Contemporary Wisdom

Abstract Hadi Sabzi[1]
Abstract
"Constructed (i'tibari) Concepts" is a widely used structure in various fields of humanities and Islamic studies. However, the difficulty of finding a concept that is inherently Constructed on the one hand, and Allamah Tabatabai's analysis of Constructed perceptions on the other, has led to the belief that proposition is inherently Constructed, and the concept is called constructed figuratively. In this paper, by descriptive-analytical method, we will discuss the possibility of independently formation of Constructed Concepts in various ways and present a new explanation in which truly Constructed Concepts can exist. to this end, various views on metaphor in Islamic thought have been studied and evaluated and based on them and their weakness, according to a theory that is derivable from some Allamah's phrases, we have established a new view that the concept itself is Constructed, while it's attribution is real (non-figurative). The result of the research shows that "Constructed" is not just a description of propositions, but a group of concepts are truly Constructed. Examples of these concepts have been presented and the impact of this approach in epistemological fields has been shown; and finally, we have clarified the wide range of Constructed Concepts, their function, and the criteria governing them, as well as their definition manner.
Keywords: metaphor, extension of meaning, independence of Constructed concepts, real truth, Allamah Tabatabai
 
1. Introduction
The Constructed (i'tibārī) concept is a common expression in various fields of the humanities and Islamic studies, especially in the writings of Allameh Tabataba'i. Some commentators and critics, with regard to Allameh's analysis of Constructed perceptions and its connection to intellectual figurative language (majāz 'aqlī) in metaphor, have maintained that what is inherently Constructed is the proposition, and that the concept is called Constructed figuratively. Within the field of metaphor, three views are notable among Muslim scholars of rhetoric: lexical figurative language, intellectual figurative language, and semantic expansion. Allameh defines Constructed perception as "giving the definition of one thing to something else through the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty (wahm)," and with this definition, it becomes clear that he draws upon the second view, in proposing his theory of Constructed perceptions. characteristic of intellectual figurative language is that in a metaphorical proposition, without alteration of the meaning of the predicate, the subject is posited the alleged instance of the predicate. Given the metaphorical nature of attribution, it must be said that the proposition itself is qualified with the attribute of Constructed, and not the subject or the predicate. The fundamental question of this research is whether we can offer a reasonable and satisfactory account in which the concepts themselves are inherently Constructed.
2. Materials & Methods   
In this article, through a descriptive-analytical method, and by examining Allameh's writings and some commentators and critics, as well as by evaluating views related to metaphor among Muslim scholars, we argue that it is possible to speak of concepts that are inherently Constructed.
3. Discussion & Result
3.1. The Problem of Inherently Constructed Concepts
If we place this analysis, which concludes that only propositions are Constructed, alongside Allameh's other view that the human mind does not independently create concepts, but rather obtains concepts as a result of connection with their real instances, this view is strengthened that Constructed is applied to concepts "leniently", and that what is truly Constructed is the proposition.
3.2. The Challenge Posed by "Constructed Concepts"
Nevertheless, the expression "Constructed concepts" or "Constructed meanings", are used in numerous instances in Allameh's writings. In some cases, he places these concepts as divisions alongside Real (or literal) concepts that have a cognitive function, meaning that these types of concepts do not have a cognitive function and are merely concepts pertaining to the realm of action. This point indicates that we cannot easily regard "Constructed concepts" as merely a matter of lenient expression, and at least at first glance, it seems that he genuinely believes that some concepts lack a cognitive role and serve only a practical function, and that the concept itself, and not the proposition, is constructed due to emotional factors and practical purposes.
 
3.3. Proposed Solutions for the occurrence of Inherently Constructed Concepts
3.3.1. Manipulation of The Estimative Faculty in Real (literal) Concept
One possible solution is the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty in Real concept to bring about inherently Constructed concepts. When we ascribe "lion" to jack, and regard him as an alleged instance of lion, we know that "lion" is ascribed to him with some kind of manipulation. What is meant is that "lion" is not ascribed to him with all of its conceptual precision. Therefore, the Estimative Faculty manipulates the meaning of the predicate and constructs a new meaning. drawback of this solution is that merely manipulating of Estimative Faculty in a concept and highlighting certain features while downplaying others doesn't cause the concept to lose its knowledge-generating nature and to be oriented toward the realm of action.
3.3.2. The Constructed Concept Arising from Constructed Propositions
A second solution is to consider the Constructed concept as arising from Constructed propositions. In other words, Constructed concepts are, first of all, composite concepts; that is, they inherently include a proposition or propositions; and secondly, the kind of propositions hidden within them are Constructed and practical Assertions. If a composite concept inherently includes Constructed propositions, this concept also loses its cognitive function and becomes a Constructed concept. Here, one can draw upon Sakaki's notion of metaphor as semantic expansion. The Constructed concept of "Head" has two instances, one customary and the other uncommon; but both are considered its real instances. drawback of this view is that, based on Sakaki's perspective, we ultimately expand the concept in such a way that it truly includes both customary and uncommon instances. The new concept constructed based on Sakaki's view is an expansion of the previous Real Concept, rather than the emergence of a new and Constructed concept. Moreover, the expanded concept must apply truly (non-figuratively) to both the customary and uncommon instances; whereas, in inherently Constructed concepts, application to the uncommon instance is metaphorical.
3.3.3. The Author's Chosen View: Constructed Concept and real (literal) truth
The preferred view is that the real concept does not contradict its being Constructed. A real concept and A Constructed concept can each have real or Constructed (figurative) truth, which together form four states:

real concept and real truth. 2. real concept and Constructed truth. 3. Constructed concept and real truth. 4. Constructed concept and Constructed truth.

Case 3 is a concept that is truly Constructed, but its truth is real. With this account, the two aforementioned problems with Sakaki's view also disappear; because the new concept is entirely Constructed and not an expansion of the previous real concept; and furthermore, its application to something that is not its instance is a Constructed application.
3.4. Categories of Concepts
Thus, we can now categorize concepts into two types: concepts that are knowledge-generating, and concepts that have a practical function and are related to emotional motivations and practical purposes. The nature of this latter kind of concepts is such that no cognitive or epistemic function can be attributed to them.
4. Conclusion
in Allameh's viewpoint, one can defend inherently Constructed concepts. By analyzing their formation process, we can show that none of the views of metaphor among Muslim rhetoricians are fully successful in explaining the formation of these concepts. Although these concepts are inherently Constructed, they have real application to their primary instances and figurative application to others. By finding concepts related to the realm of action, we can also explain how social systems are formed. Corresponding to real or literal concepts, there are Constructed concepts, and corresponding to the real world, there is a Constructed world consisting of positions and institutions. Moreover, the mechanism of defining Constructed concepts is distinct from that of defining real concepts, just as argumentation in Constructed propositions is distinct from logical proof.

Abstract Abstract Proving the foundational tenets of belief in Islam is possible only through sound rational arguments. The Holy Quran, in its call to monotheism and description of divine attributes, employs rational reasoning, with demonstrative proof (burhan) holding a special place in Quranic arguments due to its soundness in both form and content.
Issue: What types of arguments for theology are present in the Quran? Have a priori (limmi) arguments been used in the Quran to prove and introduce God?
Method: This research, using a descriptive-analytical method and through a study of Quranic verses and authoritative exegeses, examines and analyzes the various types of theological arguments in the Holy Quran.
Findings: The majority of theological arguments in the Quran are a posteriori (inni), proceeding from effect to cause—an approach compatible with the general level of understanding of the Quran's audience. However, considering the definition of an a priori argument and due to the absence of a cause for God, the Quran does not employ strictly a priori arguments. Nonetheless, in explaining and proving God's affirmative and negative attributes, the Quran employs a type of non-a posteriori reasoning, termed "quasi-a priori" arguments in this research.
Conclusion: Contrary to the belief of some researchers, not all theological arguments in the Quran are a posteriori; non-a posteriori (quasi-a priori) arguments are also used for theology. These arguments are primarily structured based on inherent concomitances and essential implications. Keywords: The Holy Quran, A Posteriori Argument (Burhan Inni), A Priori Argument (Burhan Limmi), Quasi-A Priori Argument, Theology.   Introduction The Holy Qur’an presents itself as a guide for all people and, in order to realize this guidance, calls its audience to reflection and contemplation upon its verses. Accordingly, when addressing people—and especially when arguing for truths—it fully adheres to the general rules of reasoning and logic, and does not put forward anything contrary to intellect and rationality. For this reason, the guidance-oriented verses of the Holy Qur’an are often accompanied by diverse rational arguments in terms of both their material and formal aspects. Philosophers and logicians maintain that among the various types of arguments, demonstration (burhān), due to its reliance on certain premises and syllogistic form, is the most rigorous type of reasoning. Therefore, the Holy Qur’an has also employed numerous demonstrations to prove the existence of God and His essential and active attributes. This study has been conducted using a descriptive–analytical method through an examination of the verses of the Holy Qur’an, authoritative Qur’anic commentaries, and by drawing upon narrations from the Infallibles (peace be upon them).   Materials & Methods This research has been conducted using a descriptive–analytical method, through the study of the verses of the Holy Qur’an and authoritative exegeses, and by drawing upon the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them).   Discussion and Results The main questions addressed in this research are: Why are most of the Qur’anic theistic demonstrations of the innī type? Why has the Qur’an not employed limmī demonstration for knowing God Almighty, and what is the reason for designating some theistic demonstrations as quasi-limmī? The findings of the present study indicate that the widespread use of innī demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an is due to the greater ease with which this type of argument can be understood by the general public, who constitute the primary audience of the Qur’an. The reason for this ease of understanding is that, in innī demonstrations, one of the premises usually has an experiential or innate aspect, the comprehension of which does not require extensive reflection or contemplation. In the Holy Qur’an, this type of demonstration is employed for two main purposes: Proving the existence of God as the First Cause of all that is other than God; Proving the affirmative attributes of God Almighty on the basis of the principle “the giver of a thing cannot be devoid of it” (muʿṭī al-shayʾ lā yakūnu fāqidan lahu). The innī demonstrations of theistic knowledge in the Holy Qur’an are divided into two general categories: cosmic (āfāqī) demonstrations and anthropological or inner (anfusī) demonstrations. In cosmic demonstrations, through reflection on external phenomena (the horizons), the existence of God Almighty and His attributes of beauty and majesty are established. The most important and well-known of these demonstrations is the demonstration of the perfection of creation (burhān itqān al-ṣunʿ). In this demonstration, from the order and astonishing, purposeful creation governing the universe, the existence of an ordering, knowing, powerful, and wise Creator is inferred. A clear example of the demonstration of the perfection of creation in the Holy Qur’an is the argument for the Lordship-based unity of God Almighty in verse 22 of Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ. This demonstration is expressed with utmost brevity in the form of a conditional syllogism with the negation of the consequent: “Had there been gods in the heavens and the earth other than Allah, both would surely have fallen into ruin.” Since such corruption is not observed, it follows that only one God Almighty rules over the universe. In the inner demonstrations of theistic knowledge, the human being comes to know the existence of God Almighty by turning inward to his own self. The most important inner demonstration in the Holy Qur’an is the demonstration of fiṭrah (innate nature), which is emphasized in numerous verses. One of the findings of the present research is that, given the definition provided for limmī demonstration, it is not possible to prove the existence of God Almighty through this type of argument, since it is impossible to conceive of a cause that could mediate in proving Him. However, the Holy Qur’an contains arguments in which reasoning proceeds from one necessary correlate to its necessary consequence, or from one concomitant to another concomitant. Because this method more closely resembles limmī demonstration, it has been termed quasi-limmī demonstration. A clear example of quasi-limmī demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an is reasoning from the Divine Name Allah to His attributes of beauty and majesty—such as His oneness and His having no partner—in the verse “Allah bears witness that there is no deity except Him”, which is known as the Verse of Testimony.   Conclusion Most of the demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an for proving the existence of God Almighty are of the innī type, and these demonstrations are divided into cosmic and inner demonstrations. The most important cosmic demonstration is the demonstration of the perfection of creation, or the argument from order, in which from the order of the phenomena of the world one infers the existence of an ordering, knowing, powerful, and generous Creator. The most important inner demonstration in the Holy Qur’an is that which is referred to as the demonstration of fiṭrah. Contrary to the view of some researchers, not all theistic demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an are innī; rather, some of the most rigorous Qur’anic demonstrations established for the knowledge of God are of the quasi-limmī type, in which reasoning proceeds from a necessary correlate to its consequence or from one concomitant to another concomitant. The most important quasi-limmī demonstration of theistic knowledge found in the Holy Qur’an is the demonstration in which the concept of the Divine Name Allah serves as the middle term for establishing His other affirmative and negative attributes.

Abstract Abstract Transcendent Wisdom, which aims at the reformation and perfection of practical reason, is actualized solely within a socio‑existential framework. Mullā Ṣadrā, as a social philosopher, regarded the critical engagement with the historical and socio‑political conditions of his epoch as an essential duty of the philosopher—a commitment embodied in his treatises Kashr al‑Aṣnām al‑Jāhiliyyah (The Demolition of the Idols of Ignorance) and Risālah‑yi Seh Aṣl (The Treatise on the Three Principles). Research Problem: The formation of non‑governmental power groups that generate what he terms “sanctified ignorance” (jahl‑i muqaddas) within society, thereby precipitating a profound crisis and potentially instigating socio‑political upheavals. Methodology: Utilizing thematic analysis, this study examines the defining characteristics of these power groups. Findings: The analysis reveals a triangular structure comprising “deception” (tazwīr – non‑governmental elites), “wealth” (zar – economic elites), and “coercion” (zūr – governmental elites). Through elite circulation, this nascent power bloc displaces the authentic spiritual authority (ʿārifān‑i rāstīn), resulting in social disequilibrium, a predatory relationship of exploitation, and systemic oppression of subaltern classes. Conclusions: The “deception” axis, employing instruments such as performative monotheism, ostentatious pseudo‑Sufism, demagoguery, character assassination, and a deficit of self‑knowledge (maʿrifat‑i nafs), precipitates socio‑political transformations rooted in the transmutation of values. Consequently, the social philosopher’s mission is to dismantle the idols of jāhiliyyah (pre‑Islamic ignorance), unmask these power structures before the public, and cultivate societal consciousness regarding elite circulation—thereby forestalling calamities of such magnitude that they could even culminate in events as consequential as the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn (AS). Keywords: Mullā Ṣadrā, Risālah-yi Seh Aṣl (Three Principles Treatise), Kashr al-Aṣnām al-Jāhiliyya, Jāhiliyya (Ignorance), non-governmental reference groups.           Introduction Isfahan during Mulla Sadra’s era represented the cultural, social, and political dynamics of Iran, shaped by the decisions and thoughts of the ruling intellectuals. Beyond being a metaphysician, Mulla Sadra emerged as a social and cultural philosopher within the framework of Transcendent Philosophy (Hikmat al-Muta’aliyah), addressing the crises of his time and proposing practical solutions to social and political challenges. He defined social philosophy as “a way of living with specific social, political, and civilizational objectives” and expanded Islamic practical philosophy by analyzing power structures and social crises. Two of his major treatises, Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah and Resaleh-ye Se Asl, examine ignorance (jahiliyyah) as a socio-historical crisis. Resaleh-ye Se Asl focuses on self-knowledge and establishes socio-political ethics based on three epistemic principles, while Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah analyzes the role of power groups in fostering social crises. This study employs qualitative thematic analysis to explore these two treatises and elucidate the characteristics of the non-governmental elites and reference groups that Mulla Sadra highlights. Materials & Methods This study was conducted using a qualitative approach and the method of Theme Analysis, a systematic technique for transforming scattered textual data into coherent and rich themes. The purpose of theme analysis is to identify patterns and extract themes that emerge from the data itself. In this research, Stirling’s (2001) thematic network framework was employed, which is based on three levels of themes: Basic Theme, Organizing Theme, and Global Theme. These themes are structured as web-like maps to reveal the relationships between them.The data collection tool consisted of analyzing two books by Mulla Sadra: Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah and Resaleh-ye Se Asl. The research process involved several steps: first, the texts were segmented into meaningful units, and key words and phrases were coded. Second, meaningful units were labeled, followed by the refinement and review of data to identify the main themes. Third, the relationships between themes were analyzed, and core themes were extracted. To ensure the validity of the findings, peer review and expert feedback were utilized, and the results were repeatedly reviewed and approved.Finally, the main themes were presented in a coherent manner, accompanied by direct quotations and clear examples from the texts to enhance the depth and richness of the interpretation. Discussion & Result: In his treatises Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyyah and Risālah-ye Seh Asl, Mulla Sadra employs thematic analysis to enumerate and critique nine pervasive characteristics central to the non-governmental referential groups of his time. These traits reveal the essence of the “axis of deceit” (tazwir) within the tripartite structure of power—comprising wealth (zar), force (zur), and deceit (tazwir)—which establishes dominance over society. The deceitful elite, constituting the tazwir axis, collude with political and economic elites to perpetuate the dominion of this sinister alliance. Sadra’s critique transcends personal censure; it carries a social mission aimed at exposing the mechanism of this deceptive power and delineating a path to liberation. Core Characteristics of the Tazwir Axis: Intellectual Stagnation and Deficient Self-Knowledge: This group remains stagnant in delusion, imagination, and sensory perception, rather than engaging in rational inquiry and the discovery of metaphysical truths. The root cause of all their subsequent deviations is ignorance of the self and neglect of ethical cultivation. Rejection of Religious Law and a Narcotizing Interpretation of Religion: Under pretexts such as “God’s independence from worship,” they transgress religious ordinances. Their interpretation of religion is a dangerous amalgam of superficial literalism and unregulated, extreme esotericism, which transforms religion into an instrument of sedation. Sufi Pretense and Performative Monotheism: Their primary instrument is the pretense of mysticism and imitation of genuine Sufis. Without genuine spiritual wayfaring, they claim guidance through populist displays, reducing monotheism (tawhid) to verbal invocations and hypocrisy (riya’). Demagoguery and the Denigration of Rivals: By assuming the position of spiritual masters and claiming fabricated miracles, this group entraps the gullible masses. To consolidate their status, they demean and repudiate genuine mystics, philosophers, and scholars. State of Perdition: The ultimate consequence of this life based on deceit and carnal desire is loss and perdition. According to Mulla Sadra, they warrant punishment, divine wrath, and deprivation of true guidance. The Path to Salvation: The True Elite and Social Insight In opposition to this corrupt network, Mulla Sadra posits his antidote: the “true elite” or “guiding mystics” (Ārifān-e Rahbar). These individuals are the antithesis of the tazwir axis: possessing profound self-knowledge, adhering to religious law as a manifestation of truth, sincere in action, and endowed with moral virtues. They govern hearts through wisdom and ethics, not through coercion. However, Mulla Sadra emphasizes that the emergence of these true elites alone is insufficient for salvation. An essential condition is the “social insight” (basirat-e ejtemā’i) of the people. Society must be endowed from within with a collective wisdom capable of distinguishing between the “fabricated Sufi” and the “genuine mystic,” as well as between “sacred ignorance” (jahiliyyat-e moqaddas)—the use of sacred appearances to justify falsehood—and “transcendent truth.” Therefore, Sadra’s project is simultaneously an effort to cultivate a virtuous elite and to awaken public consciousness for their recognition. This constitutes the meaning of liberation from the tripartite structure of wealth, force, and deceit in Mulla Sadra’s socio-philosophical thought.   Conclusion During Mulla Sadra’s era, non-governmental reference groups, including jurists (fuqaha), theologians (mutakallimun), mystics (ʿurafa), and philosophers, gained significant power and influence through their social authority and status among the people. However, Mulla Sadra demonstrates that many of these groups, lacking moral virtues and self-knowledge, failed to guide society effectively. Instead, driven by ambition, hypocrisy, and populism, they contributed to the reinforcement of unjust power structures. These groups formed the “hypocrisy” (tazwir) side of the triangle of power (wealth, coercion, and hypocrisy), aligning themselves with economic and political powers, thereby exacerbating social inequalities. In contrast, Mulla Sadra identifies another group of non-governmental elites who, through their moral virtues and self-knowledge, have the potential to transform society and disrupt the balance of power in favor of the people. These true leaders and mystics, endowed with innate purity and ethical integrity, can guide society toward justice and the ideal city (madinah al-fadilah). However, this transformation is contingent upon the people’s ability to achieve social awareness, distinguish genuine elites from hypocritical ones, and liberate themselves from what Mulla Sadra refers to as “sacred ignorance.”