Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Razie Sadat amiri; Reza Akbarian; ali fallahrafie
Abstract
Examining the subject of philosophy shows that philosophers have had different views of the scope of the subject. In this article, we seek to answer the question whether Allama Tabataba’i widened the scope of philosophy in comparison to his two great predecessors. If the answer is positive, what ...
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Examining the subject of philosophy shows that philosophers have had different views of the scope of the subject. In this article, we seek to answer the question whether Allama Tabataba’i widened the scope of philosophy in comparison to his two great predecessors. If the answer is positive, what impact does the difference in scope have on the function of philosophy in sciences? To answer fundamental questions and therefore to advance and progress, various sciences - including natural and human sciences and even mathematics - require general principles and rational and ontological presumptions relevant to individual particulars, provision of which falls on philosophy. The question is whether the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabataba’i’s view has the required scope to propose these principles and presumptions. There are some researches about the subject of philosophy in his view, but they have not examined whether it includes mathematical and natural limited existents (wujūdat-i muqayyad). To answer the above formulated questions, first the subject of philosophy for Allama is reread and his different stated views on the topic are analyzed. Then, the domain of the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabataba’i’s, Avicenna’s, and Mulla Sadra’s views are compared and analyzed. Having assessed the relation between the three philosophers’ views of the subject of philosophy, some of the functions of philosophy in sciences are explained in brief. Finally, the impact of widening the scope of philosophy on formation of new philosophical branches and development of philosophy’s function is examined. Research methodThis research has been conducted through the analytic-descriptive method with an emphasis on the subject of philosophy in the works of three Islamic philosophers, namely Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Tabataba’i. The data have been collected, extracted and then compared with the library research method. Finally, through analysis of the data it is examined to what extent the scope of the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabatabai’s view functions in and is effective on sciences.Discussion and resultsBeing as being, or absolute being, is the title that all the three philosophers have chosen for the subject of philosophy, but the term has different meanings and examples in their works. In initial stages, Mulla Sadra chose the universal concept of existence - which is among the secondary intelligibles (ma’qūlat-i sanaviyyi) – as the meaning of being, but in next stages he regards existent in its factual sense as an example of existence. As such, the unified graded existence flowing through all existents in contrast to limited existents is the subject of philosophy. The question is whether the most specific types of existents can be the subject of a philosophical discussion. Through pursuing this question the following results were obtained: No matter whether the universal concept of existence or unified graded factual existence constitutes the subject of philosophy, the types of the universal concept of existence or limited existents that are at some level of the graded unified factual existence can be deemed a subject of philosophy. However, in Avicenna’s and Mulla Sadra’s views, it is required that the types in question should not be peculiar to mathematics and natural sciences, or, to put it more precisely, should not be peculiar to the subjects of the sciences of the individual. In philosophy, only those types of existence are discussed which are the attribute of existent things without mathematical and natural limitations.Allama Tabataba’i too believes that existence as absolute and universal is the subject of philosophy, but also that the most specific types of existents can unconditionally be the subject of philosophical discussions.In addition to the term being as being, Allama Tabataba’i also uses the term reality, and from his explanations it becomes clear that individual realities are not only part of discussions of categorization in philosophy, but can be the subject of a more universal philosophical knowledge than divine philosophy.To enhance the functioning of philosophy in sciences, it is essential that the domain of philosophy be delimited in a way that it incorporates such specific phenomena related to other sciences as justice, freedom, beauty, life, individual and social behaviors, etc. (i.e. phenomena whose ontological analysis provides presumptions and principles that sciences need). It seems that Allama’ Tabataba’i’s expansion of the scope of philosophy makes this possible through forming new philosophical branches pivoting on ontological analysis of all phenomena. ConclusionIf the subject of philosophy is confined to universal existence and its primary categories, it won’t be able to respond to an important part of ontological questions of natural and mathematical sciences dealing with individual beings. This causes both stagnation of philosophical knowledge and impedes development and growth of sciences. It seems that through expanding the scope of philosophy Allama Tabataba’i provided the capacity required for the formation of new philosophical branches - the types of knowledge that based on the universal philosophy and its demonstrated principles both develop the function of philosophy and lay the ground for validation of other sciences.
Biannual Journal
Islamic mysticism
Azita Belali e oskui; Morteza shajari; mina heydaritorkmani; seyd jalal mousavi sharabiani
Abstract
IntroductionHuman agency, both in creation and in recognition of architectural space and their interaction with the space, has been affected by the hidden harmony that is generated in the space, which turns the architectural space away from its static state, stillness, and lifelessness, and the core ...
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IntroductionHuman agency, both in creation and in recognition of architectural space and their interaction with the space, has been affected by the hidden harmony that is generated in the space, which turns the architectural space away from its static state, stillness, and lifelessness, and the core of the harmony is indeed the “unity”; that is, multiple parts find unity and totality within a whole that creates a sense inside, which fits the aesthetic desire and indeed the internal human self, because the human self seeks unity and suffers from multiplicity, diffusion, and conflicts (Ardalan et al., 2011). In fact, it might be acknowledged that architecture as a created work secretly involves the creation of multiplicity and turning it into unity in interaction with humans. Given the idea of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) in Islamic mysticism, a world is portrayed that is, first, divine and spiritual, where the song of holiness resonates, and second, it involves a unity by which all multiple parts are unified, or more precisely speaking, all that exists is a manifestation or representation of the one unified reality. In this way, art in general and architecture in particular might come to have a different color. Unity of existence is evident in architectural work in the Islamic world, but the character of this unity is not adequately discussed. A genuine perception of unity in architectural space is not confined to external senses. To the contrary, in its higher degrees, i.e., internal senses, it affects the observer. The goal of the present research to identify the nature of this unity and how it occurs. The question of our research is as follows: are Ibn ʿArabī’s views of unity applicable to architectural space, and what material grounds are prepared in architectural space to attain the unity? To answer the question, we begin with an overview of Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical view, where the question of existence and knowledge of unity is discussed as the foundation of Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism.According to our surveys, the issue of whether Ibn ʿArabī’s account of unity is applicable to architectural space has not been properly addressed in the past research. Instead, issues of the unity of existence and multiplicity within unity have been discussed separately in philosophy and architecture. Moreover, the architectural literature tends to focus on corporeal, visual, and symbolic aspects of architectural parts in the realization of unity. In the present research, we drawAssociate Professor, Department of Architecture, Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism, Tabriz Islamic Art University, Tabriz, Iran (Corresponding Author). oskoyi@tabirziau.ac.irProfessor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran. mortezashajari@gmail.comD. Candidate of Islamic Architecture, Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism, Tabriz Islamic Art University, Tabriz, Iran. m.haydari@tabriziau.ac.irAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Education, Faculty of Multimedia, Tabriz Islamic Art University, Tabriz, Iran. sjsharabiani@tabriziau.ac.irDate received: 2022/03/19, Date of acceptance: 2022/07/19 This article has been extracted from the course "Wisdom in Islamic Architecture" in the Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism of Tabriz Islamic Art University.on Ibn ʿArabī’s views about the questions of existence and knowledge of unity as the foundation of his mysticism to tackle material and perceptual grounds in the Islamic architectural space to examine the move from multiplicity to unity.Method of ResearchMethodologically speaking, the present research is descriptive-analytic, adopting the qualitative research approach. Qualitative research involves identification of the relevant references, studies and overviews of the written sources, comprehension of their meanings, and extraction of the relevant material, establishment of relations between issues, and providing descriptions and analyses of them.Discussion and ResultsCreation of multiplicity in architectural space and its transformation into unity has been effective in attaining an understanding of the existential unity, such that this understanding in architectural space was a determinant of the degree of the work’s life, and was somehow a cause of its existence. In fact, to attain such a unity, the human presence and existence in the space is undoubtedly what engenders a motion toward its recognition. Accordingly, the move from multiplicity to unity in architectural space implies physical movement (translocation – ocular) and semantic movement (mental movement). During the movement in architectural space, the observer’s physical movement turns into visual movement, which in turn results in reception of a series of regression and connections in the observer’s mind, leading to his or her mental movement. However, once the observer begins to recognize and see signs, it enables him or her to move in the world of imagination to attain unity. In fact, genuine unity is obtained through human imagination.ConclusionThere is a remarkable correspondence between perceptions of existential unity in both philosophy and architecture. On Ibn ʿArabī’s account, imagination is perception of images in the soul after having seen something. Indeed, imagination is the intermediary between dualities. So in his view, human imagination is capable of attaining unity in the world that is abstracted or detached from the sensible world (existence of multiplicity). Furthermore, in the unity of existence, finding the existence is the same as coming to exist, where the finding is through intuitions and revelations. In the Imam Mosque of Isfahan (or the Shah Mosque), manifestation of the pairs [imagination being in pair] in space provides a bedrock for the observer’s intuition and revelation of unity through a definition of hierarchies and qualitative geometry based on the principle of the centrality and symmetry and existence of light.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
vahid khademzadeh; Fatemeh Kanaani
Abstract
Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our ...
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Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our understanding and even our behavior are based on such metaphors. In this theory, metaphors are inseparable parts of scientific and philosophical theories.The human mind and how it works has been one of the greatest philosophical and scientific mysteries in the history of thought. Various theories have been offered throughout history about the nature of the mind. In the context of conceptual metaphor theory, it can be said that these theories are based on various conceptual metaphors; Some of these metaphors have been universal and some have belonged to a particular culture and age. For example, "mind as a container" is a common metaphor among different ages and cultures. In the context of this metaphor, the mind has a definite boundary that distinguishes the mind world from the outside world. Metaphors such as "mind as machine" and "mind as computer" were considered in contemporary analytical philosophy. Each of these metaphors highlights only one aspect of the concept of mind and inevitably hides the others. The mind can not be reduced to any of these metaphors.One of the functions of the mind is to acquire knowledge. Various metaphors have been proposed to describe this mind function. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has roots in human common experience in the childhood period. So, this metaphor is accepted in different cultures and Languages. In addition to its existence in everyday and customary language, this metaphor has also found its way into philosophical and mystical texts.One of the Muslim philosophical innovations is to introduce intuitive knowledge as one of the types of knowledge. Since intuitive knowledge is not available to ordinary people, the linguistic systems have not developed specific words and terms to describe such knowledge. This makes it impossible to describe and explain such knowledge literally. Therefore, Mulla Sadra has used conceptual metaphors to describe intuitive knowledge. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has been developed in Sadra's system and many sub-metaphors have been formed under this metaphor.In this study, the role of this metaphor in Sadra's philosophical system and its various dimensions are examined.Methods and MaterialsWords literally refer to one of the elements related to the act of seeing, which were discovered and extracted in Sadra's texts. Most of these words have been used to describe intuitive knowledge. Then, these words were categorized and the conceptual metaphors, associated with them, were introduced.Results and discussionIn the act of seeing, three elements are distinguishable: seer, seeable, and relation between them. Each of the three elements is used to explain intuitive knowledge by other sub-metaphors; “Knower as Seer”, “Known as Seeable” and “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphors are defined below the “Knowing as Seeing” metaphor. The “Knower as Seer” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "the quality of the knower as the purity or pollution of the seer" and "ignorance as blindness". The “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "obstacles to acquiring knowledge as obstacles to seeing", "intensity and weakness of knowledge as the seer's proximity, and remoteness from the seeable".ConclusionsThe "knowing as seeing" metaphor is an inseparable part of the theory of knowledge in Mulla Sadra's philosophy; In Sadra's thought, knowledge of the essence of God is not possible, and on the other hand, God is described as the light of lights, which is the most visible being. Mulla Sadra uses one of the conventional human experiences to reconcile these two propositions. In conventional human experience, the sun is the brightest object, but the intensity of light in the sun prevents man from seeing it directly. Mulla Sadra maps this conventional experience into the supernatural world and introduces the intensity of divine light as an obstacle to the intuitive observation of the divine essence.In the popular view among Muslim philosophers, rational perception is the understanding of general concepts, but Mulla Sadra considered rational perception as the observation of beings who are present in the intellectual world. However, Mulla Sadra has used this conceptual metaphor to adapt his theory to the popular view. He introduces the distant observation of intellectual beings as the cause of the formation of general concepts in the human mind; because, in conventional human experience, distant observation is accompanied by ambiguity. This ambiguity causes the concept formed in the mind to be able to adapt to several instances.Blindness due to light intensity and distant observation clearly shows the vital role of the "knowing as seeing" metaphor in Mulla Sadra's epistemological system.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
neda salour; Mahin Sohrabi nasirabadi; Narges Nazarnejad
Abstract
IntroductionTraditional Persian arts, with all their aesthetic and semantic aspects, are derived from the Iranian culture, thought, and beliefs and are eminent manifestations of the notion of tradition for Iranians. Traditional designs with symbolic motifs and patterns constitute the foundation of traditional ...
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IntroductionTraditional Persian arts, with all their aesthetic and semantic aspects, are derived from the Iranian culture, thought, and beliefs and are eminent manifestations of the notion of tradition for Iranians. Traditional designs with symbolic motifs and patterns constitute the foundation of traditional arts. Such arts are mainly characterized by the artist’s reluctance to imitate the nature and his or her focus on abstraction and expression of symbolic concepts. If traditional motifs are measured and appraised in terms of the right criteria and principles, it turns out that they are not only non-repetitive but also fully ingenious and creative, and display themselves in the design through a refinement made in the artist’s mind. Such intellectual analyses prevailed in line with rationalistic theories that relied on reasoning and arguments since fourth century AH (tenth century CE) along with the prevalence of the rationalistic Peripatetic philosophy and then Avicenna’s theories of psychological faculties, particularly the human-specific rational or intellectual faculty. For Avicenna, the human intellect has degrees and it has the potential to move toward perfection. One comes to obtain the ability to connect to the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) or the Bestower of Forms (wāhib al-ṣuwar) by developing one’s intellect, and then enjoys its grace and emanation, in virtue of which one knows and understands the world and finds the ability for reasoning and acquisition of knowledge. Avicenna believes that imagination is directed at the intellect or reason, and the artist’s perceptions are of the same kind as intellectual intuition.Avicenna enumerates certain principles for the beauty of a work of art, suggesting that its beauty results from reason or intellect. The principles include good moderation, good synthesis (proportions), and good order. On the other hand, the method of drawing traditional motifs were transmitted to us through generations. The superficial aspects of traditional motifs are addressed in Dr. Ali Hasouri’s Foundations of traditional design, Dr. Abolghasem Dadvar’s Theoretical foundations of traditional arts (a collection of the views and theories of Muslim intellectuals about art and aesthetics from the perspective of Islamic philosophy and mysticism), and Dr. Yaghoub Azhand’s Seven decorative principles of Persian art (all in Persian). However, they fail to formulate the rules of formation in the method of drawing the motifs and the scientific criteria they involve. Perhaps they have taken these for granted, while an analysis and formulation of the roots and rational dimensions of the principles and rules of the traditional design can lead to creative motifs. Accordingly, preservation, revival, development, promotion, innovation, and a new discourse in the domain of traditional designs require a scientific and artistic underpinning, saturated with philosophical and intellectual grounds.Method of ResearchThe present research draws on the method of theory evaluation and an assessment of how Avicenna’s aesthetic principles corresponds to the rules of drawing the traditional motifs to present a theory about the rationalistic design of the rational traditional Persian vegetal motifs as the most fundamental and widespread motifs. The data were collected through a library-documentary method, and finally the findings are presented through a descriptive-analytic method.Discussion and ResultsThe method of drawing traditional vegetal motifs alone or alongside each other follows certain principles and rules, each of which is separately matched with Avicenna’s aesthetic principles, including:With respect to their aversion of nature, their abstraction, simplification, symbolism, and centripetalism (manifestation of unity and multiplicity), the motifs are expressive and have “good order”; that is, their parts are proportionate to, and harmonious with, the whole.The motion and dynamic of the motifs, their generativity and reproduction in varieties of frames and directions, the balance, proposition, and symmetry in design, the existence of a geometrical order among the parts, the existence of rhythm and harmony between the motifs and the design, variety in composition and frame, collation and replacement relations between motifs, and the correspondence with varieties of backgrounds, frames, and materials in the performance context are all in line with Avicenna’s definition of “good moderation” and order.Line value (intensity and mildness), which gives an impression of perspective in the two-dimensional space, equivalence of the positive and negative spaces (over and cover spaces), and the existence of the element of timelessness and placelessness in traditional designs indicate the “good synthesis” as well as the order and coherence in the design.For Avicenna, the principles of aesthetics (good synthesis, order, and moderation) are formulated based on knowledge, which is in turn a consequence of reason or intellect. Since the Avicenna’s aesthetic rules of traditional motifs are also in conformity with mathematical and geometrical proportions, it can be said to follow scientific criteria.ConclusionOur study shows that, first, the existence of order, coherence, and harmony between motifs as well as the proportion and balance within the design come from scientific criteria, which are induced by the intellectual faculty. Accordingly, once connected to the Active Intellect, the artist obtains an intuition, and after the stage of the imaginative faculty, he or she can reason by means of the intellectual faculty. Since the contribution and function of the imaginative and intellectual faculties vary at each stage of creating the design, the artist begins with senses, and then reaches the stage of imagination and abstraction until he or she attains the degree of intellection and reasoning to the point of innovation and invention in the field of art, particularly in drawing traditional vegetal motifs. This sort of intuition, which Avicenna calls “intellectual intuition,” as well as the match between the rules of the traditional design and Avicenna’s aesthetic principles, indicate the rationalistic character of the course of traditional motifs and the predominance of the intellectual faculty in the creation of innovative motifs.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
zohre salahshur sefidsangi
Abstract
AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception ...
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AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception occurs in the human soul, while neuroscience provides a fully material account of all perceptions, including auditory perception. From a neuroscientific viewpoint, sounds pass through interior layers of the ear to reach auditory neurons, in the course of which they undergo a complicated process leading to auditory perception.However, Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the whole process occurring in the auditory system is just preparatory for perception of sounds by the human soul. This is the soul that creates the true nature of sounds. On his account, the relation between sounds and the inner self is like that between actions and their agents, where actions are done by their agents, rather than that between a passive entity and what it receives.For this reason, Mullā Ṣadrā holds that the account of auditory perception offered by natural scientists is objectionable, since they involve a confusion between preparatory causes and efficient causes. The accounts provided by natural sciences rest content with an elaboration of material stages of auditory perception, while Mullā Ṣadrā believes that perception is non-material in nature, which is just enabled and prepared by those material processes. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā offers the following account: when the soul has a relation with the natural external world through its attachment to the body, it creates a similar image of the external object, where that image is both caused and known by the soul.After the auditory perception, the human soul draws on the images derived from physical entities or those received from the spiritual world (the imaginal world, or ʿālam al-mithāl) creates images in its imaginary perception as well. Contrary to senses that are limited to material entities, imagination extends to the supernatural world as well. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, imagination includes a number of perceptions, such as perception of sensible entities while no matter is present, their perception in dreams, and imaginal perceptions. Perception of sounds in the absence of any external material sources does not require material tools or organs, since many material features do not exist in that realm. This is comparable to memory in neuroscience, although it has not yet offered a plausible account of conscious selection of memories.Moreover, the hearing that occurs in dreams does not involve an environmental system. Although some people still perceive the waves of the material world in their sleep, this is a very different process from that of sensory audition. In the hearing that occurs in dreams, one might hear an intense sound like thunders, which affects one’s soul just like hearing in the waking state, although it was not perceived by the material organ of hearing; that is, one’s ears. Hearing in dreams is indeed one piece of evidence adduced by Mullā Ṣadrā as an argument for the immateriality of perceptions, but this type of hearing is investigated in neuroscience as a kind of dream. Despite their accuracy, the findings of neuroscience here merely demonstrate that perception occurs with the stimulation of certain cells in the body, but the stimulation does not show whether the area in question is a center for processing and storing information or a pathway through which information is transferred.Also in imaginal hearing, only external sounds of the imaginal world are heard, without being mixed with inner secretions, and the sound in the imaginal world does not require material factors such as waves and frequencies. For Mullā Ṣadrā, if the human imaginative faculty is strong, the relation with the imaginal world can occur in the waking state such that hidden imaginal forms are presented to the person, who will thus be able to hear sounds from the imaginal world. Because of its non-material character, this stage of auditory perception is not subject to neuroscientific investigations.The final stage of auditory perception is intellectual hearing, which is the highest degree of auditory perception, which has degrees of intensity and weakness, just like light. Intellectual hearing has degrees, the lowest of which has traces of imaginal sounds, but the higher we go on the scale of intellectual hearing, we come closer to a realm in which no imaginal properties are involved, a realm of pure perception. In its evolutionary course, intellectual hearing reaches a degree where it perceives profound supernatural ideas in the most translucent form. This is a hearing that emerges with the rise of the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād) and then gradually grows.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
nader shokrollahi; خدیجه amiri; Shaker Lavaei
Abstract
The study of the nature of prophetic revelation (waḥy risālī) is a tenet of any study of revelatory religions; that is, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. There are different ways to study and know the revelation. One such way is to make recourse to similar capacities possessed by ordinary people; ...
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The study of the nature of prophetic revelation (waḥy risālī) is a tenet of any study of revelatory religions; that is, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. There are different ways to study and know the revelation. One such way is to make recourse to similar capacities possessed by ordinary people; that is, those who are not prophets. True dreams are a case in point. Indeed, non-revelatory true dreams are significant things occurring to humans, and they have been studied by Muslim philosophers. One relevant question here is: are true dreams of the same category as prophetic revelation, and thus, can we learn more about the latter by knowing about the former? If they have an identical nature, then knowledge of one might lead to knowledge of the other, in which case, the method of knowing prophetic revelation based on true dreams, and vice versa, will be rendered rational, opening the path toward expansive future research. On the other hand, if they are just partially similar, without being of an identical nature, then although knowledge of one might partially help knowledge of the other, it cannot yield full-fledged knowledge thereof. Crucially, there are religious texts in which true dreams and prophetic revelations are said to be related to each other—e.g. the former is said to be one-fortieth or one-seventieth of the latter. This has prepared the ground for philosophical reflections on the relation between the two notions by Muslim philosophers. In this research, we aim to examine the similarities and distinctions between non-revelatory true dreams and prophetic revelations according to an influential philosopher in the history of Islamic philosophy: Fārābī. Some points about the background of the issue are in order. To begin with, although Fārābī dealt with an analysis of revelation as well as dreams, he was not primarily concerned with the similarities and distinctions between the two, and hence, no direct answer to the above question might be found in his work. Second, although his commentators have considered his account of revelation and sometimes dreams, they were not primarily concerned with the similarities and distinctions between the two. Third, contemporary scholars and authors have sought to account for prophetic revelation in terms of dreams from a phenomenological viewpoint, independently of Fārābī’s account. However, this is founded on the wrong assumption that we adequately know dreams, and thus, we can draw on such knowledge to know prophetic revelation. The present article seeks to consider whether we can properly know prophetic revelation in terms of dreams, and vice versa. This means that we are not concerned with an independent study of either of these phenomena. The method of the article is as follows: it cites the work by Fārābī and his commentators, derives the characteristics of true dreams and prophetic revelation, and having analyzed their similarities and differences, it provides an answer to the main question above. Roughly speaking, a consideration and analysis of the work by Fārābī and his commentators leads us to the conclusion that the two phenomena are remarkably similar in his view, and on account of such similarities, one might subsume prophetic revelation and true dreams under one and the same category. This means that knowledge of one might lead to an understanding of the other, although there are distinctions between the two, which preclude their identification. As to the similarities between the two phenomena, we have found the following in Fārābī’s work: (1) in both prophetic revelation and true dreams, the rational human soul is connected to the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl), and in this way, it receives universal and particular fragments of knowledge, without any reflections or education—which are often necessary for other kinds of knowledge, (2) both of these phenomena involve the imaginative faculty, which has the function of representation. That is, when receiving fragments of knowledge from the Active Intellect or other supernatural sources, the knowledge in question is sometimes formless, in which case the imaginative faculty functions to give a particular form to this formless entity, and sometimes it gives another form to a truth that already has a form, and (3) since the imaginative faculty is involved, both true dreams and revelations are sometimes in need of interpretations. Nevertheless, a prophet is discriminated from a dreamer due to his sacred power, acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād), strong imaginative faculty, and immunity to errors in receiving the revelation. We conclude that while we might make partial inferences from one phenomenon to the other, knowledge of one is not tantamount to that of the other. The distinction between true dreams and prophethood is a matter of degrees; that is, while they share certain characteristics, each has its own peculiarities as well. On the whole, it is plausible to make inferences from dreams to revelation and vice versa, but the limitations of such inferences, because of their differences, must be taken into consideration
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
ali mostajeran; ali arshad Riahi
Abstract
Introduction Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the followers of the school of Tafkik and had been strongly influenced by the thoughts of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and Sheikh Hadi Tehrani. According to school of Tafkik, the use of rational and philosophical methods has no place in proving or explaining ...
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Introduction Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the followers of the school of Tafkik and had been strongly influenced by the thoughts of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and Sheikh Hadi Tehrani. According to school of Tafkik, the use of rational and philosophical methods has no place in proving or explaining religious teachings. Also, one of the reasons, given by the deniers of the Sadra's philosophy is that this philosophy takes contradictory approach, and therefore they accuse the transcendent philosophy of methodological eclecticism. But Tehrani by proving the fundamental reality of quiddity and using it for the issue of monotheism, has confirmed the use of philosophical and rational discussions in the religious teachings. Tehrani by proposing eight critiques, he has criticized the principles and arguments of the fundamental reality of existence, and consequently, he considers the issue of essential monotheism to be provable only by the principles of the fundamental reality of quiddity. As for the background of the present research, the only article that has been published on this subject is "Critique of the arguments of the fundamental reality of existence in the thought of Mirza Javad Tehrani" by Hossein Soheili (Soheili and others، 1398) in the journal of Hikmat Muaser. The present research is structurally, contently and basically, from four aspects, different from this research.Research MethodIn this article the authors, firstly, relying on the descriptive method and analysis of the content, have studied and evaluated eight Tehrani’s critiques on the fundamental reality of existence. Consequently, it is specified that the origin of Tehrani's attitude to explaining the provable characteristic of the Essence of the Necessary Being, in order to support the principles of the fundamental reality of quiddity, is that he did not distinguish between acceptance of requirement and acceptance of causality regarding the Essence of the Necessary Being. On the other hand, it has been cleared that, relying on the Tehrani’s view -criticizing the fundamental reality of existence and strengthening the fundamental reality of quiddity- it is not possible to give a convincing answer to Ibn Kamuna's doubt and the arguments of the monotheism of Essence, attributes and actions envisage problem. But relying on the Sadra's fundamental reality of existence, although God is not a special being of any quiddity, to require His possibility, the supreme Divine Existence possesses all perfect entities. Accordingly, firstly, the existential attributes of creatures are attributed to God in the status of the act, not in the status of the Essence. Secondly, they are attributed to God in that they are existences. Therefore, it can be acknowledged that although creatures have perfections, there is no perfection other than the perfection of God. According to this interpretation, philosophical purification will not be in conflict with the appearance of verses and hadiths that limit existential attributes as well as activity and influence in God alone or attributed the actions of the creature to God.According to Tehrani, the adherents of the fundamental reality of existence believe that the truth of external objects is existence and the truth of existence is not something like other objects, so it cannot be perceived by the five senses, but its perception is possible with intuition. According to the authors' research, Tehrani, since he could not perceive the truth of existence with empirical knowledge, inevitably considered what he perceives with his five senses as truth, and finally came to believe that what exists externally is quiddity.Consequences These consequences are resulted from this article: 1- Tehrani’s criticisms on the fundamental reality of existence are not correct. In some positions, he quoted the words of the predecessors of the adherents of the fundamental reality of quiddity, and in other cases, he did not accept the principles of the adherents of the fundamental reality of quiddity. There are two central points in most of Tehran's criticisms: Firstly, he did not have a correct idea of how the object and the subject correspond to each other, because he considered the concrete to be a container-like reality in which external beings have taken place, while the subject and the subjective are the same thing, as well as object and objective are the same thing. Secondly, in most cases, he has meant what the adherents of the fundamental reality of existence mean, but in order to escape from this thesis, he has adhered to the fundamental reality of quiddity. 2- Considering the difference between requirement and causality, which is based on the fundamental reality of existence, the Essence of the Necessary Being can be considered as possessor of requirement, without any causality, because considering the issue of causality, the Essence of the Necessary Being will have caused and otherness of existence and quiddity in the contingents indicates the essential dependence of the contingent on the cause, but the sameness of existence and quiddity in the Necessary Being indicates the non-dependence of the Essence of Necessary Being on the cause, since His Essence is His Existence. But according to the fundamental reality of quiddity, relying on the unification of requirement and causality, in the Essence of the Necessary Being, the main problem is that the Essence of the Necessary Being can no longer be considered the Necessary Being of all aspects.
Biannual Journal
somayeh sadat mousavi; seyyed ali akbar hosseini ghaleh bahman
Abstract
IntroductionThe necessity of observing moral values by human beings is approved by every common sense and human nature; But does such a necessity also apply to the observance of moral values for God? If we accept that it is necessary for God to observe moral values, on what basis can we know whether ...
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IntroductionThe necessity of observing moral values by human beings is approved by every common sense and human nature; But does such a necessity also apply to the observance of moral values for God? If we accept that it is necessary for God to observe moral values, on what basis can we know whether God has acted morally or not? The truth is that knowing God as the moral agent and determining the theory of value God's actions has received less attention and no precise answer has been given.Value theories are responsible for determining the good and bad criteria for moral actions, and so far various value theories have been proposed to measure human moral actions. The most well-known theories of moral value include teleological theories, virtue-based theories, and conscientious theories. The fundamental problem in most of these theories is that they consider only man as a moral agent, and the criterion they offer is only for measuring the good and bad of human actions. Hence, in the face of the question of "whether God's actions are moral or not" they do not have a clear answer for the audience. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine whether we can basically consider God as a moral agent or whether the observance of moral values is only for man? Second, if God's actions can also be morally valued, by what criteria can we understand their morality? Are the criteria presented in the moral schools adaptable to God's actions, or should another theory of value be sought for God? In this research, we want to provide appropriate answers to such questions as possible.Methods In this research, the analytical method has been used to examine the extent to which the theories of virtue oriented, Deontological, and Teleological are applied to the actions of God.Results and DiscussionThe first theory of value to be examined is the theory of virtue oriented. Of course, those virtue ethics's views that have considered the criterion of valuing characters and recognizing virtues from vices as their end are considered as Teleological views, and any result obtained in examining the Teleological view also includes Teleological virtue ethics. Other virtue ethic's views are called Agent-based virtue ethics, which say that the criterion for good and bad deeds is only their motive; Not their goals and results. According to this view, the existence of good motives for God causes good deeds to be issued from Him, without pursuing a purpose from these deeds. This criterion is not acceptable for conforming to God's actions; Because God is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all God's actions have a wise purpose.The second theory of value is the Deontological theory. The general criterion in this theory is that an action is moral and right when it is done only because of duty. Since this cannot be assumed to be a duty to God, this view also cannot be chosen as a theory of value for measuring God's actions; Because duty means where there is a right and the right cannot be achieved without ownership. God is the owner of everything; Therefore, no one has the right to oblige him to do something. The third theory under consideration is teleologicalism. The general criterion in teleology is this: if something leads us to the desired result, it is good, and if it leads us away from that result, it is bad.We have said that God is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all God's actions have a purpose; Therefore, the main criterion of teleology is compatible with God's moral actions. But purposes such as profit, pleasure, power, and happiness, which have been proposed in kinds of teleological theories such as consequentialism and perfectionism, are all appropriate to man and cannot be considered as purposes for God. Nevertheless, the concept of "perfection" is one of the concepts that has the capacity to be presented to God; Because God is absolute perfection, and God's wisdom requires that the actions that come from Him be commensurate with His inherent perfection. Thus, a new interpretation of perfectionism can be offered that includes the actions of God.To do this, the circle of the moral agent must be considered beyond man so that God is also known as the moral agent. Then, the realization of "mere perfection", without restricting it to man, was considered as the purpose of moral actions. In this case, each of the moral actors will aim at the realization of perfection, and this perfection, according to the nature of each moral actor, can have different instances. For example, man's goal can be his own perfection and God's goal can be the perfection of creatures; Because the goal is the realization of perfection, and if a moral act leads to the realization of perfection for a person other than the doer, the moral goal is still achieved.ConclusionAccording to what has been said, our proposed theory, as a theory of value that can be applied to both human and God's actions, is a perfectionist teleological theory - which also includes a Teleological virtue ethics - with the interpretation that we consider the purpose of moral actions to be the mere realization of perfection. According to this theory, a good deed is an action that is compatible with perfection, and a bad deed is an action that is incompatible with perfection. This perfection is either the perfection of the moral agent himself or the perfection of a being other than the moral agent. Therefore, the perfection of creatures by God, which is itself pure perfection, is a moral act
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
Nafiseh Nojaba; Mahdi Qiasvand
Abstract
Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the ...
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Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the laws of nature". What the following paper examines among these assumptions, is the first commitment or assumption. Neo-Thomism poses a serious challenge to the premises of incompatibilism within the frame of contemporary scientific theories and the only solution is to present alternative model. Nevertheless, the duality of nature and the supernatural as a common facet of compatibilism and incompatibilism is a berrier to both models providing a plausible explanation. Although, neo-Thomism s argument about longitudinal God–nature relationship fails to meet all expectations and they are faced with the dilemma between Deism and the denial of non-divine agency. Breaking the ontological boundaries between nature and the supernatural, there seem to be a possible solution to the dilemma. It seems monistic approach of Sadra developed two systems of unity “Tashkiky” and “Shakhsi” can be a solution to this problem. Thus, this essay examines Sadra argument to address the problem arised by “compatibilism” approach. MethodThis article is written in a descriptive-analytical method based on Mulla Sadra's principles.Results and DiscussionIn what follows, to address the issue by relying on Sadra s argument, firstly, double causality, causal closure and the difficulty of explanation of the supernatural effect on nature which makes difficult to explain “special divine action” in the frame of “compatibilism” approach, will be analysed. Sadra theory and Thomistic view have tried to solve the problem through rejecting causal duality, that is, they deny the adequacy of physical causes. The possibility of the supernatural effect on nature by excluding the ontological aspects between them is one of the significant components provided by this paper. Given the key role of the concept of “existence” and “essence” in Sadra and Thomistic view in explanation of the supernatural and nature, by appealing to different versions of Sadra s argument about “Asalat al-wujud” and Thomistic view, analysis of the relationships between these two concepts has been done. Finally, it is argued that the dualistic approach of Thomistic view and one of the version of “Asalat al-wujud” which is the identity of “existence” and “essence” fail to prove the possibility of the effect of the supernatural on nature. However, there are two other versions of “Asala al-wujud” can provide the solution to this problem.ConclusionWhat is suggested in this paper is only to show the power of Sadra s theory in breaking of the ontological boundaries between nature and Supernatural. Even two systems of “tashkiky unity” and “shakhsi unity” support this possibility. To solve the problem of “special divine action” through the breaking of the ontological aspects requires to be committed to components such as, the adequacy of the natural sciences, the laws of nature and noninterventionism commitment.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
efat alsadat hashemi; Alireza Kohansal; seyed morteza hoseini shahrudi,
Abstract
There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. ...
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There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. Another group of verses of a similar vein are those concerning “treasuries of Allah” (khazāʾin Allāh). The predicament is that people tend to collect valuable things in treasuries only because they have a limited power and cannot have what they want whenever they do, but this is not true of God, because of His unlimited, unconstrained power and knowledge.
According to Quranic exegetes, there are two types of “divine treasuries”:
Worldly treasuries
Otherworldly treasuries (those of the absolute hidden world)
There are different views of the nature of “divine treasuries” proposed by exegetes of the Quran and Muslim philosophers. We begin with views propounded by Quranic exegetes in philosophical-theological exegeses of the Quran. Major views of this sort have been offered in the exegesis of verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr in the Quran. These views might be classified into four:
Rains
Material elements and occasions of creation
Divine predestinations
Divine knowledge
In a number of his exegetical and philosophical works, Mullā Ṣadrā has presented his account of “divine treasuries.” In line with his philosophical principles, he construes divine treasuries as intellectual entities; that is, as a particular stage of divine knowledge (after that of divine grace or ʿināyat), which mediates the emanation of divine blessings or grace to creatures—a stage in which the forms of everything inheres in an intellectual way. A systematic, rational rendering of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of divine treasuries requires a proper elaboration of his philosophical principles associated with divine knowledge, including the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), objectivity of knowledge and existence, etc.
The following are the questions we consider in this paper:
How do theological exegeses of the Quran account for the notion of “divine treasuries”? What problems do they face?
What are Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles underlying his account of divine treasuries? How does his account treat the problems faced by other accounts?
What other account of divine treasuries might be yielded, which is still compatible with the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy?
To answer these questions, we begin with a literal definition of “treasuries of Allah” and then overview the accounts provided by exegetes and their problems. Next, we offer a detailed account of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles as preliminary to a proper account of “divine treasuries.”
Articles have been published about “divine treasuries,” including “Divine treasuries” by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḥishmatpūr (2005), “A critical analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of treasuries in light of structural semantics” by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2018) and “A critical application of the theory of conceptual mixture in al-Mīzān’s reading of divine treasuries” again by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2017).
We conclude that, of the four accounts outlined in this paper, the first three suffer from numerous problems, and thus they fail to yield an adequate account of the Quranic notion of divine treasuries. In our view, the fourth view—that is, Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical account—has failed to offer a full-fledged account of instances of divine treasuries. Accordingly, we propounded a fourth view, which is an extension of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account. We argue how a proper, reasonable account of the notion of divine treasuries can be made possible by an elaboration of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles concerning divine knowledge and its degrees, and by drawing on characteristics of divine treasuries as outlined in the Quran, particularly verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr. We show that this revised Sadraean account is immune to the objections raised against other theories. On this account, divine treasuries suggest God’s knowledge of the measures of everything before its descent; that is, its creation. Moreover, on Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles, treasuries are of two sorts: worldly and otherworldly, where the latter is of two kinds in turn: objective and subjective (or cognitive). Objective treasuries are entities existing in imaginal (mithāl) and intellectual (ʿaql) worlds, and subjective treasuries are entities existing in the world of divine names and attributes. This is an “existential account of divine treasuries,” which might apply to all degrees of existence and creation.
Biannual Journal
Philosophy
mohammad ali vatandoost; mahdi Chanaani
Abstract
AbstractA major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars ...
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AbstractA major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy: some have endorsed and defended his view, and others have criticized the account. In this article, we draw on a descriptive-analytic method and adopt a critical approach to assess the two responses. We conclude that, notwithstanding its novelties, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account rests on problematic grounds. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of demonstrations propter quid and quiatic demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-inniyya), which go against the common conception of these demonstrations in Islamic logic.Keywords: ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, critique, propter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī), quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī), general implications IntroductionPropter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī) and quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī) are major issues in Islamic logic, which are deployed in other fields of study, including Islamic philosophy. In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī was the first to propound the idea that propter quid demonstrations are not legitimate in dealing with philosophical problems. On his account, the demonstrations or proofs used in coping with philosophical questions are general implications (al-mulāzamāt al-ʿamma), as it is indeed impossible to use propter quid demonstrations in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has been criticized by some of his students and contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy. Some have endorsed and defended his view, whereas others have criticized its foundations or raised objections against it by its own merits.The basic question of the present research is as follows: How to assess the arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view of the deployment of propter quid demonstrations in philosophy?Method of ResearchIn this research, we provide an accurate rereading of the definitions of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations in Islamic logic, and then assess the views of both camps. We begin with an account of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view as well as the positions of his proponents and opponents. Finally, having evaluated both views, we elaborate upon our espoused account. This research is done with a descriptive-analytic method and a critical approach.DiscussionIn some of his works, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī suggests that propter quid demonstrations do not apply to philosophy. Indeed, all demonstrations or proofs in philosophy are quiatic demonstrations based on general implications. In his view, propter quid demonstrations cannot be deployed in dealing with philosophical problems. This is because the absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq) as the subject-matter of philosophy is general, and since there is nothing beyond the absolute existence, it cannot have a cause, which implies that it cannot be subject to propter quid demonstrations, in which causes are adduced.With a survey of the debates over ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account among contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy, we find two major approaches: some have criticized ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, and some have defended and justified the view.Javadi Amoli raises two objections against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s position. He holds that the predicate of existence is predicated of both absolute and qualified (muqayyad) existences, and when it is predicated of the latter, it can be subject to propter quid demonstrations, since qualified existence needs a cause. In addition, if propter quid demonstrations did not apply to philosophical problems, then all demonstrations in philosophy would be undermined and there would be no conclusive argument in philosophy, because quiatic demonstrations are grounded indeed in propter quid demonstrations. Given ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s response to Javadi Amoli’s objections, it turns out that his view presupposes his own account of the “criterion of philosophical problems.” However, the second objection raised by Javadi Amoli seems to go through.Mesbah Yazdi has also criticized ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view based on its incompatibility with the conditions of propter quid demonstrations in logic. He argues that causation in such demonstrations is not confined to external causation, but includes analytic causation as well. Accordingly, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is objectionable. In this research, we endorse Mesbah Yazdi’s critique of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view.Gholam-Reza Fayyazi believes that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view should be examined in terms of his own assumptions. One such assumption is that all predicates that are more specific than the absolute existence equal existence when taken together with their complement notions. Moreover, in propter quid demonstrations, the middle term is indeed an external cause for the predication of the major premise on the minor premise. In Fayyazi’s view, the first assumption—equality of the “essential accident” (al-‘araḍ al-dhātī) with the subject-matter of a science—finds counterexamples in many philosophical problems, and the second contradicts the views of logicians, since they believe that the causation of the middle term in propter quid demonstrations includes both external and mental causation. In this research, we criticize Fayyazi’s first objection against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, but we agree with the second objection, which is a reformulation of Mesbah Yazdi’s view.Yazdanpanah endorses ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s assumptions, but he argues that they have their source in the idea of a cause beyond the existent qua existent. However, since this idea is problematic, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is challenged. A reflection on Yazdanpanah’s remarks makes it obvious that they are reformulations the objections raised by Mesbah Yazdi and Javadi Amoli.Finally, people such as Samadi Amoli believe that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view should be deemed intuitive (shuhūdī), while all the objections raised against his view assume that philosophy is confined to reflective or intellectual knowledge. In this research, we criticize Samadi Amoli because it does not square with ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account to take it as pertaining to intuitive, rather than acquired, knowledge.ConclusionHaving assessed and examined the arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account, we conclude that, despite its novel contributions, his view rests on problematic assumptions. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations that goes against the standard view in logic. Thus, we should either modify the standard logic definition of propter quid demonstrations or believe that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is a novel view based on new principles, which can be criticized.
Biannual Journal
Asghar Mohammadi; sahar kavandi; Mohsen Jahed
Abstract
AbstractThe root of “A M A N A”, "أ م ن" is one of the most central and fundamental concepts of the Qur'an and religious issues. According to Islamic theologians, multiple and conflicting interpretations of faith have caused some to accuse others of disbelief - the opposite of faith. Considering ...
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AbstractThe root of “A M A N A”, "أ م ن" is one of the most central and fundamental concepts of the Qur'an and religious issues. According to Islamic theologians, multiple and conflicting interpretations of faith have caused some to accuse others of disbelief - the opposite of faith. Considering faith as an epistemological-cognitive matter is used in two semantic areas: firstly, faith is achieved through reason and rational arguments; Second basically, the nature of faith is knowledge. The current research does not consider any of these two views to be correct and aims to explain the issue that faith can be achieved without any rational and epistemological reasoning. In order to prove this claim, first, a brief review of the theologians' understanding of faith has been done, to show that the lack of knowledge of faith and the necessity of obtaining it through rational reasoning is a theory that has its roots among Islamic theologians and is considered It seems that the arguments of this group are more defensible than the rival group. Then, with a brief look at some verses, evidences have been given that faith, from the perspective of the Qur'an, is related to the emotional-emotional sphere of a person. IntroductionSince the compilation of the Qur'an, this holy book has been exposed to views and opinions among Muslim thinkers, including commentators, theologians, philosophers, jurists and mystics. Ambiguity in some key words of the Qur'an has caused disputes and, as a result, categories that plague Muslims to this day. Although this is not specific to Muslims and is more or less seen in all religions and rituals, it is going on in an acute and double way in the case of Islam and the Qur'an. One of these concepts is the concept of faith, which despite the detailed discussions of Islamic commentators and theologians, but it seems that the truth of faith is still in the aura of ambiguity and there have been detailed disputes over it throughout the history of Islam. There have been researches in this field, where the viewpoints of Islamic theologians, commentators and philosophers have been explained and criticized. What is the truth and nature of the heart's acknowledgment that is stated in most of the views and what is the main role in it is the focus of this research and it seeks to discover the connection between science and faith and accordingly find the truth and the main pillar of faith. Therefore, in order to reduce the differences and apparent conflicts of the verses, there is no other choice but to return to the text and carefully review the views of Muslim thinkers. The structure of the Qur'an's worldview about God, man and nature must be obtained from the heart of the Qur'an's text, and this is important through the analysis of the main and flow-forming words, terms, and concepts of the Qur'an, taking into account the cultural and geographical background of the Qur'an's revelation. It is possible.Discussion and ResultsSince the perfection of a person and his salvation from the perspective of the Qur'an, as will be explained, is dependent on faith, and the lack of faith causes a person to fall, and on the other hand, as Islamic thinkers had already accepted that the happiness of a person depends on the realization of reason and its activity. Therefore, without paying enough attention to the logic of the Qur'an, they considered faith as a rational concept related to the power of cognition. In the books of Islamic ethics and Kalam, special attention has been paid to the development of reason and rationality, but almost no attention has been paid to the development of feelings and emotions. In this article, I would like to say that the concept of faith in the Qur'an, contrary to the general view of theologians, is not a matter of knowledge of the type of belief and opinion. Rather, it is related to human feelings and emotions. In the Islamic tradition, due to the predominance of Aristotle's view of man and the definition of man, they usually summed up the criterion of man's superiority in his intellect and rationality, and did not attach much importance to other aspects of man's existence. It was that in examining the key concepts of the Qur'an, the discussion was unintentionally going on intellectual matters. Another point is that the realm of human feelings and emotions was unknown at that time, and feelings and emotions were usually considered a subset of human will. Since Tetens, who was a contemporary of Kant, the field of feelings and emotions was recognized and emphasized as the independent field of a person. The theologians defined the word faith based on the definition given by lexicographers and made many efforts to analyze and interpret it, but none of them paid attention to the fact that faith may fundamentally belong to another area of human existence. The theologians considered faith as confirmation, and in this regard, they included both intellectual confirmation and heart confirmation in the definition of faith. Some people believed that faith is the same as science and it can be achieved based on rational arguments, but others believed that faith can be obtained through the heart. But they all had one thing in common, and that is that faith is a category of science and knowledge. Of course, this does not mean that faith has no connection with knowledge. Knowledge is a condition of faith, but it is not its camel. In the sense that knowledge is not a part of the essence and the core of faith, but it has the dignity and status of an introduction to it; Just as knowledge can be the prelude to any act or state or desire of a person. When we get angry or envious, we must be aware of the person we are angry or envious of, even though we have great knowledge; But this does not mean that anger and envy belong to the category of knowledge. A closer examination of the verses of the Qur'an can understand that faith belongs to the realm of feelings and emotions. That is, it belongs to the family of concepts such as gratitude, hope, hope, fear and the like. The opposite point of faith should also be emotional. Therefore, in understanding faith, we need to understand the mentioned concepts. As Izutsu had come to it in his books and showed it well.ConclusionThis article was intended to express the attitude of Islamic theologians about faith as briefly as possible and to find the correct meaning of faith. By examining the opinions of Islamic theologians, it became clear that faith is not just knowledge or practice, and it is not even possible to consider faith as a combination of both. What is clear is that faith requires knowledge and without it faith cannot be realized, but the truth of faith will not be knowledge. According to the point of view that faith is the confirmation of the heart, the conclusion was reached that faith is the actions of the practical intellect and the work of the heart, and it is one of human tendencies, not perceptions. According to this view, the verses related to faith can be interpreted and by looking at the verses collectively, there will be no ambiguity in this regard. According to the authors, no external model or paradigm is responsible for understanding faith. It is acceptable to have a model and paradigm in the understanding of faith that can provide a reasonable and justified interpretation of most - if not all - of the verses that contain the word faith or its derivatives. Otherwise, we will go astray in understanding it. By referring to the Qur'an, it becomes clear that faith is related to the non-cognitive domain of man, which is associated with reassurance, trust, and loyalty, and living faithfully means having trust and loyalty in God, the unseen, the angels, the prophets, and the book of the Qur'an
Book introduction
Takeshi AOKI
Abstract
This is a 392-page, extensive Persian book published in Tehran in November 2021. The biography, achievements, and ideologies of Azar Kayvan (1533–1618), who lived in Safavid Iran and Mughal India in the 16th and 17th centuries are covered, as the title of the book implies. First, I want to commend ...
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This is a 392-page, extensive Persian book published in Tehran in November 2021. The biography, achievements, and ideologies of Azar Kayvan (1533–1618), who lived in Safavid Iran and Mughal India in the 16th and 17th centuries are covered, as the title of the book implies. First, I want to commend the author for having the courage to write a book about a mystical philosopher who falls into a rather minor category in the intellectual history of the contemporary Persian world. I hope that this achievement will elevate a minor to a position where people in Iran and India will realize his significance. The author is Farzaneh Goshtasb (1973–), who is currently an Associate Professor at the Institute of Humanities and Culture in Iran. She is a Zoroastrian lady with only 0.03% of Iran's population. The author’s possible research motivation is the fact that Azar Kayvan was regarded as a Zoroastrian priest-thinker in the history of modern Zoroastrianism in the research stage of the 20th century, which is why the issue is important. Nevertheless, the more the author researched, the more she is forced to come to conclude that Azar Kayvan was not a Zoroastrian.
