Abstract Abstract One can inquire about the definition or interpretation of the ‘subject’ in various philosophical systems. So, the comparative analysis and interpretation of the subject can be counted as one of the most important issues is meta-epistemology. In this regard, this paper seeks to know given that the identity of the subject in modern philosophy and for philosophers such as Kant is one-dimensional, how many dimensions it has in contemporary Islamic philosophy which emerged through confrontation and dialogue with modern philosophy? Here we will focus on the views of one of contemporary Islamic philosopher, namely, Morteza Motahhari. The question is that: what is Motahhari's viewpoint on the dimensions and aspects of the subject, as one of the commentators of Islamic philosophy and contemporary epistemology designers of Islamic philosophy confronting with modern philosophy, particularly Kant’s philosophy? According to Motahhari's ideas and thoughts, the subject has three types of epistemological, ontological and psychological (philosophical) aspects. Its epistemological and scientific aspects relate to his theory of intuitive rationality based on secondary intelligibles and self-evident judgments. The ontological aspect must be sought in elements such as the theory of mental existence and perception abstraction. And ultimately, the psychological (philosophical) aspect is associated with the components such as Knowledge by presence, perceptual power, and so on.

Abstract   Abstract Mulla Sadra and Zagzebski expanded the scope of knowledge in such a way that it includes the concept of understanding. They argued that the subject can, by achieving rational and ethical virtues voluntarily provide suitable grounds for the formation of true beliefs, they also believe that ethical vices prevent the achievement of true belief. In other words, Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra argue that the knower can intentionally develop some of the moral and intellectual merits/virtues and remove vices so that a proper ground is created for the formation and development of true beliefs. In their view, the subject who has the motive and intention of knowledge acquiring can achieve truth by preparing the proper ground. Is the domain of valid knowledge, in Mulla Sadra’s epistemological and philosophical theory, extensive enough to include understanding,? And if so, in Mulla Sadra's opinion, what factors contribute to the formation and validity of understanding as the underlying causes?

Abstract Abstract From the second year after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, the empiricist-psychological interpretation of it began; the first collection of these interpretations was known as the Guttingen review. This psychological -empiricist approach was developed by Fries, Herbart and Benke with more intensity in the last decade of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century.  Meanwhile, Fries’ role in designing and promoting the psychological interpretation of Kant is much more prominent. Psychological interpretation has a special significance since it has prepared the ground for the emergence of important trends- such as naturalism, materialism, psychologism, and positivism- in the second half of the nineteenth century and the twenty-first century. However this significant approach usually is neglected due to the dominance of new-Hegelian narrations of history of philosophy- which instead of psychological interpretation, endorse the interpretive tradition of the transcendental idealism of Kant. Considering that Kant philosophy has revived in the latter decades of twenty-first century, particularly after the publication of Strawson’s the bounds of sense in 1975, it is needed to address this interpretive approach and its prominent figure, i.e. Fries.

Abstract Abstract Almost all Islamic philosophers have directly or indirectly addressed the problem of ‘individuality’ and have provided some answers to the problem. Thus, one can review and survey all aspects of this discussion in the Islamic philosophy tradition, but here we intend to address just one aspect, i.e. the Farabi's role in the evolution of this historical discussion, and in this way, to shed some lights on the neglected and less known angles of the rational tradition of Muslim philosophers. One of those who put the issue more and more at the center of the attention of thinkers is Mulla Sadra who, as a result of his philosophy of the Principality of Existence, expressed exuberant materials about individuality. Mulla Sadra attributes the idea of individuality- existence equality to Farabi. For scholars of the ancient period or even the contemporary period, there has never been any doubt in the authenticity of this assignment. This article seeks to reconsider this established attribution and through some textual and historical documents shows that this assignment can be disputed and even the issue that Farabi has had discussed ‘individuality’ is very suspicious.

Abstract Abstract Mirdamad, for the first time, defines or interprets the secondary intelligible concepts in such a way that are compatible with and include the characteristics of philosophical concepts. In his definition, primary intelligibles are concepts that refer to distinct and objective things in the real world, and logical and philosophical secondary intelligible, on the contrary, have not any extension in the world and so do not refer to any independent and distinct objectivity. In Mirdamad's theory, being secondary intelligible amounts Abstractedness and non-objectivity, and being primary intelligible amounts principality and objectivity. From his point of view, essential concepts and relations and their negative and positive requirements are primary intelligible, and existence is counted as secondary intelligible. In fact the abstractedness of existence means that it is secondary intelligible concept, and the principality of quiddity means that the essential concepts are primary intelligible.  Mirdamad's theory faces difficulties that arise from the lack of attention to various meanings and abstractednesses of existence.

Abstract Abstract    Ashʿarism is one of the Sunni theological schools. The apparent similarity between some of Asahira’s principal beliefs and mystical teachings has led many to regard the great Muslim mystics, including Rumi (Mowlana Jalaluddin Mohammad Balkhi), as the followers of Asharite School. However the basics and principles of mysticism and the theology are essentially independent and different. In this paper, some of the apparent similarities between Rumi's mystical opinions and Asahira’s beliefs are expressed, and then we try to uncover the deep difference between them and discuss them briefly. For this purpose, their arguments, especially on ‘good and evil’, ‘determinism and free will’, ‘the oneness of God’s actions and rejecting causality’, and ‘Sighting God’ are examined, and ultimately we will answer our primary question: ‘Is Rumi Ash'arist, in terms of his beliefs?’ It will be noticed that the mysticism and theology are so different and even incommensurable that their analogy implies ignorance of both intellectual trends.