Philosophy
Abstract
Abstract: Mullasadra in Asfar attributes to Suhrawardi an argument against the existence of existence as follows: To exist means to have existence; now, if existence exists, it has existence, and by repeating this argument a vicious regress arises; then existence does not exist. The followers of transcendent ...
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Abstract: Mullasadra in Asfar attributes to Suhrawardi an argument against the existence of existence as follows: To exist means to have existence; now, if existence exists, it has existence, and by repeating this argument a vicious regress arises; then existence does not exist. The followers of transcendent philosophy after Mullasadra and almost all contemporary researchers attribute such an argument to him. I give some reasons against this attribution. Suhrawardi himself attributes versions of this argument to the opponents of the followers of the Peripatetics, namely Ibn Sahlan. Moreover, he claims that the followers of the Peripatetics have their own response to this argument. I provide some evidence for his claim. I then analyze his real regress arguments and show that none of them rests on a semantic premise about 'to exist'. Instead, they have metaphysical assumptions, as they should. I conclude that the said regress argument is a misinterpretation of his texts in Hihmat al-Ishragh. This misinterpretation goes back at least to Qutb al-Din Shirazi's commentary. Finally, I present a proper interpretation of Suhrawardi's real regress argument in Hihmat al-Ishragh. I argue that the struggle with this argument is harder than it seems: there is no easy way out of the argument other than to admit the unity of existence.
maryam abbasabbadi arabi; Ali Haghi; Alireza Kohansal
Abstract
Philosophers and intellectuals have always been concerned with the problem of life. Many have considered it from different points of view. In ancient philosophy, life was attributed to the soul. Pythagoras was the first to treat the soul as the origin of life. He was followed by Anaxagoras who referred ...
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Philosophers and intellectuals have always been concerned with the problem of life. Many have considered it from different points of view. In ancient philosophy, life was attributed to the soul. Pythagoras was the first to treat the soul as the origin of life. He was followed by Anaxagoras who referred to the life force, which gave life to the material world, as Nous (intellect or spirit). Just like his predecessors, Plato believed that the soul was the origin of life, and in the case of real entities, life, spirit, motion, and reason are inseparable. Following Plato’s lead, Aristotle traced the cause or origin of life to the soul. These ideas left a great impact on Muslim philosophers. Avicenna—a prominent philosopher in the Islamic world—appealed to Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts to argue that life is essential to the soul, believing that the soul is by itself alive, and physical objects come to be alive by virtue of the soul. Accordingly, the criterion of life for Avicenna is perception and action. After Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā provided the same definition, developing it by drawing on his own philosophical principles.Mullā Ṣadrā argues that life is the origin of “perception” and “action,” incorporating the two notions in his definition of life. In his view, a living being is a perceiving acting entity; that is, an entity with knowledge and consciousness, which does certain actions. In other words, it should be such that it knowingly and consciously does the action. Given his philosophical principles such as the primacy of existence, its simplicity, and its gradation (tashkīk), he establishes the idea that life is a graded entity pervasive throughout all stages of existence. On this account, every living being’s life is the way of its existence, which determines its vital effects. The nobler and stronger the existence is, the more perfection the perception and the firmer the action will be. Hence, every being enjoys life as much as it enjoys existence. We refer to certain existing entities as non-living because we cannot perceive the effects of life in them. For volitional sensation and motion are indications of life, and beings that tangibly have such characteristics are living, and this is not to deny life in other beings. For instance, Quranic verses affirm that there is such a life in beings which cannot be perceived by human senses. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, all existing entities are ipso facto alive, whereas pre-Sadraean philosophies attributed life only to animals and humans on account of their perceptive and motive faculties, lacked by plants and solid objects, and thus they saw these entities as non-living. This is incompatible with Quranic verses and the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. There are Quranic verses referring to the exaltation of God by all beings—something not perceived by human senses. These verses indicate that all beings enjoy consciousness and life. Mullā Ṣadrā argued for such general consciousness and life by drawing on his philosophical principles. In this way, the widespread view that only some beings are alive is implausible in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy, and once life is proved for a stage of existence, it will be proved for all other stages of existence by dint of the principles of the primacy, simplicity, and gradation of existence. This is compatible with many Quranic verses and hadiths in which the power to talk, to hear, and to know is attributed to apparently non-living beings, which implies a degree of life in them.On this account, life is a graded reality that exists as an existential perfection in the necessary being, humans, animals, plants, and solid objects in different degrees. Thus, the necessary being is essentially alive, giving existence and life to other entities. Such existence is the same as life, and solid objects, plants, animals, and humans enjoy degrees of life to the extent that they enjoy degrees of existence. The view is confirmed by Quranic verses, denoting that all beings exalt God, which imply that all beings are alive. Mullā Ṣadrā cites the Quranic verse, “There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, but you do not understand their glorification,” and then comments that all beings prostrate for God and praise Him in a volitional conscious manner, and perfective attributes such as life, knowledge, and power are not separable from these beings.
vahid khademzadeh
Abstract
Cognitive linguists use two instruments to explain the process of human cognition: image schema and conceptual metaphor. Image schema is a mental structure that is the result of human interaction with sensory things especially human body. Conceptual metaphor extends the image schema from sensory concepts ...
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Cognitive linguists use two instruments to explain the process of human cognition: image schema and conceptual metaphor. Image schema is a mental structure that is the result of human interaction with sensory things especially human body. Conceptual metaphor extends the image schema from sensory concepts to abstract concepts systematically. Usual human interaction with physical containers like human body, house, and vehicles create the image schema of in-out orientation (containment image schema) in the mind. Conceptual metaphors based on this image schema are used to conceptualize many abstract concepts as containers. Mulla Sadra uses Arabic words like ẓarf (container), wiʻā’(container), dār(house) and buqʻah (spot) to describe metaphysical concepts such as existence ,quiddity and non-existence. Also, he talk about going in or out of existence and non-existence. He uses external existence in opposition to mental existence. This evidences are understandable in the context of the containment image schema and conceptual metaphors based on this image schema.
hossin soheili; godratoallah khayatian; azim hamzeian; hamed masjedsaraie
Abstract
Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the greatest critics of the theory of the originality of existence in contemporary times. In total, he has criticized eleven arguments for the authenticity of existence. This descriptive-analytic method aims to assess its critical point of view in the face of these arguments. ...
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Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the greatest critics of the theory of the originality of existence in contemporary times. In total, he has criticized eleven arguments for the authenticity of existence. This descriptive-analytic method aims to assess its critical point of view in the face of these arguments. Investigations show that Mirza Javad has used two main approaches in criticizing the originality principles: First, the invalidation of the proof of the authenticity of existence through the proving of the use of the distant and confiscating the desirable in them. After evaluations it turns out that this approach has been effective in eight arguments. Second, the annulment of the evidence of the originality of the existence from the way of the perception of my nature as the concept of nature. For this reason, he committed the three arguments incorrectly. Therefore, contrary to the common view, many of the evidence presented to prove the originality of existence is not a valid argument.
davood hosseini
Abstract
In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions ...
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In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions about quiddity, these are mostly supposed to be against quiddity’s being in-the-World: first that quiddity is abstract; second that quiddity, in itself, is non-existent; and third that quiddity is a predicate of existence. In order to show that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, quiddity is in-the-World, I will argue, based on textual evidences, first that if the context is considered, those texts that normally are supposed to be counter-evidence for quiddity’s being in-the-World from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, are just apparently so; and second that if all relevant texts are examined, there is just one possible reading of Mullasadra’s view about the reality of quiddity: he constantly takes quiddity in-the-World.
Roohollah karim
Volume 6, Issue 3 , October 2017, , Pages 51-74
Abstract
Abstract
The main objective of this study is to analyze the Kantian ‘existence’ from the perspective of Wolf’s, Hume’s, and Islamic philosophers’ views on existence. Since Kant addresses ‘existence’ in Critique of Pure Reason in two positions, first ...
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Abstract
The main objective of this study is to analyze the Kantian ‘existence’ from the perspective of Wolf’s, Hume’s, and Islamic philosophers’ views on existence. Since Kant addresses ‘existence’ in Critique of Pure Reason in two positions, first in the transcendental analysis section in the ‘pure categories of understanding’, as a component of ‘direction’ category among the famous four categories, and again in transcendental dialectic in criticizing ontological argument, this paper aiming to provide a comprehensive and coherent explanation of these two positions, shows that Kant's transcendental dialectic, to avoid dogmatic idealism and skeptical idealism, appeals to the giveness of existence, influenced by Hume, to criticize the ontological argument, but in the transcendental analysis which is focused on our understanding of existence, considers, influenced by Wolf, existence as the degrees of our knowledge of propositions. Also establishing a basic equivalence between ‘the principality of existence in the transcendent philosophy’ and ‘the giveness of existence in Hume’s view’ and ‘the principality of quiddity and the abstractness of existence in Suhrawardi’s view’ and ‘its being subsidiary in Wolf’s approach’, this paper uses some conceptual tools to analyze ‘existence’ in transcendent philosophy and Illumination Wisdom and to explain ‘existence’ in Kant’ view.
Davood Hosseini
Abstract
There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions ...
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There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions concerning quiddity (namely, quiddity’s being an abstract entity and its being true of existence) when attached to his theses about abstraction and truth, entails that quiddity is in-the-World; though it exists just secondarily. If these arguments turn out to be sound, a question arises: what is the difference between existence’s being primarily existent and quiddity’s being secondarily so? In order to answer this question, I will propose that one can understand and explain primary and secondary existence and being in-the-World by means of effectiveness and mind-independence. I will give some textual evidence which show that this proposal is not far from Mullasadra’s own viewpoint.
amirhossein pournamdar sarcheshmeh; mehdi azimi
Volume 7, Issue 3 , November 2016, , Pages 61-80
Abstract
Abstract
Almost all Islamic philosophers have directly or indirectly addressed the problem of ‘individuality’ and have provided some answers to the problem. Thus, one can review and survey all aspects of this discussion in the Islamic philosophy tradition, but here we intend to address just ...
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Abstract
Almost all Islamic philosophers have directly or indirectly addressed the problem of ‘individuality’ and have provided some answers to the problem. Thus, one can review and survey all aspects of this discussion in the Islamic philosophy tradition, but here we intend to address just one aspect, i.e. the Farabi's role in the evolution of this historical discussion, and in this way, to shed some lights on the neglected and less known angles of the rational tradition of Muslim philosophers. One of those who put the issue more and more at the center of the attention of thinkers is Mulla Sadra who, as a result of his philosophy of the Principality of Existence, expressed exuberant materials about individuality. Mulla Sadra attributes the idea of individuality- existence equality to Farabi. For scholars of the ancient period or even the contemporary period, there has never been any doubt in the authenticity of this assignment. This article seeks to reconsider this established attribution and through some textual and historical documents shows that this assignment can be disputed and even the issue that Farabi has had discussed ‘individuality’ is very suspicious.
Morteza jafarian; Ahad Ghramaleki
Volume 7, Issue 3 , November 2016, , Pages 81-105
Abstract
Abstract
Mirdamad, for the first time, defines or interprets the secondary intelligible concepts in such a way that are compatible with and include the characteristics of philosophical concepts. In his definition, primary intelligibles are concepts that refer to distinct and objective things in the ...
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Abstract
Mirdamad, for the first time, defines or interprets the secondary intelligible concepts in such a way that are compatible with and include the characteristics of philosophical concepts. In his definition, primary intelligibles are concepts that refer to distinct and objective things in the real world, and logical and philosophical secondary intelligible, on the contrary, have not any extension in the world and so do not refer to any independent and distinct objectivity. In Mirdamad's theory, being secondary intelligible amounts Abstractedness and non-objectivity, and being primary intelligible amounts principality and objectivity. From his point of view, essential concepts and relations and their negative and positive requirements are primary intelligible, and existence is counted as secondary intelligible. In fact the abstractedness of existence means that it is secondary intelligible concept, and the principality of quiddity means that the essential concepts are primary intelligible. Mirdamad's theory faces difficulties that arise from the lack of attention to various meanings and abstractednesses of existence.
Bagar Hossinlo; Hamed Naji
Volume 5, Issue 4 , February 2015, , Pages 37-66
Abstract
The root and source of the unity of existence is mysticism, and it has been entered into philosophy from this realm. Perhaps the first philosophical explanation of the mystics’ unity of existence doctrine has been done by Dawwani. But this philosophical explanation has some unjustified and irrational ...
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The root and source of the unity of existence is mysticism, and it has been entered into philosophy from this realm. Perhaps the first philosophical explanation of the mystics’ unity of existence doctrine has been done by Dawwani. But this philosophical explanation has some unjustified and irrational consequences and accessories. Sadra, also, makes his best efforts to give a philosophical explanation of mystics’ unity of existence of doctrine. He did that through abandoning the theory of analogical unity of existence and suggesting a new philosophical system, whose pieces have been mentioned in Asfar (Volume II) and other places of the book and also in the book of Igaz an-naimin (Awakening the sleepers). By this way, he not only has not ended philosophy, but has brought it into a new realm of philosophical thoughts. So, we must design this new philosophical system to understand this important stage of his philosophy, especially to understand his philosophical explanation of personal unity and its valuable accessories.
In this paper we describe briefly the philosophical system and the ontology of Dawwani’s approach, and attempt, as much as possible, express his philosophical explanation of unity of existence through an optimistic outlook. Then we will show that even though there are some the similarities between this explanation and Sadra's philosophical explanation, Dawwani’s approach is self-inconsistent and that is why we will criticize it ultimately. Afterwards, we continue to express the Sadra's philosophical explanation of mystical unity of existence. So the object of this paper is to compare these two philosophical explanation, reveal their strengths and weaknesses, also the relationship between these two explanations. It will be clear that Sadra's philosophical explanation is worthy and reasonably defensible through a new philosophical system which has been followed by Sadra and he has referred to it in his books, not in the analogical unity of existence
Seyed Abbas Zahabi
Volume 4, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 81-100
Abstract
Unlike the Christian philosophy, in the Islamic philosophy, the question of individuality was emerged and grew gradually in a philosophical ground. The naïve form of the problem can be found in the Farabi and Ibn Sina's works, and its perfect form can be seen in Bahmanyar’s writings. Then, ...
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Unlike the Christian philosophy, in the Islamic philosophy, the question of individuality was emerged and grew gradually in a philosophical ground. The naïve form of the problem can be found in the Farabi and Ibn Sina's works, and its perfect form can be seen in Bahmanyar’s writings. Then, Suhrawardi considered the problem at a totally different view and separated from Peripatetics basically. After Suhrawardi, Nasir al-Din Tūsi and Mulla Sadra, were dealt with the problem, while the differences between the two philosophers’ approaches were more than their agreements.
The issues related to the ‘individuality’ can be divided into four distinct debates: The conceptual bases of individuality; the affirmative principles of individuality; the Criterion of Individuality, and its justification. In the affirmative principles of individuality they are almost consentaneous, but in the other debates we can see some serious disagreements. The quiddity’s ability to justify “individuality” is the most important controversy between them. Nasir al-Din Tūsi considers quiddityas Criterion of Individuality, but Mulla Sadra belives that it is just ‘existence’ which can be the Criterion of Individuality.
Aliraza Kohansal
Volume 1, Issue 1 , September 2010, , Pages 101-118
Abstract
Contingency is one the key concepts in Islamic Philosophy, and inquiring in it, how much it be, developes the philosophical knowledge. Considering this point, in this article we intend to investigate in one of the important debates on Contingency, which has been neglected in all the previous studies. ...
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Contingency is one the key concepts in Islamic Philosophy, and inquiring in it, how much it be, developes the philosophical knowledge. Considering this point, in this article we intend to investigate in one of the important debates on Contingency, which has been neglected in all the previous studies. Our problem is “the equivocality or univocality of Contingency”. If we say that the previous thinkers have not dealt with this problem, we mean that they have not investigated in the implications and consequences of the problem, and have limited themselves in saying that the Contingency is equivocal. In this article, the Univocality of Contingency has been proved. There are many reasons for this; the correctness of the division of Contingency, the unity of the meaning of its contradictory, and the inducibility of Contingencies are among the reasons for the Univocality of Contingency. At the end, it has been proved by two accurate analyses that the Contingency, what kind it be, belongs to the Existence.
