The Journal of "Hekmat e Mo'aser" (Contemporary Wisdom) of IHCS is a scientific research journal that publishes the articles and new research achievements of professors and researchers who are interested in philosophy and various fields related to philosophy and Theology. "Hekmat e Mo'aser" (Contemporary Wisdom) is improve the reader's awareness through the publication of the latest researches in Persian or English Language about Islamic Wisdom and Philosophy.

 

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This is an Open Access journal

 This is an Open Access journal

Country: Iran

Publisher: IHCS (Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies)

Category: Philosophy & Theology

Language: Persian or English

Journal Frequency: Semiannual Journal

Format: Printed & Online

Article Submission & Processing Charges: Yes (Details)

Process of Review: Double-Blind Review (Details)

Review Time: 3 to 6 months

Access to Articles: Free (Open Access) & Full Text

Indexed: Yes (Details)

MSRT Journal Grade: B70

ISC Journal Grade: Q2

Biannual Journal Philosophy

An Analysis of the Purposes of Sharia from the Perspectives of Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā

Pages 1-30

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.49801.2070

malihe khodabandehbigy; Fatemeh Rajaei; Ali Jollaini; مومنی momeni

Abstract Abstract:
Explaining the purposes of jurisprudence has long been a topic of great interest among Islamic jurists, theologians, and philosophers. From the perspective of many theologians, God's actions and sayings are motivated by purposes; therefore, all the laws of the Sharia are established for a purpose. According to Shiite jurists, the preservation of the soul, religion, reason, lineage, and property are considered as the consideration of all laws.  The purposes of Sharia have also been considered in sciences such as theology and philosophy, and each has explained the main purposes and objectives of Sharia based on its own methodology. Some Muslim philosophers, due to the importance of the social and political approach to religion, have paid more attention to the philosophical analysis of the purposes of Sharia and its provisions in three areas: individual, political and legal, which require analysis and examination. Therefore, the issue of this article is: From the perspective of Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, as two Muslim philosophers, how have the purposes of Sharia and its role in regulating and developing the knowledge of jurisprudence, as well as establishing and deepening approaches such as governmental jurisprudence, been explained? In this article, the views of these two philosophers on this issue are expressed, and the results of the research are also presented below.
 
Keywords: maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, purposes of Sharia, philosophy of jurisprudential rulings, Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā.
Introduction
Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa refers to the purposes and objectives that underpin the enactment of religious laws (Sharia), aimed at securing worldly and otherworldly benefits, promoting human welfare, and preventing harm and corruption. These objectives include the preservation of religion, life, intellect, progeny, and property. This study seeks to examine the purposes and objectives of Sharia (Islamic law) from the perspectives of Islamic philosophers. The central question of this research is: How have Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, as two prominent Muslim philosophers, interpreted the objectives of Sharia and their role in regulating and advancing the field of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), as well as in solidifying and deepening approaches such as governance-oriented jurisprudence?
 
Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical approach based on library sources.
 
Discussion and Results
Based on the findings presented in the study, the classification of the purposes of jurisprudence and the application of the rational method by Muslim philosophers such as Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā are rooted in their philosophical foundations. The philosophical principles of these Muslim philosophers have significantly contributed to the development of governance-oriented jurisprudence and the extraction of the systematic components of jurisprudence.

From the perspectives of Mullā Ṣadrā and Avicenna, the purposes of Sharia and the philosophy of jurisprudential rulings can be classified into three levels: devotional (ʿibādī) purposes, political purposes, and legal purposes. According to these Muslim philosophers, all these purposes aim at the perfection and elevation of the human soul, ultimately aligning with the definition of wisdom.
The purposes of devotional rulings are the objectives and aims of the laws and commandments that mandate worship of God in various forms, such as prayer, fasting, and hajj pilgrimage. These rulings are directly intended to promote growth and perfection, facilitate the journey toward God, cultivate a wholesome life, and elevate the human being from an animalistic state to an angelic (malakī) rank. Mullā Ṣadrā considers the purpose of establishing devotional rulings to be the remembrance and worship of God, fostering existential proximity (al-taqarrub al-wujūdī) to Him, and guiding the human soul toward the Divine. Devotional rulings serve as a means for the spiritual journey of the soul toward the ultimate end of existence, a journey that is realized through the knowledge and servitude of God. Avicenna, on the other hand, identifies two distinct dimensions in the philosophy behind devotional rulings. The first is the subjugation of base desires, the strengthening of the rational and immaterial aspect of the human being, and the cultivation of a transcendental disposition (al-hayʾat al-istiʿlāʾiyya) whereby the soul gains mastery over bodily impulses. In this framework, true happiness lies in attaining complete abstraction and absolute proximity to God.
In political rulings as well, concepts such as human felicity (saʿāda), drawing closer to God, and divine guidance cast their influence over the political philosophy and the purposes of political rulings. The establishment of governance and the creation of the madīna fāḍila (virtuous city), where the prophet possesses knowledge of true felicity, has attained the highest degree of nearness to God, and is capable of leading people toward divine proximity, are considered prerequisites for the perfection and elevation of the human soul, ultimately guiding humanity toward true felicity.

 
Conclusion
These two philosophers, drawing upon a virtue-based framework and employing their rational methodology, analyzed and classified the purposes of Sharia. The socio-political theory of Islamic philosophy can be utilized by Islamic jurists (fuqahāʾ) in the development of jurisprudence through a comprehensive approach to managing both the individual and society. The philosophical principles upheld by these thinkers, due to their proximity to governance-oriented jurisprudence in terms of ultimate goals—namely, the administration of society—serve as a solid foundation for the philosophy of governance-oriented jurisprudence. From this perspective, the journey toward God, existential proximity to Him, and the remembrance of God constitute the primary purpose behind the enactment of devotional rulings. Likewise, the establishment of governance, the implementation of divine policies to guide and perfect society toward God, and the regulation of social life by prophets represent the central objectives behind political rulings. Furthermore, the preservation of life, progeny, and property are regarded as the most fundamental principles in uncovering the purposes of Sharia in the domain of legal rulings

Biannual Journal Philosophy

Analyzing the social-cultural determination of transcendent wisdom and its relationship with our contemporary era

Pages 1-31

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.50811.2085

Muhammad Hasan Yaghoubian

Abstract Introduction: transcendent wisdom has three aspects, include the sage, the system of transcendent wisdom, and its cultural-social determination. The issue of this research is its third aspect is cultural-social determination. Cultural-social determination does not mean the inference of society and culture from the perspective of transcendent wisdom rather includes the foundations, background and time of the formation of transcendent wisdom and Sadra's actions towards them and his time as a philosopher. This determination is, in fact, a dimension of transcendent wisdom, in which Mulla Sadra considered the fields of knowledge and tried to collect them in a philosophical model.  Method: It is descriptive-analytical in order to obtain a clearer understanding of our current situation while examining the background, Consequences and present of the transcendent wisdom in the past and analyzing his epistemological action in those conditions. The importance and necessity of this research is due to the fact that it tries to link the originality of the heritage of Islamic philosophy to our contemporaneity and has walked and shown the way ahead and diagnosed its obstacles.  Discussion: Mulla Sadra had a multi-dimensional personality and in his philosophy, he was able to create a comprehensive philosophical system in which different sciences, centered on existence, have a methodical dialogue and connection with each other. In addition, the cultural-social determination of transcendent wisdom shows the concerns and political and religio-cultural dimensions of Sadra's time in regard to Shiite wisdom and religious science and integrationism in intra-cultural epistemological flows and that he was able to systematically connect and collect those sciences in an epistemic geometry in the third model, in addition to collecting different sciences within himself. In fact, the background of this philosophical system is from the Helleh/Maragheh school and the philosophical tradition of Shiraz to the policy of integrationism in territorial unity and the Shia approach in the culture of the Safavid period. After this philosophical system, there is the philosophical tradition of Tehran and Qom. Mulla Sadra's effort has been in the direction of philosophical reinterpretation and integrationism regarding the diversity of intra-cultural epistemological currents including theology, mysticism and philosophy in an epistemological geometry and with a religious approach to science. But his incompatibility with the political establishment and the power of that time and his distance during his isolation from the scientific circles of that day, as well as the lack of attention of his first-rate students to expand his creative philosophical system, did not give him the opportunity to transform his schema as a concrete worldview to be transferred to the public culture of the society. But now, by avoiding the general rejection and negation of philosophical others such as the philosophy of the West or the Far East, as well as avoiding self-centeredness and mere imitation of the legacy of the past, he can achieve an active wisdom that also participates in the intellectual discourse of the world. Conclusion; Our new interpretation of Mulla Sadra's philosophy, while preserving his great efforts and merits, considers a more open approach to science and a more open educational system. Also, in paying attention to cultural-intellectual others, he can use Mirfendersky's attitude to sciences and industries and his lived experiences during his trip to India. and find its way in a correct method of comparative philosophy to re-examine this unity and plurality in the historical-cultural context and time and the concrete place of the land in our current time. Because the discussion of time and history is empty in Sadra's philosophy. In the component of place, the lack of a concrete place in the sense of community and culture is noticeable, because Islamic sages have either thought of an ideal utopia without a place, or have depicted a religious cosmopolitanism, or have followed a mystical homeland.  Also in bringing together the two transcendental and worldly trends for philosophy, in addition to the hereafter happiness, worldly happiness and besides theology, consider the dimensions of the concrete life of this world. Because the prominence of the theological side, with all its importance, has gradually taken the place to pay attention to other philosophical branches and concrete matters of this-worldly life and cultural dimensions and issues from transcendent wisdom. In summing up the aforementioned components, it can be said that by rereading the transcendent wisdom in relation to the present, we should be able to recognize our existing cultural diversity and at the same time, follow the appropriate theory of their integration. This is our current project, and of course, it should be done through philosophical thinking and our local self becomes a global self, so that we can think in connection with cultural-intellectual others and participate in the intellectual discourse of the world. Of course, this participation with selfishness against the alien does not lead anywhere. In fact, these cases are among the important components in understanding and restoring the Sadrai schema and its relationship with our contemporary situation so that it becomes self-aware and relying on that original heritage, it can also think about its contemporaneity.

Biannual Journal Philosophy

Ontological Analysis of the Knowledge in Transcendent Philosophy and Its Relation to the Correspondence Theory

Pages 33-64

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.51215.2092

ali fathi

Abstract Abstract:
Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and his Transcendent Wisdom (Hikmat al-Muta‘aliyah) are deeply interwoven with the doctrines of the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud), the unity of existence (wahdat al-wujud), and the gradation of existence (tashkik al-wujud). Consequently, any subject or issue within his philosophical system must be examined with reference to these fundamental principles.
The central question of this study is how Mulla Sadra’s ontological interpretation of knowledge, based on his fundamental philosophical principles, can provide a justification for knowledge in its general sense and for the correspondence theory of truth. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and drawing upon Mulla Sadra’s works and those of his commentators, this study aims to demonstrate that a precise interpretation of knowledge in Mulla Sadra’s thought, considering the novel ideas and concepts introduced in his philosophical system (Hikmat al-Muta‘aliyah), leads to a new understanding of knowledge. According to this reading, all forms of knowledge ultimately possess an existential status. Through this perspective, knowledge and cognition, within the framework of his philosophy, are justified and explained in accordance with the correspondence theory, in a manner that is in harmony with the foundational elements of his philosophical thought.

Introduction

The problem of knowledge and its justification has been one of the fundamental issues in philosophy and has been particularly emphasized in Islamic philosophy. Among the philosophical traditions, the Transcendent Wisdom (Hikmat al-Muta‘aliyah) of Mulla Sadra provides an ontological interpretation of knowledge, attempting to explain it based on the principles of the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud) and the gradation of existence (tashkik al-wujud). In this system, knowledge is considered coextensive with existence, and thus, the attributes of existence apply to it. This study aims to investigate how Mulla Sadra’s ontological interpretation of knowledge can serve as a justification for the correspondence theory of truth.

Materials & Methods

Employing a descriptive-analytical method and through an extensive examination of Sadra’s works and those of his commentators, this research argues that, unlike classical theories, Sadra’s correspondence theory is not based on the mere conformity of mental forms with external objects but rather on the principle of the subsumption of the lower reality under the higher reality (ḥaml al-ḥaqīqah ʻala al-raqīqah).

Discussion & Result

The Nature and Types of Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy



The issue of knowledge has been a central topic in philosophical discourse from Plato to contemporary times. In modern philosophy, figures such as Descartes, Hume, and Kant have given special attention to epistemology. In Islamic philosophy, although epistemology was not traditionally treated as an independent discipline, discussions on topics such as mental existence (wujud dhihni) have addressed fundamental epistemological concerns. Philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Suhrawardi, and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi explicitly distinguished between ilm huduri (immediate or presential knowledge) and ilm husuli (acquired or representational knowledge).

Knowledge in Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Wisdom

Mulla Sadra does not consider knowledge as an independent category but rather as an ontological reality. According to his doctrine of the primacy of existence, knowledge is a mode of existence and follows the same hierarchical structure as existence itself. This perspective challenges conventional epistemological interpretations of acquired and presential knowledge, proposing that knowledge is not merely a cognitive representation but an existential phenomenon.

The Primacy and Gradation of Existence and Their Implications for Knowledge

One of the fundamental principles of Transcendent Wisdom is the asalat al-wujud, which asserts that entities derive their reality from existence rather than essence (mahiyya). Consequently, knowledge, as a form of existence, is actualized not through mental concepts but through presence and unveiling (kashf). Additionally, the principle of tashkik al-wujud (gradation of existence) states that all beings exist within a spectrum of intensity and weakness. This principle extends to knowledge, implying that cognition also possesses degrees of intensity corresponding to the ontological rank of the knower.

Presential and Acquired Knowledge and Their Relation to the Correspondence Theory

In Transcendent Wisdom, ilm huduri (presential knowledge) is understood as the direct and immediate presence of the known object to the knower. Due to the existential unity between the knower and the known, presential knowledge is infallible and does not require epistemological justification. In contrast, ilm husuli (acquired knowledge), which involves mental representations of external objects, is susceptible to error and necessitates an examination of its correspondence to external reality.
Islamic philosophers have proposed two main theories to explain this correspondence:

The Theory of Mimetic Shadows (Ashbah Muhaki): According to this theory, mental representations are akin to shadows of external realities, and their correspondence is based on their resemblance to real objects.
The Theory of Essential Identity (Ayniyyat Mahuwiyya): This view holds that mental forms share the same essence as external objects but exist with a different ontological modality.

Both theories face challenges in explaining how mental representations genuinely correspond to external objects. Mulla Sadra addresses these challenges by proposing the return of acquired knowledge to presential knowledge, arguing that even representational knowledge is ultimately rooted in existential presence and unity between the knower and the known.

The Relationship Between Knowledge and the Unity of Being

A key principle in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is the wahdat al-wujud (unity of being), which posits that all entities are manifestations of a single existential reality. This principle extends to knowledge, suggesting that cognition is fundamentally an existential connection between the soul and the reality of being. The higher the ontological rank of the knower, the deeper and more profound their knowledge.

The Theory of the Contraction of Reality (Haml al-Haqiqah ‘ala al-Raqiqah) and a New Interpretation of the Correspondence Theory

In his interpretation of the correspondence theory, Mulla Sadra utilizes the principle of haml al-haqiqa ‘ala al-raqiqah, which is derived from the gradational nature of existence. According to this principle, a reality that exists in a lower ontological level is a weaker manifestation of the same reality in a higher ontological plane. In epistemology, this means that a mental form is a lower-grade manifestation of an external object, ensuring an existential correspondence between mind and reality. This view not only provides a justification for the correspondence theory but also offers a solution to the classical epistemological problem of how the mind relates to external reality.

Gradational Knowledge and the Hierarchy of Cognition

Like existence, knowledge is structured in a hierarchical manner within Transcendent Wisdom. The more elevated the ontological rank of the knower, the more complete their knowledge. In this framework, knowledge progresses through a hierarchical continuum from sensory perception to imagination (khayal), intellect (‘aql), and finally, intuitive or mystical knowledge (ma‘rifa shuhudiyya). Human cognitive development is thus viewed as a gradual ascent from lower to higher forms of knowledge. Importantly, the susceptibility to error in acquired knowledge is not due to its inherent nature but rather to its lower ontological standing in the epistemic hierarchy.

Conclusion

Mulla Sadra’s ontological interpretation of knowledge redefines it not as an abstract epistemological category but as a mode of existence. In this framework, presential knowledge is regarded as the foundational form of knowledge, while acquired knowledge is ultimately reducible to presential knowledge. The correspondence theory, rather than being treated as a mere semantic relation between propositions and reality, is reformulated within the context of haml al-haqiqa ‘ala al-raqiqah, wherein mental representations are seen as weaker existential reflections of external objects. This ontological approach to knowledge, combined with the doctrine of the unity of being, establishes a tashkik (gradation-based) system of epistemology in which knowledge and reality are intrinsically linked. Consequently, cognition is not merely a mental process but an existential unveiling of reality, occurring progressively across the different planes of being.

Biannual Journal Philosophy

The transformation of »Priority and Posteriority « into »Concomitance « during three philosophical courses (The Originality of Essence, The Originality of Existence of Gradational Oneness and the Originality of Existence of Personal Oneness)

Pages 65-92

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.51498.2096

mahdi saadatmand; ali babaie

Abstract Abstract
The importance of investigating between priority and posteriority with concomitance is in the representation of the relationship between their following issues. These concepts are related to the fundamental issues in different philosophical approaches. The question of the article is: with the change in the philosophical view from the originality of essence to the originality of existence of gradational oneness and then the originality of existence of personal oneness, what is the relation between priority and posteriority with concomitance? According to the originality of essence  the principle is with the priority and posteriority in many types. But according to the originality of existence, the existential concomitance becomes original. In the second journey, according to the gradation in existence, priority and posteriority are meant at the same time as existential stages, while in personal oneness only among the manifestations of Hāqq, emergence gradation occurs. The result of this research shows: The third journey, which is dominated by absolute oneness, is called the “qayyūmiyyā concomitance” and Because of this feature, priority and posteriority give way to concomitance.
KeyWords: Priority and Posteriority, Concomitance, The Originality of Essence, Gradational Oneness, Personal Oneness
priority and posteriority are intellectual and mental meanings and are the result of a comparison that the intellect makes between two things. The compatibility of priority and posteriority with pluralistic philosophical schools and concomitance with monistic ideas is clear. This compatibility is a motivation for answering the question: How does the relationship between priority and posteriority change with concomitance, in proportion to the change in philosophical approach from the originality of essence to the originality and gradation unity of existence and then the personal unity of existence? This issue has been examined with the focus on Sadra'i's transcendental wisdom.
    The third stage is the manifestation of the one existence of truth (haqq), which causes another type of “Superior Priority”. Based on which, beyond the existence of truth, there is truly nothing that can be placed on its side and find a relationship with it, even if it is posterior. Only between the manifestations of truth itself is a kind of manifestational gradation conceivable, which replaces existential gradation in the second stage.
 
Conclusion
In the essential stage, concomitance is a non-existent, invalid, relatives concept, and subject to priority and posteriority. Therefore, originality and gradation are characteristics of priority and posteriority, While in the gradational unity of existence, this role is entrusted to  concomitance, although priority and posteriority are also valid as a consequence of the existential concomitance. finally, with the unity of the personality, pure originality is achieved to the concomitance, and any priority or  posteriority becomes meaningless, because the concomitance is one with the unity, that is, the existence of the truth (haqq). We interpret this finding as " The transformation of »priority and posteriority « into » concomitance «. This is reflected in Mulla Sadra's statement with the term "Qayyumiyyah concomitance ", in which the manifestations are nothing other than the guardianship of haqq (God).

Biannual Journal Philosophy

A Comparative Analysis of the Methodologies of Mulla Sadra and Kant in Explaining Reality and Knowledge

Pages 93-119

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.51730.2105

Ahmad Tayyebi

Abstract Abstract
This study presents a comparative philosophical analysis of two major thinkers who represent different historical and intellectual traditions: Mulla Sadra in the Islamic world and Immanuel Kant in modern Western philosophy. The central problem addressed in this research concerns the ways in which these two philosophers conceptualize reality and knowledge, and how their metaphysical foundations lead to distinct methodological frameworks. The hypothesis is that fundamental differences in ontological presuppositions result in different approaches to the structure and limits of knowledge. The research adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology based on textual analysis of primary philosophical works and secondary interpretations. Mulla Sadra, by emphasizing the primacy of existence, gradation of being, substantial motion, and knowledge by presence, considers reality as an autonomous, multi-layered and dynamic unity that can be grasped through both rational and intuitive means. Kant, by contrast, draws a strict distinction between noumenon and phenomenon and highlights the a priori structure of the mind, viewing reality as constructed and limited to human experience. The results indicate that although both thinkers engage with similar epistemological questions, their methodologies and underlying metaphysics produce sharply contrasting conceptions of knowledge and reality.
Keywords:Mulla Sadra; Immanuel Kant; philosophical methodology; epistemology; ontology; primacy of existence; transcendental idealism.
 
Introduction
The problem of how human beings relate to reality and how knowledge is formed has long occupied the center of philosophical reflection. Mulla Sadra, working in the intellectual environment of the Islamic world, and Immanuel Kant, situated in the Enlightenment of modern Europe, represent two powerful and divergent responses to this enduring question. Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy proposes an ontologically grounded framework in which existence is the ultimate foundation of both reality and knowledge. Kant’s transcendental idealism, on the other hand, proposes that knowledge is determined by the cognitive structures of the human mind rather than by reality as it is in itself. Both philosophers address similar questions about the nature and limits of human knowledge, but they do so within radically different metaphysical and methodological contexts. This study aims to identify and analyze those differences systematically, showing how each framework reflects a distinct philosophical worldview.
Materials and Methods
The research is based on a descriptive–analytical approach with a comparative methodology. It involves the close reading and structural analysis of philosophical texts by both Mulla Sadra and Kant. The analysis proceeds in three stages.
1.Identifying metaphysical foundations: Sadra’s ontological realism and Kant’s transcendental framework.
2.Examining epistemological consequences: participatory knowledge versus representational knowledge.
3.Comparing methodological approaches: intuitive–metaphysical synthesis versus transcendental–critical analysis.
This method allows for a systematic comparison of philosophical structures rather than a mere juxtaposition of concepts, revealing the deep methodological divergences between these two traditions.
Results
The comparative analysis yields several key findings. First, the two philosophers operate on fundamentally different ontological assumptions. Sadra regards existence as the ultimate ground of reality, independent of mental construction, characterized by gradation and intrinsic dynamism. Reality is accessible not only through rational argument but also through intuitive and spiritual insight. Kant, conversely, denies epistemic access to reality as it is in itself (noumenon) and confines knowledge to phenomena structured by space, time, and categories. Second, the two systems diverge in their understanding of knowledge. For Sadra, knowledge is a mode of existence itself; knowing is an ontological participation in reality. His notion of knowledge by presence reflects a direct, non-representational relation between the knower and the known. Kant views knowledge as representational, produced by the synthesis of sensory data and the mind’s a priori conceptual framework. Third, their methodological orientations reflect these metaphysical commitments. Sadra combines rational demonstration, mystical intuition, and theological insight, aiming for a holistic vision of reality. Kant applies a critical–transcendental method, analyzing the conditions of the possibility of experience without making ontological claims about what lies beyond.
 
Discussion
These differences reveal two contrasting philosophical attitudes toward the relation between mind and reality. Sadra works within an ontological realist paradigm in which reality precedes and grounds knowledge. Knowledge is not a construction but an uncovering, a direct participation in the fabric of being. His method integrates rational reasoning and intuitive unveiling, reflecting the close relationship between metaphysics, epistemology, and spiritual experience in classical Islamic philosophy. Kant represents a critical and modern paradigm in which epistemology precedes ontology. For him, what can be known is strictly determined by the structure of human cognition, and reality beyond experience is inaccessible. While Sadra’s framework extends knowledge to metaphysical and transcendent realms, Kant limits it to empirical phenomena and assigns metaphysical ideas to the realm of practical reason. Despite their profound differences, both philosophers share a concern with establishing a systematic methodology for understanding knowledge. Both reject naïve realism, though in different ways: Sadra through ontological gradation and union, Kant through transcendental structure and critical delimitation. This shared orientation toward methodological rigor makes their comparison philosophically productive, especially for contemporary debates on the nature and scope of human cognition.
Conclusion
The comparative analysis of Mulla Sadra and Immanuel Kant demonstrates that their divergent metaphysical foundations lead to fundamentally different epistemological and methodological positions. Sadra grounds knowledge in an ontological structure that transcends the limits of sensory experience and embraces intuition as a legitimate mode of knowing. Kant, in contrast, grounds knowledge in the structure of the human mind, restricting its reach to phenomena and establishing clear boundaries for human reason. These two approaches reveal not only two distinct philosophical systems but also two epistemic horizons: one expansive and participatory, the other critical and delimiting. By placing these two traditions in dialogue, this study highlights the possibility of integrating insights from both: the metaphysical depth of Sadrian philosophy and the epistemic clarity of Kantian critique. Such an integrative perspective may contribute to contemporary philosophical discussions on the nature of reality, the scope of human knowledge, and the role of methodology in bridging different intellectual traditions.

Biannual Journal Philosophy

A Comparative Study of the World of Forms and Exemplars in the Thought of Suhrawardi and the Realm of Language in the Thought of Martin Heidegger

Pages 121-150

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.51954.2107

Seyyed Muhammad Sadeq Atashzar.; Mahdi Monfared; Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Nabavian

Abstract Problem: The World of Forms and Images (ʿālam al-muthul wa al-mithāl) has been a significant topic since the inception of philosophical history. Some argue that neglecting the intermediary world (ʿālam-e mīyāna) has led to a crisis in Western thought. This issue gains heightened importance in comparative philosophy, as such an approach remains impossible without acknowledging a transhistorical realm (sāḥat-e farātārīkh) and the intermediary world.

Method: This research employs a descriptive-analytical method, utilizing library resources and a comparative approach to study Platonic Forms (muthul-e aflātūnī), the World of Images (ʿālam-e mithāl) in Suhrawardī’s thought, and the realm of language (sāḥat-e zabān) in Heidegger’s philosophy.

Findings: In Suhrawardī’s thought, the World of Images is an imaginal (khayālīn), real (ḥaqīqī), and objective (ʿaynī) realm that, unlike Forms, possesses quantity (miqdār) and shape (shakl). Heidegger, while critical of Platonic Forms, speaks of language as an imaginal, real, and objective realm that also has quantity and shape. However, he occasionally refers to a "truer" realm, such as the essence of art (dhāt-e honar), which lacks quantity and shape.

Conclusion: Heidegger, too, acknowledges something akin to the World of Forms and Images but critiques interpretations emphasizing truth as correspondence (muṭābaqa). Heidegger grounds the manifestation (āshkār-gī) of ontological and epistemological hierarchies in unconcealment. Similarly, Suhrawardī emphasizes light (nūr) and defines knowledge as presential knowledge (ʿilm-e ḥuḍūrī), which is not based on correspondence.

Biannual Journal Philosophy

The relationship between Known by essence and Known-by-Accident from Avicenna's perspective

Pages 151-177

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.51535.2099

Jafar Mohammadalizadeh; Sohrab Haghighat; Hamid Hasani

Abstract Abstract The present study seeks to discover the Known by essence (ma'lum bil-dhat) and known-by-accident (ma'lum bil-'aradh) relationship from Avicenna's perspective. The first assumption, namely the objectivity of the Known by essence, is incorrect. However, the second assumption, i.e. they are different, challenges the understanding of knowledge and cognition. Method: To find an answer, Avicenna’s views on knowledge have been collected and analyzed. Ultimately. Findings: Abstraction, form and connection are the most important concepts that create knowledge in the thought of Ibn Sina. And it seems that rather than being consistent with the Substantive view, it illuminates some facts of Avicenna's epistemological system in the context of existence. So that the answer to many issues in this field, including the present issue, is also. Argument: Basically, no relationship leads to unity except in the context of existence. Ultimately, the conclusion was that, Known by essence and Known-by-Accident would achieve unity by connecting in the realm of existence. Therefore, due to their existential connection, they have objectivity; But one is an effect and the other is effective, and in this respect they are different. Keywords: Knowledge, Abstraction, Known by essence, Known-by-Accident, Avicenna   Introduction The discussion of science and cognition is one of the important topics in philosophy and one of the current issues in this field. One of the major issues in Islamic philosophy is the discussion of science and epistemology. This issue has been considered and studied in various chapters by Islamic philosophers, including Avicenna. Analyzing Avicenna's theory of science helps us to accurately understand acquired knowledge and distinguish it from direct knowledge, and provides a precise criterion for these two types.   Materials & methods This article was conducted and analyzed using a descriptive-analytical method and collecting Avicenna's views on science from library sources.   Discussion & Result The issue raised here is what relationship does Known by essence have with Known-by-Accident? If these two truths are independent and disconnected, the reality of science faces a challenge. And if they are in fact one thing and one truth, then when we perceive a tree, the tree itself should be present in our minds, rather than its form. But obviously that is not the case. It seems that in the knowledge of a thing, there must be both objectivity and unity between the external object and the perceiver, and also otherness and separation. Avicenna has precise references to science in his works and he explained this issue with the language of his philosophy on the axis of existence. Therefore, paying attention to them can guide us to the answer to the problem. The theory of science in Avicenna's view is more existential. The truth of "knowledge" in Avicenna's thought is linked to concepts that cannot be properly understood without considering all of them. The most important of these concepts are: "Existence", "Contact", and "Immateriality".    Conclusion It is understood from the words of Avicenna that when perceiving something, between Known by essence and Known-by-Accident, there must be both objectivity and otherness, in such a way that neither contradiction nor sophistry arises. Without considering "Existence" as the truth present in the context of reality, both mental and objective and without considering the concept of "Contact " and how the truths of existence are related at all levels it is impossible to justify the way Known by essence and Known-by-Accident communicate. Therefore, the connection between the two is not of the quiddity type. Rather, for the realization of knowledge, a connection is established between them in their existential plane. Basically, no relationship leads to unity except in the context of existence. Therefore, it must be said that Known by essence and Known-by-Accident are two sides of the same existential truth. This means that one being has two sides, one called Known by essence and the other called Known-by-Accident. Known by essence is the abstract aspect of Known-by-Accident and its effect that is compatible with the abstract soul and can be known to the soul.

Biannual Journal Philosophy

The role of death contemplation in realizing freedom from the perspective of Mulla Sadra and Heidegger

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 08 November 2025

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.51727.2103

amin dehghani; abbas javareshkian; Jahangir masoudi; Seyed Morteza Hosseini Shahrudi

Abstract The issue discussed in this article is a comparative examination of the role of mortality awareness in achieving freedom from the perspectives of two great philosophers, Mulla Sadra and Heidegger. Mortality awareness, as conceptualized by Mulla Sadra and Heidegger, is among the most significant components of their philosophies and is closely related to the concept of freedom. Sadraean freedom is defined as "transcendence in elevation" and "approaching infinite truth through self-knowledge," while Heideggerian freedom is characterized as "ek-sistence and transcendence based on authenticity." Sadraean death is understood as "entry into inner and esoteric realms," whereas Heideggerian death is defined as "the negation of Dasein." The deficiencies in Heidegger’s philosophy can be summarized as follows: (1) Neglect of the immaterial dimensions of human existence and their supporting arguments, (2) absence of a principle for the stages of proximity and freedom, (3) a linear view of human truth (from thrownness to death), overlooking origin and return, (4) lack of a precise depiction of positive freedom, (5) absence of the issue of ethics and moral freedom, (6) failure to provide a practical program for realizing freedom, (7) lack of a correct conception of the afterlife as a realm for the manifestation of inner truth, rather than a realm of origination, and (8) lack of coherence in ontology, theology, and eschatology.

Allameh Ja'fari and the Islamic Human Rights Issue

Volume 2, Issue 2, October 2011, Pages 107-122

Seyyed Yahya Yasrebi

Abstract In the last decades, human rights have become a very sensitive topic. Elements of human rights can be traced back to ancient sources, however, there is no doubt that the current concept is the products of fairly recent intellectual and philosophical endeavors. For many years now, Muslims have been making the case for Islamic human rights, seeking the recognition of an equal status to the western human rights. Among preeminent scholars in Islamic society who have argued for Islamic human rights, there is Allameh Ja'fari (1923-1998), who published some insightful works in 1982, as well as Javad Amuli (1933-…). In the present article, we survey and analyze the work of Allameh Ja'fari, focusing on the following points: 1. A recognition of the effort and precision of Allameh Ja'fari's work. 2. An assessment of his proposed definition of elements of Islamic human rights as well as his comparison with western human rights. 3. His suggestions as to how one should react and interact with the issue of human rights: a) What should be the foundation of human rights and how to reflect on the rights of various religions according to it. b) An emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of Islamic human rights, that is how and by which means these rights should be applied, rather than spending a huge amount of time on marginal issues, and seeking difficult to reach ideals.

Principality of Existence and Principality of Quiddity: Encountering Two Philosophical Problems or Two Philosophical Systems?

Volume 4, Issue 2, October 2013, Pages 21-36

Reza Akbari

Abstract Prima facie it seems that principality of existence and principality of quiddity are two opposed theories, but they are, in fact, two distinct philosophical systems with different principles which these two theories are in their forefront stand. For example, considering Mulla Sadra's argument to prove principality of existence based on intensifying movement, shows that he criticized Peripatetic’s philosophical system which contained, in Mulla Sadra's view, principality of quiddity, denying intensifying movement of quiddity, and Peripatetic’s specific view about qule movement. On the other hand only when we consider ‘intensifying movement’ in a philosophical system, containing principality of existence, unity of existence, and intensity of existence, it can be a basis to prove principality of existence. This shows that Mulla Sadra portrays reality in his mind which has many metaphysical components, and conceives it as a distinguished and correct picture of reality compared to the picture of principality of quddity advocates. But having a picture in mind and its epistemic transmission to others are two different things. Epistemic transmission of a picture to others needs putting the picture into pieces and transmitting them in a linear state. This is exactly what Mulla Sadra did. To put the metaphysical pieces of his picture in a linear state he put the principality of existence in the forefront.

Examination of Avicenna’s and Mollā Sadrā’s View on the Concept of God

Volume 1, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 29-39

Qāsem Akhavān Nabavi

Abstract In this paper, I will try to present a comparative examination of Avicenna’s and Mullā Sadrā’s views of analyzing the concept of the Necessary Being. According to Avicenna, “the Necessary Being” is an entity which is Pure Being, but according to Mullā Sadrā, Necessity of Being requires that the existent besides being real and not having conditional mode and accidental intermediary has not causative mode. According to the separability of these two modes, the Necessary Being is a being which is both “by-itself” and “for-itself”; hence, Mullā Sadrā considers these two qualifications in his definition of the Necessary Being. Therefore, the arguments of the two philosophers for Necessary Being will be different.

Cosmological Argument (Demonstration of Necessity and Contingency) and Criticisms of Hume and Kant

Volume 1, Issue 1, September 2010, Pages 1-18

Hamid Parsania

Abstract The Siddiqin proof as presented by Avicenna for the first time to express the proof from contingency and necessity, entred into the works of Thomas Acquinas through Arerroes and Maimonides in the middle ages. The concept related to this proof was not conveyed in the works of the above-mentioned authors and this led to a kind of ambiguity in that proof in philosophy after the western Renaissance. This article deals with the proof from contingency and necessity as reflected in western philosophy since the 17th century. The present article claims that Leibniz and Wolff appealed to this proof on the basis of possible Contingency rather than essential Contingency and also the criticisms aimed at its Thomistic account by Hume and Kant is not devoid of some strength and validity. In the final part of the article, the validity and strength of Avicennan account of the proof are cited and emphasized, so as to reject the criticisms aimed at it since the 17th century onward.

Theosophists’ Agnostical Approach about the God Essence Status

Volume 4, Issue 4, July 2014, Pages 21-51

Manouchehr khademi

Abstract The absolutely unconditioned status is the usual reading of theosophists’ words regarding the essence of God. But in this article inspiring from a deep and novel division, offered by late Gharavy Isfahany, known as Kompany, regarding the mere truth, quiddity and identity, we will prove another consideration in which neither considering others, so the tenor of the absolutely unconditioned is taken, nor non-considering others is considered. Also we recognize the consideration, the most suitable attention to God’s furtive essence and in the wake of it we consider the absolutely unconditioned in connection with god’s essence in the level of appearance and divulgence in nominal, genuine, emersion, comedown, and creatures places and opening verses. On the other hand, the consideration is related to the attention to the most secretive of the secrets, and the most intrinsic conscience of every consciences and the invisible Maghib and Angha-e-Maghreb and knowing the God as the hidden treasure which is in inherent heterogeneity with the process of appearance and emersion and has no presence and descent in God and the existential Hadavat presences, rather it is deep-seated and steeped in the mere secret and mere consciences, with stairs extended and emerged infinitely. Also being comprehensive, it involves the appearance of restricted Esm-alzaher and consciences of restricted Esm-albaten which are from divine names. Also we present some theosophists’ statements from some theosophical books in which they tenderly have had hinted the consideration in question. At the final section, the most important section of this paper, I want to deal with the implications of my viewpoint. I disprove and deny the consequences of the absolutely unconditioned consideration of God, and demonstrate their opposites, regarding the aforesaid consideration, consequences like the realization of the collection and the disavow of the opposites in the stair of invisibility of essence, denying the realization of names and epithets, either with dissolved glancing limited mode or extended limited one, having inherent heterogeneity with appearance and emersion in mirrors and places of appearance, the Maghib invisibility, Angha-e-Moghrib, the essence remaining, hidden treasure, divesting aspiration of absolute and inapplicable being, eternity of absolute unknown of God’s essence and the stair left unsaid.

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