Contemporary Wisdom

Biannual Journal Philosophy

constructed concept and real truth: A new explanation for independent formation of constructed concepts in Allamah Tabatabai's view

Pages 31-65

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2025.50836.2090

Ehsan Kermanshahani; Hadi Sabzi

Abstract Hadi Sabzi[1]
Abstract
"Constructed (i'tibari) Concepts" is a widely used structure in various fields of humanities and Islamic studies. However, the difficulty of finding a concept that is inherently Constructed on the one hand, and Allamah Tabatabai's analysis of Constructed perceptions on the other, has led to the belief that proposition is inherently Constructed, and the concept is called constructed figuratively. In this paper, by descriptive-analytical method, we will discuss the possibility of independently formation of Constructed Concepts in various ways and present a new explanation in which truly Constructed Concepts can exist. to this end, various views on metaphor in Islamic thought have been studied and evaluated and based on them and their weakness, according to a theory that is derivable from some Allamah's phrases, we have established a new view that the concept itself is Constructed, while it's attribution is real (non-figurative). The result of the research shows that "Constructed" is not just a description of propositions, but a group of concepts are truly Constructed. Examples of these concepts have been presented and the impact of this approach in epistemological fields has been shown; and finally, we have clarified the wide range of Constructed Concepts, their function, and the criteria governing them, as well as their definition manner.
Keywords: metaphor, extension of meaning, independence of Constructed concepts, real truth, Allamah Tabatabai

1. Introduction
The Constructed (i'tibārī) concept is a common expression in various fields of the humanities and Islamic studies, especially in the writings of Allameh Tabataba'i. Some commentators and critics, with regard to Allameh's analysis of Constructed perceptions and its connection to intellectual figurative language (majāz 'aqlī) in metaphor, have maintained that what is inherently Constructed is the proposition, and that the concept is called Constructed figuratively. Within the field of metaphor, three views are notable among Muslim scholars of rhetoric: lexical figurative language, intellectual figurative language, and semantic expansion. Allameh defines Constructed perception as "giving the definition of one thing to something else through the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty (wahm)," and with this definition, it becomes clear that he draws upon the second view, in proposing his theory of Constructed perceptions. characteristic of intellectual figurative language is that in a metaphorical proposition, without alteration of the meaning of the predicate, the subject is posited the alleged instance of the predicate. Given the metaphorical nature of attribution, it must be said that the proposition itself is qualified with the attribute of Constructed, and not the subject or the predicate. The fundamental question of this research is whether we can offer a reasonable and satisfactory account in which the concepts themselves are inherently Constructed.
2. Materials & Methods
In this article, through a descriptive-analytical method, and by examining Allameh's writings and some commentators and critics, as well as by evaluating views related to metaphor among Muslim scholars, we argue that it is possible to speak of concepts that are inherently Constructed.
3. Discussion & Result
3.1. The Problem of Inherently Constructed Concepts
If we place this analysis, which concludes that only propositions are Constructed, alongside Allameh's other view that the human mind does not independently create concepts, but rather obtains concepts as a result of connection with their real instances, this view is strengthened that Constructed is applied to concepts "leniently", and that what is truly Constructed is the proposition.
3.2. The Challenge Posed by "Constructed Concepts"
Nevertheless, the expression "Constructed concepts" or "Constructed meanings", are used in numerous instances in Allameh's writings. In some cases, he places these concepts as divisions alongside Real (or literal) concepts that have a cognitive function, meaning that these types of concepts do not have a cognitive function and are merely concepts pertaining to the realm of action. This point indicates that we cannot easily regard "Constructed concepts" as merely a matter of lenient expression, and at least at first glance, it seems that he genuinely believes that some concepts lack a cognitive role and serve only a practical function, and that the concept itself, and not the proposition, is constructed due to emotional factors and practical purposes.

3.3. Proposed Solutions for the occurrence of Inherently Constructed Concepts
3.3.1. Manipulation of The Estimative Faculty in Real (literal) Concept
One possible solution is the manipulation of the Estimative Faculty in Real concept to bring about inherently Constructed concepts. When we ascribe "lion" to jack, and regard him as an alleged instance of lion, we know that "lion" is ascribed to him with some kind of manipulation. What is meant is that "lion" is not ascribed to him with all of its conceptual precision. Therefore, the Estimative Faculty manipulates the meaning of the predicate and constructs a new meaning. drawback of this solution is that merely manipulating of Estimative Faculty in a concept and highlighting certain features while downplaying others doesn't cause the concept to lose its knowledge-generating nature and to be oriented toward the realm of action.
3.3.2. The Constructed Concept Arising from Constructed Propositions
A second solution is to consider the Constructed concept as arising from Constructed propositions. In other words, Constructed concepts are, first of all, composite concepts; that is, they inherently include a proposition or propositions; and secondly, the kind of propositions hidden within them are Constructed and practical Assertions. If a composite concept inherently includes Constructed propositions, this concept also loses its cognitive function and becomes a Constructed concept. Here, one can draw upon Sakaki's notion of metaphor as semantic expansion. The Constructed concept of "Head" has two instances, one customary and the other uncommon; but both are considered its real instances. drawback of this view is that, based on Sakaki's perspective, we ultimately expand the concept in such a way that it truly includes both customary and uncommon instances. The new concept constructed based on Sakaki's view is an expansion of the previous Real Concept, rather than the emergence of a new and Constructed concept. Moreover, the expanded concept must apply truly (non-figuratively) to both the customary and uncommon instances; whereas, in inherently Constructed concepts, application to the uncommon instance is metaphorical.
3.3.3. The Author's Chosen View: Constructed Concept and real (literal) truth
The preferred view is that the real concept does not contradict its being Constructed. A real concept and A Constructed concept can each have real or Constructed (figurative) truth, which together form four states:

real concept and real truth. 2. real concept and Constructed truth. 3. Constructed concept and real truth. 4. Constructed concept and Constructed truth.

Case 3 is a concept that is truly Constructed, but its truth is real. With this account, the two aforementioned problems with Sakaki's view also disappear; because the new concept is entirely Constructed and not an expansion of the previous real concept; and furthermore, its application to something that is not its instance is a Constructed application.
3.4. Categories of Concepts
Thus, we can now categorize concepts into two types: concepts that are knowledge-generating, and concepts that have a practical function and are related to emotional motivations and practical purposes. The nature of this latter kind of concepts is such that no cognitive or epistemic function can be attributed to them.
4. Conclusion
in Allameh's viewpoint, one can defend inherently Constructed concepts. By analyzing their formation process, we can show that none of the views of metaphor among Muslim rhetoricians are fully successful in explaining the formation of these concepts. Although these concepts are inherently Constructed, they have real application to their primary instances and figurative application to others. By finding concepts related to the realm of action, we can also explain how social systems are formed. Corresponding to real or literal concepts, there are Constructed concepts, and corresponding to the real world, there is a Constructed world consisting of positions and institutions. Moreover, the mechanism of defining Constructed concepts is distinct from that of defining real concepts, just as argumentation in Constructed propositions is distinct from logical proof.

Biannual Journal Philosophy

A posteriori and quasi-a priori proofs of God's existence in the Holy Quran

Pages 107-136

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.52253.2112

mohammad javad dakami

Abstract Abstract Proving the foundational tenets of belief in Islam is possible only through sound rational arguments. The Holy Quran, in its call to monotheism and description of divine attributes, employs rational reasoning, with demonstrative proof (burhan) holding a special place in Quranic arguments due to its soundness in both form and content.
Issue: What types of arguments for theology are present in the Quran? Have a priori (limmi) arguments been used in the Quran to prove and introduce God?
Method: This research, using a descriptive-analytical method and through a study of Quranic verses and authoritative exegeses, examines and analyzes the various types of theological arguments in the Holy Quran.
Findings: The majority of theological arguments in the Quran are a posteriori (inni), proceeding from effect to cause—an approach compatible with the general level of understanding of the Quran's audience. However, considering the definition of an a priori argument and due to the absence of a cause for God, the Quran does not employ strictly a priori arguments. Nonetheless, in explaining and proving God's affirmative and negative attributes, the Quran employs a type of non-a posteriori reasoning, termed "quasi-a priori" arguments in this research.
Conclusion: Contrary to the belief of some researchers, not all theological arguments in the Quran are a posteriori; non-a posteriori (quasi-a priori) arguments are also used for theology. These arguments are primarily structured based on inherent concomitances and essential implications. Keywords: The Holy Quran, A Posteriori Argument (Burhan Inni), A Priori Argument (Burhan Limmi), Quasi-A Priori Argument, Theology. Introduction The Holy Qur’an presents itself as a guide for all people and, in order to realize this guidance, calls its audience to reflection and contemplation upon its verses. Accordingly, when addressing people—and especially when arguing for truths—it fully adheres to the general rules of reasoning and logic, and does not put forward anything contrary to intellect and rationality. For this reason, the guidance-oriented verses of the Holy Qur’an are often accompanied by diverse rational arguments in terms of both their material and formal aspects. Philosophers and logicians maintain that among the various types of arguments, demonstration (burhān), due to its reliance on certain premises and syllogistic form, is the most rigorous type of reasoning. Therefore, the Holy Qur’an has also employed numerous demonstrations to prove the existence of God and His essential and active attributes. This study has been conducted using a descriptive–analytical method through an examination of the verses of the Holy Qur’an, authoritative Qur’anic commentaries, and by drawing upon narrations from the Infallibles (peace be upon them). Materials & Methods This research has been conducted using a descriptive–analytical method, through the study of the verses of the Holy Qur’an and authoritative exegeses, and by drawing upon the narrations of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them). Discussion and Results The main questions addressed in this research are: Why are most of the Qur’anic theistic demonstrations of the innī type? Why has the Qur’an not employed limmī demonstration for knowing God Almighty, and what is the reason for designating some theistic demonstrations as quasi-limmī? The findings of the present study indicate that the widespread use of innī demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an is due to the greater ease with which this type of argument can be understood by the general public, who constitute the primary audience of the Qur’an. The reason for this ease of understanding is that, in innī demonstrations, one of the premises usually has an experiential or innate aspect, the comprehension of which does not require extensive reflection or contemplation. In the Holy Qur’an, this type of demonstration is employed for two main purposes: Proving the existence of God as the First Cause of all that is other than God; Proving the affirmative attributes of God Almighty on the basis of the principle “the giver of a thing cannot be devoid of it” (muʿṭī al-shayʾ lā yakūnu fāqidan lahu). The innī demonstrations of theistic knowledge in the Holy Qur’an are divided into two general categories: cosmic (āfāqī) demonstrations and anthropological or inner (anfusī) demonstrations. In cosmic demonstrations, through reflection on external phenomena (the horizons), the existence of God Almighty and His attributes of beauty and majesty are established. The most important and well-known of these demonstrations is the demonstration of the perfection of creation (burhān itqān al-ṣunʿ). In this demonstration, from the order and astonishing, purposeful creation governing the universe, the existence of an ordering, knowing, powerful, and wise Creator is inferred. A clear example of the demonstration of the perfection of creation in the Holy Qur’an is the argument for the Lordship-based unity of God Almighty in verse 22 of Sūrat al-Anbiyāʾ. This demonstration is expressed with utmost brevity in the form of a conditional syllogism with the negation of the consequent: “Had there been gods in the heavens and the earth other than Allah, both would surely have fallen into ruin.” Since such corruption is not observed, it follows that only one God Almighty rules over the universe. In the inner demonstrations of theistic knowledge, the human being comes to know the existence of God Almighty by turning inward to his own self. The most important inner demonstration in the Holy Qur’an is the demonstration of fiṭrah (innate nature), which is emphasized in numerous verses. One of the findings of the present research is that, given the definition provided for limmī demonstration, it is not possible to prove the existence of God Almighty through this type of argument, since it is impossible to conceive of a cause that could mediate in proving Him. However, the Holy Qur’an contains arguments in which reasoning proceeds from one necessary correlate to its necessary consequence, or from one concomitant to another concomitant. Because this method more closely resembles limmī demonstration, it has been termed quasi-limmī demonstration. A clear example of quasi-limmī demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an is reasoning from the Divine Name Allah to His attributes of beauty and majesty—such as His oneness and His having no partner—in the verse “Allah bears witness that there is no deity except Him”, which is known as the Verse of Testimony. Conclusion Most of the demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an for proving the existence of God Almighty are of the innī type, and these demonstrations are divided into cosmic and inner demonstrations. The most important cosmic demonstration is the demonstration of the perfection of creation, or the argument from order, in which from the order of the phenomena of the world one infers the existence of an ordering, knowing, powerful, and generous Creator. The most important inner demonstration in the Holy Qur’an is that which is referred to as the demonstration of fiṭrah. Contrary to the view of some researchers, not all theistic demonstrations in the Holy Qur’an are innī; rather, some of the most rigorous Qur’anic demonstrations established for the knowledge of God are of the quasi-limmī type, in which reasoning proceeds from a necessary correlate to its consequence or from one concomitant to another concomitant. The most important quasi-limmī demonstration of theistic knowledge found in the Holy Qur’an is the demonstration in which the concept of the Divine Name Allah serves as the middle term for establishing His other affirmative and negative attributes.

Biannual Journal Philosophy

The Role of Social Power Holders in the Crisis of Ignorance in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Thought: A Qualitative Reading on the “Resaleh Se Asl and Kasr o Asnam al Jaheliyyah

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 07 January 2026

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.51591.2100

Mohammad Javad Zarieh; zahra Abyar; shahla Abyar

Abstract Transcendent Wisdom, which aims at the reformation and perfection of practical reason, is actualized solely within a socio‑existential framework. Mullā Ṣadrā, as a social philosopher, regarded the critical engagement with the historical and socio‑political conditions of his epoch as an essential duty of the philosopher—a commitment embodied in his treatises Kashr al‑Aṣnām al‑Jāhiliyyah (The Demolition of the Idols of Ignorance) and Risālah‑yi Seh Aṣl (The Treatise on the Three Principles). Research Problem: The formation of non‑governmental power groups that generate what he terms “sanctified ignorance” (jahl‑i muqaddas) within society, thereby precipitating a profound crisis and potentially instigating socio‑political upheavals. Methodology: Utilizing thematic analysis, this study examines the defining characteristics of these power groups. Findings: The analysis reveals a triangular structure comprising “deception” (tazwīr – non‑governmental elites), “wealth” (zar – economic elites), and “coercion” (zūr – governmental elites). Through elite circulation, this nascent power bloc displaces the authentic spiritual authority (ʿārifān‑i rāstīn), resulting in social disequilibrium, a predatory relationship of exploitation, and systemic oppression of subaltern classes. Conclusions: The “deception” axis, employing instruments such as performative monotheism, ostentatious pseudo‑Sufism, demagoguery, character assassination, and a deficit of self‑knowledge (maʿrifat‑i nafs), precipitates socio‑political transformations rooted in the transmutation of values. Consequently, the social philosopher’s mission is to dismantle the idols of jāhiliyyah (pre‑Islamic ignorance), unmask these power structures before the public, and cultivate societal consciousness regarding elite circulation—thereby forestalling calamities of such magnitude that they could even culminate in events as consequential as the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn (AS).

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Biannual Journal Philosophy

Matter and Modality in Fakhr al-Rāzī and Later Scholars

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 10 January 2026

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.52610.2122

Asadollah Fallahi

Abstract In another article, I showed that in Aristo-Avicennan logic, a distinction was made between the matter (māddat) of propositions and their modality (jihat), and that there are at least two different approaches to this distinction in the history of Avicennan logic: 1) Avicenna was the first to consider matter as a non-verbal entity and defined it as “the state of the predicate in relation to the subject.” 2) However, Suhrawardī considered matter to be the proposition itself minus modality (or minus modality and negation). In this article, I have followed this subject matter from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā. The Problem: What characteristics each of of the two different approaches to matter and modality had after Suhrawardī and why this semantic transfer occurred. The Method: Analytiical-historical. The Findings: Although in their early works, Khūnajī and Abharī followed Suhrawardī’s approach, in their later works, in accordance with Avicenna’s approach, they defined matter as “the quality of the relation of the predicate to the subject” and considered modality as denoting or indicating matter, and they incorporated this definition into the Avicennan logic. After Khūnajī and Abharī, almost all Muslim logicians accepted Avicenna’s approach and followed Khūnajī’s and Abharī’s definitions of matter and modality, and hence Suhrawardī’s approach was completely forgotten, to the extent that today, almost no one knows that a verbal definition of matter once existed. The Conclusion: In sum, I will show that many Muslim logicians in few works followed Suhrawardī’s approach and in most of their various works followed Avicenna’s approach.

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Biannual Journal Philosophy

Sadrian Existence Cosmopsychism: A Response to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available Online from 02 February 2026

https://doi.org/10.30465/cw.2026.51549.2098

Seyyed Ali Hosseini; Ali Haghi; Seyyed Morteza Hosseini Shahrudi

Abstract Problem: The generation of consciousness from non-conscious entities—the hard problem of consciousness—is a central issue in the philosophy of mind. We argue that addressing it requires a critical stance toward reductionist approaches (including physicalism, emergentism, and micropsychism) and a shift toward a holistic framework. Gradualist Cosmopsychism and Existence Cosmopsychism represent two holistic options which can be brought into alignment, respectively, with the Sadrian frameworks of gradation of existence and unity of existence., thereby offering two distinct frameworks for articulating MullāṢadrā’s holistic solution to the hard problem.
Method: We employ a descriptive–analytical approach to outline the relevant theories and a comparative method to evaluate them.
Findings: Existence Cosmopsychism faces fewer theoretical difficulties and is more compatible with MullāṢadrā’s ultimate metaphysical commitments. On his framework of the unity of existence, belief in a single, maximally perfect Existence—which manifests all beings and their perfections—requires that the apparent generation of consciousness from seemingly non-conscious manifestations also be explained by reference to this single Existence.
Conclusion: The Sadrian version of Existence Cosmopsychism—formed through integrating Existence Cosmopsychism with Ṣadrā’s doctrine of unity of existence—grounds the two key components for addressing the hard problem in a single cosmic Existence/Consciousness: (1) the pervasiveness of consciousness throughout all manifestations, and (2) the possibility of its perfection within them. Consciousness is manifested equally by the one Existence, while differences among manifestations arise from their varying capacities to disclose it; the evolution of consciousness is thus understood as the expansion of this disclosing capacity.

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Allameh Ja'fari and the Islamic Human Rights Issue

Volume 2, Issue 2, October 2011, Pages 107-122

Seyyed Yahya Yasrebi

Abstract In the last decades, human rights have become a very sensitive topic. Elements of human rights can be traced back to ancient sources, however, there is no doubt that the current concept is the products of fairly recent intellectual and philosophical endeavors. For many years now, Muslims have been making the case for Islamic human rights, seeking the recognition of an equal status to the western human rights. Among preeminent scholars in Islamic society who have argued for Islamic human rights, there is Allameh Ja'fari (1923-1998), who published some insightful works in 1982, as well as Javad Amuli (1933-…). In the present article, we survey and analyze the work of Allameh Ja'fari, focusing on the following points: 1. A recognition of the effort and precision of Allameh Ja'fari's work. 2. An assessment of his proposed definition of elements of Islamic human rights as well as his comparison with western human rights. 3. His suggestions as to how one should react and interact with the issue of human rights: a) What should be the foundation of human rights and how to reflect on the rights of various religions according to it. b) An emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of Islamic human rights, that is how and by which means these rights should be applied, rather than spending a huge amount of time on marginal issues, and seeking difficult to reach ideals.

Principality of Existence and Principality of Quiddity: Encountering Two Philosophical Problems or Two Philosophical Systems?

Volume 4, Issue 2, October 2013, Pages 21-36

Reza Akbari

Abstract Prima facie it seems that principality of existence and principality of quiddity are two opposed theories, but they are, in fact, two distinct philosophical systems with different principles which these two theories are in their forefront stand. For example, considering Mulla Sadra's argument to prove principality of existence based on intensifying movement, shows that he criticized Peripatetic’s philosophical system which contained, in Mulla Sadra's view, principality of quiddity, denying intensifying movement of quiddity, and Peripatetic’s specific view about qule movement. On the other hand only when we consider ‘intensifying movement’ in a philosophical system, containing principality of existence, unity of existence, and intensity of existence, it can be a basis to prove principality of existence. This shows that Mulla Sadra portrays reality in his mind which has many metaphysical components, and conceives it as a distinguished and correct picture of reality compared to the picture of principality of quddity advocates. But having a picture in mind and its epistemic transmission to others are two different things. Epistemic transmission of a picture to others needs putting the picture into pieces and transmitting them in a linear state. This is exactly what Mulla Sadra did. To put the metaphysical pieces of his picture in a linear state he put the principality of existence in the forefront.

Cosmological Argument (Demonstration of Necessity and Contingency) and Criticisms of Hume and Kant

Volume 1, Issue 1, September 2010, Pages 1-18

Hamid Parsania

Abstract The Siddiqin proof as presented by Avicenna for the first time to express the proof from contingency and necessity, entred into the works of Thomas Acquinas through Arerroes and Maimonides in the middle ages. The concept related to this proof was not conveyed in the works of the above-mentioned authors and this led to a kind of ambiguity in that proof in philosophy after the western Renaissance. This article deals with the proof from contingency and necessity as reflected in western philosophy since the 17th century. The present article claims that Leibniz and Wolff appealed to this proof on the basis of possible Contingency rather than essential Contingency and also the criticisms aimed at its Thomistic account by Hume and Kant is not devoid of some strength and validity. In the final part of the article, the validity and strength of Avicennan account of the proof are cited and emphasized, so as to reject the criticisms aimed at it since the 17th century onward.

Examination of Avicenna’s and Mollā Sadrā’s View on the Concept of God

Volume 1, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 29-39

Qāsem Akhavān Nabavi

Abstract In this paper, I will try to present a comparative examination of Avicenna’s and Mullā Sadrā’s views of analyzing the concept of the Necessary Being. According to Avicenna, “the Necessary Being” is an entity which is Pure Being, but according to Mullā Sadrā, Necessity of Being requires that the existent besides being real and not having conditional mode and accidental intermediary has not causative mode. According to the separability of these two modes, the Necessary Being is a being which is both “by-itself” and “for-itself”; hence, Mullā Sadrā considers these two qualifications in his definition of the Necessary Being. Therefore, the arguments of the two philosophers for Necessary Being will be different.

Theosophists’ Agnostical Approach about the God Essence Status

Volume 4, Issue 4, July 2014, Pages 21-51

Manouchehr khademi

Abstract The absolutely unconditioned status is the usual reading of theosophists’ words regarding the essence of God. But in this article inspiring from a deep and novel division, offered by late Gharavy Isfahany, known as Kompany, regarding the mere truth, quiddity and identity, we will prove another consideration in which neither considering others, so the tenor of the absolutely unconditioned is taken, nor non-considering others is considered. Also we recognize the consideration, the most suitable attention to God’s furtive essence and in the wake of it we consider the absolutely unconditioned in connection with god’s essence in the level of appearance and divulgence in nominal, genuine, emersion, comedown, and creatures places and opening verses. On the other hand, the consideration is related to the attention to the most secretive of the secrets, and the most intrinsic conscience of every consciences and the invisible Maghib and Angha-e-Maghreb and knowing the God as the hidden treasure which is in inherent heterogeneity with the process of appearance and emersion and has no presence and descent in God and the existential Hadavat presences, rather it is deep-seated and steeped in the mere secret and mere consciences, with stairs extended and emerged infinitely. Also being comprehensive, it involves the appearance of restricted Esm-alzaher and consciences of restricted Esm-albaten which are from divine names. Also we present some theosophists’ statements from some theosophical books in which they tenderly have had hinted the consideration in question. At the final section, the most important section of this paper, I want to deal with the implications of my viewpoint. I disprove and deny the consequences of the absolutely unconditioned consideration of God, and demonstrate their opposites, regarding the aforesaid consideration, consequences like the realization of the collection and the disavow of the opposites in the stair of invisibility of essence, denying the realization of names and epithets, either with dissolved glancing limited mode or extended limited one, having inherent heterogeneity with appearance and emersion in mirrors and places of appearance, the Maghib invisibility, Angha-e-Moghrib, the essence remaining, hidden treasure, divesting aspiration of absolute and inapplicable being, eternity of absolute unknown of God’s essence and the stair left unsaid.