Abstract Abstract Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi is one of the Iranian Muslim philosophers who lived in Safavid era and was a contemporary of Mulla Sadra. Tabrizi, however, rejected many principles of Sadra’s philosophy including the principle of the principality of existence. Tabrizi firmly defended the principality of quiddity and at the same time endorsed a kind of objectivity of existence. In this paper, we first examine Tabrizi’s view through exploring his definitions for ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ and his picture of the relation between them. Then we raise some fundamental objections against his arguments for the principality of quiddity.

Abstract  Abstract The purpose of this research is to study, in a descriptive-analytic way, one important similarity, among the other, between the philosophical views of Plotinus and Mulla Sadra on ‘soul’ in three periods: before, along, and after the body. Both have accepted the existence of soul before the body with minor differences. Regarding the second period, Plotinus believes that soul is essentially separated from body despite some interactions. But Mulla Sadra holds that soul in some periods is united with body but due to substantial motion it gradually leaves the body and finally departs the body entirely by death. According to Plotinus, soul returns to its essential position by death but retains worldly imaginations. But Mulla Sadra holds that soul totally leaves the body and lives in self-created formal and otherworldly body. The major difference between the two philosophers is that Plotinus believes in reincarnation for undeveloped humans, while Mulla Sadra totally rejects the idea of reincarnation.

Abstract   Abstract The main objective of this study is to analyze the Kantian ‘existence’ from the perspective of Wolf’s, Hume’s, and Islamic philosophers’ views on existence. Since Kant addresses ‘existence’ in Critique of Pure Reason in two positions, first in the transcendental analysis section in the ‘pure categories of understanding’, as a component of ‘direction’ category among the famous four categories, and again in transcendental dialectic in criticizing ontological argument, this paper aiming to provide a comprehensive and coherent explanation of these two positions, shows that Kant's transcendental dialectic, to avoid dogmatic idealism and skeptical idealism, appeals to the giveness of existence, influenced by  Hume, to criticize the ontological argument, but in the transcendental analysis which is focused on our understanding of existence, considers, influenced by Wolf, existence as the degrees of our knowledge of propositions. Also establishing a basic equivalence between ‘the principality of existence in the transcendent philosophy’ and ‘the giveness of existence in Hume’s view’ and ‘the principality of quiddity and the abstractness of existence in Suhrawardi’s view’ and ‘its being subsidiary in Wolf’s approach’, this paper uses some conceptual tools to analyze ‘existence’ in transcendent philosophy and Illumination Wisdom and to explain ‘existence’ in Kant’ view.

Abstract Abstract According to the theological fatalism, future matters are necessary and this necessity makes them unalterable; so, human beings are not able to make the future by their free will and this is incompatible with human freedom.    Based on theological fatalism, there are four alternatives: first, accepting divine foreknowledge and denying human freedom, which is in fact affirming theological fatalism; second, accepting human freedom and rejecting divine foreknowledge; third, accepting both; and fourth, refusing both.    Allameh Tabatabaei and William Craig accept the compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human freedom; consequently both thinkers believe that divine knowledge about human free actions is due to His knowledge of conditions and properties of the action. Thus, God knows what the subject will freely do in any circumstance.

Abstract   Finding a solution to get out of Arab-Islamic blocked thinking area, Muhammad Abid Jaberi has resorted to analyzing Arab-Islamic ‘tradition’ and its past. He has recognized three thought systems i.e. explication, illumination, and demonstrative episteme, with a historical and structural view, and in a critical rationality framework. Historicity and structural methodology have leaded him to deconstruct Arab-Islamic thinking area, and at the same time impose some structures to it. Reviewing Jaberi’s system of thought, this article concludes that, because of its historicity and structuralism, Jaberi’s thought have to be ideological to acquire its desirable goal; an ideology which is resulted from modern scientism, historicity and structuralism in Jaberi’s view.

Abstract Allameh Taba-tabaei (1281-1360 Hijri) is the first contemporary thinker who has paid serious attention to epistemological discussions. In his book, philosophy principles and realism method, written to clarify the contrariety between Islamic philosophy principles and materialism, he removes doubts instilled by sophists, skeptics and empiricism about confidence in reason (intellect) in attaining truths, and introduces Islamic philosophy as a realistic constitution based on rationalism rather than idealism. Allameh has been well-informed of the serious attention of European philosophers especially after Kant to epistemological discussions, and has had conscientious effort to explain the defense of Islamic philosophers of intellect dignity and the validity of its issues. He has also paid attention to the unique role of intellect in the comprehension of religious facts, and comments on important points in Almizan-Exegesis regarding this issue. It can be said that Allameh Taba-tabaei defended rationality in two fronts. First, against excessive sensualism and positivism that resulted in negation and rejection of all kinds of philosophical and religious sovereignty, and culminated in skepticism and relativism in all realms of belief and ethics. Second, against literalism (formalism) and Akhbarism, which through denying the authority of rationally, disparaged the bases of revelation itself and have led to agnosticism and obscurantism at the same time. This article considers the position of Allameh on these two issues.