Philosophy
Keramat Varzdar; Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi
Abstract
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent ...
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Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
Philosophy
ali asghar jafari valani
Abstract
Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept ...
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Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept in an epistemological context, asserting that Avicenna’s flying man not only exists, but also knows that he exists. Such an interpretation of the flying man argument seems to be at odds with his own principles, his passages throughout his works, and what he pursued to establish through this scenario.
Method
Deploying a descriptive and analytical method, it may be said that
Findings: Avicenna believes that perception begins from senses, and the first stage of the human reason is material or hylic reason or pure potentiality. Moreover, there is a difference between consciousness (shuʿūr) that is actually obtained by humans since the beginning of their existence and consciousness of consciousness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-shuʿūr), which he believes to be a potential character that needs to be acquired, while our primary consciousness of the soul is the existence of our soul. Thus, the flying man is solely the existence and presence of the soul before any actual consciousness.
Results
In view of the fact that man was suspended in space at the beginning of his creation and Ibn Sina considers the human soul to be the event of the body and in the order of the beast intellect and pure power, which lacks any perception and becomes actual through sensory perception, it should be said : The human being suspended in Ibn Sina's space can have an existential quality and in fact, he is observing the position of presence, existence, and mere existence. In addition, Ibn Sina, emphasizing the two positions of consciousness and consciousness to consciousness, believes that consciousness is actually and permanently suspended in man, but consciousness to consciousness is potential in him. Therefore, it seems that the soul at the beginning of creation, although it is present and proven, but it cannot be said that it has knowledge of itself; That is, the soul initially lacks attention to itself, and this lack of attention prevents any self-perception of the soul.
Innovation: In fact, regarding "Avicenna's suspended human being in space", it can only be said that "a human being is conscious (without any actual awareness)", but it cannot be said: "In addition, because this human being is conscious, he knows that he is like this." ».
Philosophy
neda salour; Mahin Sohrabi nasirabadi; Narges Nazarnejad
Abstract
IntroductionTraditional Persian arts, with all their aesthetic and semantic aspects, are derived from the Iranian culture, thought, and beliefs and are eminent manifestations of the notion of tradition for Iranians. Traditional designs with symbolic motifs and patterns constitute the foundation of traditional ...
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IntroductionTraditional Persian arts, with all their aesthetic and semantic aspects, are derived from the Iranian culture, thought, and beliefs and are eminent manifestations of the notion of tradition for Iranians. Traditional designs with symbolic motifs and patterns constitute the foundation of traditional arts. Such arts are mainly characterized by the artist’s reluctance to imitate the nature and his or her focus on abstraction and expression of symbolic concepts. If traditional motifs are measured and appraised in terms of the right criteria and principles, it turns out that they are not only non-repetitive but also fully ingenious and creative, and display themselves in the design through a refinement made in the artist’s mind. Such intellectual analyses prevailed in line with rationalistic theories that relied on reasoning and arguments since fourth century AH (tenth century CE) along with the prevalence of the rationalistic Peripatetic philosophy and then Avicenna’s theories of psychological faculties, particularly the human-specific rational or intellectual faculty. For Avicenna, the human intellect has degrees and it has the potential to move toward perfection. One comes to obtain the ability to connect to the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) or the Bestower of Forms (wāhib al-ṣuwar) by developing one’s intellect, and then enjoys its grace and emanation, in virtue of which one knows and understands the world and finds the ability for reasoning and acquisition of knowledge. Avicenna believes that imagination is directed at the intellect or reason, and the artist’s perceptions are of the same kind as intellectual intuition.Avicenna enumerates certain principles for the beauty of a work of art, suggesting that its beauty results from reason or intellect. The principles include good moderation, good synthesis (proportions), and good order. On the other hand, the method of drawing traditional motifs were transmitted to us through generations. The superficial aspects of traditional motifs are addressed in Dr. Ali Hasouri’s Foundations of traditional design, Dr. Abolghasem Dadvar’s Theoretical foundations of traditional arts (a collection of the views and theories of Muslim intellectuals about art and aesthetics from the perspective of Islamic philosophy and mysticism), and Dr. Yaghoub Azhand’s Seven decorative principles of Persian art (all in Persian). However, they fail to formulate the rules of formation in the method of drawing the motifs and the scientific criteria they involve. Perhaps they have taken these for granted, while an analysis and formulation of the roots and rational dimensions of the principles and rules of the traditional design can lead to creative motifs. Accordingly, preservation, revival, development, promotion, innovation, and a new discourse in the domain of traditional designs require a scientific and artistic underpinning, saturated with philosophical and intellectual grounds.Method of ResearchThe present research draws on the method of theory evaluation and an assessment of how Avicenna’s aesthetic principles corresponds to the rules of drawing the traditional motifs to present a theory about the rationalistic design of the rational traditional Persian vegetal motifs as the most fundamental and widespread motifs. The data were collected through a library-documentary method, and finally the findings are presented through a descriptive-analytic method.Discussion and ResultsThe method of drawing traditional vegetal motifs alone or alongside each other follows certain principles and rules, each of which is separately matched with Avicenna’s aesthetic principles, including:With respect to their aversion of nature, their abstraction, simplification, symbolism, and centripetalism (manifestation of unity and multiplicity), the motifs are expressive and have “good order”; that is, their parts are proportionate to, and harmonious with, the whole.The motion and dynamic of the motifs, their generativity and reproduction in varieties of frames and directions, the balance, proposition, and symmetry in design, the existence of a geometrical order among the parts, the existence of rhythm and harmony between the motifs and the design, variety in composition and frame, collation and replacement relations between motifs, and the correspondence with varieties of backgrounds, frames, and materials in the performance context are all in line with Avicenna’s definition of “good moderation” and order.Line value (intensity and mildness), which gives an impression of perspective in the two-dimensional space, equivalence of the positive and negative spaces (over and cover spaces), and the existence of the element of timelessness and placelessness in traditional designs indicate the “good synthesis” as well as the order and coherence in the design.For Avicenna, the principles of aesthetics (good synthesis, order, and moderation) are formulated based on knowledge, which is in turn a consequence of reason or intellect. Since the Avicenna’s aesthetic rules of traditional motifs are also in conformity with mathematical and geometrical proportions, it can be said to follow scientific criteria.ConclusionOur study shows that, first, the existence of order, coherence, and harmony between motifs as well as the proportion and balance within the design come from scientific criteria, which are induced by the intellectual faculty. Accordingly, once connected to the Active Intellect, the artist obtains an intuition, and after the stage of the imaginative faculty, he or she can reason by means of the intellectual faculty. Since the contribution and function of the imaginative and intellectual faculties vary at each stage of creating the design, the artist begins with senses, and then reaches the stage of imagination and abstraction until he or she attains the degree of intellection and reasoning to the point of innovation and invention in the field of art, particularly in drawing traditional vegetal motifs. This sort of intuition, which Avicenna calls “intellectual intuition,” as well as the match between the rules of the traditional design and Avicenna’s aesthetic principles, indicate the rationalistic character of the course of traditional motifs and the predominance of the intellectual faculty in the creation of innovative motifs.
Philosophy
Afra Khakzad; Hadi Rabiei; Mohammad Akvan
Abstract
AbstractIntroduction: Avicenna has discussed the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties in several of his works. Avicenna's views on the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties are often expressed under the more general concept of pleasure and are scattered in works with various subjects such as ...
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AbstractIntroduction: Avicenna has discussed the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties in several of his works. Avicenna's views on the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties are often expressed under the more general concept of pleasure and are scattered in works with various subjects such as theological, logical, natural and mathematical works. He also discusses pleasure in relation to the perception and the perceptual faculties of the soul. In addition, an important and significant part of Avicenna's discussions about pleasure is devoted to pleasure of the arts, especially the representative arts.Since the work of art is considered sensible, the question arises as to which perceptual faculties of man the pleasure of the work of art depends? Does the mere fact that a work of art is a sensible thing, means that the pleasure of a work of art is considered a sensible pleasure? Do other perceptual faculties, including the internal sensory faculties and the rational faculties, also contribute to the perception of the work of art, and does the pleasure of the work of art also depend on them? In the case of each of these faculties, including the external and internal sensory faculties and the rational faculty, the question can be asked how important and effective they are in perceiving the beauty of the work of art? In the present article, an attempt has been made to answer these questions from Avicenna's point of view. Methods and Materials:The research method of this article is fundamental. This research was conducted using a library research method, and the method of describing and analyzing information in this research is qualitative. The claim of this research is that according to Avicenna's views, the pleasure that is obtained from works of art, as a kind of sensible things, is not merely sensory pleasure and dependent on the five external sensory faculties.Results and Discussions:To examine this claim, the characteristics of aesthetic pleasure and its subjects as well as the epistemological status of this pleasure are studied and the pleasure of the arts of poetry, painting and music is explained from Avicenna's point of view. Finally, it is shown that the aesthetic pleasure of works of art is first of all a rational pleasure and depends on the faculty of reason and then, respectively, is an imaginary pleasure and depends on the faculty of imagination, and finally, is a sensible pleasure and depends on the perceptual faculties. Among the faculties of external perception, the faculties of sight and hearing have the greatest ability to obtain aesthetic pleasure from the arts, respectively.Conclusion:The findings of this study show that from Avicenna's point of view, each of the external and internal sensory faculties, and to a higher degree, the rational faculty, have their own aesthetic pleasure. External sensory faculties, namely sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, each have limitations. In this way they can only enjoy what they can comprehend. But the range of pleasure of the internal faculties is much greater than the pleasures of the external faculties. Because all the sensory forms perceived by the external perceptual faculties are grouped together and interconnected, there is more pleasure for the internal faculties. This is why the imaginative faculty enjoys the perception of images preserved in the imagination. For example, the imagination, by preserving and storing sensible auditory forms of musical notes, makes it possible that the audience's pleasure is not limited to single notes and sound type, but can understand the sequence of musical notes and enjoy them. Ultimately, it is the faculty of reason that in the strict sense of the word can enjoy the pleasure of perceiving beauty. Because from Avicenna's point of view, beauty lies in features such as proportion, composition and symmetry, and although the audience first perceives data from a sensible object through sensory perception, but the perception of features such as proportion is specific to reason. Accordingly, aesthetic pleasure is at its highest dependent on rational perception.According to Avicenna, irrational pleasure is a pleasure that is aroused, but without thought and reflection, and is appropriate to nature and the senses, but hearing and sight give pleasures to the soul that are not merely by nature, but are rational, because they refer to nonsensible meanings, for example, when one sees a beautiful work of art, one is drawn to it and tends to liken it.The results of this study show that according to Avicenna, since the external and internal senses present the works of art to the human intellect and the intellect recognizes their beauty, the perception of beauty encompasses all levels of human cognitive faculties. Also, since aesthetic pleasure follows the perception of beauty, the perception of beauty produces different levels of pleasure, at least as much as it involves perceptual levels.
fateme soleimani
Abstract
IntroductionGod as the creator and lord of humans, and as All-Provider (razzāq), is in charge of providing for human primary basic needs, as in the Qur’an God promises to make basic provisions for everyone. The promise led some people to think that humans have a right to receive provisions ...
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IntroductionGod as the creator and lord of humans, and as All-Provider (razzāq), is in charge of providing for human primary basic needs, as in the Qur’an God promises to make basic provisions for everyone. The promise led some people to think that humans have a right to receive provisions from God, expecting that God should optimally and fully provide for human needs. For this reason, the difference in people’s provisions has led to questions concerning divine justice.The problem with which this paper is concerned is why God has allotted different amounts of provisions to different people, instead of giving different people equal shares of provisions. Moreover, if allotment of provisions is attributed to God, why is it emphasized that people try hard to gain provisions?These questions have frequently been raised in religious milieus throughout the history, often with the intention of casting doubts on religious beliefs by questioning divine justice, since different provisions for different people are thought to be at odds with God’s justice.A number of papers in the field of Quranic sciences have been written about this problem, which are based on the views of Quranic exegetes, on which we draw in this paper. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a philosophical consideration of the problem in terms of Avicenna’s philosophy, particularly his essay on provisions (Risāla fi-l-arzāq). It is noteworthy that the problem was not tackled by any other Muslim philosophers. In Islamic philosophy, God’s attribute of All-Provider is mentioned in passing as an attribute of action—it is at most defined and reduced to divine attributes of essence such as knowledge, wisdom, and power. Avicenna deals with the problem of provisions in his Risāla fi-l-arzāq. This is an essay attributed to Avicenna. Over 20 manuscripts of the essay are available in libraries, and its attribution to Avicenna has not been a matter of dispute.The essay is concerned with questions about divine justice and how to treat people’s differences in their provisions in these terms. Avicenna explicitly deals with the problem in terms of a debate. In line with his Peripatetic framework, he considers different aspects and possible results of the question, as illustrated with numerous examples.In this paper, I provide an account of Avicenna’s remarks here given his general theoretical framework as explicated in other works of his. I also offer criticisms of his account. Taking account of the views of Quranic exegetes concerning the problem, I offer my own account of the problem.Discussion and ConclusionsIn order to reconcile two groups of Quranic verses in one of which the allotment of provisions is attributed to God and in the other the attainment of provisions is conditioned upon the human labor and efforts, one might offer the following account: in a monotheistic view, provisions are ultimately allotted and distributed by God, but this is in terms of unchanging traditions in accordance to the divine wisdom. In the best or optimal order and the dynamics of the universe, human wills and the amount and quality of their labors and efforts play roles in the expansion or diminution of one’s provisions. For obtaining a desirable provision, a set of conditions should be satisfied and certain grounds should be prepared.Given one’s material and spiritual possessions, which are in turn from God, every person tries to obtain provisions by drawing upon one’s insight, intelligence, as well as spiritual and material capitals. The better one performs in utilizing one’s opportunities the more provisions one attains, and the more negligent and indolent one is in using one’s existential and material capacities and the more vulnerable one makes oneself to unpredictable economic circumstances the more deprived one will be and the more futile one’s efforts will turn out to be, in which case one will have a diminished provision. In this way, God the Wise has established laws and traditions in the creation in such a way that everyone can attain his or her own share of provisions with their mental and physical capacities, without there being any injustice.In his “Essay on provisions” Avicenna has dealt with the problem of the difference in people’s provisions and its bearing upon the divine justice. In this essay, he tries to rely on divine wisdom and grace to correct wrong conceptions and establish divine justice in the measurement of people’s provisions. Through an articulation of the contradictions involved in different aspects of the problem, Avicenna shows that the idea of exactly equal provisions leads to an impossibility or the human destruction.
fatemeh rajaei; مومنی momeni
Abstract
Logicians, such as Avicenna (or Ibn Sīnā), give moral propositions (like “injustice is bad” and “justice is good”) as examples of “popular” (mashhūrāt) propositions and praised opinions in the section of dialectics. However, Islamic theologians (those adhering ...
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Logicians, such as Avicenna (or Ibn Sīnā), give moral propositions (like “injustice is bad” and “justice is good”) as examples of “popular” (mashhūrāt) propositions and praised opinions in the section of dialectics. However, Islamic theologians (those adhering to justice or ‘adliyya) cite these propositions in their discussion of rational goodness and badness. This can be discussed in different respects: Are goodness and badness propositions primitively self-evident propositions or just popular propositions? Are they rational or legislated propositions? Do they admit of truth and falsity? Are they realistic or irrealistic? If they are popular propositions, then can their goodness or badness still be essential? In this paper, we are concerned with this latter question. To begin with, according to passages from Avicenna, these propositions are admittedly popular, but then the question arises of whether this is compatible with their goodness and badness being essential. This is because the essentiality of goodness and badness implies their reality, whereas a merely popular proposition does not have a reality beyond an agreement among rational agents. In the first case, popularity or general interests are at stake, whereas essentiality amounts to being detached from general interests or popularity within the society, in the sense that an act is immediately described as good or bad, but this is at odds with what logicians have suggested. The question of this research is to reveal a conflict between essentiality and rationality of such propositions on the one hand, and their popularity, on the other. We begin with an introduction of epistemological and ontological dimensions of the problem, and then consider the problem in terms of logic, referring to passages from Avicenna in this regard, and after an elucidation of the conflict, we finally formulate Muẓaffar’s solution to the conflict. The idea is that although the popularity of such propositions is incompatible with essentiality or rationality of good and badness as widely understood by theologians, a more refined understanding of essentiality and rationality will help resolve the conflict.
makek abiyan; gholamhossein khedri; jalal peykani; alireza parsa
Abstract
The “argument of the sincere” (burhān al-ṣiddīqīn) was first introduced by Avicenna as andirect proof for a creator. He tried to provide a nearly ideal and direct version of the proof for God’s existence. The argument from possibility and necessity found its way to the Western ...
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The “argument of the sincere” (burhān al-ṣiddīqīn) was first introduced by Avicenna as andirect proof for a creator. He tried to provide a nearly ideal and direct version of the proof for God’s existence. The argument from possibility and necessity found its way to the Western philosophy through translations, and then Thomas Aquinas made tremendous efforts to refine and supplement it as a proof for the source of the world. This paper seeks to provide a more clear account of Avicenna’s argument of the sincere in the Islamic world and Aquinas’s argument from possibility and necessity in the Western world as proofs for the creator. It will then be argued that, first of all, these are two different arguments, and despite their shared foundations, they have different structures. It seems that Aquinas’s argument is like the argument from possibility and necessity in Islamic philosophy and theology. Secondly, regardless of how persuasive it might be to the public, Thomas’s argument rests upon controversial philosophical assumptions and involves lengthy premises, whereas Avicenna’s argument has solid rational foundations and structure, achieving its goal through fewer mediating premises.
Hadi Rabiei; Mitra Ghafari
Abstract
"Mohakat" (Muḥākāt) is a central concept in Avicenna's thoughts on art. He uses this term as a translation for Aristotelian "mimesis". Since there have been different conceptions about Mohakat, or representation, in the history of thought, it should be questioned that what Mohakat means in painting ...
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"Mohakat" (Muḥākāt) is a central concept in Avicenna's thoughts on art. He uses this term as a translation for Aristotelian "mimesis". Since there have been different conceptions about Mohakat, or representation, in the history of thought, it should be questioned that what Mohakat means in painting according to Avicenna's views. In studies about the aesthetics of Avicenna, poetry and music have been much considered, but Avicenna's views on painting have not been much noticed in the literature. The present research, therefore, seeks to provide a clear account of Avicenna's views on the concept and the meaning of Mohakat in painting, and in other words, to determine the characteristic features of Mohakat in painting according to his views. It is tried to answer this question by examining Avicenna's scattered words about painting. In this study, the aesthetic views of Avicenna on Mohakat are summarized in three general themes. The nature of Mohakat in painting is examined in the first part, the sub-queries of which are as follows: is the meaning of Mohakat pure and complete imitation, or is this kind of representation compatible with innovation? What are the cases of Mohakat, and in other words, what kinds of objects are represented in a painting? Does the painter merely represent the existing things, or he/she can deal with things that are not actual existing only in his mind? Does the painter only represent the surfaces of the things, or can he/she represent the inner qualities of the subject? What is the relation of Mohakat in painting with that in such other arts as poetry and music? The second part addresses the pleasure of Mohakat. This aesthetic pleasure is considered about both the artist and the audience. It should be inquired that are there any differences between the pleasure of the Mohakat in painting and that in the other arts? Is this pleasure dedicated to humans, or other beings can also benefit from it? The third part discusses the epistemic role of the Mohakat in painting. Is the picture necessarily true, in the sense that it should correspond to an actual object, or may it offer a non-correspondent knowledge to the audience? If so, how does it influence the audience' soul? Finally, can a painting be a good medium for transferring knowledge? And in this case, what is the characteristic features of it? In this research, it has been attempted to respond to above questions using library resources, mainly Avicenna's works, specially his scattered words about painting. Avicenna believes that the work of a poet resembles that of a painter, both imitate something. He defines Mohakat as "presenting something similar to something else, but not the thing itself." Nevertheless, he believes that Mohakat in painting does not imply mere imitation of a model. Mohakat in painting is not merely the imitation of existing objects, and it is not necessary for the painter to make use of a model that presents in the outside world, that is, Mohakat in painting is not merely an imitation of outward appearance. In other words, the painter can portray, in addition to the outward appearance of someone, his/her inward states. Considering the relation that Avicenna has made between the kind of Mohakat in poetry and painting, it can be concluded that from his point of view, imagination has an important role in the definition of painting. Avicenna describes imitated painted forms as "pleasurable" and "delightful", and regards the ability of imitating things as one of the aspects of human superiority over animals. He emphasizes that the pleasure of Mohakat is not purely sensual pleasure and dedicated to it, rather, it is a mental pleasure and depends on the rational faculty. The audience of a painting is enjoying two things: first, the picture itself in terms of its quality and status, and the like. It seems that, according to amodern interpretation, it may imply color, composition, and formal features of the image. But on the second level, the thing that completes the pleasure is to understand that the image is an imitation of something else. Avicenna believes that the pleasure of painting is so great that it is more enjoyable to see a painting of an object than the object itself. There is also a kind of pictorial Mohakat in the music. From his point of view, Mohakat in the painting is not necessarily true or false. Truth and falsehood in painting is beyond logical truth and falsehood. Avicenna believes that painting can make people charmed and fascinated, and engage the mind of human beings. Also, Mohakat in painting can be a means of expressing rational meanings in sensible language using a coded form.
Mohammad Saeedi Mehr
Abstract
From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, ...
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From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, sonot only onecan define it, but should do so. In his book Al-Isharatva Al-Tanbihāt, he has provided a precise definition of pain,according to whichpain is the perception of what is perceived as a pest and evil qua pest and evil. Nasir al-Din Tusi, in his commentary on the book, has given a detailed analysis of this definition. In spite of its precision, it seems that Ibn Sina's definition suffers from someambiguities, for exampleit is not clear whether the pain is merely a subjective matter or has objective features. Moreover, the lack of clarity in the distinction between acquirable (mediated) knowledge and direct (unmediated) knowledge in Sheikh’s philosophy, has made it difficult to express the being directness feature of pain as a kind of perception, in this definition.
Kamal Nosrati Heshi; Reza Ali Nowrozi; Zohre Mottagi; Mehrnosh Amini
Volume 6, Issue 2 , July 2015, , Pages 75-100
Abstract
The main purpose of this study is to identify, according to Avicenna's views, the elements of perception and its different types, and also its training results of which we can use in upbringing. We’ll first, based on our findings, indicate that in Avicinna’s views, ‘ego’ (Nafs) ...
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The main purpose of this study is to identify, according to Avicenna's views, the elements of perception and its different types, and also its training results of which we can use in upbringing. We’ll first, based on our findings, indicate that in Avicinna’s views, ‘ego’ (Nafs) plays very important role such that we can say that it is the cornerstone of perception. Then, after having some words on perception, its definition, and its types and levels, we’ll consider its educational implications, specifically targets and procedure centered on perception basis. Finally, ‘achieving bliss’ is recognized as an ultimate aim of Avicenna education system. However, achieving such aim is associated with achieving some secondary objectives, such as development of sensory, imagination, intellect, and intuitive understanding abilities. Therefore, the training methods resulted from this study will be: active usage of the senses, remembering, to orient imagination and creativity, intellectual development, research-based training, thought strengthening, intuition or verbal and esoteric observation (guess), and syncretic methods.
Mohammad Miri
Volume 5, Issue 3 , November 2014, , Pages 81-99
Abstract
The steam which comes out of subtle parts of body is known as steamy soul. Steamy soul is the most subtle part of physical body and its role is mediating between soul and physical body. The nature of steamy soul and its issues had been vastly explained by Avicenna, and after him we can find Avicennian ...
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The steam which comes out of subtle parts of body is known as steamy soul. Steamy soul is the most subtle part of physical body and its role is mediating between soul and physical body. The nature of steamy soul and its issues had been vastly explained by Avicenna, and after him we can find Avicennian explanation in the works of Sheikh- e- Eshragh and Molla -Sadra.
As much as it is related to human physical health and illness, however, steamy soul has been at canonical attention of physicians in medical profession, and as much as it, if any, roles as a mediator between soul and body it has been very attractive to philosophers, so steamy soul has been discussed a lot in philosophical psychology.
Steamy soul denial by modern medicine does not invalidate reliability of philosophical psychology, because philosophical psychology assumes it as a reliable theorem taken from ancient medicine
Mahmoud Joneidi Jafari; Seyed Saeed Jalali
Volume 4, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 53-80
Abstract
To find the roots and causes of backwardness of Arab World, al-Jaberi has examined and criticized the religious discourses and their epistemic elements, and found the starting point of the ascension and decline of Arabic-Islamic culture in the age of compilation; the age during which Islamic thoughts ...
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To find the roots and causes of backwardness of Arab World, al-Jaberi has examined and criticized the religious discourses and their epistemic elements, and found the starting point of the ascension and decline of Arabic-Islamic culture in the age of compilation; the age during which Islamic thoughts have emerged around Qur'an in the form of various systems of Islamic Knowledge (religious intelligible) along with non-Islamic epistemic systems (religious unintelligible). According to al-Jaberi, the inborn religious epistemic systems which have been founded upon religious intelligible are the result of the scientific endeavors of Sunnites, and Shiism just represents the other unintelligible epistemic systems. He also through differentiating Arabic west from Arabic east; opines that the foundations of pure Islamic rationality must be sought for in the western lands of Arabic-Islamic world, and Iran must be seen as the cradle of eclectic philosophies and unintelligible religious systems. To escape from the current intellectual and civilizational decline, al-Jaberi claims that we should leave the ideologies of Arabic east and appeal to the current rationalism in the Arabic west which is a heritage of Averroes. The purpose of the paper is to criticize these aforementioned stands of al-Jaberi, based on the existed cultural and civilizational realities in Islamic World and also by showing his methodological lapses and fallacies.
Gholamhossein Khedri; Ali Heidari Faraj
Volume 4, Issue 1 , October 2013, , Pages 65-85
Abstract
Immortality of the soul has always been one of the crucial concerns of deist philosophers. Regarding to significance and status of this problem, it would be accurate to say that all philosophical attempts proving the existence of the soul, have been dealing with setting fourth an explanatory definition ...
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Immortality of the soul has always been one of the crucial concerns of deist philosophers. Regarding to significance and status of this problem, it would be accurate to say that all philosophical attempts proving the existence of the soul, have been dealing with setting fourth an explanatory definition of it. As two major figures in this tradition, Avicenna and Aquinas, following Aristotle, got substantially involved in giving a religiously and philosophically valid basis to support the existence of the soul. They both elaborated this concept on the Aristotelian understanding and further developed their own theories, viewing immortality as one of the pivotal features of the soul. For this reason, a succinct explanation of Aristotle’s idea of the soul should be inevitably presented. This essay consists of two parts. The first part concerns explaining the concept of the soul, its abstractness and in corporeality and the way it is affiliated to the body, introductory to prove immortality of the soul. In the second part, I try to elaborate the explanation analysis and researching of the soul and its immortality in philosophy of Avicenna and Aquinas.
