Contemporary Wisdom

Biannual Journal Philosophy

"Investigating the relationship and challenges between Comparative philosophy and Intercultural philosophy in contemporary Iran"

Pages 1-32

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.53438.2141

Muhammad Hasan Yaghoubian Ghomsheh

Abstract Abstract Among the important philosophical movements in contemporary Iran are comparative philosophy and intercultural philosophy, which, while having points of connection, also have challenges, and sometimes intercultural attitude claims to be an alternative to comparative philosophy. The issue is to compare these trends and evaluate their challenges. The method of this research, while creating a dialogue between them, provides a brief description in the initial processing and presents the perspectives proposed in the relationship between them, including inclusion, opposition, and correlation, in order to reach a final evaluation in the secondary processing and analysis. Findings: the non-identity of the two currents in the perspective of opposition, including defects such as Western origin, ambiguity of nature and method and self-centeredness from the intercultural perspective towards comparative philosophy, and on the contrary, defects such as Eurocentrism under the German tradition, non-philosophy,and relativism have been pointed at intercultural philosophy.But this perspective ignores the points of connection between the two streams, and the problems raised sometimes have a lack of evidence or are double-edged. Conclusion: the perspectives of inclusion and correlation are more helpful in explaining their emergence, continuity, and exchange. Comparing the two currents to the cultural situation of contemporary Iran, it attempts to show their self-awareness and placement in the crossroads and cultural interdependence of Iran, as well as the path of paying attention to unity in diversity as an appropriate cultural policy. Keywords: Philosophy, comparison, comparative philosophy, Intercultural philosophy, challenges of comparative and Intercultural philosophy, contemporary Iran. Introduction A look at philosophy in contemporary Iran reveals important trends in comparative and intercultural philosophy, and paying attention to them reflects an important part of the state of contemporary Iranian philosophy and its lived experience since the Qajar erato the present. Comparative philosophy in contemporary Iran, although it has emerged as a new phenomenon under the French tradition with figures such as Gobineau and Corbin, can be traced back to early and late Islamic philosophers. Contemporary figures such as Allameh Tabatabaei and Dr. Mahdi Haeri have also paid serious attention to comparative philosophy. The father of intercultural philosophy is sometimes considered to be the Indian Ram Adhar Mall, who founded the first association, or Betancourt or even Professor Abdul Javad Falatowri. In addition, the connection with individuals such as Morteza Ghasempour and Hamid Reza Yousefi at the beginning of its emergence in Germany and the connection and interest of Iranian scholars in this movement led to the establishment of the Intercultural Philosophy Association in Iran. Also, by rereading thinkers such as Allameh Tabatabaei, Dr. Abdul Javad Falaturi, and Dariush Shaygan, this stream tried to maintain its connection to the Iranian cultural body, although it saw problems and obstacles in his path in Iranian and Islamic culture. The issue of this research is to examine the relationship between these two philosophical trends in contemporary Iran and the challenges between them in criticizing each other and claiming to replace intercultural philosophy with comparative philosophy, which has been formed in academic meetings and discourses and in some cases has also shown itself in written scientific works. In this regard, the need to evaluate and judge between the claims made by the parties in favor of these trends and the situation and needs assessment of Iran's current cultural and social conditions in order to become aware of a comparative and intercultural approach is among the necessities of this research. Materials & Methods The method of this research: in the first step, deals with the initial processing of describing the perspectives of the parties and presenting the perspectives raised in the relationship between the two comparative and intercultural streams. In the secondary processing, the explanation and analysis of those relations, arguments and criticisms of the parties are considered so that in the light of the dialogue between them, the relation between them becomes clearer. In the second step, the relation of the two currents with the current and contemporary culture of Iran is examined. Discussion & Result After the initial processing in describing the two streams of comparative philosophy and intercultural philosophy, focusing on the non-identity between them, it was determined that three perspectives of inclusion, opposition, and correlation have been proposed by the thinkers of both sides. From the perspective of confrontation, mutual critiques have been raised by the proponents of each approach: 1. Critiques of Intercultural Philosophy toward Comparative Philosophy
The Western origin of comparative philosophy in the French tradition; ambiguities in its definition and methodology; ethnocentrism; the incompatibility of a cultural homogenization policy with the pluralistic and diverse reality of the contemporary world; exclusivist readings; and the limited capacity of Islamic philosophy to address temporal and contemporary questions. 2.Critiques of Comparative Philosophy toward Intercultural Philosophy
Eurocentrism and the emergence of intercultural philosophy within the German tradition; the claim that intercultural approaches do not constitute genuine philosophy; relativism; and the critique of other constituent elements, as intercultural philosophy often occupies an intermediary position, operating in practice under Western and European frameworks. 3.Evaluation of Mutual Critiques
The critiques exchanged between the two currents, from the perspective of confrontation, have been examined. The dichotomous view, understood as pure opposition, not only disregards areas of overlap and points of connection but also neglects distinctions, ultimately dismissing one approach in favor of the other. The arguments and critiques presented by each side are, in some cases, responsive or commensurable from the perspective of the opposing current. Overall, greater intellectual tolerance is necessary to allow the two approaches to engage with each other, acknowledging both similarities and differences. Distinctions in concerns and goals, the epistemic orientation toward truth-seeking or dialogue, and the philosophical status of intercultural philosophy are among the considerations that challenge the notion of substituting intercultural philosophy for comparative philosophy. Conclusion By moving beyond the perspective of equality between the two currents in homogeneity and contrast in the perspective of opposition, with the help of the perspective of inclusion and interdependence, their distinction and connection are explained in such a way that comparative philosophy was prior in terms of emergence and, in the continuation of the encounter with the paradigm of culture and cultural diversity in the contemporary world, it has led to intercultural philosophy. In the continuation of their continuity, despite their differences, they are interconnected and have the possibility of coexisting with each other, because they have similarities in their consideration of the principle of dialogue, culture, or the models of Ourseli's analogy and the analogical hermeneutics. Their relationship with Iran and Islamic culture can also be examined. In fact, Iran's status as a crossroads between East and West throughout its history and the characteristic of its cultural betweenness are compatible with a comparative and intercultural approach. Both currents have found themselves in the history of Iranian culture with their components, and have paid attention to the dynamics of the past philosophical tradition and have tried to pathologize the obstacles to seeing philosophical diversity and self-centeredness. But to transform these movements into cultural politics in the current and contemporary situation, they must be able to stand between absolutism and radical relativism and actively preserve both unity and plurality

Biannual Journal Philosophy

The One beyond Being and the One qua Being: A Study of the Transcendence of the Arche in Neoplatonic Philosophy and Transcendent Wisdom

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.52930.2129

Zahra Amini, Mustafa Zali

Abstract Abstract
Plotinus, through his criticism of the Aristotelian conception of the Arche as lacking of transcendence and simplicity, emphasized on the Arche’s transcendence beyond both Intellect and being, thereby establishing it as the beyond-being. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, via his innovative doctrine of causality, articulated this transcendence by equating being with the singular essence of God as the One qua being. This article studies the problem of relation of God and the world in a conceptual-argumentative method. According to the findings of this study, despite apparent similarities, these two conceptions of transcendence yield radically different conclusions concerning the Arche’s relation to the world—specifically, its being knowable, describable, and its knowledge of the world. This divergence exposes their fundamental disagreement on the meaning of transcendence itself. As a result for Mulla Sadra, it denotes the Arche's absolute perfection, while for Plotinus, it implies the Arche's absolute distinction from the world, A difference which itself originates from a deeper ontological division: While for Plotinus, being is founded on a simpler, prior grade of reality, Mulla Sadra thinks of existence as self-subsistent and the single source of all perfection, rendering any transcendence beyond itself impossible.
Keywords: Arche, Perfection, Distinction, The One beyond being, The One qua being, Plotinus, Mulla Sadra

1. Introduction
The inquiry into the Arche (Principle) of the world, beyond its general significance in the history of philosophy, occupies a direct relationship with the foundational conceptions of the two philosophers within Neoplatonic philosophy and Transcendent Wisdom. According to a common interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā's explanation of the Principle as the True Cause, presented in the second volume of al-Asfār al-arbaʿah and emphasized by those commentators of Transcendent Wisdom who advocate a reading based on the personal unity of existence, is seen as analogous to the position of negative theology of Neoplatonic philosophers—an interpretation that, as will be shown, is challenged by the authors of this paper. Plotinus, emphasizing the necessity of the Principle's simplicity, spoke of the criterion of the Principle's absolute distinction from the world. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, by centering existence and reducing perfection and transcendence to a same reality—namely, existence—considered the most perfect being to be the most transcendent being. In Ṣadrā's explanation, God, as the sole True Cause and the sole True being or the One qua being, possesses a supremacy of the kind of perfection over other beings. In the Neoplatonic explanation, God as the One beyond-being is absolutely distinct from the entire chain of existent and intelligible beings. This discrepancy is rooted in a distinction within the ontological principles underlying the two philosophers' views: for one, the structure of the world is based on the duality of existence and non-existence, with existence being a self-subsistent reality that explains God's absolute perfection; for the other, existence is dependent upon and distinct from a higher plane that transcends all existential perfection, positive attribution, and knowability. Understanding this fundamental distinction, which has recurrently manifested throughout the history of philosophy between proponents of negative and positive theology, reveals a foundational divergence between two positions that invites reflection on their respective implications and consequences.

2. Materials & Methods
This paper pursues the problem of the transcendence of the Principle in the Neoplatonic Philosophy and the Transcendent Wisdom through a conceptual-argumentative method.

3. Discussion & Result
3.1 Transcendence as Absolute Distinction: The One Beyond-Being in Neoplatonic Philosophy
To criticize the Aristotelian conception of the Intellect as the Principle, Plotinus argues that the Intellect, due to a threefold composition (composition arising from the multiplicity of intelligible content, composition necessitated by the inherent duality in the act of self-thinking, and composition due to the Intellect's entanglement with the five supreme or universal Ideas), lacks simplicity and is interwoven with realities non-identical to itself, thus lacking absolute distinction and transcendence from the world. Consequently, to attain the Principle and First Origin of the world, one must transcend the Intellect and being. Plotinus calls this Principle the Good or the One beyond-being, maintaining that its being beyond existence implies its absolute transcendence and distinction from the totality of the chain of beings. The transcendence he speaks about, is not a gradable attribute but one which something either possesses completely or lacks entirely. Plotinus's specific position about the transcendence of the Principle entails three significant consequences: Firstly, it negates God's knowledge of the lower world and even His self-knowledge, since knowledge implies a composition and entanglement between the Principle and the world, negating its absolute distinction and transcendence. The second consequence of Plotinus's view is the absolute ineffability of the Principle, such that no positive attribute can be ascribed to it, and speaking of it is possible only through negation (via negativa). The third consequence of transcendence in the Neoplatonic conception is the intrinsic unknowability of the Principle, meaning that the Principle of the world, by virtue of its absolute transcendence and distinction from the realm of intelligibles, remains absolutely unknowable for any knower (even the First Intellect, and beyond that, the Principle itself).
3.2 Transcendence as Absolute Perfection: The One qua being in Transcendent Wisdom
By centering existence and offering a specific explanation of causality, Mullā Ṣadrā presents a completely different understanding of the Principle's transcendence, leading in all three aspects—knowledge, knowability, and describability—to results opposite those emphasized in Plotinus's philosophy. Through the theory of imkān faqrī and by emphasizing the relational existence of other beings, he argues that the only independent and self-subsistent existence is the essence of the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd). Contingent beings are essentially poverty, relation, and dependence upon this sole existence, considered as its manifestations, modes, and attributes. According to this explanation, God's transcendence means that He, as the sole true being and cause whose causality is identical with His essence, possesses absolute perfection. This perfection is gradable, and lower levels of existence participate in it to varying degrees. Such an explanation of transcendence leads to three outcomes entirely distinct from those in Plotinus's philosophy: Firstly, based on the Transcendent Wisdom, God, as the True Cause with complete existential encompassment over His manifestations, possesses intrinsic and detailed knowledge of the world and of what is other than Himself. Furthermore, the divine essence is identical with all perfect attributes, and these attributes are not superadded to His essence. Finally, God's essence, due to the intensity of its perfection of existence, is the most knowable being. What causes its concealment and hiddenness from human understanding is the deficiency of human mind in the face of this complete manifestation, not an intrinsic unknowability as proposed by Plotinus.
The distinction discussed in the two philosophers' approaches to the problem of the transcendence of the world's Principle reveals a discrepancy in the ontological principles of the two metaphysical systems. Contrary to the Plotinian ontology, in which existence is founded upon a simpler and higher plane that is beyond existence/non-existence and perfection/deficiency, Mullā Ṣadrā considers existence to be self-subsistent. Relying on the duality of existence and non-existence, he explains the relationship between God and the world, interprets all perfections by reference to existence, and regards God as the perfect instantiation of all perfections.

4. Conclusion
Thus, while a common interpretation judges there to be a proximity between the systems of Plotinus and Mullā Ṣadrā, this paper challenges that understanding and claims that within the two aforementioned metaphysical systems we encounter two entirely distinct conceptions of transcendence: transcendence as absolute perfection versus transcendence as absolute distinction. This difference itself stems from two completely distinct ontological approaches: in one, existence is self-subsistent, while in the other, it is dependent upon a reality beyond itself. This opposition is not confined to the philosophical systems of Plotinus and Ṣadrā but is traceable throughout the history of philosophy under the two traditions of positive and negative theology.

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Biannual Journal Philosophy

Evidentialism and Its Functions in al-Farabi's Thought: Based on Anthony Robert Booth's Reading

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 21 April 2025

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.47887.2031

maryam rohani, Seyed Mehdi Hosseini, Ali Moayedi

Abstract
Abstract
The main problem of this research is that evidentialism, as an epistemological theory, emphasizes the necessity of sufficient evidence for belief; however, the variety of its types and its relationship with al-Farabi's thought requires investigation. Using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on Anthony Robert Booth's reading, this research examines the types of evidentialism and their relationship with al-Farabi's epistemological foundations. The findings show that Booth considers al-Farabi to advocate "Islamic moderate evidentialism," whereby absolute certainty is exclusive to prophets, and only in their case does complete evidentialism find meaning; other individuals have access only to a lower degree of evidentialism, and their evidence, unlike the universal evidence of prophets, contains gaps that undermine epistemic certainty. In this regard, the role of prophethood in epistemic guidance and the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic evidence are explained. Finally, one consequence of this moderate evidentialism is the identification of extremist beliefs, meaning that non-elite individuals who hold certain beliefs without definitive evidence are considered extremist and must always accept the possibility of error; based on this view, there is no conflict between revelation and reason or religion and philosophy, and the necessity of prophetic guidance for human perfection becomes clear.

Keywords: al-Farabi, Anthony Robert Booth, evidentialism, anti-evidentialism, moderatism, normativity
1. Introduction
This research examines the position of "evidentialism" in al-Farabi's philosophy. Evidentialism, as an epistemological theory, considers belief justification contingent upon sufficient evidence, deeming mere faith or emotional inclination insufficient. The main question is whether al-Farabi can be counted among evidentialists, and if so, what characterizes this evidentialism? The study focuses on Anthony Booth's theory, which coins "Islamic moderate evidentialism," introducing al-Farabi as a moderate approach representative. Booth claims al-Farabi distinguished between absolute certainty (exclusive to prophets) and relative certainty (exclusive to philosophers and the general public). While accepting Booth's general framework, this research argues his analysis, rather than being directly extracted from al-Farabi's texts, is influenced by commentators such as Deborah Black and Leo Strauss. Therefore, the present study systematizes this theory through direct reference to al-Farabi's works. Reviews indicate that although numerous articles address reason and revelation, imagination, and prophethood in al-Farabi's philosophy, "moderate evidentialism" with focus on Booth's views lacks sufficient background. This article's distinction lies in direct reference to "Conditions of Certainty" (Sharā'iṭ al-Yaqīn), "The Principles of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City" (Mabādi' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila), and "The Attainment of Happiness" (Taḥṣīl al-Sa'āda) to test Booth's claims.

2. Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical method, relying on direct reference to al-Farabi's primary texts to systematize and evaluate Booth's theoretical framework of Islamic moderate evidentialism. The primary sources include "Conditions of Certainty" (Sharā'iṭ al-Yaqīn), "The Principles of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City" (Mabādi' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila), and "The Attainment of Happiness" (Taḥṣīl al-Sa'āda). By engaging directly with these works, the study examines Booth's claims and evaluates whether his interpretations derive from al-Farabi's texts or are influenced by secondary commentators.
3. Discussion & Result
This research begins by delineating the Islamic world's intellectual atmosphere. From Booth's perspective, Mu'tazilites represent evidentialism, insisting on independent rational argumentation for justifying religious belief. Conversely, Ash'arites, through their theory of "acquisition" (kasb) and prioritizing divine will, represent "anti-evidentialism," where God's command alone suffices for belief justification. Al-Farabi went beyond Mu'tazilite theology and turned to philosophy to offer knowledge certain and superior to theological dialectics.
Based on Booth's reading of al-Farabi's "Conditions of Certainty," certainty possesses six fundamental conditions, most importantly "being essential" and "actual and complete correspondence with reality." Booth concludes this absolute certainty is exclusively available to prophets. This exclusivity lies in the supreme imaginative faculty and the prophet's complete connection with the Active Intellect. Since non-elites lack this imaginative faculty, their certainty remains relative and mixed with doubt and probability. In this system, religion transmits truths to the masses. The masses lack capacity to comprehend pure rational demonstrations; therefore, they must be guided through rhetorical, representational, and persuasive methods. Consequently, religious beliefs of common people, though not philosophical demonstrations, are not false; rather, they are "imitations" (muḥākāt) and "representations" of truth.
An important result of al-Farabi's moderate evidentialism is resolving the apparent conflict between religious and philosophical propositions. First, the metaphorical aspect of religious teachings for masses: these are imaginative and representational forms of philosophical truths. Although their epistemic evidence is weaker than demonstration, they are true and necessary within their domain and do not conflict with philosophy. Second, the practical aspect of certain religious beliefs: these must be accepted based on practical evidence. Validity conditions for such beliefs differ from truth conditions of theoretical philosophical knowledge.
This research addresses that belief in absolute certainty for non-prophets is itself "extremist belief" and deviation. Human perfection for ordinary people consists in following laws and representations brought by the prophet and moving toward happiness according to their existential capacity. Since we lack voluntary control over our certainty, extremist belief is deficient due to "non-correspondence with available evidence." With this provision, al-Farabi justifies the political and epistemic order of the virtuous city based on epistemological hierarchy (the prophet at the apex, the philosopher in the middle, and common people at the base).
4. Conclusion
This research demonstrates that Booth's effort to formulate "moderate evidentialism" in al-Farabi's thought provides a useful framework for understanding the complex relationship between reason and faith in Islamic philosophy. According to this reading, al-Farabi is neither an absolute rationalist nor an Ash'arite fideist, but a philosopher granting distinguished epistemological status to "absolute prophetic certainty." Non-elites are bound to live in religious representations' shadow, while the philosopher operates at the boundary between philosophical demonstration and practical necessity of guiding society. Thus, philosophy and religion are both justified and necessary, with no inherent conflict, although their epistemological levels are not identical. The author emphasizes that, contrary to Booth, who remained confined within the Straussian interpretive framework, direct examination of al-Farabi's texts reveals profound coherence between the soul's faculties and the ultimate goal of human happiness.

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Biannual Journal Philosophy

Sadrian Existence Cosmopsychism: A Response to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 02 February 2026

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.51549.2098

Seyyed Ali Hosseini, Ali Haghi, Seyyed Morteza Hosseini Shahrudi

Abstract Problem: The generation of consciousness from non-conscious entities—the hard problem of consciousness—is a central issue in the philosophy of mind. We argue that addressing it requires a critical stance toward reductionist approaches (including physicalism, emergentism, and micropsychism) and a shift toward a holistic framework. Gradualist Cosmopsychism and Existence Cosmopsychism represent two holistic options which can be brought into alignment, respectively, with the Sadrian frameworks of gradation of existence and unity of existence., thereby offering two distinct frameworks for articulating MullāṢadrā’s holistic solution to the hard problem.
Method: We employ a descriptive–analytical approach to outline the relevant theories and a comparative method to evaluate them.
Findings: Existence Cosmopsychism faces fewer theoretical difficulties and is more compatible with MullāṢadrā’s ultimate metaphysical commitments. On his framework of the unity of existence, belief in a single, maximally perfect Existence—which manifests all beings and their perfections—requires that the apparent generation of consciousness from seemingly non-conscious manifestations also be explained by reference to this single Existence.
Conclusion: The Sadrian version of Existence Cosmopsychism—formed through integrating Existence Cosmopsychism with Ṣadrā’s doctrine of unity of existence—grounds the two key components for addressing the hard problem in a single cosmic Existence/Consciousness: (1) the pervasiveness of consciousness throughout all manifestations, and (2) the possibility of its perfection within them. Consciousness is manifested equally by the one Existence, while differences among manifestations arise from their varying capacities to disclose it; the evolution of consciousness is thus understood as the expansion of this disclosing capacity.

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Biannual Journal Philosophy

The Ontological Levels of the Human Body and Their Formation According to Mulla Sadra

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 21 April 2026

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.53011.2132

morteza hoseinzadeh, sahar kavandi

Abstract Problem: One of the fundamental challenges in philosophical anthropology and eschatology is to explain the relationship between soul and body and to provide a rational account of bodily resurrection. Within this context, Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretation of the existential levels of the human body and their relation to the soul raises important questions concerning personal identity and the ontological unity of the worldly and otherworldly body, which require careful analysis.
Method: This study adopts a descriptive–analytical approach based on a close reading of Mullā Ṣadrā’s original texts, especially the foundational works of Transcendent Philosophy. The key concepts are examined and analyzed within the framework of Sadrian metaphysical principles.
Findings: The findings show that through his fourfold theory of the body—elemental, vaporous, imaginal, and eschatological—Mullā Ṣadrā offers a gradational and ontological account of the human body grounded in such principles as the primacy of existence, the gradational unity of being, and substantial motion. The elemental body is the material body formed from the semen; the vaporous body ensures the continuity of natural life and vital faculties; the imaginal body, generated from actions and moral dispositions, mediates between the soul and the natural body; and the eschatological body is the imaginal body at a more intense level of existence, appropriate to the Hereafter. The relation between soul and body is initially based on existential unity and, in the eschatological state, is elevated to existential concomitance.
Conclusion: The study concludes that the theory of the existential levels of the body in Transcendent Philosophy, by affirming the identity of the worldly and otherworldly body and highlighting the formative role of actions and moral dispositions in shaping the eschatological body, provides a coherent solution for reconciling bodily and spiritual resurrection. It also offers a rational response to contemporary challenges concerning personal identity

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Biannual Journal Philosophy

A Comparative Rereading of "This-Worldly Vision of God"; Ṣadrā to Eckhart

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 21 July 2026

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.53089.2136

Fatemeh Farzali

Abstract The problem of the possibility and quality of the sensory vision of God in the material world has long been a fundamental question in the field of comparative philosophy and mysticism. The main research question in this paper is as follows: Can and how can the vision of God be interpreted as a this-worldly and objective experience within the framework of Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliya) and Meister Eckhart's mysticism? This research has been conducted using a descriptive-analytical method with a comparative approach. Data were collected by referring to the primary texts of the two thinkers, and then the ontological and epistemological principles they uphold regarding the problem of sensory vision were analyzed and compared. The findings indicate that, despite differences in language and intellectual tradition, both thinkers emphasize the centrality of several common principles: God is not beyond the world, but present within it; the material world is not a veil over God, but rather a mirror and manifestation of Him. In Transcendent Philosophy, concepts such as the existential poverty (faqr wujūdī) of possible existents, the personal unity (waḥdat shakhṣiyya) of existence, transcendent sense, and certain other rules provide the philosophical basis for the sensory vision of God in this very world. Eckhart, too, with concepts such as ground (Grund), the birth of God in the soul, and the single eye, considers vision contingent upon the human being emptying themselves of self and intuiting the divine presence at the heart of all creatures, including sensible things. The article concludes that the vision of God in the material world is possible, but it is neither a simple sensory-physical observation nor a purely mental affair; rather, it is an existential experience in which sense, reason, and intuition unite in the light of a transcendent truth. In this experience, the duality of "seer" and "seen" dissolves into unity, and the world is read as a book in which every word manifests the immediate presence of the Divine.

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Biannual Journal Philosophy

Analyzing the Existential Boundaries of the Artificial Teacher and the Wise Teacher: A Critique of Reductionism in Technological Education

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 21 July 2026

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.54005.2168

Hamid Ahmadi-Hedayat, Najmeh Ahmadabadi Arani

Abstract The present study investigates the existential boundaries between the artificial teacher and the wise teacher, offering a critique of reductionism in technological education. Employing a descriptive-analytical and deductive methodology grounded in Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy, this study examines the possibility or impossibility of machines fulfilling an educational role. The findings indicate that despite its efficiency in information processing and behavioral simulation, artificial intelligence remains ontologically situated at the level of inanimate matter due to its lack of a rational soul and knowledge by presence, rendering it incapable of comprehending semantic meaning. Since upbringing within Transcendent Philosophy is defined as the existential intensification of the learner, replacing the human teacher with an artificial agent is philosophically impossible because machines lack spiritual and moral perfections. Furthermore, based on the philosophical maxim "one who lacks a thing cannot bestow it", the artificial teacher—being inherently void of spiritual life, wisdom, and moral virtue—is unable to impart these qualities to the learner and cannot serve as an agent of the student's spiritual self-actualization. Ultimately, the study concludes that AI should function solely as a cognitive support tool, while the status of existential guidance and moral upbringing must remain the exclusive prerogative of the human teacher.

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Allameh Ja'fari and the Islamic Human Rights Issue

Volume 2, Issue 2, October 2011, Pages 107-122

Seyyed Yahya Yasrebi

Abstract In the last decades, human rights have become a very sensitive topic. Elements of human rights can be traced back to ancient sources, however, there is no doubt that the current concept is the products of fairly recent intellectual and philosophical endeavors. For many years now, Muslims have been making the case for Islamic human rights, seeking the recognition of an equal status to the western human rights. Among preeminent scholars in Islamic society who have argued for Islamic human rights, there is Allameh Ja'fari (1923-1998), who published some insightful works in 1982, as well as Javad Amuli (1933-…). In the present article, we survey and analyze the work of Allameh Ja'fari, focusing on the following points: 1. A recognition of the effort and precision of Allameh Ja'fari's work. 2. An assessment of his proposed definition of elements of Islamic human rights as well as his comparison with western human rights. 3. His suggestions as to how one should react and interact with the issue of human rights: a) What should be the foundation of human rights and how to reflect on the rights of various religions according to it. b) An emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of Islamic human rights, that is how and by which means these rights should be applied, rather than spending a huge amount of time on marginal issues, and seeking difficult to reach ideals.

Principality of Existence and Principality of Quiddity: Encountering Two Philosophical Problems or Two Philosophical Systems?

Volume 4, Issue 2, October 2013, Pages 21-36

Reza Akbari

Abstract Prima facie it seems that principality of existence and principality of quiddity are two opposed theories, but they are, in fact, two distinct philosophical systems with different principles which these two theories are in their forefront stand. For example, considering Mulla Sadra's argument to prove principality of existence based on intensifying movement, shows that he criticized Peripatetic’s philosophical system which contained, in Mulla Sadra's view, principality of quiddity, denying intensifying movement of quiddity, and Peripatetic’s specific view about qule movement. On the other hand only when we consider ‘intensifying movement’ in a philosophical system, containing principality of existence, unity of existence, and intensity of existence, it can be a basis to prove principality of existence. This shows that Mulla Sadra portrays reality in his mind which has many metaphysical components, and conceives it as a distinguished and correct picture of reality compared to the picture of principality of quddity advocates. But having a picture in mind and its epistemic transmission to others are two different things. Epistemic transmission of a picture to others needs putting the picture into pieces and transmitting them in a linear state. This is exactly what Mulla Sadra did. To put the metaphysical pieces of his picture in a linear state he put the principality of existence in the forefront.

Cosmological Argument (Demonstration of Necessity and Contingency) and Criticisms of Hume and Kant

Volume 1, Issue 1, September 2010, Pages 1-18

Hamid Parsania

Abstract The Siddiqin proof as presented by Avicenna for the first time to express the proof from contingency and necessity, entred into the works of Thomas Acquinas through Arerroes and Maimonides in the middle ages. The concept related to this proof was not conveyed in the works of the above-mentioned authors and this led to a kind of ambiguity in that proof in philosophy after the western Renaissance. This article deals with the proof from contingency and necessity as reflected in western philosophy since the 17th century. The present article claims that Leibniz and Wolff appealed to this proof on the basis of possible Contingency rather than essential Contingency and also the criticisms aimed at its Thomistic account by Hume and Kant is not devoid of some strength and validity. In the final part of the article, the validity and strength of Avicennan account of the proof are cited and emphasized, so as to reject the criticisms aimed at it since the 17th century onward.

Examination of Avicenna’s and Mollā Sadrā’s View on the Concept of God

Volume 1, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 29-39

Qāsem Akhavān Nabavi

Abstract In this paper, I will try to present a comparative examination of Avicenna’s and Mullā Sadrā’s views of analyzing the concept of the Necessary Being. According to Avicenna, “the Necessary Being” is an entity which is Pure Being, but according to Mullā Sadrā, Necessity of Being requires that the existent besides being real and not having conditional mode and accidental intermediary has not causative mode. According to the separability of these two modes, the Necessary Being is a being which is both “by-itself” and “for-itself”; hence, Mullā Sadrā considers these two qualifications in his definition of the Necessary Being. Therefore, the arguments of the two philosophers for Necessary Being will be different.

Theosophists’ Agnostical Approach about the God Essence Status

Volume 4, Issue 4, July 2014, Pages 21-51

Manouchehr khademi

Abstract The absolutely unconditioned status is the usual reading of theosophists’ words regarding the essence of God. But in this article inspiring from a deep and novel division, offered by late Gharavy Isfahany, known as Kompany, regarding the mere truth, quiddity and identity, we will prove another consideration in which neither considering others, so the tenor of the absolutely unconditioned is taken, nor non-considering others is considered. Also we recognize the consideration, the most suitable attention to God’s furtive essence and in the wake of it we consider the absolutely unconditioned in connection with god’s essence in the level of appearance and divulgence in nominal, genuine, emersion, comedown, and creatures places and opening verses. On the other hand, the consideration is related to the attention to the most secretive of the secrets, and the most intrinsic conscience of every consciences and the invisible Maghib and Angha-e-Maghreb and knowing the God as the hidden treasure which is in inherent heterogeneity with the process of appearance and emersion and has no presence and descent in God and the existential Hadavat presences, rather it is deep-seated and steeped in the mere secret and mere consciences, with stairs extended and emerged infinitely. Also being comprehensive, it involves the appearance of restricted Esm-alzaher and consciences of restricted Esm-albaten which are from divine names. Also we present some theosophists’ statements from some theosophical books in which they tenderly have had hinted the consideration in question. At the final section, the most important section of this paper, I want to deal with the implications of my viewpoint. I disprove and deny the consequences of the absolutely unconditioned consideration of God, and demonstrate their opposites, regarding the aforesaid consideration, consequences like the realization of the collection and the disavow of the opposites in the stair of invisibility of essence, denying the realization of names and epithets, either with dissolved glancing limited mode or extended limited one, having inherent heterogeneity with appearance and emersion in mirrors and places of appearance, the Maghib invisibility, Angha-e-Moghrib, the essence remaining, hidden treasure, divesting aspiration of absolute and inapplicable being, eternity of absolute unknown of God’s essence and the stair left unsaid.

Steamy Soul in Islamic and Contemporary Philosophy

Volume 5, Issue 3, November 2014, Pages 81-99

Mohammad Miri

Abstract The steam which comes out of subtle parts of body is known as steamy soul. Steamy soul is the most subtle part of physical body and its role is mediating between soul and physical body. The nature of steamy soul and its issues had been vastly explained by Avicenna, and after him we can find Avicennian explanation in the works of Sheikh- e- Eshragh and Molla -Sadra. As much as it is related to human physical health and illness, however, steamy soul has been at canonical attention of physicians in medical profession, and as much as it, if any, roles as a mediator between soul and body it has been very attractive to philosophers, so steamy soul has been discussed a lot in philosophical psychology. Steamy soul denial by modern medicine does not invalidate reliability of philosophical psychology, because philosophical psychology assumes it as a reliable theorem taken from ancient medicine

Motahhari and the Refutation of Idealism

Volume 2, Issue 1, October 2011, Pages 43-59

Abdurrazzaq Hesamifar

Abstract
Since 17^th century, western philosophy experienced a basic change in philosophical research and discussing the formation of knowledge and its validity became the most important problem in philosophy. This change, however, was reflected in Islamic philosophy three century later, because there was no relation between these two worlds of philosophy. As a great expert in Islamic philosophy, Motahhari attempted at first to be informed of the ideas of the modern and contemporary philosophers and afterwards to review them. One of these ideas on which he was concerned, was the problem of knowledge. There are two counter views on perception and its representation. The first one is realism which affirms the existence of physical things as the objects of perception and thinks that the external world is represented in the perceptions. The other one is subjective idealism which denies this matter. In their The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism, Tabatabaei and Motahhari by reliance on the realistic foundations of Islamic philosophy, criticize subjective idealism on the one hand and dialectic materialism on the other. Motahheri's view in this book which has been written in 1330s H. differs from his view in his Detailed Account of Manzoumeh which has been written in 1350s H. In the former book he regards idealism as equal to sophism and thinks of the idealist philosophers like Berkeley and Schopenhauer as equal to the sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, because they all deny the external world, but in the later he presents some deeper analysis of the theory of knowledge and proving the existence of external world. In this paper Motahheri's views on epistemology and his critics against idealism will be discussed and reviewed.