Philosophy
Morteza Motavalli; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the ...
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AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the testimony of others for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God. Another line of study were philosophers and logicians, who regarded testimony as one of the principles of judgement. At the same time that he was participating in these two lines of studies, Suhrawardī initiated a third line of study in his theology. In this paper, we will show Suhrawardī's contribution in this topic with two analytical and historical approaches.Suhrawardī's Epistemology of TestimonySuhrawardī has spoken about testimony in three places of his works: in logic when enumerating the principles of judgements, in methodology of jurisprudence when discussing religious proofs, and in theology when talking about the doctrine of the nobler contingent to prove platonic forms.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Logical-Fārābī and Avicenna had talked about propositions taken from the testimony of others in their logic when discussing the first principles. With this in his hand, Suhrawardī begins to contemplate on the issue. He identifies two kinds of propositions that are related to testimony: accepted premises (maqbūlāt) and widely transmitted propositions (mutawātirāt). Accepted premises are propositions that we accept from someone we have good opinion of. In al-Talwīhāt, he adds that this good opinion is because of something celestial in that person or because he is more intelligent or religious. Widely transmitted premises are propositions that we become certain of because of the plethora of the testimonies of others. He, against others, does not require for what is testified to be perceptual/sensible. This is a smart move because he demonstrates the credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer using exactly the widely transmitted propositions.Suhrawardī makes four important movements that are contrary to the Avicennan peripatetic tradition-four movements that cannot be simply passed by. They become clearer only when they are considered in the historical context and with regard to al-Ghazālī's statements. First of all, he eliminates Peripatetics’ intuitive propositions and innate propositions from the list of certain principles. Second, he brings widely transmitted and experiential propositions under one title. Thirdly, he gives them the name of intuitive propositions, while what he means by intuition is its literal meaning, not its peripatetic terminological meaning. And the fourth is that he attends to the role of evidences in them.It seems, from what we have said so far in addition to what will come in the next section from al-Ghazālī and his influence on Suhrawardī, that he thinks of the accumulated opinions as the reason why widely transmitted propositions are certain.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Methodology of JurisprudenceOne of religious proofs for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God is what is transmitted by testimony. Here, Suhrawardī takes one of al-Ghazālī's books-i.e., al-Mustaṣfā-and writes accordingly. One of al-Ghazālī's contributions in this discussion is that he eliminates intuitive propositions from the six self-evident propositions and introduces another sixth way to knowledge base on evidences. Suhrawardī takes the idea of evidences and their role in knowledge firmly. It is from here that we can see the idea of evidences in his philosophical works.He also mentions some requirements for the one who gives testimony such as being just and having good vision. This, and other things, could show that he is not totally individualist and internalist about testimony.Testimony in Suhrawardī's TheologyIn theology, Suhrawardī, innovatively and for the first time, brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer. Sometimes, testimony is in important matters and by experts. When that is the case, Suhrawardī says, one or two testimony is enough to become certain about what is testified. For example, when one or two astronomers testify about something related to their specialty, that brings us knowledge and certainty about that thing. This is the way of science. He continues that when this is so, the testimony of religious experiencers should also bring us knowledge. Here, testimony is as valuable as testimony in science, and even more valuable. This is because the number of testifiers here are more, they are sages and prophets that moral truth is certain in them, and their testimony is about what they have seen directly not what they have inferred from their observations.ConclusionAlthough Suhrawardī relies heavily on al-Fārābi, Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī, he makes a great contribution to the epistemology of testimony. His point that the certainty of widely transmitted propositions is because of the accumulated opinions developed by Shahīd Ṣadr later on. His brilliant innovation is that he brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer.
Mahdi Azimi; javad soufi
Abstract
IntroductionMuslim Peripatetic philosophers believe that physical objects are composites out of matter and form, holding that each natural kind involves a form other than the physical form, with which physical objects turn into various kinds, hence the label “specific [i.e. kind-related] form” ...
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IntroductionMuslim Peripatetic philosophers believe that physical objects are composites out of matter and form, holding that each natural kind involves a form other than the physical form, with which physical objects turn into various kinds, hence the label “specific [i.e. kind-related] form” (or form of species). Suhrawardī opposes Peripatetic philosopher on this matter, raising many objections against the view. Mullā Ṣadrā believes that Peripatetic philosophers are right, responding to Suhrawardī’s objections. In this article, we consider and criticize the arguments by Peripatetic philosophers, the objections by Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā’s replies to the latter. We argue that although some of Suhrawardī’s objections do not work, attempts by Peripatetic philosophers and defenses by Mullā Ṣadrā do not suffice as proofs for the existence of specific forms.Research BackgroundIn his book, Ḥikmat Ishrāq (2017), Yazdanpanah formulates Suhrawardī’s critiques of the Peripatetic arguments for the existence of specific forms, supporting Mullā Ṣadrā’s replies to Suhrawardī. The article “Recognition of the concept of nature in Suhrawardī’s philosophy in light of criticizing the specific form” addresses why Suhrawardī rejects the existence of specific forms and what implications it has, but it does not grapple with the arguments themselves (Dibaji and Nasekhian 2020). Qavam Safari in his “Theory of form in Aristotle’s philosophy” (2015) and Ahmadi in his “Substantial form” (2003) study the form and its features and applications for Aristotle. Kompani Zare makes a short reference to Suhrawardī’s critiques of the Peripatetic account of specific forms in his “A brief survey of Suhrawardī’s natural science” (2015).Arguments for the Existence of Specific FormsFirst argument: physical objects have various effects. For instance, water has effects and features different from those of the air. The source of those effects cannot be the physical form shared by all physical objects. Moreover, it cannot be the hyle, which is pure potentiality and is thus the same in all physical objects. There should therefore be another source in physical objects, which is the cause of those effects, and that is the specific form.Second argument: In each kind of physical object, there is an entity over and above the hyle (or matter) and physical form, which is exclusive to and inseparable from that kind. That entity is either an accident or a substance. The first horn is false because this entity constitutes matter, which is a substance, while an accident cannot constitute substance. This constitutive component of matter is a specific form. For just as matter is not void of physicality, it cannot be imagined without being exclusively attached to a kind of physical object.Third argument: when a form changes, the physical object’s quiddity changes too. So, a form is not an accident in that a thing’s quiddity does not vary with the change of its accidents. The thing with the change of which the quiddity (our answer to the question of what it is in its substance) changes is a substance, rather than an accident. Otherwise, a substance would consist of accidents.Fourth argument: specific forms are parts of specific substances. The part of substance is a substance. For instance, the quiddity of fire is not exhausted by its physicality, but consists of a physical object and an entity with which the nature of fire comes to be.Critique and Analysis of the ArgumentsAn objection against all the arguments for specific forms is that they all are quiatic proofs (al-burhān al-innī), which are not characteristically certainty-conferring. This is because form the existence of an effect, one can know about the existence of its cause, but one cannot thereby know its nature. We cannot thus say with certainty that the cause of various effects issued from physical objects is their specific forms. The cause might be something else, whose nature is totally obscure to us.The objection against the first argument is that the horns are not logically restricted to those enumerated in the argument. So, the logical possibility remains that something else is the source of those effects, such as a certain combination between component particles of physical objects as discovered by modern sciences. Another objection is that the combination of physical objects out of matter and form, which is the basis of this argument, is an analytic combination, and thus, form and matter are analytic, rather than external, parts of physical objects. From the fact that, analytically speaking, physical objects have such parts, it does not follow that they have those parts in the external world as well.The middle term in the second argument is a difference we see in physical objects, rather than being constitutive of matter, which Mullā Ṣadrā adduces as evidence for his claim. This is because being constitutive of matter is a middle term for proving the substantiality of forms, rather than its very existence. Just like the first argument, it assumes the existence of matter and physical form to show that there should be a third entity in physical objects. On this account, all objections against the first argument also work against this argument.As for the third argument, it is true that when essential properties of a thing change, its quiddity (the way we answer the question “what is it?”) change too. However, the reverse of this claim, which is deployed in this argument, is not always true; that is, we cannot say that whenever the answer to the question of “what is it?” changes, the essential properties also change. For instance, when water turns into ice, the answer to its “what is it?” question changes, but this is not to say that its form changes too.The fourth argument does not provide us with an independent argument for the existence of specific forms. Indeed, it is based on the preceding arguments, which makes it vulnerable to Suhrawardī’s objection: the principle that the part of a substance is a substance is true only if we know that the thing in question is a substance in all respects.ConclusionIt turns out that none of the arguments above suffice as proofs for the existence of specific forms because, on the one hand, all of these are quiatic proofs, which cannot apply to quiddities, and on the other hand, each argument is susceptible to separate objections.
Akbar Amiri; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
The quiddity of paranormal phenomena has been interesting and questionable throughout human history and mankind has alwayes tried to underestand it in format of various names and titles. when it is talked about these phenomena , some poeple try to prove them and others try to deny them; ...
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The quiddity of paranormal phenomena has been interesting and questionable throughout human history and mankind has alwayes tried to underestand it in format of various names and titles. when it is talked about these phenomena , some poeple try to prove them and others try to deny them; Without having a common and precise definition of these phenomena in advance. in other words; Before giving a reason for existence or non-existence of "X" , we must have a precise definition of it. that has all the conditions of a correct and logical definition, Otherwise any discussion about " X" will be useless and other than adding ambiguity, it does not help to clarify the matter. for this reason, in this article we have tried to examine the most popular definitions of paranormal phenomenom that has been presented so far and after analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of each definition over each other to provide the basis for reaching a fairly accurate definition of these phenomena. our position in this article is that it is possible to reach a accurate definition of paranormal phenomenon. we try to pave the way for a better definition , which in our opinion is the ninth definition; by showing the defects and strengths of each definition. we must note that our claim in this article is not to provide a very precise definition but it is to show this matter that contrary to popular belief; provided definitions of paranormal phenomenon are not perfect. however, it is possible to take steps and try to achieve the almost accurate definition that does not have the drawbacks of previous definitions. although there is a long way to go to reach an absolutely accurate definition and walking this way requires many steps; This article can be one of the first steps. Methods and Matterial: our research method in this article is a rational method that includes deductive method. however, we also used experimental data to show the accuracy of our results. Results and Discussion: Before defining the paranormal phenomenon, a distinction must be made between three categories: normal, unnormal and paranormal phenomena. Phenomena that we call paranormal are divided into two categories: the first category is phenomena that are "aparrantly" paranormal that with the advancement of science, we may no longer consider them paranormal, The second category is phenomena that are truly paranormal. Although ordinary people do not have a clear criterion for distinguishing between normal and unnormal phenomena ;None of them doubts the existence of unnormal phenomena, but still they doubt the existence of paranormal phenomen and are skeptical about putting them in the category of unnormal phenomena. however, there are phenomena that are candidates for the paranormal category our definition should be such that it includes aparrantly paranormal phenomena. Since Ducasse's definition of paranormal phenomena is based on natural causation, his definition is not accurate, beacause causality in paranormal phenomena may be another type of causality. Definitions based on scientific inexplicability are also not appropriate because first, many natural phenomena, such as gravity, do not yet have a scientific explanation and yet no one calls them paranormal. Secondly, if we consider it absolutely scientifically inexplicable, we have denied the possibility of their occurrence. Broad's definition, which is based on basic limiting principles, is not correct either. because the exact number of these principles is not known and there is doubt in their basicity. Scriven's definition, while introducing the component of consciousness, is still ambiguous. The ninth definition, which is the one we have provided, has at least one major advantage over the other definitions; and that by knowing these phenomena beyond time and space considers phenomena such as precognition and clairvoyance to be rationally explainable without considering them empirically explicable. Conclusion: The first step in explaining paranormal phenomena is to try to reach an accurate definition of them. In parapsychology, different conceptual definitions of these phenomena have been presented. which are mainly based on scientific inexplicability The definition based on scientific inexplicability, if it is limited to a specific time, then includes normal and unnormal phenomena as well and it will no longer be an exact definition, even if it is not limited to a specific time and we consider the supernatural phenomenon to be absolutely inexplicable, then we have denied the possibility of its occurrence. In Islamic philosophy and mysticism, there are valuable discussions about the paranormal phenomenon but they have two problems, the first of which is their dependence on religious and theological issues and the lack of an independent and phenomenological research on them. another problem is that most of their definitions of a paranormal phenomenon are based on mentioning referents of concept of this phenomenon and fail to provide a precise conceptual definition. Since in the first eight definitions, the criterion of scientific inexplicability constitutes at least one of the key elements of the definition of the paranormal phenomenon. until we have a precise and clear definition of science and its scope, none of them can be considered a proper definition of the paranormal phenomenon. however, it seems that the ninth definition, that is, the definition we have given, does not have this defect because it is not based on scientific inexplicability and it has advantages that even Scriven's definition lacks. simplicity, comprehensiveness and compatibility with customary understanding are important advantages of this definition over previous definitions. therefore, until we reach a completely accurate definition of these phenomena, the ninth definition is better and more accurate than other definitions.
mehdi azimi
Abstract
One of the important voids in Iranian, even World, logical Studies is absence of a comprehensive History of Islamic Logic. The works has been done in the East and West hitherto are steps for peregrinating a long road which should be continued many years. Writing a history of Islamic Logic naturally should ...
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One of the important voids in Iranian, even World, logical Studies is absence of a comprehensive History of Islamic Logic. The works has been done in the East and West hitherto are steps for peregrinating a long road which should be continued many years. Writing a history of Islamic Logic naturally should be begun by the study of the development of Porphyry’s Isagoge, a book that always was the first part of all logical writings in the history of Islamic Logic. Doing this, in turn, should be begun by the study of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s Isagoge, a paraphrase that firstly introduced Porphyry’s Isagoge to the Islamic World.
morteza doroudi javan; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Amshaspandan, are the best traits or creatures of Ahura Mazda in Zoroastrian belief. We have tried in this research using the content analysis method to examine the Direct and indirect signs and indications of Shahrivar Amshaspand, as one of the Amshaspandan in the works of Shahabuddin Suhrawardi, Iranian ...
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Amshaspandan, are the best traits or creatures of Ahura Mazda in Zoroastrian belief. We have tried in this research using the content analysis method to examine the Direct and indirect signs and indications of Shahrivar Amshaspand, as one of the Amshaspandan in the works of Shahabuddin Suhrawardi, Iranian philosopher. By exploring this text, all the items containing the name of Shahrivar were counted and extracted. Also, after Induction the general features of Amshaspandan and specific features ofShahrivar, we searched for the signs of this Amshaspand in the text. As a result of this research, finding the presence of Shahrivar as the supreme light and divine authority , Absence of Shahrivar as the Lord of Kinds in this text , Gathering the strongest signs of Shahrivar in Persian texts while mentioning Iranian mythological heroes and other achievements can be mentioned.
Seyed Mohammad Amin Moshkforoosh; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
According to psychologism, laws of logic and mathematics are not anything except generalized accounts of thought patterns which govern human's mind. Therefore, the content of laws of logic is merely subjective idea created by the human mind. If the structure of the mind was different from our actual ...
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According to psychologism, laws of logic and mathematics are not anything except generalized accounts of thought patterns which govern human's mind. Therefore, the content of laws of logic is merely subjective idea created by the human mind. If the structure of the mind was different from our actual structure, then the laws of logic would be something different from the laws existing now. For Frege, this theory is on the basis of the conceptualism and idealism of the meaning of the words. Frege believes that the meanings of propositions, which he called "Thought", are a distinct matter from "Ideas", which exist in every individual's mind. Frege's arguments endeavor to prove it via two basic reasonings, as stated in this article. The absence of common discourse, which changes language to an individual matter, as well as the presentation of "epistemological relativism" are two vicious consequences, which is the course of accepting the matter that there is no distinction between "Thought" and "Idea". In Frege’s view, if psychologism were true, everything would be reduced to "Idea". And if everything reduces to "Idea", "Thought" will be "Idea" as well; however, "Thought" is not "Idea". Therefore, psychalogism is void. When Frege tries to explain why Thought is not the same as Idea, he starts with the Idea properties. Frege believes that Ideas are dependent on individual (Individual-dependent), and are always dependent, hence, cannot exist without their owner independently. Each Idea only belongs to one person (individual) can never be the owner of another’s Idea. Our own Ideas naturally and essentially are so related to our consciousness realm that each Idea owned by every person is distinct from our own Idea only belonging to ours. If two persons have one Idea, it is necessary that Ideas exist independently from them, which is in contrast to the hypothesis and essence of Idea. In his first arguments, Frege declares that if Thought is the same as Idea, it would not be possible to have common perception about one Thought, therefore, identical meaning, and as a result conversation (common discourse), would not exist. So, language would change into an individual private matter. This outcome is a result of individual-dependent (relative to subjects) relative to characteristic of Idea. His second argument is in the same direction as the first one, stating that if Thought is the same as Idea, contradiction between two Thoughts would not be possible. Because there is no identical criterion by which people (person who are communicating) could evaluate their perception, verify the validity of their viewpoints, and discover the contradiction of their thoughts toward others. Also, dispute over Truth would be vain. It is like the quarrel between two persons who fight over being an original 100 Marks banknote in their pocket. Each of them believes that only the banknote in his/her own pocket is original, then all the science would not be only as superstition. Frege in his second arguments illustrate that epistemological relativism and individualism are vicious consequents of psychologism. This research investigates the criticism of some classic logicians and contemporary thinkers on Islamic philosophy. They have declared that Frege does not distinguish between conceptualism and psychologism and also between existence of Idea and its indication. Moreover, they criticize Frege's affirmative theory about grasping of thought. In this research, it becomes clear that Frege's objections to conceptualism (psychological individualism) are still valid. There is no convincing reply to these objections yet. The approach of this research concentrates on the Frege's negative reasoning in the criticism of psychologism, not on the Frege’s affirmative views on the manner of Thought perceptions.
Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ...
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Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ‘no’. In Hekmat al-Ishehraq,Suhrawardihas three basic criticisms to the theory of completeessential definition, some of which can be generalized to the incomplete essential definition and also accidental definitions: (1) conflicts with the conventional use of language; (2) the incomprehensibility of the realdifferences; (3) the perpetual probability of neglect of one or more intrinsic features. The bold veins of these three critiques can be found in the treatise of Ibn Sina’sal-Hodoodva al-Ta'lighat, along with two other criticisms: (4) theperpetual probability of theacquisition ofrequisite rather than essence; and (5) the perpetual probability of the acquisition of remote genus instead of close genus. The only possible definition fromSuhrawardi point of view is the definition of quiddity through the combination of general accidents that are belonged to thatquiddity, provided that the definition proceeds in the epistemological trades between definiens and definiendum and on the basis ofdirect(unmediated) knowledge.This theory is also the extender of the line Ibn Sina has drawn in Al-Ta'lighatva Al-Isharat. Therefore, Suhrawardi'slogic of definition complementsthe Avicenna's logicofdefinition.
amirhossein pournamdar sarcheshmeh; mehdi azimi
Volume 7, Issue 3 , November 2016, , Pages 61-80
Abstract
Abstract
Almost all Islamic philosophers have directly or indirectly addressed the problem of ‘individuality’ and have provided some answers to the problem. Thus, one can review and survey all aspects of this discussion in the Islamic philosophy tradition, but here we intend to address just ...
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Abstract
Almost all Islamic philosophers have directly or indirectly addressed the problem of ‘individuality’ and have provided some answers to the problem. Thus, one can review and survey all aspects of this discussion in the Islamic philosophy tradition, but here we intend to address just one aspect, i.e. the Farabi's role in the evolution of this historical discussion, and in this way, to shed some lights on the neglected and less known angles of the rational tradition of Muslim philosophers. One of those who put the issue more and more at the center of the attention of thinkers is Mulla Sadra who, as a result of his philosophy of the Principality of Existence, expressed exuberant materials about individuality. Mulla Sadra attributes the idea of individuality- existence equality to Farabi. For scholars of the ancient period or even the contemporary period, there has never been any doubt in the authenticity of this assignment. This article seeks to reconsider this established attribution and through some textual and historical documents shows that this assignment can be disputed and even the issue that Farabi has had discussed ‘individuality’ is very suspicious.
Mahdi Azimi
Volume 7, Issue 1 , May 2016, , Pages 107-127
Abstract
سهروردی چرا شکل چهارم را از دستگاه قیاسیاش حذف میکند؟ آیا دستگاه قیاسی او، همانند دستگاه قیاسی ارسطو، به رغم فقدان شکل چهارم پذیرای آن است؟ یا تنگناهایی دارد که نمیتواند ...
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سهروردی چرا شکل چهارم را از دستگاه قیاسیاش حذف میکند؟ آیا دستگاه قیاسی او، همانند دستگاه قیاسی ارسطو، به رغم فقدان شکل چهارم پذیرای آن است؟ یا تنگناهایی دارد که نمیتواند شکل چهارم را صورتبندی کند؟ فرضیۀ این مقاله گزینۀ دوم است. دستگاه سهروردی در تنگنای سه اصل قرار داد که در این جستار «اصل بستگی»، «اصل ناوابستگی»، و «اصل یگانگی» نامیده شدهاند. شکل چهارم نمیتواند هم به روش سهروردی صورتبندی شود و هم این اصول سهگانه را حفظ کند. این نشانگر یک محدودیت مهمِ دستگاه قیاسی سهروردی در سنجش با دستگاه قیاسی ارسطو است.
