Maryam Saneapour
Volume 4, Issue 1 , October 2013, , Pages 87-115
Abstract
In this paper presents an Epistemological Process of Mulla-Sadra’s transcendental wisdom. He introduces First Intellect as Perfect Man’s light that is first effusion and emanation’s source of vertical intelligences in gradational degrees. On his Approach the first Creature is the “Intellect” ...
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In this paper presents an Epistemological Process of Mulla-Sadra’s transcendental wisdom. He introduces First Intellect as Perfect Man’s light that is first effusion and emanation’s source of vertical intelligences in gradational degrees. On his Approach the first Creature is the “Intellect” namely “Light of Perfect Man” that descends stage to stage from unity and activeness of Intellect to plurality and passiveness of reason and then ascends from potential reason to unity of Active Intellect and swamp in Happiness and Mercy of ALLAH.
In both of them, all of intellects from particular reason to universal intellect are prerequisite of upper degrees on the substantial motion.
Zohreh Mottaghi; Reza Ali Nowrozi
Volume 5, Issue 1 , October 2014, , Pages 87-107
Abstract
The epistemological approach of a thinker influences his attitudes to education, and determines teacher activity in the learning process. This article through a qualitative approach and based on a ‘descriptive- inferential’ method, examines the necessity of aesthetic experience in education ...
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The epistemological approach of a thinker influences his attitudes to education, and determines teacher activity in the learning process. This article through a qualitative approach and based on a ‘descriptive- inferential’ method, examines the necessity of aesthetic experience in education based on Allama Jafari’s epistemological principles. So we at first, according to his works, consider Allama’s epistemological elements as theoretical principles, then focusing on his cognitive pluralism, explain the necessity of aesthetic experience in education, and analyze the importance of its use in the education system. The results show that regarding epistemic pluralism can get rid us of narrow perspectives in education and can lead us to a special kind of literacy i.e. aesthetical literacy
Tahereh Sahebalzamani
Volume 5, Issue 4 , February 2015, , Pages 87-104
Abstract
One of the most difficult topics in metaphysic is that how multiplicity of beings has been aroused from simple reality. Sufism Moslem scholars like Mohyedin Arabi has a special viewpoint which called ‘Individual unity of existence theory’. Mullah Sadri axiomatized this theory through the ...
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One of the most difficult topics in metaphysic is that how multiplicity of beings has been aroused from simple reality. Sufism Moslem scholars like Mohyedin Arabi has a special viewpoint which called ‘Individual unity of existence theory’. Mullah Sadri axiomatized this theory through the principles of his philosophy and defended of its rationality.
In this paper I will show that individual unity of existence theory has three main problematic consequences; first, denial of casualty; second, fatalism; and third, Panentheism. So in this essay finally will be shown that accepting the theory will be ended up in atheism so will be resulted in anti-rationalism
Fatemeh Moindini; Alireza Kohansal; seyd morteza hosseini shahroudi
Volume 7, Issue 4 , January 2017, , Pages 87-109
Saeed Moghadas; ahmad behashti
Volume 5, Issue 2 , November 2014, , Pages 89-112
Abstract
Are ‘Divine freedom’ and ‘necessity of His will and action’ compatible? There are two different answers to this theological question: compatibilism, which confirms the compatibility of these doctrines, and incompatibilism, which claims that those beliefs are incompatible. Compatibilists ...
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Are ‘Divine freedom’ and ‘necessity of His will and action’ compatible? There are two different answers to this theological question: compatibilism, which confirms the compatibility of these doctrines, and incompatibilism, which claims that those beliefs are incompatible. Compatibilists advocate their position through two distinct approaches; the first approach presents five reasons that why necessity of divine will and action are consistent with His freedom, while the second, without arguing directly, claims that incompatibilism implies attribution of contingency to God, so accepting compatibilism is the only way to avoid such a false consequence. These two approaches, however, have not been immune from the criticisms of contemporary incompatibilists. In this article I want to explain compatibilist views and review their contemporary criticisms.
Mohammad Hosein Vafaiyan; Ahad Faramarz Ghramaleki
Abstract
‘Thinking about ends, ‘measuring the possible ends’ and ‘the final selection of end or purpose’, are the first stage (the stage of cognition) of the stages of issuance of action for Muslim philosophers in their analysis of the philosophy of action. Analyses regarding the ...
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‘Thinking about ends, ‘measuring the possible ends’ and ‘the final selection of end or purpose’, are the first stage (the stage of cognition) of the stages of issuance of action for Muslim philosophers in their analysis of the philosophy of action. Analyses regarding the recognition of end and purpose at this stage, are epistemological, therefore are influenced by human perceptual powers, and particularly the mode of imagination and its effect on the scientific basis of act issuance. The main issue of this research is to recognize the place, function, and the influencing mechanism of imagination in the cognition and selection of ends (goals). The results show the effective and extensive influence of imagination power on ‘human self-knowledge’ and ‘the selection of goals’. Motive and will to do a particular behavior or act is also based on the needs and perfectionism of the subject, which is formed in the light of the images which imagination power constructs of the subject and its surrounding objects, so that behavioral goals and motivations are belonged to human’s imaginative images, not external facts.
zeynab barkhordari; somayeh khoshdoni
Volume 7, Issue 2 , August 2016, , Pages 93-117
habilah danesh shahraki; Ali Sadeghinejad
Abstract
The issue of the value of judgment is an issue that is important in the philosophy of ethics, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of religion. From this perspective, Transcendental wisdom, as the transcendental philosophy that must be extracted from the other philosophies, should provide an ontological ...
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The issue of the value of judgment is an issue that is important in the philosophy of ethics, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of religion. From this perspective, Transcendental wisdom, as the transcendental philosophy that must be extracted from the other philosophies, should provide an ontological basis for this value of judgment, in order to determine where the value of judgment is, how it should be and Its ontological basis is determined. The issue of truth and logical truth, error and misconception, good and evil, as well as good and bad are the topics that have been studied as an example in this essay. The originality of existence, the systematic ambiguity of existence, the existential and human perfection of man are the principles which, from the perspective of transcendental wisdom, provide the ontological basis for the value of arbitration. In the end, it seems that with the results of these principles, namely, the equality of existence with the good and the failure to think evil, as well as the simultaneous emphasis on the will of the nature of existence, it is hardly possible to derive from these realistic values for Extracted human verbs.
Salar Manafi-Anari; Esmat Shahmoradi
Volume 6, Issue 1 , May 2015, , Pages 95-105
Abstract
This study aims to examine the applicability of Mulla Sadra’s theory of Substantial Motion in translation. To begin with, it starts with the concept of motion as the move from a state of potency into act and investigates time and motion in the tripartite categories of text, translator, and the ...
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This study aims to examine the applicability of Mulla Sadra’s theory of Substantial Motion in translation. To begin with, it starts with the concept of motion as the move from a state of potency into act and investigates time and motion in the tripartite categories of text, translator, and the process of translation. With a view to the theory of Substantial Motion, this study offers a definition for the source text which involves the concepts of ‘essence’, ‘substance’, and ‘motion’, by which it explores the semantics of the source text and its ontological levels and investigates the very concepts of polysemy, homonymy, and plurality of meanings and multiplicity of translations.
In pursuit of meaning and gradation of the substance of the source text, it also explores the intellectual and cognitive motion in the mind of the translator, and borrowing Sadra’s methodology finds translation as a permanent process of evolution in which every translation is in a state of flux awaiting retranslation.
Hossein Hushangi
Volume 2, Issue 2 , October 2011, , Pages 97-106
Abstract
The theory of constructional perception is a new and innovative theory in the field of pragmatic perception-resembling in its requirements and implications traditional phronesis (practical wisdom)-which is finding new application and purposes. This theory provides a unique explanation of the formation ...
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The theory of constructional perception is a new and innovative theory in the field of pragmatic perception-resembling in its requirements and implications traditional phronesis (practical wisdom)-which is finding new application and purposes. This theory provides a unique explanation of the formation of pragmatic human knowledge by mean of the individual's psycho-somatic dimensions interacting with his/her natural and social environments, which opens up new theoretical horizons in combined philosophies like ethics, law, politics, free will and epistemology. From a more general perspective, the theory offers rich possibilities for explaining and justifying political, economical and social statements and rules, culture and tradition. This theory can be postulated as the basis from which theorization in philosophies related to the humanities can be engaged.
Moreover, apart from searching for the nature and quality of constructional perceptions and how it affects the individual mind as well as his/her social dimensions, we inquire upon the principles and the mechanisms of the relationship of these constructional perceptions with reality and "real perceptions" as well as the mechanisms of transformation at play. We also investigate how constructional perceptions become firmly fixed and how they affect reality or are affected by it.
Mohammad Saeedimehr; Saeed Moghaddas
Volume 3, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 99-123
Abstract
There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii ...
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There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii proposes a specific version of compatibilism based on the notion of “comparative contingency” (al-imkan al-bilqiyas). According to his theory, the principle of causal necessity does not require more than that the human free action possess comparative contingency in comparison with the human agent and comparative necessity in comparison with its complex perfect cause (al-illah al-tammah). Moreover, the very nature of the human freedom is nothing but the action’s being contingent in relation to his agent. Therefore, the causal comparative necessity of the action in relation to its complex perfect cause does not contradict its being free. This compatibilist view has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers. In this paper we first give a short explication of Tbatabaii’s theory and then examine the arguments of its critics.
maryam dashtizadeh; asghar javani; farzan sojoudi
Volume 6, Issue 4 , March 2016, , Pages 99-115
Abstract
Abstract Islamic Arts in Museums, are distracted from their original function and placed in another world. Though the role of museums in the semantic transformation of Islamic arts is an open question in this study. In this regard, the formation of the first collections of Islamic art (from the late ...
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Abstract Islamic Arts in Museums, are distracted from their original function and placed in another world. Though the role of museums in the semantic transformation of Islamic arts is an open question in this study. In this regard, the formation of the first collections of Islamic art (from the late 18th century to the twentieth century in Europe and then in America) is of great importance. Hence our present understanding of Islamic arts is significantly influenced by the legacy and dominant discourses of those first temporary exhibitions in the West and their approaches. This study is qualitative and used descriptive and analytical method. The article assumes that Islamic arts experience different valuesat Western museums, though, an analysis of the literature is presented and three dominant approaches of orientalism, art history, and cross-cultural studies at museums. The results show that domination of the mentioned epistemological Systems, in early museums of Islamic art in the West, has affected our understanding of Islamic heritage as "goods", "art" and “Cultural Goods", and correspond to three distinct values, i.e. economic, aesthetic, and symbolic, in Islamic art. According to this study Semantic transformation and assigning different values are the consequences of representation of Islamic art in museums.
faramarz mirzade ahmad biglou
Volume 6, Issue 3 , October 2017, , Pages 101-120
Abstract
Finding a solution to get out of Arab-Islamic blocked thinking area, Muhammad Abid Jaberi has resorted to analyzing Arab-Islamic ‘tradition’ and its past. He has recognized three thought systems i.e. explication, illumination, and demonstrative episteme, with a historical and structural ...
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Finding a solution to get out of Arab-Islamic blocked thinking area, Muhammad Abid Jaberi has resorted to analyzing Arab-Islamic ‘tradition’ and its past. He has recognized three thought systems i.e. explication, illumination, and demonstrative episteme, with a historical and structural view, and in a critical rationality framework. Historicity and structural methodology have leaded him to deconstruct Arab-Islamic thinking area, and at the same time impose some structures to it. Reviewing Jaberi’s system of thought, this article concludes that, because of its historicity and structuralism, Jaberi’s thought have to be ideological to acquire its desirable goal; an ideology which is resulted from modern scientism, historicity and structuralism in Jaberi’s view.
malihe khodabande bigy; seyd morteza shahroudi; jafar morvarid
Abstract
Abstract: Mulla Sadra's existential look into the Temperament, His own theory of the physical creation of soul, Special attitude with his body and soul, And Golden Transcendent Theosophy category Namely Trans-Substantial Motion, All together, The narrator of practical wisdom, Let varying steps in the ...
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Abstract: Mulla Sadra's existential look into the Temperament, His own theory of the physical creation of soul, Special attitude with his body and soul, And Golden Transcendent Theosophy category Namely Trans-Substantial Motion, All together, The narrator of practical wisdom, Let varying steps in the field of ethics in The body and corporeality, In order to warrant the presence of moral statements about nutrition, reproduction and human thinking, issue. So the author of this article has attempted to explain theory about the relationship between temperament and ethics, The corresponding, If the identity of the embryo into primary human and physical Sperm of temperance and moderation in favorable conditions, be concluded, Then the effects, results and appliances and it's clearly evident in the emotions and ethics qualities seen, And man will see, The top to bottom of her affairs, justice, decency, Nzaht, holiness, wisdom and spirituality to form.
Amirhossein Zadyousefi
Abstract
Introduction Is the relation of necessary concomitance or mutual implication (talāzum) between two things a sui generis relation or is it reducible to some other relation(s)? If it is so reducible, then what is (are) the metaphysical relation(s) to which the relation of necessary concomitance between ...
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Introduction Is the relation of necessary concomitance or mutual implication (talāzum) between two things a sui generis relation or is it reducible to some other relation(s)? If it is so reducible, then what is (are) the metaphysical relation(s) to which the relation of necessary concomitance between two things is reduced? This question has raised a controversy among Muslim philosophers. For them, the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, but they are divided over the second question, offering two classes of theories: causal theories and causal-correlational theories. In the literature on Islamic philosophy, this problem was dealt with by Mūsawī A‘ẓam (2016) and Miṣbāḥ Yazdī (2012: 341-5). My research is distinguished from these two works in that first, I will portray the controversy between the two rival theories; second, I present objections by opponents of the causal theory; third, I consider whether advocates of the causal theory succeed in their responses to these objections; fourth, I introduce certain counterexamples that have not been taken account of in the literature; and fifth, I make suggestions in response to those counterexamples. No independent paper has so far been published on this subject. Method of Research This research is done with the descriptive-analytic method drawing on a logical analysis. Data are first collected through library studies, and then they are analyzed by deploying the methods of logical analysis. Discussion and Conclusions According to the first theory, the relation of necessary concomitance between two things is reducible to a causal relation between them. In contrast, proponents of the causal-correlational theories believe that correlations offer counterexamples to the causal theory, reducing the relation of necessary concomitance between two things to a causal relation or to a correlation between them. Advocates of the causal theory, however, seek to argue that correlation is itself reducible to the causal relation. Moreover, they provide an argument to show that correlations are also reducible to causal relations. Conclusion The argument by advocates of the causal theory for the reduction of correlations to causal relations does not seem valid. Moreover, there are further counterexamples against advocates of the causal theory, including: (a) the necessary concomitance of existence and quiddity, and (b) the necessary concomitance of quiddities and their implications, such as the ‘human quiddity and possibility’ and the ‘quiddity of number 4 and evenness.’ These examples involve a necessary concomitance between two things, whereas they do not have a causal relation. Nevertheless, there seem to be suggestions on behalf of proponents of the causal theory to respond to these counterexamples. As to the examples of ‘existence and quiddity,’ the ‘human quiddity and possibility,’ and the ‘quiddity of number 4 and evenness,’ one might say that if there is a distinction between external causation (namely, the relation of dependence between two entities, which implies two distinct existences) and analytic causation (namely, the relation of dependence between two entities that do not exist distinctly, and indeed have the same existence) as is defended by some people, then one might say that, to begin with, the causation involved in a causal theory generalizes over both external and analytic causations, and secondly, there is an analytic, rather than external, causation holding between the above pairs of entities. Moreover, as to the counterexample of two correlates, it might be explained that they are effects of a third entity: each correlate, say x’s being above and y’s being below, is caused by a third entity, which consists of a situation in which x is above y in the external world relative to our perceptual system as we observe the situation. As long as such a cause obtains, there is a necessary concomitance between x’s being above and y’s being below.
fateme soleimani
Abstract
Introductin Since the best order is the best possible created order, such an order is a complete created order as an act of God the All-wise. Given the teleological notion of order, which is the harmony and coherence of the parts of a whole directed at a purpose, the existence of an order in the world ...
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Introductin Since the best order is the best possible created order, such an order is a complete created order as an act of God the All-wise. Given the teleological notion of order, which is the harmony and coherence of the parts of a whole directed at a purpose, the existence of an order in the world can be seen as evidence of a harmony among phenomena in the world to achieve an end. Given the process of developments and changes in the world, the discovery of its complex laws and regularities leads the human mind to a serious problem: How can such changes and developments be accounted for by the fixed and rigid laws of the world. Moreover, how can man as part of the order have a conscious free life in such a coherent and fixed world? The main question is: What is the characteristic of the dominant order of the world, in virtue of which it can accommodate all the developments and changes of the natural world, particularly the developments of man’s free acts? This research seeks to provide an account of the changes and developments of the natural world and those of man’s free acts through an account of the created order and the relationship among God, the world, and man. In reply to objections such as the reconciliation of the human agency and the divine agency—man’s free will and divine will—theologians and philosophers have offered general accounts that fail to accommodate particularities and cannot solve problems concerning badā’ (alternation in divine will) and prayer. Because of this, it is necessary to provide an account of the world as a divine act, in which the world has room for both human choices and the deterministic processes of natural phenomena, despite its rigidity and organization. Discussion and results In the best order of the world, all changes and developments of the material world occur within the framework of fixed divine laws. God the All-wise exhibits proper reactions to the developments of the world in accordance with the fixed laws without undergoing passions or changes. On this picture, the world is a creative and dynamic process in a constant state of renewal. This process is creative in that it is spontaneous, internally caused, and systematic as directed by an All-wise and All-living agent. Thus, the world order is active and dynamic in accordance with fixed and inviolable laws, complying with these laws and traditions in different circumstances. In such an order, man with his power of choice applies divine traditions to himself with his power to choose. According to the Transcendent Wisdom, in a world in which evils are inevitable because of causal conflicts, God provides man with a variety of possibilities for achieving the good. When people comply with divine traditions and the worldly order, the material and spiritual causes and forces of the world will act in their favor, leading them to further enjoyment of the material world and spiritual benefits. However, if people act against divine traditions and the worldly order, they will face negative forces and will be subject to divine traditions that lead him to a wretched life. Under the direction of an All-knowing and All-powerful God, the world displays intelligent reactions to human actions and reactions. The divine power and will are absolute, and yet, they are guide and encourage people; that is, God guides people to the good and prohibits them from evils. God’s final goal is to improve and enrich people’s practice. In the dynamic order of the world, the fate never changes; it is made. In this order, God’s response to the prayer is not a matter of man’s influence on God. It is a matter of proper use of material and spiritual causes and forces within the framework of divine traditions and the discovery of the ways out of impasse. We refer to such a construal of the world as the “dynamic world’ which is a lawful, intelligent, and active system or order directed by an All-knowing, All-powerful, and All-wise being, appearing in a manifestation at every moment. On this account, man has a creative and choice-making power, making his fate within the framework of divine traditions in accordance with the extent of his understanding at every moment.
zohre zarei; Qodratullah Qorbani
Abstract
IntroductionThis research deals with Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to constructed (iʿtibārī) concepts in Illuminationist philosophy. A major philosophical issue in Islamic philosophy today is a division of universal concepts into quiddity-based (māhuwī), logical, and philosophical. Suhrawardī ...
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IntroductionThis research deals with Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to constructed (iʿtibārī) concepts in Illuminationist philosophy. A major philosophical issue in Islamic philosophy today is a division of universal concepts into quiddity-based (māhuwī), logical, and philosophical. Suhrawardī and philosophers before him had just discerned the difference between real (ḥaqīqī) and constructed concepts, placing them respectively into objective and subjective categories, and until Mullā Ṣadrā’s time, the division was restricted to first intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-ūlā) or quiddity-based concepts and secondaryintelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-thāniya) or logical concepts, and the place of philosophical concepts was not clear.Accordingly, Suhrawardī subsumes concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, and colorfulness under constructed concepts without drawing a distinction between logical and philosophical concepts. This was mainly because there is no distinction between these concepts in the external world, and because repetition and vicious regress would follow if infinite attributes coextensively existed.In addition to his critique of Suhrawardī for having distinguished concepts into subjective and objective, Mullā Ṣadrā challenged Suhrawardī’s views of each of these concepts.Research Method or ApproachThis research adopts a fundamental descriptive-analytic method and relies on Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentaries on Suhrawardī’s Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Exposition of the wisdom of illumination) to elaborately deal with Suhrawardī’s remarks concerning constructed concepts and Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to these views. Data of the research have been collected through a library method, and cases were extracted by indexing. Finally, by drawing on the intellectual method, the indexed contents were analyzed and criticized, and the views were critically analyzed and considered.Discussion and ConclusionHere is a summary of findings of the research:A major contribution of Suhrawardī concerning concepts was a division of concepts into subjective and objective, by which all philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, colorfulness, and relation are subsumed under purely constructed concepts, without corresponding to anything in the external reality.Suhrawardī’s main reason for the negation of external distinction in the case of philosophical concepts is that the coextensive existence of infinite attributes implies vicious regress and repetition, since in his Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī proposes a criterion for the distinction between the subjective and the objective and for the impossibility of the distinction in the external world, according to which everything whose occurrence implies repetition and regress counts as constructed.Major objections raised by Mullā Ṣadrā against Suhrawardī’s account of constructed concepts, which serves as the foundation and tenet of the rest of his objections, are as follows:Absence of any distinction between philosophical and logical secondaryintelligiblesConfusion between concepts and their instancesFailure to take account of the organic composition (al-tarkīb al-ittiḥādī) between quiddities and existencesConflation of the name and what is namedConfusion between primary essential predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) and common technical predication (al-ḥaml al-shāʾiʿ al-ṣunāʿī).Given these findings, the obstacles, problems, and proposals of the research are as follows:While most of Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections are accurate and based on his insights into the problem of intelligibles, some of his objections are not plausible because of their anachronistic nature.Although in some cases, Suhrawardī’s remarks are attacked and even undermined by Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections, in some cases it is open to us to criticize and adjudicate the two parties and even offer novel contributions to the debate since Mullā Ṣadrā has rested content with Avicenna’s views, among other predecessors, and did not offer an alternative account.
Mahdi Azimi; javad soufi
Abstract
IntroductionMuslim Peripatetic philosophers believe that physical objects are composites out of matter and form, holding that each natural kind involves a form other than the physical form, with which physical objects turn into various kinds, hence the label “specific [i.e. kind-related] form” ...
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IntroductionMuslim Peripatetic philosophers believe that physical objects are composites out of matter and form, holding that each natural kind involves a form other than the physical form, with which physical objects turn into various kinds, hence the label “specific [i.e. kind-related] form” (or form of species). Suhrawardī opposes Peripatetic philosopher on this matter, raising many objections against the view. Mullā Ṣadrā believes that Peripatetic philosophers are right, responding to Suhrawardī’s objections. In this article, we consider and criticize the arguments by Peripatetic philosophers, the objections by Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā’s replies to the latter. We argue that although some of Suhrawardī’s objections do not work, attempts by Peripatetic philosophers and defenses by Mullā Ṣadrā do not suffice as proofs for the existence of specific forms.Research BackgroundIn his book, Ḥikmat Ishrāq (2017), Yazdanpanah formulates Suhrawardī’s critiques of the Peripatetic arguments for the existence of specific forms, supporting Mullā Ṣadrā’s replies to Suhrawardī. The article “Recognition of the concept of nature in Suhrawardī’s philosophy in light of criticizing the specific form” addresses why Suhrawardī rejects the existence of specific forms and what implications it has, but it does not grapple with the arguments themselves (Dibaji and Nasekhian 2020). Qavam Safari in his “Theory of form in Aristotle’s philosophy” (2015) and Ahmadi in his “Substantial form” (2003) study the form and its features and applications for Aristotle. Kompani Zare makes a short reference to Suhrawardī’s critiques of the Peripatetic account of specific forms in his “A brief survey of Suhrawardī’s natural science” (2015).Arguments for the Existence of Specific FormsFirst argument: physical objects have various effects. For instance, water has effects and features different from those of the air. The source of those effects cannot be the physical form shared by all physical objects. Moreover, it cannot be the hyle, which is pure potentiality and is thus the same in all physical objects. There should therefore be another source in physical objects, which is the cause of those effects, and that is the specific form.Second argument: In each kind of physical object, there is an entity over and above the hyle (or matter) and physical form, which is exclusive to and inseparable from that kind. That entity is either an accident or a substance. The first horn is false because this entity constitutes matter, which is a substance, while an accident cannot constitute substance. This constitutive component of matter is a specific form. For just as matter is not void of physicality, it cannot be imagined without being exclusively attached to a kind of physical object.Third argument: when a form changes, the physical object’s quiddity changes too. So, a form is not an accident in that a thing’s quiddity does not vary with the change of its accidents. The thing with the change of which the quiddity (our answer to the question of what it is in its substance) changes is a substance, rather than an accident. Otherwise, a substance would consist of accidents.Fourth argument: specific forms are parts of specific substances. The part of substance is a substance. For instance, the quiddity of fire is not exhausted by its physicality, but consists of a physical object and an entity with which the nature of fire comes to be.Critique and Analysis of the ArgumentsAn objection against all the arguments for specific forms is that they all are quiatic proofs (al-burhān al-innī), which are not characteristically certainty-conferring. This is because form the existence of an effect, one can know about the existence of its cause, but one cannot thereby know its nature. We cannot thus say with certainty that the cause of various effects issued from physical objects is their specific forms. The cause might be something else, whose nature is totally obscure to us.The objection against the first argument is that the horns are not logically restricted to those enumerated in the argument. So, the logical possibility remains that something else is the source of those effects, such as a certain combination between component particles of physical objects as discovered by modern sciences. Another objection is that the combination of physical objects out of matter and form, which is the basis of this argument, is an analytic combination, and thus, form and matter are analytic, rather than external, parts of physical objects. From the fact that, analytically speaking, physical objects have such parts, it does not follow that they have those parts in the external world as well.The middle term in the second argument is a difference we see in physical objects, rather than being constitutive of matter, which Mullā Ṣadrā adduces as evidence for his claim. This is because being constitutive of matter is a middle term for proving the substantiality of forms, rather than its very existence. Just like the first argument, it assumes the existence of matter and physical form to show that there should be a third entity in physical objects. On this account, all objections against the first argument also work against this argument.As for the third argument, it is true that when essential properties of a thing change, its quiddity (the way we answer the question “what is it?”) change too. However, the reverse of this claim, which is deployed in this argument, is not always true; that is, we cannot say that whenever the answer to the question of “what is it?” changes, the essential properties also change. For instance, when water turns into ice, the answer to its “what is it?” question changes, but this is not to say that its form changes too.The fourth argument does not provide us with an independent argument for the existence of specific forms. Indeed, it is based on the preceding arguments, which makes it vulnerable to Suhrawardī’s objection: the principle that the part of a substance is a substance is true only if we know that the thing in question is a substance in all respects.ConclusionIt turns out that none of the arguments above suffice as proofs for the existence of specific forms because, on the one hand, all of these are quiatic proofs, which cannot apply to quiddities, and on the other hand, each argument is susceptible to separate objections.
Philosophy
zohre salahshur sefidsangi
Abstract
AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception ...
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AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception occurs in the human soul, while neuroscience provides a fully material account of all perceptions, including auditory perception. From a neuroscientific viewpoint, sounds pass through interior layers of the ear to reach auditory neurons, in the course of which they undergo a complicated process leading to auditory perception.However, Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the whole process occurring in the auditory system is just preparatory for perception of sounds by the human soul. This is the soul that creates the true nature of sounds. On his account, the relation between sounds and the inner self is like that between actions and their agents, where actions are done by their agents, rather than that between a passive entity and what it receives.For this reason, Mullā Ṣadrā holds that the account of auditory perception offered by natural scientists is objectionable, since they involve a confusion between preparatory causes and efficient causes. The accounts provided by natural sciences rest content with an elaboration of material stages of auditory perception, while Mullā Ṣadrā believes that perception is non-material in nature, which is just enabled and prepared by those material processes. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā offers the following account: when the soul has a relation with the natural external world through its attachment to the body, it creates a similar image of the external object, where that image is both caused and known by the soul.After the auditory perception, the human soul draws on the images derived from physical entities or those received from the spiritual world (the imaginal world, or ʿālam al-mithāl) creates images in its imaginary perception as well. Contrary to senses that are limited to material entities, imagination extends to the supernatural world as well. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, imagination includes a number of perceptions, such as perception of sensible entities while no matter is present, their perception in dreams, and imaginal perceptions. Perception of sounds in the absence of any external material sources does not require material tools or organs, since many material features do not exist in that realm. This is comparable to memory in neuroscience, although it has not yet offered a plausible account of conscious selection of memories.Moreover, the hearing that occurs in dreams does not involve an environmental system. Although some people still perceive the waves of the material world in their sleep, this is a very different process from that of sensory audition. In the hearing that occurs in dreams, one might hear an intense sound like thunders, which affects one’s soul just like hearing in the waking state, although it was not perceived by the material organ of hearing; that is, one’s ears. Hearing in dreams is indeed one piece of evidence adduced by Mullā Ṣadrā as an argument for the immateriality of perceptions, but this type of hearing is investigated in neuroscience as a kind of dream. Despite their accuracy, the findings of neuroscience here merely demonstrate that perception occurs with the stimulation of certain cells in the body, but the stimulation does not show whether the area in question is a center for processing and storing information or a pathway through which information is transferred.Also in imaginal hearing, only external sounds of the imaginal world are heard, without being mixed with inner secretions, and the sound in the imaginal world does not require material factors such as waves and frequencies. For Mullā Ṣadrā, if the human imaginative faculty is strong, the relation with the imaginal world can occur in the waking state such that hidden imaginal forms are presented to the person, who will thus be able to hear sounds from the imaginal world. Because of its non-material character, this stage of auditory perception is not subject to neuroscientific investigations.The final stage of auditory perception is intellectual hearing, which is the highest degree of auditory perception, which has degrees of intensity and weakness, just like light. Intellectual hearing has degrees, the lowest of which has traces of imaginal sounds, but the higher we go on the scale of intellectual hearing, we come closer to a realm in which no imaginal properties are involved, a realm of pure perception. In its evolutionary course, intellectual hearing reaches a degree where it perceives profound supernatural ideas in the most translucent form. This is a hearing that emerges with the rise of the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād) and then gradually grows.
Jalal Dorakhsheh; Mohammad Masroor
Abstract
Anthony Giddens tries to recreate sociology on the axis of time. This revival begins with a critique of the historical evolution of classical sociology such as Marx and Durkheim as a time-space separation and by following it in other areas of the emergence of temporality, such as time-space separation, ...
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Anthony Giddens tries to recreate sociology on the axis of time. This revival begins with a critique of the historical evolution of classical sociology such as Marx and Durkheim as a time-space separation and by following it in other areas of the emergence of temporality, such as time-space separation, futurism, the construction of society, and finally, time technologies such as clock and calendar provide new meanings and functions of time. The purpose of this article is to compare these meanings with Sadrolmote'allehin’s philosophy of time. Using a comparative method, Mulla Sadra's philosophy of time and Giddens's ideas about time were first studied and then the similarities and differences of two thoughts were explained. Time is considered to be a fluid existence in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, and since the emanation of the essence is continuous, temporality is considered as part of the reality of creatures, and because the time primacy and recency is due to the intrinsic primacy and recency of the creatures, so the historical position is not an external issue, As Giddens imagines, but is institutionalized in the essence of man and other creatures. The emergence of the time primacy and recency from the existential primacy and recency excludes the suspension of the present time to the past or the future, and the present moment, takes an absolute deployment. The major similarity of two thoughts is this: for both of them, the survival and time in this world are the same. The major similarity between these two thoughts is that the survival and time in this world are the same for both. These two ideas share a major similarity: the survival and time in this world are the same for both.
Morteza jafarian; Ahad Ghramaleki
Volume 7, Issue 3 , November 2016, , Pages 81-105
Abstract
Abstract
Mirdamad, for the first time, defines or interprets the secondary intelligible concepts in such a way that are compatible with and include the characteristics of philosophical concepts. In his definition, primary intelligibles are concepts that refer to distinct and objective things in the ...
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Abstract
Mirdamad, for the first time, defines or interprets the secondary intelligible concepts in such a way that are compatible with and include the characteristics of philosophical concepts. In his definition, primary intelligibles are concepts that refer to distinct and objective things in the real world, and logical and philosophical secondary intelligible, on the contrary, have not any extension in the world and so do not refer to any independent and distinct objectivity. In Mirdamad's theory, being secondary intelligible amounts Abstractedness and non-objectivity, and being primary intelligible amounts principality and objectivity. From his point of view, essential concepts and relations and their negative and positive requirements are primary intelligible, and existence is counted as secondary intelligible. In fact the abstractedness of existence means that it is secondary intelligible concept, and the principality of quiddity means that the essential concepts are primary intelligible. Mirdamad's theory faces difficulties that arise from the lack of attention to various meanings and abstractednesses of existence.
Hadi Vakili; Maryam Davarniya; Zeynab Barkhordari
Abstract
Spirituality is a concept that has been given special attention in the present era and is now also used in relation to children. Spirituality is one of the key religious concepts and is based on certain foundations, structures and religious methods. It also plays a central role in spiritual mysticism. ...
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Spirituality is a concept that has been given special attention in the present era and is now also used in relation to children. Spirituality is one of the key religious concepts and is based on certain foundations, structures and religious methods. It also plays a central role in spiritual mysticism. Considering the specialized discussions in the field of spirituality, we seek to study the relationbetweenthe contemporaryteachings on spirituality for children and the teachings of Islamic mysticism. Limiting its scope of research to two mystics of Ayatollah ShahAbadiand Imam Khomeini, this paper studies the principles and teachings of spirituality for children, and the corresponding discussions of this concept in Islamicmysticism. Obviously, spirituality for children as anindependent topic has not been presented inworks of these sages, butthe study oftheir works showed that the definition of spirituality, the significance of spiritual teachings for children, its foundations and methods, can be derived from their works. In terms of its foundations and goals, spirituality for children in Islamic mysticism differs from what can bederived from non-Islamic principles, although one can find some similarities in methods and examples between them.
Amirhossein Farshchian; Morteza Shajari
Abstract
Tradition is a path that preserves all fundamental aspects of human life and keeps them connected to their original sources, to the sacred past, and one of the most important aspects of human life - almost encompassing and framing all the others and being central to our experience of being human - is ...
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Tradition is a path that preserves all fundamental aspects of human life and keeps them connected to their original sources, to the sacred past, and one of the most important aspects of human life - almost encompassing and framing all the others and being central to our experience of being human - is ‘architecture’. There is a causal relation between the ‘Islamic tradition’ and ‘Islamic architecture’, thus, it would actually be meaningless to attribute the adjective ‘Islamic’ to ‘architecture’ in the absence of true traditional values. The present study critically investigates Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s attitude toward Islamic architecture, including its relation to Islamic tradition and traditional Islam, its definition and its essential characteristics, its interaction with urban societies and finally its socio-religious functions in traditional and modern life. Islamic architecture is not an outdated-forgotten art with some sets of footprints left in the remains of ancient settlements. It has internally survived long enough to reproduce itself in concordance with the necessities of the time without losing its essential characteristics and elements.
Hassan Mo’allemi
Volume 1, Issue 2 , March 2011, , Pages 97-106
Abstract
One of the important issues in moral philosophy is the relation between “ought” and “is”. Many different views have been arisen about this issue. One of these views is ’Allāmeh Tabātabāyī’s view. According to his view, moral ought and ought not are inventions that ...
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One of the important issues in moral philosophy is the relation between “ought” and “is”. Many different views have been arisen about this issue. One of these views is ’Allāmeh Tabātabāyī’s view. According to his view, moral ought and ought not are inventions that originate in human beings’ establishing the real relation between his voluntary acts and their consequences, and the “ought” are based on the acts, although they are not induced from the facts.
Zahra Mohammadi Mohammadieh; Abbas Javareshkian
Volume 4, Issue 4 , July 2014, , Pages 99-119
Abstract
Plato on the basis of his unifier viewpoint offered the theory of Idea and other cosmological related to creation and the chain and arrangement of beings. He also placed the principal of Goodness in the climax of the pyramid of his ontology, and by which tried to refer the plurality of beings to oneness. ...
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Plato on the basis of his unifier viewpoint offered the theory of Idea and other cosmological related to creation and the chain and arrangement of beings. He also placed the principal of Goodness in the climax of the pyramid of his ontology, and by which tried to refer the plurality of beings to oneness. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra by his philosophical and religious principals and on the basis on his unifier viewpoint offered his first ontological theory (i.e. Tashkiki unity of being) and the ultimate one (i.e. personal unity of being). As a result, he also tried to explain the quality of manifold beings by reference to oneness. Despite the thought differences of the two philosophers in the field which based is based on their philosophical foundations, both return manifold beings to unity, so that they regard manifold beings as shadows of a transcendent unity. Ontology in Plato's thought corresponds with Mulla Sadra's first theory (i.e. Tashkiki unity of being).
