soghra babapour; jafar shanazari
Abstract
From the complex and controversial issues of epistemology, both in Islamic philosophy and in Western philosophy, is the question of how the mind and the reality communicate with one another. The main argument in the epistemology of the debate is to reconcile the concepts with what is present in reality, ...
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From the complex and controversial issues of epistemology, both in Islamic philosophy and in Western philosophy, is the question of how the mind and the reality communicate with one another. The main argument in the epistemology of the debate is to reconcile the concepts with what is present in reality, That is, how to adapt mental forms to objective forms. The realists believe in the correspondence between the mind and the reality. But a group of philosophers have opposed this idea and considered mental concepts apart from foreign ones, or even consider foreign objects as images of mental concepts. This is while the consistency of mind and real in the transcendent philosophy one of the most principled issues. Mullasadra intended to resolve the issue by discussing unity quiddity in mental existence and the objective gradation unity of supreme existence. Kant proposes his Copernican Revolutionary Theory that if the known conform to our minds, this is more consistent with the prior knowledge of objects. Therefore, the mind has a special activity and Specifies the type of epistemic it gains. The present article examines the quality of matching the mind and the real from the viewpoint of MullaSadra and Kant, and looks for similarities and differences between them in conformity.
abbas asalem; shaker lavaei
Abstract
Free will as the most obvious human perception Has always faced with theoretical barriers. Science, Divine absolute power and will is one of the theological barriers. Hereditary and geographical factors are the scientific obstacles And necessitate causation as one of the branches of causality, ...
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Free will as the most obvious human perception Has always faced with theoretical barriers. Science, Divine absolute power and will is one of the theological barriers. Hereditary and geographical factors are the scientific obstacles And necessitate causation as one of the branches of causality, is philosophical obstacles in agent cause cognition. Incompatibility in necessitate causation with cognition agent cause makes philosopher of different thoughts in traditional Islamic thought to answer them according to its intellectual foundation. Philosopher By accepting necessitate causation consider agent cause's will as the last component of perfect causation to justify optional action. But theologian deny necessitate causation and replace it with preponderance. then found essential possibility sufficient for optional actions.although they deny necessity that is derivated from necessitate causation. accordingly they are proven free will by denying necessity and sufficiency of preponderance .meanwhile Some Osolions of Shia that are known in the name of Naeeni's circle by their special theory,denied necessitate causation about agent cause but accepted necessitate causation for the rest of subjects. as a result they proved free will in agent cause. Following research not only will provide several answers but also tries to emphasize and highlight Osolions of Shia answers.
Hossein Atrak
Abstract
This paper in the field of Islamic theology scrutinizes the implication of the verse Aṭīʿū on the infallibility. The verse (اطِیعُوا اللَّهَ وَ أَطِیعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَ أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُمْ) “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger ...
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This paper in the field of Islamic theology scrutinizes the implication of the verse Aṭīʿū on the infallibility. The verse (اطِیعُوا اللَّهَ وَ أَطِیعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَ أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُمْ) “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority” (Q. Nisa /59) is one of the most important Quranic reasons that Islamic theologians have prepared for proving the infallibility of prophets, especially Islam prophet. Muslim theologians have made a reason like this: 1) God has absolutely commended Muslim believers to obey the Messenger and those who have authority on others among them. 2) If they were not infallible, God’s absolute command to obey them would be wrong. 3) But God never is wrong. 4) Therefore, they were infallible. The author thinks that this reasoning is wrong. According to some evidences, God’s command to obey the Messenger and who are in authority is not absolute. On the other hand, there is no correlation between God’s absolute command to obey someone and his infallibility. Introduction The Infallibility of God’s prophets is one the most significant issues in Islamic theology (Kalam). Muslim theologians have posed some rational and traditional reasons to prove the infallibility of prophets. One the main traditional reasons is this verse of the Quran which says: (أَطِیعُوا اللَّهَ وَ أَطِیعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَ أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُم); “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority” (Nisa, 59). The aim of this paper is criticizing this reason after explaining. Explaining the Reasoning to the Verse The logical form of Muslim theologians’ reasoning to the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا) is like this: 1) God has absolutely commanded people to obey the Prophet. 2) The absoluteness of the command indicates that the Prophet is infallible. 3) Then, the Prophet is infallible. In explaining the correlation between the absoluteness of God’s command and infallibility (premise 2), Muslim theologians say that if the Prophet was not infallible and it was probable that he committed a sin or lapse, it was wrong that God absolutely commanded people to obey him. Since, the absolute command to obey a fallible man will lead people into obey him in his wrong commands and sins. This is against God’s aim of sending the Prophet. However, God never is wrong. Therefore, the absoluteness of God’s command implies that the Prophet is infallible (see: Hillī, 1365: 183-184; Muẓaffar, 1422: 4/ 221; Āmidī, 1423: 5/ 217). Shiite theologians also assert this reason for affirming the infallibility of their Imams, since they believe that the word ‘أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُم’ (those of you who are in authority), which has been mentioned after the prophet’s name, refers to their Imams. Critique of the Reasoning The author thinks that Muslim theologian’s reasoning is wrong in both premises 1 and 2. Firstly, God’s command to obey the prophets is not absolute in a way that people are obligated to obey their all commands even their wrong commands. Secondly, the absoluteness of the command to obey someone does not indicate that his is infallible. In explaining the first objection, I must to mention a subject in Islamic ʿIlm al-ʿUsūl which is called Muqaddamāt Ḥikmat (the premises of wisdom). This subject deals with the condition of understanding an absolute meaning from a statement that some unconditional words has been used in. Islamic jurisprudents are not in agreement about the number of these conditions, but there is general consensus about both of them. The first one is that the speaker who uses an absolute proposition to be in the state of asserting his complete intention not in the state of saying a brief outline. Sometimes a speaker is in a position that just wants to say a brief outline of his/her opinion and intention, then he/she uses general words and propositions without saying details. However, he/she will state the details and conditions of his/her general judgments in other situations. Here, it is wrong if someone thinks that his/her main intention of those words and propositions has been general and absolute. The second premise of Muqaddamāt Ḥikmat is lack of continuous or discontinuous conditions. It is clear that when a speaker states a condition for his absolute statement, it is wrong to take his main intention absolute. Sometime the speaker uses a continuous condition and sometime discontinuous. A continuous condition is like saying first “buy meat. I mean lamb meat”. A discontinuous condition is a condition that the speaker add after a while, short or long. The author thinks that both of these conditions are absent in the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا). In this verse, God is in the state of giving the outline of His law about obeying the Prophet. The reason for this claim is citing three different subjects in one proposition. These are God, the Prophet and the ʾUlulʿamr (those who have authority on others). God is an eternal, omniscience, omnipotent, omnibenevolent existent and the creator of humans who has absolute authority on the world. The Prophet is a human being who receives God’s revelation, the man who God has said about him “The Prophet is more protective towards the believers than they are themselves” (Ahzab/ 6). And ʾUlulʿamr which literally means the governor and who has authority and sovereignty on others. God has never made the meaning of this word clear in the Quran. Muslims are not in agreement about its meaning. Shiite says they are our Imams, ʿAli and his children. Sunni says they are our Islamic caliphs. By the way, ʾUlulʿamr are individuals who are in lower state of the Prophet. They have never received God’s revelation. Therefore, due to these differences, the extents of obeying these three subjects are not the same. Hence, we can conclude that the order of obeying them in one statement is a brief outline. On the other hand, by a brief search we can find several evidences that show the conditions and qualifications of obeying the prophets. The first evidence is rational. According to the idea of rational goodness and badness which most Islamic sects like Shiite and Muʿtazilites believe in, understanding moral principles is done by reason. Therefore, observing moral principles is necessary for all people and rational beings even for God. Thus, if someone, God or the Prophet, gives a command against apparent moral principles, like killing an innocent person, we are not obligated to obey it. Also, there are some traditional (naqlī) evidences in the Quran that make clear where people can disobey the prophets’ commands. The Quran says: “No person to whom God had given the Scripture, wisdom, and prophethood would ever say to people, ‘Be my servants, not God’s” (Āl-ʿImrān/ 79). And in another verse: “It is inconceivable that a prophet would ever dishonestly take something from the battle gains” (Āl-ʿImrān/ 161). In these verse, God has put two conditions for obeying the prophets’ command. First, if they say: “Be my servants, not God’s”, people are not obligated to obey. Second, if they want dishonestly to take something from the battle gains. The third case is when their order is against God’s judgment in the Scripture. As we read in the Quran: “Mankind was a single community, then God sent prophets to bring good news and warning, and with them He sent the Scripture with the Truth, to judge between people in their disagreements” (al-Baqara/ 213); “We revealed the Torah with guidance and light, and the prophets, who had submitted to God, judged according to it for the Jews”. In addition, there are some traditions from the Prophet and Shiite Imams that we can put them as the conditions of the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا) like this: “No obedience of a creature is permissible as long as the creator is being disobeyed”, the Prophet said (Hurr ʿĀmilī, 1409: 11/ 157). The second objection to Muslim theologians’ reasoning to the verse is criticizing the correlation between the absoluteness of God’s command to obey the Prophet and his infallibility. Since, it is reasonable to say people that have to absolutely obey that man in whatever said, who is most knowledgeable and righteous among them. Although, he is not infallible and it might be that he makes a mistake, but obeying him has more advantages than disobeying. Conclusion According to the mentioned objections, the author of this paper thinks that Muslim theologians’ reasoning to the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا) for proving the Prophet’s infallibility is not correct.
mohammad javad esmaili
Abstract
Motion in the categories is one of the most significant topics in the natural philosophy of Ibn Sīnā (428 AH/1037 CE). Ḥakīm Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Tonekābonī (1040 AH/1631 CE-1124 AH/1713 CE), known as Fādhil Sarāb, one of the great thinkers of the Safavid era, composed a ...
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Motion in the categories is one of the most significant topics in the natural philosophy of Ibn Sīnā (428 AH/1037 CE). Ḥakīm Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Tonekābonī (1040 AH/1631 CE-1124 AH/1713 CE), known as Fādhil Sarāb, one of the great thinkers of the Safavid era, composed a work titled Risāla fī Bayān al-Ḥarka fī al-Maqula. In this work, he analyzes and evaluates a topic from the second chapter of the second article of the art of "natural hearing" of Ibn Sīnā's Cure, titled “On the Relation of Motion to the Categories,” where the nature of motion is discussed. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī's explanation is invaluable because his assessment is based on his identification of the nature of motion with the doctrine of gradation. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī's study has a "they say/I say” structure, which encourages the reader to pay attention to the ideas that are rejected as well as those that are accepted in the discussion. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī goes beyond the discussion of the nature of motion and also deals with issues such as the connection between motion and time and instantaneous motion (ḥaraka tawassuṭiyya), as well as continuous motion (ḥaraka qaṭʿiyya). Referring to the views of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (339 AH/ 950/1 CE) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (908 AH/ 1502 CE), he establishes a link between philosophical issues and the commentary tradition of the Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād. The editio princeps of the treatise, along with an analysis of the text, provides a basis for further discussion of Ibn Sīnā's natural philosophy. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī was born in Sarab, one of the villages of Tonekābon; after acquiring the basics of science with his father, he left for Isfahan and the religious schools of Tonekābon. The date of Hakim Tonekābonī's death is recorded as Monday, the 18th of Dhihjah in 1124 AH, and his burial place is recorded as the Takhte- Fulad of Isfahan. His masters in the intellectual sciences are Mirza Muḥammad Bāqir Sabzevārī (d. 1090 AH), Āghā Ḥossein Khʷānsārī (d. 1098 AH) and Mullā Rajab-ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080 AH). In this article, Hakim Tonekābonī's view of motion in the categories is examined from a historical and philosophical perspective, based on his work, Risāla fī Bayān al-Ḥarka fī al-Maqula (The Treatise of Motion in Categories). The approach is philosophical, because the issue of motion and its conceptual analysis has a long philosophical ancestry. On the one hand, Heraclitus considered being to be a kind of motion itself, and on the other hand, Parmenides described being as alien to and incompatible with motion. The analysis is at the same time historical, in that the first detailed exploratioin of this issue is found in Aristotle's Physics, whereas in the Islamic world, Ibn Sina in his works, especially in the Shifa (Cure), offered a philosophical explanation of the nature of motion by way of various interpretations of Aristotle's Physics. But Ibn Sina expressed his view of the nature of motion after evaluating previous arguments on the subject and their consequences. Ibn Sina then presents his own interpretation. For example, in other views, according to him, motionis a matter of homonym, or of analogical gradation; Or if it is analogical gradation, it is like settled topoi (places), or fixed blackness or fluid blackness. He himself, however, engages with philosophical analysis of the category of the passion and raises the question of whether passion is motion or a relation between motion and something else. And if passion is identical with motion, then is motion absolute or restricted? With this method, Ibn Sina does not accept the idea of ten categories, like the Aristotelians, and he regards either of the categories as a real genera [this is unclear]. Accordingly, passion is identical with motion. After discussing Ibn Sina's view on the nature of motion, I examine Hakim Tonekābonī's explanation of Ibn Sina's view. The treatise on motion in the categories by Hakim Tonekābonī is considered at two levels: 1. analysis of text itself, 2. further considerations in the form of comments and marginal notes. Hakim Tonekābonī offers further considerations or comments in six sections, which cover only half of the topics of the treatise. Hakim Tonekābonī's answers to the view that the motion is based on analogical gradation are presented in a "they say/I say” structure" that encourages the reader to return to the text of the treatise. Hakim Tonekābonī composed this treatise in order to in response to the debates over Tusi's Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād (The Purification of Belief) and to answer an aporia about the nature of motion.
seyedeh akram ashabi
Abstract
Throughout the history of human thought, the question of innate inclinations (fiṭrat) has given rise to many debates. Regarding its significance, it needs to be said that the question is the cornerstone and substance of moral psychology, such that if we eliminate it from discussions about moral psychology, ...
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Throughout the history of human thought, the question of innate inclinations (fiṭrat) has given rise to many debates. Regarding its significance, it needs to be said that the question is the cornerstone and substance of moral psychology, such that if we eliminate it from discussions about moral psychology, the whole building of the knowledge will collapse. Hence knowledge about innate inclinations is the mother of knowledge about human questions. There are two theories on whether or not human beings have innate inclinations. According to the first, there is no such thing as an innate inclination in human beings, human nature at birth being like an empty and shapeless container taking the shape of whatever society pours into it. According to the second theory, human nature is not like an empty container, but, rather, there are needs and inclinations in human beings on the basis of which they live and these needs and inclinations are realized if put in favorable conditions. In this article, we study viewpoints on innate inclinations of famous mystic Rumi and contemporary thinker Morteza Motahhari, both belonging to the area of philosophical and mystic thought in Islam. The article’s main point is that the idea of the innate in the thoughts of both of the great men was inspired by the religion of Islam, and that they believed in a divine origin for the innate, as well as in the fact that human existence is a battle field for the innate against carnal and sensual forces. Hence human beings always struggle with their material dependencies, longing for return to their divine origins, and they will calm down only when set free from the snare of their whims and material dependencies and when they return to their divine innate inclinations. In spite of the commonalities in their premises (Islamic teachings), each of these two thinkers has adopted different methods. Rumi has benefited from visionary and intuitive methods as well as from exegesis, and Motahhari has benefited from philosophical and argumentative methods. Interestingly, however, they have drawn same conclusions. Motahhari’s theory is more meticulous than Rumi’s and has analytic categorizations, which is typical of philosophical method. Both of them had detailed meditations on innate inclinations, and the comparison between them is worthwhile because it shows what use these thoughts have and that their main points and origins are Islamic teachings. This article has discussed, first, the significance of moral psychology, especially in the modern world, and then the significance and status of innate inclinations in human existence. The term fiṭrat was differentiated from instinct and other natural affairs and its distinctive features were presented, citing the verse 30 of Chapter al-Rum in the Qur’an. The conclusion from the examination and analysis of Rumi’s Masnavi is that by invoking Koranic verses he describes human beings as having two divine and corporeal aspects. Citing the verse of Covenant, he says that human beings have their origins in their divine innate inclinations, and depicts an eternal relation with God which is metaphorically described in the poems of his Masnavi as a reed bed, associating the separation from the world of fiṭrat with lack, despair, and confusion in this earthly world. In his In It There is What Is In It (Fi hi Ma Fi h), Rumi regards individuals as enjoying varying degrees of knowledge about God, and prophets and those who are close to God as people who can draw aside the material veil and through their hearts become connected to God and aware of his being. In every tale of Masnavi human beings’ clean, and ugly and hideous faces are depicted and all human beings struggle between the opposites, and as long as they have not returned to their clean and original innate inclinations they do not feel excellence and triumph. Here, there is a serious distinction between Rumi and other mystics: the latter basically consider the human soul as deplorable and human beings as debased, spoiled, and aggressive. They did not see in humans anything but brutality and atrocity, which is why they tried to suppress inclinations and carnalities, whereas Rumi believed in the high status of human beings and the spiritual aspect of their existence and their connection with the divine world, and sought to show how this part of human beings can overcome their material aspects. In Motahhari, fiṭrat is used with two specific and general meanings. He thinks that all innate affairs in the general meaning have their origins in divine innate inclinations. Ultimately, he introduces only one authentic fiṭrat which is absolute perfection. Since human beings are always seeking perfection and any perfection comes with a flaw, the only perfection towards which human innate inclinations can be directed is the perfection above which there is not any perfection. Because in this small material world that perfection cannot be achieved, human beings keep feeling disenchantment and restlessness. Motahhari thinks of human perfection-seeking innate inclination as having varying degrees, and that there are factors affecting its realization, the most important of which are prophets. Prophets can save not only human beings who are distanced from their fiṭrat but also those who are suffering from the metamorphosis of their fiṭrat, which was what motivated Moses to go to Pharaoh: innate inclinations are not destroyed, therefore, there is room for the hope that human beings will return to their fiṭrat. Motahhari considers human beings as involved with two existential aspects, heavenly and earthly, and believes that they will triumph only when they rein in their soul and make it subject to their true self. Citing Koranic verses, both Rumi and Motahhari as Islamic thinkers regard human existence as two-sided: innate affairs have their origins in the spiritual aspect and instinctive tendencies in the corporeal aspect. Invoking the verse of Covenant they both see the knowledge about God as innate and dating back from before creation of human beings. Furthermore, human beings’ distance from their origin and their imprisonment in the small material world has caused human distress, sadness and grief. Another point is the conflict between two human existential forces namely innate and sensual forces, deriving from two-sidedness of human existence. And human beings will triumph if they make their desires subject to the transcendent aspect of their existence. To convey his meaning, Motahhari sometimes uses couplets composed by Rumi. Referring to the significant role of prophets in precluding deviation from fiṭrat and placing human beings in the course of their human nature are among other commonalities between these two great men.
hossein ahmadi
Abstract
INTRODUCTIONOne of the main issues of moral philosophy is ethical ontology, and the main theme of ethical ontology is Moral Realism and moral anti-realism. The title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any order, ...
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INTRODUCTIONOne of the main issues of moral philosophy is ethical ontology, and the main theme of ethical ontology is Moral Realism and moral anti-realism. The title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any order, recommendation, feeling, taste, agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality; however, anti-realism does not consider any reality for the morality other than an order, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement.The influence of Farabi on the creation the Islamic civilization is obvious to the thinkers; he made an extensive attempt during his life to Islamize the sciences. Important works have been written about Farabi's moral views, But Unfortunately, none of these works has addressed the topics of Moral Ontology that is considered the main topic in Moral Philosophy.Farabi has stated at least four arguments to prove realism. Sometimes Farabi gains help from the aesthetics, and he also proves reality sometimes through the semantics of moral concepts and felicity, through achievement of ultimate perfection on occasion, and also at times through determining the recognition path. The present research attempts to present the ontological subjects of Farabi's ethics in a new form so as to familiarize the researchers with the helpful method employed by Farabi in Moral Philosophy in order to prepare a ground to make a greater use of the method and content potential of Farabi's discussions of Moral Philosophy by Farabi. It seems Farabi does not address a number of ethical issues that need to be addressed to them because of the power of reasoning for realism, such as the rational explanation for human proportional perfection and how the way of happiness is the knowledge of the disability. Also, Farabi's attention to the separation of ethics from customs will eliminate the relativistic charge from him.MaterialFarabi, like the early thinkers before him, did not author an independent book in the field of Moral Philosophy because the Moral Philosophy had not branched out then as a separate knowledge, but there are some discussions of Moral Philosophy dispersed in some of his works. We can gain some of his novel attitudes on Moral Philosophy through the examination of his writings. So this article uses analytical philosophical method and It takes its materials from the library way.DiscussionIt is possible to propose numerous statements about the realist nature of Farabi proving that he is a moral realist. In the present research we only explain the following arguments indicating the Moral Realism that can be inferred from the sayings of Farabi.Proving the Moral Realism through Aesthetics. One of Farabi's arguments used to prove the morally realist nature of Farabi is that he considers ethics as a beautiful subject (Farabi, 1992; P.243; Farabi,1992: P. 65) and he also considers beauty to be equal to existential perfection (Farabi, 199a: PP.42-43). Therefore, Farabi considers ethics as the existential perfection, and the existential perfection is the same as existential enjoyment, that is, it is real.Proving realism through finalism. Farabi is a finalist scholar and he believes in the real ends and finalism is considered one of the realist schools, so Farbi is a realist. Farabi believes that the goal of ethics is to enable human to achieve the real felicity and he considers the real felicity and goal of ethics as an existential object (Farabi, 1995a, PP.101-103). Regarding the definition of Moral Realism, where the title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any order, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality (Ahmadi, 2017: P.118), many Muslim thinkers are moral realists.Proving Moral Realism through semantics of moral concepts. Farabi defines the concepts indicating the moral predicate that can be interpreted as predicate concepts, as existential and real and when the moral concepts are real, the proposition formed by the moral concepts will be real and thereby the Moral Realism will be proved.Proving realism through Epistemology. If Farabi did not believe in any reality for ethics, then it had been senseless to introduce wisdom as a method to recognize ethics, while Farabi has determined multiple ways like wisdom to recognize the moral reality (Farabi, 1995b: P.42).ConclusionFarabi explained his absolutism through dividing goodness into absolute goodness and non-absolute goodness. The absolute goodness explains human's ultimate perfection and real felicity and the non-absolute goodness explains the relationship between the action and ultimate perfection1. Farabi also offers a particular innovation in defining and explaining wisdom because he believes that wisdom in a special sense means that the wisdom reason out the best things through the best knowledge. The best knowledge means the permanent knowledge and knowledge of essence that is imperishable and presential that is considered the best knowledge2 and he explains about the wisdom of divine proximity and human's needs for God's blessings even in acquiring the ultimate perfection. Then he explained about the path to the ultimate perfection in Moral Philosophy by defining wisdom in a novel way.Another innovation of Farabi was to determine the instance of the real felicity that none of his preceding scholars had completed and Islamicized the Greek moral theory so accurately that he did. He accepted the divine proximity theory as a supplement to the moral theories of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and enriched it through explaining the features of divine proximity degrees.Despite all the innovations of Farabi, but it seems necessary that Be explained The following content, such as rational explanation for the appropriate perfection for humans, and for relation between knowledge of the caused to its need from Cause and the true perfection of the caused, as well as the separation of ethics from customs.
Philosophy
Razie Sadat amiri; Reza Akbarian; ali fallahrafie
Abstract
Examining the subject of philosophy shows that philosophers have had different views of the scope of the subject. In this article, we seek to answer the question whether Allama Tabataba’i widened the scope of philosophy in comparison to his two great predecessors. If the answer is positive, what ...
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Examining the subject of philosophy shows that philosophers have had different views of the scope of the subject. In this article, we seek to answer the question whether Allama Tabataba’i widened the scope of philosophy in comparison to his two great predecessors. If the answer is positive, what impact does the difference in scope have on the function of philosophy in sciences? To answer fundamental questions and therefore to advance and progress, various sciences - including natural and human sciences and even mathematics - require general principles and rational and ontological presumptions relevant to individual particulars, provision of which falls on philosophy. The question is whether the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabataba’i’s view has the required scope to propose these principles and presumptions. There are some researches about the subject of philosophy in his view, but they have not examined whether it includes mathematical and natural limited existents (wujūdat-i muqayyad). To answer the above formulated questions, first the subject of philosophy for Allama is reread and his different stated views on the topic are analyzed. Then, the domain of the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabataba’i’s, Avicenna’s, and Mulla Sadra’s views are compared and analyzed. Having assessed the relation between the three philosophers’ views of the subject of philosophy, some of the functions of philosophy in sciences are explained in brief. Finally, the impact of widening the scope of philosophy on formation of new philosophical branches and development of philosophy’s function is examined. Research methodThis research has been conducted through the analytic-descriptive method with an emphasis on the subject of philosophy in the works of three Islamic philosophers, namely Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Allama Tabataba’i. The data have been collected, extracted and then compared with the library research method. Finally, through analysis of the data it is examined to what extent the scope of the subject of philosophy in Allama Tabatabai’s view functions in and is effective on sciences.Discussion and resultsBeing as being, or absolute being, is the title that all the three philosophers have chosen for the subject of philosophy, but the term has different meanings and examples in their works. In initial stages, Mulla Sadra chose the universal concept of existence - which is among the secondary intelligibles (ma’qūlat-i sanaviyyi) – as the meaning of being, but in next stages he regards existent in its factual sense as an example of existence. As such, the unified graded existence flowing through all existents in contrast to limited existents is the subject of philosophy. The question is whether the most specific types of existents can be the subject of a philosophical discussion. Through pursuing this question the following results were obtained: No matter whether the universal concept of existence or unified graded factual existence constitutes the subject of philosophy, the types of the universal concept of existence or limited existents that are at some level of the graded unified factual existence can be deemed a subject of philosophy. However, in Avicenna’s and Mulla Sadra’s views, it is required that the types in question should not be peculiar to mathematics and natural sciences, or, to put it more precisely, should not be peculiar to the subjects of the sciences of the individual. In philosophy, only those types of existence are discussed which are the attribute of existent things without mathematical and natural limitations.Allama Tabataba’i too believes that existence as absolute and universal is the subject of philosophy, but also that the most specific types of existents can unconditionally be the subject of philosophical discussions.In addition to the term being as being, Allama Tabataba’i also uses the term reality, and from his explanations it becomes clear that individual realities are not only part of discussions of categorization in philosophy, but can be the subject of a more universal philosophical knowledge than divine philosophy.To enhance the functioning of philosophy in sciences, it is essential that the domain of philosophy be delimited in a way that it incorporates such specific phenomena related to other sciences as justice, freedom, beauty, life, individual and social behaviors, etc. (i.e. phenomena whose ontological analysis provides presumptions and principles that sciences need). It seems that Allama’ Tabataba’i’s expansion of the scope of philosophy makes this possible through forming new philosophical branches pivoting on ontological analysis of all phenomena. ConclusionIf the subject of philosophy is confined to universal existence and its primary categories, it won’t be able to respond to an important part of ontological questions of natural and mathematical sciences dealing with individual beings. This causes both stagnation of philosophical knowledge and impedes development and growth of sciences. It seems that through expanding the scope of philosophy Allama Tabataba’i provided the capacity required for the formation of new philosophical branches - the types of knowledge that based on the universal philosophy and its demonstrated principles both develop the function of philosophy and lay the ground for validation of other sciences.
Mahdi Assadi
Abstract
IntroductionṢadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. ...
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IntroductionṢadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. Remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. In this way, when it comes to memory, Ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. Because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. They often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding.In this article, I adjudicate these opposing views. To do so, I overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in Ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. I then show that, pace Ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. I propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize Ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies.MethodIn this research, I analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. On occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well.DiscussionFor Ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. These immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. In his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. Ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. In this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. Another argument presented by Ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. Moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived. However, “identity” is incompatible with the materiality of memory. Changes in the brain also demonstrate that memory is not material: brains and their nerves change with all of their material contents, while psychological memories remain in the mind after years.I think all of these arguments are objectionable. Suffice to say, Peripatetic philosophers believe that sensory and imaginary mental forms are material, and then assume that no mental form goes away, but remains in its own realm. Such constancy does not necessarily have to do with immateriality, since such constancy of the material is conceived in modern philosophy and physics in terms of the growing block view of time.In critique of the recognition argument for the immateriality of memory, for example, we might say that it proves too much: The basis of this argument is the very paradox of Meno, which challenges not only the memory but also any kind of knowledge.Similarly, the identity argument proves too much and therefore it is objectionable in that if identity could show the immateriality of memory, it could establish the immateriality of the material world as well. For instance, the mountain I see today is identical to the one I saw yesterday. So, these are identical, without the mountain being immaterial. Since identity does not imply immateriality in these cases, it does not imply the immateriality of memory either.In response to the argument from brain change, we might say that, before their destruction, brain cells transmit their physical information to the young cells, which in turn transmit the information to other cells before they die. As an analogy, suppose that an audio tape lasts for twenty years, but before it expires, we record its content on another brand-new tape, which retains the same audio.In addition, since Ṣadrīans believe that the retained perceptual forms are directly present to us, they must say that we have knowledge-by-presence of them, albeit unconsciously. The idea of unconscious knowledge sounds implausible to me.To establish the immateriality of memory and imaginative forms, Ṣadrā also tries to undermine the material account of memory. He argues that the many forms we have perceived in our lives cannot be imprinted in our finite, and even small, material brains. However, this seems unlikely only for Ṣadrā while it is not impossible by itself. It simply can be explained away by modern science: it has been established today that a large amount of information can be stored in very small memory cards.A major objection I raised against the Ṣadrīan view is that errors in memory are incompatible with its immateriality and with being remembrance a matter of knowledge by presence. For just as sensory perceptions cannot be kinds of knowledge by presence because they involve errors, remembrance cannot be a kind of such knowledge because of errors it involves.Moreover, I argue that not only Ṣadrā’s commentators, but also Ṣadrā himself, failed to stay committed to the consequences of the immateriality of memory, as he sometimes says, and rightly so, that memories are destructible. This is an obvious endorsement of changes in such perceptual forms, which imply their materiality and inconstancy.ConclusionPre-Ṣadrīan philosophies as well as the prevalent scientific view present a far more plausible account of memory and how sensory and imaginative forms are retained than the Ṣadrīan constancy and immateriality account. Alternative materialistic explanations and the objection from errors in memory, as well as a host of other reasons, call Ṣadrīan arguments into question, including the sudden survival of movement, instantaneous detailed recollection of all forgotten memories in abnormal states or under unusual pressures, conceiving particular meanings as they were initially perceived by some old and sick people without any distortions, recognition and identity, and constancy of memory despite changes in brain cells.
Mehdi Dehbashi
Volume 2, Issue 2 , October 2011, , Pages 53-78
Abstract
In Western and Islamic philosophy, one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects, that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers ...
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In Western and Islamic philosophy, one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects, that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers seeking to explain the relationship of knowledge and the "outside world". In this article we present and compare Kant and Mulla Sadra's philosophical solutions to this problem.
Although in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, mind and phenomenal objects do not stand on the same ontological levels, however according to the "primacy of existence" (Aṣālat al-wujūd) principle, the two are alongside each other. Knowledge is not separate from ontology and relies on the outside world in its process of perception occurring through the help of the senses, the imagination, reason, and intuition. What occurs between the outside world and the mind is called by Mulla Sadra the construction of quiddity. Quiddity is neither bound to the mind or the outside world; however it is necessary on every ontological level and participates in all the levels of perception. Mulla Sadra can explain the relationship between the intuitions of the mind and the outside world first by positing a soul which creates forms and elements related to perception and secondly, by filling the gap between mind and phenomenal objects by postulating a division of ontological levels.
According to Kant, knowledge requires two things: a) observation, which is given to us in space and time and b) the reception of an intelligible upon what has been observed. For the process to occur the phenomenal object and the intelligible must share a similarity. Some intelligibles have no similarity with anything from the experiential level. Kant, in trying to reconcile mind and the phenomenal objects uses the concept of Transcendental Schemata, that is forms produced in time by the imagination. By arguing for a direct reciprocity between the phenomena and the intelligible, Kant is bound to uphold the reciprocity between phenomena and transience.
Aziz Jashan Nezhad; Abbas Javareshkyan
Volume 6, Issue 2 , July 2015, , Pages 15-41
Abstract
In Mulla Sadra’s and Ibn-e Arabi’s thought, the unity of existence could be proved in ontological, epistemological and anthropological aspects and we can say that the three aspects are integrated, and are the faces of one thing. The gist of Ibn-e Arabi’s thought is nothing but pantheism; ...
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In Mulla Sadra’s and Ibn-e Arabi’s thought, the unity of existence could be proved in ontological, epistemological and anthropological aspects and we can say that the three aspects are integrated, and are the faces of one thing. The gist of Ibn-e Arabi’s thought is nothing but pantheism; a kind of pantheism that is based on realism or the priority and originality of discovery, intuition, and experience.
Mulla Sadra also through priority of existence pave the way for the unity of creatures and considers creatures, except God, as the rays and the beams of true light or the reality of existence (eternal nature of God). Only the existence or the nature of God is original and unique. Sadra unlike Ibn-e Arabi, who thinks that the rational method in theology is neither sufficient nor necessary, has done efforts to rationalize what is beyond the mind, for public understanding. In this article, it is tried to review and compare the principles and styles of these two divine sages in the formation of the theory of pantheism, from three mentioned aspects, i.e. epistemology, ontology and anthropology.
akram asgarzadeh mazraeh; seyd ali alamol hoda
Volume 7, Issue 3 , November 2016, , Pages 15-37
Abstract
Abstract
Mulla Sadra and Zagzebski expanded the scope of knowledge in such a way that it includes the concept of understanding. They argued that the subject can, by achieving rational and ethical virtues voluntarily provide suitable grounds for the formation of true beliefs, they also believe ...
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Abstract
Mulla Sadra and Zagzebski expanded the scope of knowledge in such a way that it includes the concept of understanding. They argued that the subject can, by achieving rational and ethical virtues voluntarily provide suitable grounds for the formation of true beliefs, they also believe that ethical vices prevent the achievement of true belief. In other words, Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra argue that the knower can intentionally develop some of the moral and intellectual merits/virtues and remove vices so that a proper ground is created for the formation and development of true beliefs. In their view, the subject who has the motive and intention of knowledge acquiring can achieve truth by preparing the proper ground.
Is the domain of valid knowledge, in Mulla Sadra’s epistemological and philosophical theory, extensive enough to include understanding,? And if so, in Mulla Sadra's opinion, what factors contribute to the formation and validity of understanding as the underlying causes?
Mehri Changi Ashtiyani
Volume 2, Issue 2 , October 2011, , Pages 17-34
Abstract
The role of the intellect (or reason) and its functions in religious speculation is very important. In the Islamic context, a wide variety of functions are attributed to the intellect. Most of the philosophical and theological schools as well as the theoretical disputes have their origin in the various ...
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The role of the intellect (or reason) and its functions in religious speculation is very important. In the Islamic context, a wide variety of functions are attributed to the intellect. Most of the philosophical and theological schools as well as the theoretical disputes have their origin in the various status attributed to the intellect and intellection. Kindi, Avicenna, Farabi, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra are among the great Islamic philosophers who have postulated various functions for the intellect and speculated on its relationship with religion. Farabi particularly stands out on this topic. Farabi developed his philosophical position while the Islamic word was caught in doctrinal, juridical and theological quandaries and arguments, political differences and social upheavals, and wars between various groups claiming authority. In that period, having lost its religious principle, Islam was in a state of crisis and needed a scientific explanation for its existing challenges. Hence, people were drawn towards Greek philosophy, and its principles were used to solve problems in religious thinking. Hence, we see that Farabi, using Greek philosophy and logical deduction, strive for a better understanding of religion. He considers the general Islamic principles and the law of the revelation, a key guaranteeing happiness in this world and the next. Farabi argues that it is possible for the human intellect to understand these general Islamic principles and laws by comprehending them logically. According to him, the intellect has a universal nature, and accepting its rational proofs is a common and unalterable factual possibility for all human beings. Farabi believes that the teaching of philosophy and religion are the same. They both come from the source of revelation, or emanation of the agent intellect, and both ultimately leads to perfection and happiness. Farabi does not see any tension between religion and rational intellection and attributes a unique status to the intellect. Leaving aside his unconventional position that the philosopher has a higher status than the prophet, Farabi believes that the philosopher talks using the attributes of speech, and relying upon reason, while the prophet convinces and persuades people by means of the agent intellect imprint upon his imaginal faculty.
Abdollah Javadi-Amoli
Volume 1, Issue 1 , September 2010, , Pages 19-28
Abstract
The views on the science of Ethics are as diverse and different as the views on understanding man and his nature. In the present article, at first the preliminary points of the discussion are presented. Then, the different views on the abstract or material nature of man are cited and their differences ...
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The views on the science of Ethics are as diverse and different as the views on understanding man and his nature. In the present article, at first the preliminary points of the discussion are presented. Then, the different views on the abstract or material nature of man are cited and their differences are enumerated. In the second premise of the present study, the highest and the most perfect attributes of Allāh are cited and it becomes evident that these attributes are not different from the essence of God and the unification of God with these attributes are cited, although God and his attributes are different. In the third premise, it is stated that for the divine religion, there exists only an initiator which acts as the doer and only one receiver. In the fourth premise, it is stated that the main body and structure of religion and moral principles and all religious rules, are produced by God and are issued from God. Based on these four premises, it is stated that man is a God-seeking being. Therefore, any true knowledge, any sublime morality and any righteous action which makes man similar to God, are important for man and give him a kind of real life and any belief or attribute or deed which would make him approach atheism, will lead to his death. In this case, man is a dead being with only the features of a living thing because the life of spirit becomes possible only with true understanding and perfect and pure faith, and the death of the spirit comes from ignorance in views and lack of reasoning in actions.
Seyed Alireza Hejazi; Maryam Afrafar
Volume 2, Issue 1 , October 2011, , Pages 19-42
Abstract
This article or paper is disbursed a discuss between Gnostics and satan We got 38 discussion that have surveyed and studied them of various types In totally Such as , satan image, time, place, sentences, beginning to talk, speech and Discussion which are bilateral or unilateral, and at the satan ...
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This article or paper is disbursed a discuss between Gnostics and satan We got 38 discussion that have surveyed and studied them of various types In totally Such as , satan image, time, place, sentences, beginning to talk, speech and Discussion which are bilateral or unilateral, and at the satan visit , Gnostics know him or not and story elements and so on ... And at the statistically form have some results.
Forough al- Sadat Rahimpour; mohammad nasr esphahay
Volume 6, Issue 3 , October 2017, , Pages 19-50
Abstract
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to study, in a descriptive-analytic way, one important similarity, among the other, between the philosophical views of Plotinus and Mulla Sadra on ‘soul’ in three periods: before, along, and after the body.
Both have accepted the existence ...
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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to study, in a descriptive-analytic way, one important similarity, among the other, between the philosophical views of Plotinus and Mulla Sadra on ‘soul’ in three periods: before, along, and after the body.
Both have accepted the existence of soul before the body with minor differences. Regarding the second period, Plotinus believes that soul is essentially separated from body despite some interactions. But Mulla Sadra holds that soul in some periods is united with body but due to substantial motion it gradually leaves the body and finally departs the body entirely by death.
According to Plotinus, soul returns to its essential position by death but retains worldly imaginations. But Mulla Sadra holds that soul totally leaves the body and lives in self-created formal and otherworldly body.
The major difference between the two philosophers is that Plotinus believes in reincarnation for undeveloped humans, while Mulla Sadra totally rejects the idea of reincarnation.
seyd ali haghi; somayeh hosseini
Volume 7, Issue 1 , May 2016, , Pages 19-34
Reza Akbarian; Siavash Asadi
Volume 3, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 21-43
Abstract
This paper tries to answer to these questions: what is Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s solution to state the problem of non-existent objects and what are their similarities and differences and, moreover, challenges of these views. Following affirmation to “being” and “thing” ...
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This paper tries to answer to these questions: what is Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s solution to state the problem of non-existent objects and what are their similarities and differences and, moreover, challenges of these views. Following affirmation to “being” and “thing” concomitance, Williamson brings forward “necessary existence” theory in which “possibility” is referred to properties, including concrete existence, of things. But “necessary” is referred to logical existence for the solution to state the non-existent problem. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra’s solution, following graded unity of existence theory, is based on “mental existence”. In this case, mental existence is one of the ontological stages of “equivocal unique truth” of existence and “quiddity” is preserved in mind and exterior of mind. Therefore, since we express some statements about external non-existents, they must be existent in mind and their quiddities are manifestations of their mental existence. But, each of these solutions has some philosophical challenges: Mulla Sadra has not said how non-existents can be conceived; moreover preserving of quiddity in philosophical structure of Mulla Sadra is unjustified. On the other hand, “necessary existence” theory can’t be an explanation of reality. Allameh Tabatabaii, notwithstanding Mulla Sadra’s point of view, says that reality is absolute or limited existence (not existence and quiddity) and quiddities are mental (not external) manifestations of limited existents. Then non-existence can be abstracted by human mind from limited existents. On this basis, we do a mental act related with reality, when we state a proposition with a non-existent subject. This paper shows that Allameh’s theory can obviate the challenges of Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s theory.
Reza Akbari
Volume 4, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 21-36
Abstract
Prima facie it seems that principality of existence and principality of quiddity are two opposed theories, but they are, in fact, two distinct philosophical systems with different principles which these two theories are in their forefront stand. For example, considering Mulla Sadra's argument to prove ...
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Prima facie it seems that principality of existence and principality of quiddity are two opposed theories, but they are, in fact, two distinct philosophical systems with different principles which these two theories are in their forefront stand. For example, considering Mulla Sadra's argument to prove principality of existence based on intensifying movement, shows that he criticized Peripatetic’s philosophical system which contained, in Mulla Sadra's view, principality of quiddity, denying intensifying movement of quiddity, and Peripatetic’s specific view about qule movement. On the other hand only when we consider ‘intensifying movement’ in a philosophical system, containing principality of existence, unity of existence, and intensity of existence, it can be a basis to prove principality of existence. This shows that Mulla Sadra portrays reality in his mind which has many metaphysical components, and conceives it as a distinguished and correct picture of reality compared to the picture of principality of quddity advocates. But having a picture in mind and its epistemic transmission to others are two different things. Epistemic transmission of a picture to others needs putting the picture into pieces and transmitting them in a linear state. This is exactly what Mulla Sadra did. To put the metaphysical pieces of his picture in a linear state he put the principality of existence in the forefront.
Manouchehr khademi
Volume 4, Issue 4 , July 2014, , Pages 21-51
Abstract
The absolutely unconditioned status is the usual reading of theosophists’ words regarding the essence of God. But in this article inspiring from a deep and novel division, offered by late Gharavy Isfahany, known as Kompany, regarding the mere truth, quiddity and identity, we will prove another ...
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The absolutely unconditioned status is the usual reading of theosophists’ words regarding the essence of God. But in this article inspiring from a deep and novel division, offered by late Gharavy Isfahany, known as Kompany, regarding the mere truth, quiddity and identity, we will prove another consideration in which neither considering others, so the tenor of the absolutely unconditioned is taken, nor non-considering others is considered. Also we recognize the consideration, the most suitable attention to God’s furtive essence and in the wake of it we consider the absolutely unconditioned in connection with god’s essence in the level of appearance and divulgence in nominal, genuine, emersion, comedown, and creatures places and opening verses. On the other hand, the consideration is related to the attention to the most secretive of the secrets, and the most intrinsic conscience of every consciences and the invisible Maghib and Angha-e-Maghreb and knowing the God as the hidden treasure which is in inherent heterogeneity with the process of appearance and emersion and has no presence and descent in God and the existential Hadavat presences, rather it is deep-seated and steeped in the mere secret and mere consciences, with stairs extended and emerged infinitely. Also being comprehensive, it involves the appearance of restricted Esm-alzaher and consciences of restricted Esm-albaten which are from divine names. Also we present some theosophists’ statements from some theosophical books in which they tenderly have had hinted the consideration in question. At the final section, the most important section of this paper, I want to deal with the implications of my viewpoint. I disprove and deny the consequences of the absolutely unconditioned consideration of God, and demonstrate their opposites, regarding the aforesaid consideration, consequences like the realization of the collection and the disavow of the opposites in the stair of invisibility of essence, denying the realization of names and epithets, either with dissolved glancing limited mode or extended limited one, having inherent heterogeneity with appearance and emersion in mirrors and places of appearance, the Maghib invisibility, Angha-e-Moghrib, the essence remaining, hidden treasure, divesting aspiration of absolute and inapplicable being, eternity of absolute unknown of God’s essence and the stair left unsaid.
Sayyed Hossein Hosseini
Volume 5, Issue 2 , November 2014, , Pages 21-45
Abstract
Interdisciplinary nature of ‘researching civilization’ studies expands the domain of its issues from some certain specialized categories to a wider range. This challenge appears especially in the analyzing the concept of civilization more than anywhere else; because here we deal with a multidimensional ...
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Interdisciplinary nature of ‘researching civilization’ studies expands the domain of its issues from some certain specialized categories to a wider range. This challenge appears especially in the analyzing the concept of civilization more than anywhere else; because here we deal with a multidimensional word which carries another parallel concepts along with. Concepts like human, culture, society, history, religion, are considered as synonyms of the concept of civilization. So solving the problem of understanding the unreachable sides of the meaning of the word depends on the understanding the whole body of the synonymous words; on the one hand the conceptual realm of each word should be trimmed and on the other their pseudo-systems should be convoluted in order to we could reveal their relative impact on each other and achieve a systematic definition for the word. In the introduction, after pointing out the paper's aims in determining the conceptual components of civilization (rather than defining it), we will mention tripod assumptions of ‘non-realization of Islamic civilization in the modern world’ ‘necessity of establishing a modern Islamic civilization’ and ‘the possibility of such a civilization’. Then as a first step towards a systematic analysis of the problem, we talk about the ‘set-oriented’ model which looks systematically at par implications, and then by analyzing the relation between the civilization concept and four other terms we will provide a new interpretation of civilization. The privileges and five stages of the analysis, will constitute the next part of the paper, according to which and regarding the application of ‘Western Civilization’ in the world today, it is shown that the proposed model self-consistently is capable to analyze the current situation of the dominant civilization too, and that is why the paper talks about the appearance of a comprehensive analysis. Finally, based on the achieved concept and infused quality of the western civilization, this paper will try to reveal conceptual components of civilization. We will talk about the eight components: transnational dominance; collective and human will; ‘land and cradle’ element; geographic boundaries non-limitation; human relationships inclusion; influence and supremacy; seeking excellence, and the impact on historical developments. Finally through comparing the elements of the mentioned analysis, we will have a quick look on Islamic civilization concept
Mohammad Hadi Tavakoli; Azam Ghasemi
Abstract
The question of ‘knowability of God’ is not a major topic in the works of traditional Muslim philosophers, as if taken for granted. Despite his critical view of ‘those who divest God of His Attributes’ (mu’attila) - hence, actually divest the concept of God of all conceivability ...
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The question of ‘knowability of God’ is not a major topic in the works of traditional Muslim philosophers, as if taken for granted. Despite his critical view of ‘those who divest God of His Attributes’ (mu’attila) - hence, actually divest the concept of God of all conceivability - Hakīm Sabzawārī (1797-1873) also denied the possibility of a rational knowledge of God. Sabzawārī believed that the natural light of the human reason, when intensified by the divine Light, would be capable of knowledge of God through ‘arguments’, although he also emphasized that the very Essence of God cannot be known ‘exhaustively’, since any ‘acquired knowledge aimed at fathoming the depth’ (‘ilm al-iktināhī) would be possible only through the comprehensive acquisition of the essence of the ‘object’ supposed to be known, which is impossible in the case of God Who ‘by definition’ transcends any knowable ‘essence’ (māhiyya). It is worth mentioning that Sabzawārī enriched his arguments with insightful observations taken from Hadith literature and other traditional sources.
hasan ahmadizade
Abstract
Mysticism in Islamic and western tradition has been raised many important issues about God, nature and being as a whole especially human being and his relation to God and to himself. Of course, these issues have been noticed also by other thinkers and traditions other than mystical traditions, but in ...
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Mysticism in Islamic and western tradition has been raised many important issues about God, nature and being as a whole especially human being and his relation to God and to himself. Of course, these issues have been noticed also by other thinkers and traditions other than mystical traditions, but in this article we will try to notice to the mystical tradition in Islam and western. So, the most important subject for this article is the quality of the relation between human and God. We will notice to two famous thinkers in Islamic and western mystical traditions, Saenoddin Ibn Torke and Spinoza. As we already said, the relationship between God and His creatures, especially with human beings, have been noticed in the Islamic and western mysticism and many books has been written on this issue. For mystics it is important to believe to the God's transcendence and at the same time, believe to this idea that God is in a real relation with His creatures. Indeed, mystics for explanting the possibility of relationship between God and His creatures, and also for preserving God's transcendence beyond creatures, paid more attention to this issue. Saenoddin Ibn Torke, one of the prominent mystics in the eighth and ninth AH, have been noticed to this issue by using the term Surrounding Distinction. We can see in the Spinoza's writings, issues like the Ibn Torke's Surrounding Distinction in his mystical writings. Both thinkers have been paid attention to the issue of God's nature, His attributes and His relationship to creatures. And also both thinkers by using the kinds of distinctions, tried to show that the distinction between God and His creatures, in not a contrasting one but a Surrounding one. In another word, both try to demonstrate the transcendence and incarnate (albeit not materiality) for God. Surrounding Distinction is an important concept in Islamic mysticism that mystics by using it have been tried to solve the challenging problem about the possibility of relationship between God and His creatures. Of course, they have been explained different kinds of distinction: confrontational distinction and surrounding distinction. The first kind is a metaphysical or philosophical distinction and is between two things that have characterizes differently, so one is characteristically different from another. In confrontational distinction, there in only Otherness between two things and there is not Identity between them. But, on the other hand, there is another kind of distinction that, as we said, is raised by mystics and for them is most important from confrontational distinction that is philosophically or metaphysically distinction. The necessity of surrounding distinction for mystics is in this problem that many humans sometimes say something about the relation between God and themselves but maybe they understand this relationship as an identical one. But this is not the same thing that mystics have in mind. For them God has direct relation to His creatures but God is not His creatures and is not identical with them. So this is one of most important issuers for Islamic and western mystical traditions that try to show that God is not identical with His creatures but has a direct and real relationship with them. This approach in mysticism helps to mystics for interpretation the quranicverse and many Hadiths in Islamic tradition. Also mystics can demonstrate that mysticism is not characteristically paradoxical. Spinoza too like some of Muslim mystics, explained different kind of distinction and try to show that God has direct relation to His creatures but God is not His creatures and is not identical with them. Of course, there are different interpretations on the Spinoza's view on God and His relation to creatures especially to human beings. Two kinds of these interpretations that are most important from other interpretations are logical interpretation and causal one. In this article we will try to compare between Ibn Torke and Spinoza's thought on the Surrounding Distinction between God and His creatures, according to their books. These two thinkers have similarities in their view on the Surrounding Distinction between God and His creatures. Methodically Ibn Torke and Spinoza use a compositional method means a composition of their philosophical, religious and mystical traditions. But Spinoza is in Cartesian tradition and so notice to the philosophical and geometric methods in his writings. In addition, there are some differences in Ibn Torke and Spinoza's view on God and His attributes so this subject affected on their explanation on the relation between God and His creatures.
Kazem Ostadi
Volume 4, Issue 1 , October 2013, , Pages 23-49
Abstract
In the last two decades, a theory has been presented by some Moslem philosophers, which implies that the paradise and the hell are not but the incarnations of man's behavior which appear to him in different ways. This article is an attempt to explain and criticize this viewpoint, which has been rejected ...
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In the last two decades, a theory has been presented by some Moslem philosophers, which implies that the paradise and the hell are not but the incarnations of man's behavior which appear to him in different ways. This article is an attempt to explain and criticize this viewpoint, which has been rejected by theologians and approved by philosophers. It is finally claimed that even though some of these deeds may be incarnated for the man, the retribution and tribute of man's deeds are not exclusively limited to the incarnation of deeds. There are also some questions presented in the article for the believers in the incarnation of deeds to answer.
Mohammad Hadi Tavakoli; Mohammad Saeedi Mehr
Volume 4, Issue 3 , March 2014, , Pages 23-39
Abstract
The argument of correlation which Mulla Sadra present to prove the unification of the intellect and the intelligible, although accepted by some philosophers, but the other criticized it.
Allameh Tabatabaii accepted the unification of the intellect and the intelligible but he refuted the argument of ...
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The argument of correlation which Mulla Sadra present to prove the unification of the intellect and the intelligible, although accepted by some philosophers, but the other criticized it.
Allameh Tabatabaii accepted the unification of the intellect and the intelligible but he refuted the argument of correlation by five reasons, and instead offered a new method to prove the theory. In this article, after stating all of his reasons, we have tried to reject them.
morteza shajari; zakiyeh sadat tabatabai lotfi
Volume 7, Issue 2 , August 2016, , Pages 23-44
