Contemporary Wisdom

Abstract Abstract Among the important philosophical movements in contemporary Iran are comparative philosophy and intercultural philosophy, which, while having points of connection, also have challenges, and sometimes intercultural attitude claims to be an alternative to comparative philosophy. The issue is to compare these trends and evaluate their challenges. The method of this research, while creating a dialogue between them, provides a brief description in the initial processing and presents the perspectives proposed in the relationship between them, including inclusion, opposition, and correlation, in order to reach a final evaluation in the secondary processing and analysis. Findings: the non-identity of the two currents in the perspective of opposition, including defects such as Western origin, ambiguity of nature and method and self-centeredness from the intercultural perspective towards comparative philosophy, and on the contrary, defects such as Eurocentrism under the German tradition, non-philosophy,and relativism have been pointed at intercultural philosophy.But this perspective ignores the points of connection between the two streams, and the problems raised sometimes have a lack of evidence or are double-edged. Conclusion: the perspectives of inclusion and correlation are more helpful in explaining their emergence, continuity, and exchange. Comparing the two currents to the cultural situation of contemporary Iran, it attempts to show their self-awareness and placement in the crossroads and cultural interdependence of Iran, as well as the path of paying attention to unity in diversity as an appropriate cultural policy. Keywords: Philosophy, comparison, comparative philosophy, Intercultural philosophy, challenges of comparative and Intercultural philosophy, contemporary Iran. Introduction A look at philosophy in contemporary Iran reveals important trends in comparative and intercultural philosophy, and paying attention to them reflects an important part of the state of contemporary Iranian philosophy and its lived experience since the Qajar erato the present. Comparative philosophy in contemporary Iran, although it has emerged as a new phenomenon under the French tradition with figures such as Gobineau and Corbin, can be traced back to early and late Islamic philosophers. Contemporary figures such as Allameh Tabatabaei and Dr. Mahdi Haeri have also paid serious attention to comparative philosophy. The father of intercultural philosophy is sometimes considered to be the Indian Ram Adhar Mall, who founded the first association, or Betancourt or even Professor Abdul Javad Falatowri. In addition, the connection with individuals such as Morteza Ghasempour and Hamid Reza Yousefi at the beginning of its emergence in Germany and the connection and interest of Iranian scholars in this movement led to the establishment of the Intercultural Philosophy Association in Iran. Also, by rereading thinkers such as Allameh Tabatabaei, Dr. Abdul Javad Falaturi, and Dariush Shaygan, this stream tried to maintain its connection to the Iranian cultural body, although it saw problems and obstacles in his path in Iranian and Islamic culture. The issue of this research is to examine the relationship between these two philosophical trends in contemporary Iran and the challenges between them in criticizing each other and claiming to replace intercultural philosophy with comparative philosophy, which has been formed in academic meetings and discourses and in some cases has also shown itself in written scientific works. In this regard, the need to evaluate and judge between the claims made by the parties in favor of these trends and the situation and needs assessment of Iran's current cultural and social conditions in order to become aware of a comparative and intercultural approach is among the necessities of this research. Materials & Methods The method of this research: in the first step, deals with the initial processing of describing the perspectives of the parties and presenting the perspectives raised in the relationship between the two comparative and intercultural streams. In the secondary processing, the explanation and analysis of those relations, arguments and criticisms of the parties are considered so that in the light of the dialogue between them, the relation between them becomes clearer. In the second step, the relation of the two currents with the current and contemporary culture of Iran is examined. Discussion & Result After the initial processing in describing the two streams of comparative philosophy and intercultural philosophy, focusing on the non-identity between them, it was determined that three perspectives of inclusion, opposition, and correlation have been proposed by the thinkers of both sides. From the perspective of confrontation, mutual critiques have been raised by the proponents of each approach: 1. Critiques of Intercultural Philosophy toward Comparative Philosophy
The Western origin of comparative philosophy in the French tradition; ambiguities in its definition and methodology; ethnocentrism; the incompatibility of a cultural homogenization policy with the pluralistic and diverse reality of the contemporary world; exclusivist readings; and the limited capacity of Islamic philosophy to address temporal and contemporary questions. 2.Critiques of Comparative Philosophy toward Intercultural Philosophy
Eurocentrism and the emergence of intercultural philosophy within the German tradition; the claim that intercultural approaches do not constitute genuine philosophy; relativism; and the critique of other constituent elements, as intercultural philosophy often occupies an intermediary position, operating in practice under Western and European frameworks. 3.Evaluation of Mutual Critiques
The critiques exchanged between the two currents, from the perspective of confrontation, have been examined. The dichotomous view, understood as pure opposition, not only disregards areas of overlap and points of connection but also neglects distinctions, ultimately dismissing one approach in favor of the other. The arguments and critiques presented by each side are, in some cases, responsive or commensurable from the perspective of the opposing current. Overall, greater intellectual tolerance is necessary to allow the two approaches to engage with each other, acknowledging both similarities and differences. Distinctions in concerns and goals, the epistemic orientation toward truth-seeking or dialogue, and the philosophical status of intercultural philosophy are among the considerations that challenge the notion of substituting intercultural philosophy for comparative philosophy. Conclusion By moving beyond the perspective of equality between the two currents in homogeneity and contrast in the perspective of opposition, with the help of the perspective of inclusion and interdependence, their distinction and connection are explained in such a way that comparative philosophy was prior in terms of emergence and, in the continuation of the encounter with the paradigm of culture and cultural diversity in the contemporary world, it has led to intercultural philosophy. In the continuation of their continuity, despite their differences, they are interconnected and have the possibility of coexisting with each other, because they have similarities in their consideration of the principle of dialogue, culture, or the models of Ourseli's analogy and the analogical hermeneutics. Their relationship with Iran and Islamic culture can also be examined. In fact, Iran's status as a crossroads between East and West throughout its history and the characteristic of its cultural betweenness are compatible with a comparative and intercultural approach. Both currents have found themselves in the history of Iranian culture with their components, and have paid attention to the dynamics of the past philosophical tradition and have tried to pathologize the obstacles to seeing philosophical diversity and self-centeredness. But to transform these movements into cultural politics in the current and contemporary situation, they must be able to stand between absolutism and radical relativism and actively preserve both unity and plurality

Abstract Abstract
Plotinus, through his criticism of the Aristotelian conception of the Arche as lacking of transcendence and simplicity, emphasized on the Arche’s transcendence beyond both Intellect and being, thereby establishing it as the beyond-being. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, via his innovative doctrine of causality, articulated this transcendence by equating being with the singular essence of God as the One qua being. This article studies the problem of relation of God and the world in a conceptual-argumentative method. According to the findings of this study, despite apparent similarities, these two conceptions of transcendence yield radically different conclusions concerning the Arche’s relation to the world—specifically, its being knowable, describable, and its knowledge of the world. This divergence exposes their fundamental disagreement on the meaning of transcendence itself. As a result for Mulla Sadra, it denotes the Arche's absolute perfection, while for Plotinus, it implies the Arche's absolute distinction from the world, A difference which itself originates from a deeper ontological division: While for Plotinus, being is founded on a simpler, prior grade of reality, Mulla Sadra thinks of existence as self-subsistent and the single source of all perfection, rendering any transcendence beyond itself impossible.
Keywords: Arche, Perfection, Distinction, The One beyond being, The One qua being, Plotinus, Mulla Sadra

1. Introduction
The inquiry into the Arche (Principle) of the world, beyond its general significance in the history of philosophy, occupies a direct relationship with the foundational conceptions of the two philosophers within Neoplatonic philosophy and Transcendent Wisdom. According to a common interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā's explanation of the Principle as the True Cause, presented in the second volume of al-Asfār al-arbaʿah and emphasized by those commentators of Transcendent Wisdom who advocate a reading based on the personal unity of existence, is seen as analogous to the position of negative theology of Neoplatonic philosophers—an interpretation that, as will be shown, is challenged by the authors of this paper. Plotinus, emphasizing the necessity of the Principle's simplicity, spoke of the criterion of the Principle's absolute distinction from the world. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, by centering existence and reducing perfection and transcendence to a same reality—namely, existence—considered the most perfect being to be the most transcendent being. In Ṣadrā's explanation, God, as the sole True Cause and the sole True being or the One qua being, possesses a supremacy of the kind of perfection over other beings. In the Neoplatonic explanation, God as the One beyond-being is absolutely distinct from the entire chain of existent and intelligible beings. This discrepancy is rooted in a distinction within the ontological principles underlying the two philosophers' views: for one, the structure of the world is based on the duality of existence and non-existence, with existence being a self-subsistent reality that explains God's absolute perfection; for the other, existence is dependent upon and distinct from a higher plane that transcends all existential perfection, positive attribution, and knowability. Understanding this fundamental distinction, which has recurrently manifested throughout the history of philosophy between proponents of negative and positive theology, reveals a foundational divergence between two positions that invites reflection on their respective implications and consequences.

2. Materials & Methods
This paper pursues the problem of the transcendence of the Principle in the Neoplatonic Philosophy and the Transcendent Wisdom through a conceptual-argumentative method.

3. Discussion & Result
3.1 Transcendence as Absolute Distinction: The One Beyond-Being in Neoplatonic Philosophy
To criticize the Aristotelian conception of the Intellect as the Principle, Plotinus argues that the Intellect, due to a threefold composition (composition arising from the multiplicity of intelligible content, composition necessitated by the inherent duality in the act of self-thinking, and composition due to the Intellect's entanglement with the five supreme or universal Ideas), lacks simplicity and is interwoven with realities non-identical to itself, thus lacking absolute distinction and transcendence from the world. Consequently, to attain the Principle and First Origin of the world, one must transcend the Intellect and being. Plotinus calls this Principle the Good or the One beyond-being, maintaining that its being beyond existence implies its absolute transcendence and distinction from the totality of the chain of beings. The transcendence he speaks about, is not a gradable attribute but one which something either possesses completely or lacks entirely. Plotinus's specific position about the transcendence of the Principle entails three significant consequences: Firstly, it negates God's knowledge of the lower world and even His self-knowledge, since knowledge implies a composition and entanglement between the Principle and the world, negating its absolute distinction and transcendence. The second consequence of Plotinus's view is the absolute ineffability of the Principle, such that no positive attribute can be ascribed to it, and speaking of it is possible only through negation (via negativa). The third consequence of transcendence in the Neoplatonic conception is the intrinsic unknowability of the Principle, meaning that the Principle of the world, by virtue of its absolute transcendence and distinction from the realm of intelligibles, remains absolutely unknowable for any knower (even the First Intellect, and beyond that, the Principle itself).
3.2 Transcendence as Absolute Perfection: The One qua being in Transcendent Wisdom
By centering existence and offering a specific explanation of causality, Mullā Ṣadrā presents a completely different understanding of the Principle's transcendence, leading in all three aspects—knowledge, knowability, and describability—to results opposite those emphasized in Plotinus's philosophy. Through the theory of imkān faqrī and by emphasizing the relational existence of other beings, he argues that the only independent and self-subsistent existence is the essence of the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd). Contingent beings are essentially poverty, relation, and dependence upon this sole existence, considered as its manifestations, modes, and attributes. According to this explanation, God's transcendence means that He, as the sole true being and cause whose causality is identical with His essence, possesses absolute perfection. This perfection is gradable, and lower levels of existence participate in it to varying degrees. Such an explanation of transcendence leads to three outcomes entirely distinct from those in Plotinus's philosophy: Firstly, based on the Transcendent Wisdom, God, as the True Cause with complete existential encompassment over His manifestations, possesses intrinsic and detailed knowledge of the world and of what is other than Himself. Furthermore, the divine essence is identical with all perfect attributes, and these attributes are not superadded to His essence. Finally, God's essence, due to the intensity of its perfection of existence, is the most knowable being. What causes its concealment and hiddenness from human understanding is the deficiency of human mind in the face of this complete manifestation, not an intrinsic unknowability as proposed by Plotinus.
The distinction discussed in the two philosophers' approaches to the problem of the transcendence of the world's Principle reveals a discrepancy in the ontological principles of the two metaphysical systems. Contrary to the Plotinian ontology, in which existence is founded upon a simpler and higher plane that is beyond existence/non-existence and perfection/deficiency, Mullā Ṣadrā considers existence to be self-subsistent. Relying on the duality of existence and non-existence, he explains the relationship between God and the world, interprets all perfections by reference to existence, and regards God as the perfect instantiation of all perfections.

4. Conclusion
Thus, while a common interpretation judges there to be a proximity between the systems of Plotinus and Mullā Ṣadrā, this paper challenges that understanding and claims that within the two aforementioned metaphysical systems we encounter two entirely distinct conceptions of transcendence: transcendence as absolute perfection versus transcendence as absolute distinction. This difference itself stems from two completely distinct ontological approaches: in one, existence is self-subsistent, while in the other, it is dependent upon a reality beyond itself. This opposition is not confined to the philosophical systems of Plotinus and Ṣadrā but is traceable throughout the history of philosophy under the two traditions of positive and negative theology.