initially lacks attention to itself, and this lack of attention prevents any self-perception of the soul.
Innovation: In fact, regarding "Avicenna's suspended human being in space", it can only be said that "a human being is conscious (without any actual awareness)", but it cannot be said: "In addition, because this human being is conscious, he knows that he is like this." ».
Biannual Journal
mostafa momeni; MOHAMAD JAVAD AKHGARI; yaser Salari
Abstract
Introduction: Knowledge by presence (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) is a problem explicitly discussed by Suhrawardī (Shaykh al-Ishrāq). This issue has since become a significant topic in Islamic epistemology. More recently, Allameh Tabatabai has examined this problem and drawn noteworthy conclusions. According ...
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Introduction: Knowledge by presence (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) is a problem explicitly discussed by Suhrawardī (Shaykh al-Ishrāq). This issue has since become a significant topic in Islamic epistemology. More recently, Allameh Tabatabai has examined this problem and drawn noteworthy conclusions. According to him, knowledge by presence is an existential concept, and is detached from matter. He establishes the existence of such knowledge by appealing to human self-consciousness, which manifests the presence of the existence of our own selves to us. In his view, the criterion for knowledge by presence consists in the real presence of something (the known) to another thing (the knower). Accordingly, he broadens the instances of knowledge by presence to encompass self-knowledge, a cause’s knowledge of its own effects, the effect’s knowledge of its cause, an effect’s knowledge of other effects of its cause, and human knowledge of his own sensory impressions. As for the reduction of knowledge by acquisition (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) to knowledge by presence, Allameh Tabatabai believes that each instance of the former is indeed an instance of the latter. In fact, knowledge by acquisition always involves knowledge by presence. It follows that all human knowledge is by presence through and through. This is because it is always an instance of knowledge by presence that turns into an instance of knowledge by acquisition. This transformation is done through the imaginative faculty, which he dubs the faculty of transforming knowledge by presence to knowledge by acquisition. According to Allameh Tabatabai’s view of knowledge by presence and its transformation into knowledge by acquisition, the soul has an effective agential role with respect to epistemic forms or images, obtaining both universal and particular epistemic forms via “unification.” This implies that the process of perception consists in the “strengthening of the detached (immaterial) existence of the world” and its unification with the intellectual level of existence. Another corollary of his view is that, since knowledge is in fact something existential that cannot be subsumed under any of the quiddity-based categories, it cannot be characterized as corresponding or failing to correspond to the reality, whereas knowledge by acquisition can be thus characterized. Furthermore, his view of knowledge by presence implies that knowledge by acquisition is restricted to the material world, since material entities can neither know, nor be known. Of course, material entities involve immaterial dimensions such as change and ignorance in virtue of which knowledge applies to them.
Method: This research was carried out with the library-analytical method.
Discussion and results: The main conclusion to be drawn from Allameh Tabatabai’s discussion of the nature of knowledge by presence and its corollaries is that it can be used to determine the ground of distinction between real (ḥaqīqī) and constructed (iʿtibārī) perceptions and how they relate to knowledge by presence. Since an instance of knowledge by presence is involved in any instance of knowledge by acquisition, it follows that when knowledge is divided, what is actually divided is knowledge by presence. That is, there are two types of knowledge by presence: pure knowledge by presence and knowledge presence that can be transformed into knowledge by acquisition. Moreover, given the account of the process through which the former is transformed into the latter and how constructed perceptions emerge from real perceptions with the aid of the estimative (wahmiyya) faculty, it can be concluded that the criterion for the division of perceptions into real and constructed, on Allameh Tabatabai’s account, is the same criterion depicted in the distinction between knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition. In other words, just as the mind draws on the activities of the estimative faculty to transform knowledge by presence into knowledge by acquisition for purposes of convenience in ordinary life, it utilizes the same activities to derive constructed perceptions from real perceptions.
Conclusion: According to Allameh Tabatabai, it is knowledge by presence that is transformed into knowledge by acquisition through the activities of the imaginative faculty. The activities of the estimative faculty concerning real entities result in the formation of constructed perceptions. The criterion proposed by him for the division of perceptions into constructed and real is the one depicted in the distinction between knowledge by acquisition and knowledge by presence.
This clarifies the ground of the distinction between real and constructed perceptions, as well as its relationship with knowledge by presence. The ground of real perceptions is pure knowledge by presence, while the ground of constructed perceptions is the type of knowledge by presence that can be transformed into knowledge by acquisition. The distinction between these two kinds of perceptions lies in the difference of the knowledge by presence involved in them.
Biannual Journal
mahdiyeh seyyed nurani
Abstract
Introduction
Futuwwa (as spiritual chivalry) holds a significant place as a creedal and ethical framework among those who have written futuwwat-nāma, or letters on futuwwa. According to the comprehensive definition provided by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī in his book Tuḥfat al-ikhwān fī ...
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Introduction
Futuwwa (as spiritual chivalry) holds a significant place as a creedal and ethical framework among those who have written futuwwat-nāma, or letters on futuwwa. According to the comprehensive definition provided by ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī in his book Tuḥfat al-ikhwān fī khaṣāʾiṣ al-fityān, futuwwa is deeply connected to the light of one's innate nature (fiṭra). It is through this light that chivalrous rituals and virtues are cultivated, and all the components involved in its rituals are portrayed as enigmatic symbols.
Topic and the Main Question
This research delves into the enigmas of futuwwa as explored in the writings of Shahāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, also known as Shaykh al-Ishrāq. The objective is to draw comparisons between the enigmas and symbols employed in his works and the rituals and virtues associated with chivalry. While al-Suhrawardī did not explicitly pen a book on futuwwa, the definitions of futuwwa and the enigmatic elements present in his works suggest that he may be regarded as part of the chivalrous circle, viewing futuwwa as the initial step towards attaining innate knowledge and transcendent realms.
The primary question of this research is to uncover and decipher the enigmatic aspects of chivalry found within the works of al-Suhrawardī. This is achieved by comparing the customary rituals and beliefs of the chivalrous as documented in Islamic literature on futuwwa. These symbols emerge prominently in relation to the central theme of chivalry, which is the illumination of one's innate nature. Al-Suhrawardī explores this theme in a scattered manner throughout his writings. By comparing the key symbols of chivalrous creeds and enigmas found in al-Suhrawardī's works, it becomes evident that he aligned himself with the idea of futuwwa, defining it as an embellishment within the path of “illumination” (ishrāq).
Research Background
The background of this research can be traced back to articles such as Kateb and Shamili’s “The creed of spiritual chivalry and the educational system of arts and industries” (2012) and Mousavi Gilani and Shakibadel’s “The mystical wayfaring in the master-pupil tradition of the literature on spiritual chivalry and its impact on the artist’s creativity” (2016). These articles provide an elaborate account of spiritual chivalry, tracing all such creeds to the archangel Gabriel. There are also articles devoted only to the history if ʿayyārs (warriors) and heros, such as Mohammad Jafar Mahjoub’s “Chivalry in Islamic Iran” (1992), which addresses the historical background of chivalry. However, there is no study of the enigmatic and innate aspects of futuwwa. Moreover, there is a paucity of sources that tackle with al-Suhrawardī’s works from the perspective of spiritual chivalry. The relevant articles such as “The hermeneutics of the ‘romantic return’ in Suhrawardī’s al-Ibrāj essay with Henry Corbin’s illuminationist phenomenological approach” solely deal with the romantic return of the soul to its origin.
The present article focuses on the innate nature (fiṭra), heart, and enigmas pertaining to spiritual chivalry. It makes a comparative study of two groups of works by al-Suhrawardī: the ones related to futuwwa and the ones about illumination, which nonetheless align with the idea of futuwwa.
The Main Body of the Article
This article addresses three definitions of futuwwa, offered in the relevant Islamic literature, in terms of morality, the pre-eternal divine covenant known as “alast,” and the innate nature. It then discusses Shaykh al-Ishrāq’s definition of futuwwa. It then deals with topics related to the creeds of spiritual chivalry, the characters of the chivalrous, their enigmatic elements such as garments, drinking, rituals, and tools, as well as psychological virtues. Throughout the enigmas found in the Islamic literature on futuwwa, we identify al-Suhrawardī’s remarks in his works, comparing them with such enigmas. Prominent among these enigmas are the symbols of childhood, the innate nature, and the heart.
Research Methodology
The methodology of this research is comparative and phenomenological. By discussing the enigmas pertaining to rituals, creeds, and tools within the chivalrous circle, we provide a comparative study of the symbols implicitly mentioned by al-Suhrawardī, analyzing the essence of these symbols in creedal, innate, and instrumental terms.
Discussion and Conclusions
Al-Suhrawardī is not widely recognized as an author specifically focused on futuwwa. Establishing a direct correlation between his works and the literature on futuwwa proves challenging. Nevertheless, scattered indications can be found throughout his writings that allude to spiritual chivalry and the enigmas associated with its creeds, tools, garments, beverages, and even the teachings allegedly impacted by Gabriel. It could therefore be argued that he secretly believed in the circle of the chivalrous and was well aware of its rituals. Through our comparative analysis of the enigmas present in al-Suhrawardī's works and the literature on futuwwa, we can discern shared elements between spiritual chivalry and illumination. This observation lends support to the hypothesis of a potential connection between the creed of futuwwa and the path of illumination.
Conclusion
An examination of the various enigmas associated with futuwwa as depicted in both the literature on futuwwa and al-Suhrawardī's works reveals that, at its core, futuwwa pertains to the innate nature and the innate light. This concept encompasses the "alast" covenant, as well as the psychological virtues of chivalry rooted in the innate nature. In both literatures, the innate nature counts as the core of the chivalrous, although these symbols are not much evident in al-Suhrawardī’s works. In contrast to the Islamic literature on futuwwa, al-Suhrawardī does not view futuwwa as the ultimate culmination of the path of illumination. Alongside scholars such as ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, al-Suhrawardī regards futuwwa as an initial stage leading towards transcendent realms. Furthermore, throughout his works like Bustān al-qulūb (The orchard of the hearts) and Āwāz parr Jabraʾīl (The sound of Gabriel’s wing), al-Suhrawardī makes occasional references to virtuous qualities that bear resemblance to the virtues associated with chivalry.
Extension scientific
Philosophy
gholamali moghaddam
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction
Only few philosophical works, such as Hadi Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma (literally, commentary on verses concerning philosophy), are used as textbooks. Consisting of didactic verses composed and explained by Sabzavari, the book is regarded as one of his valuable works ...
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Abstract
Introduction
Only few philosophical works, such as Hadi Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma (literally, commentary on verses concerning philosophy), are used as textbooks. Consisting of didactic verses composed and explained by Sabzavari, the book is regarded as one of his valuable works and a main textbook on Islamic philosophy. The research question is how we can examine and evaluate this work as a textbook, or how we can re-write it to provide a more useful textbook.
I aim to foster a discourse of critique and evaluation of existing textbooks, encouraging and motivating the academic community to enhance and supplement these texts, and to provide up-to-date and useful versions of philosophical textbooks. Some critical views of Sharḥ al-manẓūma have been proposed in a number of books and articles, including Teaching philosophy: a comparative study of Sharḥ al-manẓūma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma (Izadi 2013, 59), “Haj Mulla Hadi Sabzavari and his Sharḥ al-manẓūma” (Fani 1983, 44), “A Comparative Study of Sharḥ al-manẓūma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma” (Taba’i Izadi 2001, 58), “Teaching Transcendent Philosophy or obfuscating and destroying it?” (Shijari 2016, 51).
Given its significance, Sharḥ al-manẓūma merits thorough examination and review to capitalize on its strengths and mitigate its weaknesses. The present article contributes by discussing specific passages of Sharḥ al-manẓūma to illustrate certain educational difficulties within the text in a tangible manner. In light of these challenges, suggestions are put forth for the improvement of this and other philosophy textbooks.
Research method
This article addresses a theoretical question using the library research method. In this method, after formulating the question and developing schematic and detailed plans, sources were provided, notes were taken, and an initial edit was conducted through thematic categorization of the notes. Subsequently, the finalized version was prepared after further reconsiderations.
Discussion
Apart from its strengths, Sharḥ al-Manẓūma, like all human creations, has weaknesses that are analyzed in detail in the article. One such weakness is its explanation of the content through versification and commentary mixed with the text. This has placed Sabzavari in a challenging position, making it difficult for him to clarify phrases and shape the structure of sentences, resulting in the complexity and difficulty of understanding phrases in Sharḥ al-manẓūma. Furthermore, other drawbacks of Sharḥ al-manẓūma include theoretical complications, criticisms of other views, and elaboration of objections. At times, Sabzavari unexpectedly adds fuel to the fire of lengthy theoretical debates and controversies, which do not align with the structure of the discussion and the reader’s capacity.
Among other issues with Sharḥ al-manẓūma is its excessive optimism towards views, a tendency to justify them, and taking a charitable stance towards them without due regard for the facts of the history of philosophy. Moreover, Sabzavari attributes and justifies various views in terms of religious teachings. This approach has cast doubts on some of the citations in the book (Mutahhari 2011, 304). Furthermore, the prominence of Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent philosophical approach in Sabzavari’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma, and latter’s alignment with mystical principles and discussions, have sometimes led Sabzavari to make intricate mystical remarks. However, understanding these remarks requires a beginner in philosophy to be relatively or even fully familiar with the issues of theoretical mysticism.
Conclusion and Suggestions
Although sharing many outstanding characteristics of standard textbooks, Sharḥ al-Manẓūma suffers from issues such as the complication of its versification, difficulties arising from the blending of texts and commentaries, literary digressions, inclusion of mystical allusions, excessive justification and a charitable stance, neglect of historical context, digressions in explanations of reasons, and personal interpretations of Quranic verses and hadiths. In these respects, the book lacks some characteristics of a textbook. A contribution of this article is its content analysis of some parts of the text in a concrete and tangible way. Finally, this study suggests that Sharḥ al-manẓūma should be re-written preserve its authenticity and yet be transformed to an up-to-date and useful textbook with as many faults removed as possible.
