Contemporary Wisdom

Abstract This study examines classical Iranian mystical narratives through the dialogic lens of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory. The primary aim is to investigate how time and space, the role of the narrator and audience, and the production of meaning are represented within Bakhtin’s narrative framework, and subsequently to analyze classical Iranian mystical narratives from a Bakhtinian perspective. Thus, the central research question is: How can Bakhtin’s dialogical theory be applied to analyze and interpret the narrative structure and meaning-making in classical Persian mystical texts, specifically the works of Rumi and Attar?
The research adopts a descriptive-analytical method based on library studies. Findings reveal that the mystical narratives of Rumi and Attar, contrary to the common perception of them as monologic and linear texts, possess a profoundly dialogic, nonlinear, and multi-layered structure. In these texts, time and space are represented symbolically and cyclically, serving as tools for expressing inner spiritual journeys. The narrator appears in fluid, multifaceted, and metaphorical forms, creating a polyphonic space. Consequently, Bakhtin’s theoretical framework proves to be an effective tool for uncovering the dynamic, dialogic, and complex dimensions of narrative within the Iranian mystical tradition.

Abstract Transcendent Wisdom, which aims at the reformation and perfection of practical reason, is actualized solely within a socio‑existential framework. Mullā Ṣadrā, as a social philosopher, regarded the critical engagement with the historical and socio‑political conditions of his epoch as an essential duty of the philosopher—a commitment embodied in his treatises Kashr al‑Aṣnām al‑Jāhiliyyah (The Demolition of the Idols of Ignorance) and Risālah‑yi Seh Aṣl (The Treatise on the Three Principles). Research Problem: The formation of non‑governmental power groups that generate what he terms “sanctified ignorance” (jahl‑i muqaddas) within society, thereby precipitating a profound crisis and potentially instigating socio‑political upheavals. Methodology: Utilizing thematic analysis, this study examines the defining characteristics of these power groups. Findings: The analysis reveals a triangular structure comprising “deception” (tazwīr – non‑governmental elites), “wealth” (zar – economic elites), and “coercion” (zūr – governmental elites). Through elite circulation, this nascent power bloc displaces the authentic spiritual authority (ʿārifān‑i rāstīn), resulting in social disequilibrium, a predatory relationship of exploitation, and systemic oppression of subaltern classes. Conclusions: The “deception” axis, employing instruments such as performative monotheism, ostentatious pseudo‑Sufism, demagoguery, character assassination, and a deficit of self‑knowledge (maʿrifat‑i nafs), precipitates socio‑political transformations rooted in the transmutation of values. Consequently, the social philosopher’s mission is to dismantle the idols of jāhiliyyah (pre‑Islamic ignorance), unmask these power structures before the public, and cultivate societal consciousness regarding elite circulation—thereby forestalling calamities of such magnitude that they could even culminate in events as consequential as the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn (AS).

Abstract In the last decades, human rights have become a very sensitive topic. Elements of human rights can be traced back to ancient sources, however, there is no doubt that the current concept is the products of fairly recent intellectual and philosophical endeavors. For many years now, Muslims have been making the case for Islamic human rights, seeking the recognition of an equal status to the western human rights. Among preeminent scholars in Islamic society who have argued for Islamic human rights, there is Allameh Ja'fari (1923-1998), who published some insightful works in 1982, as well as Javad Amuli (1933-…). In the present article, we survey and analyze the work of Allameh Ja'fari, focusing on the following points: 1. A recognition of the effort and precision of Allameh Ja'fari's work. 2. An assessment of his proposed definition of elements of Islamic human rights as well as his comparison with western human rights. 3. His suggestions as to how one should react and interact with the issue of human rights: a) What should be the foundation of human rights and how to reflect on the rights of various religions according to it. b) An emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of Islamic human rights, that is how and by which means these rights should be applied, rather than spending a huge amount of time on marginal issues, and seeking difficult to reach ideals.

Abstract Prima facie it seems that principality of existence and principality of quiddity are two opposed theories, but they are, in fact, two distinct philosophical systems with different principles which these two theories are in their forefront stand. For example, considering Mulla Sadra's argument to prove principality of existence based on intensifying movement, shows that he criticized Peripatetic’s philosophical system which contained, in Mulla Sadra's view, principality of quiddity, denying intensifying movement of quiddity, and Peripatetic’s specific view about qule movement. On the other hand only when we consider ‘intensifying movement’ in a philosophical system, containing principality of existence, unity of existence, and intensity of existence, it can be a basis to prove principality of existence. This shows that Mulla Sadra portrays reality in his mind which has many metaphysical components, and conceives it as a distinguished and correct picture of reality compared to the picture of principality of quddity advocates. But having a picture in mind and its epistemic transmission to others are two different things. Epistemic transmission of a picture to others needs putting the picture into pieces and transmitting them in a linear state. This is exactly what Mulla Sadra did. To put the metaphysical pieces of his picture in a linear state he put the principality of existence in the forefront.

Abstract The Siddiqin proof as presented by Avicenna for the first time to express the proof from contingency and necessity, entred into the works of Thomas Acquinas through Arerroes and Maimonides in the middle ages. The concept related to this proof was not conveyed in the works of the above-mentioned authors and this led to a kind of ambiguity in that proof in philosophy after the western Renaissance. This article deals with the proof from contingency and necessity as reflected in western philosophy since the 17th century. The present article claims that Leibniz and Wolff appealed to this proof on the basis of possible Contingency rather than essential Contingency and also the criticisms aimed at its Thomistic account by Hume and Kant is not devoid of some strength and validity. In the final part of the article, the validity and strength of Avicennan account of the proof are cited and emphasized, so as to reject the criticisms aimed at it since the 17th century onward.

Abstract In this paper, I will try to present a comparative examination of Avicenna’s and Mullā Sadrā’s views of analyzing the concept of the Necessary Being. According to Avicenna, “the Necessary Being” is an entity which is Pure Being, but according to Mullā Sadrā, Necessity of Being requires that the existent besides being real and not having conditional mode and accidental intermediary has not causative mode. According to the separability of these two modes, the Necessary Being is a being which is both “by-itself” and “for-itself”; hence, Mullā Sadrā considers these two qualifications in his definition of the Necessary Being. Therefore, the arguments of the two philosophers for Necessary Being will be different.

Abstract The absolutely unconditioned status is the usual reading of theosophists’ words regarding the essence of God. But in this article inspiring from a deep and novel division, offered by late Gharavy Isfahany, known as Kompany, regarding the mere truth, quiddity and identity, we will prove another consideration in which neither considering others, so the tenor of the absolutely unconditioned is taken, nor non-considering others is considered. Also we recognize the consideration, the most suitable attention to God’s furtive essence and in the wake of it we consider the absolutely unconditioned in connection with god’s essence in the level of appearance and divulgence in nominal, genuine, emersion, comedown, and creatures places and opening verses. On the other hand, the consideration is related to the attention to the most secretive of the secrets, and the most intrinsic conscience of every consciences and the invisible Maghib and Angha-e-Maghreb and knowing the God as the hidden treasure which is in inherent heterogeneity with the process of appearance and emersion and has no presence and descent in God and the existential Hadavat presences, rather it is deep-seated and steeped in the mere secret and mere consciences, with stairs extended and emerged infinitely. Also being comprehensive, it involves the appearance of restricted Esm-alzaher and consciences of restricted Esm-albaten which are from divine names. Also we present some theosophists’ statements from some theosophical books in which they tenderly have had hinted the consideration in question. At the final section, the most important section of this paper, I want to deal with the implications of my viewpoint. I disprove and deny the consequences of the absolutely unconditioned consideration of God, and demonstrate their opposites, regarding the aforesaid consideration, consequences like the realization of the collection and the disavow of the opposites in the stair of invisibility of essence, denying the realization of names and epithets, either with dissolved glancing limited mode or extended limited one, having inherent heterogeneity with appearance and emersion in mirrors and places of appearance, the Maghib invisibility, Angha-e-Moghrib, the essence remaining, hidden treasure, divesting aspiration of absolute and inapplicable being, eternity of absolute unknown of God’s essence and the stair left unsaid.