Document Type : Biannual Journal
Author
Assistant professor, Tarbiat Modares University
Abstract
Introduction
Is the relation of necessary concomitance or mutual implication (talāzum) between two things a sui generis relation or is it reducible to some other relation(s)? If it is so reducible, then what is (are) the metaphysical relation(s) to which the relation of necessary concomitance between two things is reduced? This question has raised a controversy among Muslim philosophers. For them, the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, but they are divided over the second question, offering two classes of theories: causal theories and causal-correlational theories. In the literature on Islamic philosophy, this problem was dealt with by Mūsawī A‘ẓam (2016) and Miṣbāḥ Yazdī (2012: 341-5). My research is distinguished from these two works in that first, I will portray the controversy between the two rival theories; second, I present objections by opponents of the causal theory; third, I consider whether advocates of the causal theory succeed in their responses to these objections; fourth, I introduce certain counterexamples that have not been taken account of in the literature; and fifth, I make suggestions in response to those counterexamples. No independent paper has so far been published on this subject.
Method of Research
This research is done with the descriptive-analytic method drawing on a logical analysis. Data are first collected through library studies, and then they are analyzed by deploying the methods of logical analysis.
Discussion and Conclusions
According to the first theory, the relation of necessary concomitance between two things is reducible to a causal relation between them. In contrast, proponents of the causal-correlational theories believe that correlations offer counterexamples to the causal theory, reducing the relation of necessary concomitance between two things to a causal relation or to a correlation between them. Advocates of the causal theory, however, seek to argue that correlation is itself reducible to the causal relation. Moreover, they provide an argument to show that correlations are also reducible to causal relations.
Conclusion
The argument by advocates of the causal theory for the reduction of correlations to causal relations does not seem valid. Moreover, there are further counterexamples against advocates of the causal theory, including: (a) the necessary concomitance of existence and quiddity, and (b) the necessary concomitance of quiddities and their implications, such as the ‘human quiddity and possibility’ and the ‘quiddity of number 4 and evenness.’ These examples involve a necessary concomitance between two things, whereas they do not have a causal relation. Nevertheless, there seem to be suggestions on behalf of proponents of the causal theory to respond to these counterexamples. As to the examples of ‘existence and quiddity,’ the ‘human quiddity and possibility,’ and the ‘quiddity of number 4 and evenness,’ one might say that if there is a distinction between external causation (namely, the relation of dependence between two entities, which implies two distinct existences) and analytic causation (namely, the relation of dependence between two entities that do not exist distinctly, and indeed have the same existence) as is defended by some people, then one might say that, to begin with, the causation involved in a causal theory generalizes over both external and analytic causations, and secondly, there is an analytic, rather than external, causation holding between the above pairs of entities. Moreover, as to the counterexample of two correlates, it might be explained that they are effects of a third entity: each correlate, say x’s being above and y’s being below, is caused by a third entity, which consists of a situation in which x is above y in the external world relative to our perceptual system as we observe the situation. As long as such a cause obtains, there is a necessary concomitance between x’s being above and y’s being below.
Keywords
)