Philosophy
Keramat Varzdar; Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi
Abstract
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent ...
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Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
Islamic mysticism
mohammad javad dakami; Akbar orvatimovaffagh
Abstract
Introduction
Muslim theologians and philosophers debate the manner in which the world was created by God. Theologians assert that God’s role in creation is characterized in terms of agency-by-intention (fāʿiliyya bi-l-qaṣd), while Peripatetic philosophers argue for agency-by-providence (fāʿiliyya ...
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Introduction
Muslim theologians and philosophers debate the manner in which the world was created by God. Theologians assert that God’s role in creation is characterized in terms of agency-by-intention (fāʿiliyya bi-l-qaṣd), while Peripatetic philosophers argue for agency-by-providence (fāʿiliyya bi-l-ʿināya), and Illuminationist (Ishrāqī) philosophers propose agency-by-agreement (fāʿiliyya bi-l-riḍā). Mullā Ṣadrā and his adherents advocate for agency-by-providence, where their definition of this kind of agency closely aligns with the concept of agency-by-manifestation (fāʿiliyya bi-l-tajallī) as suggested by Muslim mystics. Twentieth-century Muslim philosopher Mahdi Elahi Ghomshei introduced another form of agency, which he calls agency-by-love (fāʿiliyya bi-l-ʿishq). He posits that the primary impetus behind the creation of the world by the necessary existent is His love and delight for His own essence, serving as the source from which all things emanate. Elahi Ghomshei pioneered this concept to explain God’s agency. The central question of this study is whether this concept has precedent in the works of earlier Muslim philosophers and, if so, how it was addressed within those works.
Research Methodology
This research employs the analytic-descriptive method by examining library sources. Initially, we investigate the perspectives of the scholars concerning the agency of the necessary existent, and subsequently, we draw our conclusions.
Discussion and Results
An examination of the writings of philosophers and intellectuals predating Elahi Ghomshei reveals that they did not neglect the significance of love in God’s agency. Indeed, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, the role of love in the agency of the necessary existent has been consistently emphasized. Furthermore, certain philosophers contended that the creation of the world without love is inconceivable. However, instead of employing the term "agency by love," they utilized alternative expressions such as attraction force, natural magnetism, love-based motion, and others, as will be elucidated below.
Plato and Aristotle delved into the concept of the love of the demiurge—the creator of the world—or the unmoving mover for its own essence, highlighting its significance in imparting order and motion to worldly affairs. Among thinkers, Muslim philosophers and mystics stand out for their emphasis on God''s love and delight in His essence. Al-Fārābī offers a nuanced definition of love and delight, positing that the love of the necessary existent for its essence represents the pinnacle of love. He contends that God possesses the utmost perception, directed at the highest perceivable entity—His own essence. Thus, in the realm of the divine, the distinction between lover and beloved collapses, as they are one and the same.
Avicenna contends that the ultimate form of delight is found in the necessary existent''s delight in its own essence. This arises from its perfect perception of all beings, making it impervious to the realm of possibility and nonexistence. Avicenna posits that God is loved for His essence and is the object of love for all beings, suggesting that their very existence is sustained through their love for God. Shaykh al-Ishrāq Suhrawardī and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn also emphasize God''s profound inherent love for His essence, depicting Him as the most delighted being by its essence, and asserting that this fundamental love and delight are the primary impetuses behind the creation of the world.
Ibn al-ʿArabī asserts that all motion in this world, culminating in the existence of the universe, emanates from love—primarily the love possessed by God and also by other beings and natural causes through divine love. Without such affection, the world would remain unmanifest. Similarly, Imam Khomeini contends that divine love serves as the guiding and directing force in both the natural and supernatural realms (Imam Khomeini 1989, 76). He argues that existence and the sustenance of existence stem from essential love, which acts as both the existence-conferring and sustaining causes of beings. Referring to these two realms as the facilitators of creation and the pathways to perfection, he emphasizes that without this love, no entity could come into being, and no individual or object could attain perfection; thus, the heavens themselves are erected by love.
Conclusion
We conclude that although Mahdi Elahi Ghomshei was the first philosopher to employ the term "agency-by-love" to explain the agency of the necessary existent, discussions regarding God''s love for His own essence trace back to ancient times. Plato, Aristotle, and several other ancient Greek philosophers explored the notion of the creator''s love for its essence. In the Islamic world, mystics, philosophers, and theologians engaged with and endeavored to explain the notion of God''s agency within their respective frameworks. While they present various explanations for God''s agency—such as agency-by-intention, agency-by-providence, agency-by-agreement, or agency-by-manifestation—they unanimously affirm God''s possession of agency-by-love. These philosophers argue that perception is the source of love, with the intensity of love corresponding to the brilliance and beauty of the perceived entity. As God''s essence epitomizes beauty and brilliance, and He is both the perceiver and the perceived by His essence, He possesses the utmost love and delight for His essence.
Mahdi Assadi
Abstract
IntroductionṢadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. ...
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IntroductionṢadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. Remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. In this way, when it comes to memory, Ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. Because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. They often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding.In this article, I adjudicate these opposing views. To do so, I overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in Ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. I then show that, pace Ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. I propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize Ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies.MethodIn this research, I analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. On occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well.DiscussionFor Ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. These immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. In his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. Ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. In this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. Another argument presented by Ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. Moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived. However, “identity” is incompatible with the materiality of memory. Changes in the brain also demonstrate that memory is not material: brains and their nerves change with all of their material contents, while psychological memories remain in the mind after years.I think all of these arguments are objectionable. Suffice to say, Peripatetic philosophers believe that sensory and imaginary mental forms are material, and then assume that no mental form goes away, but remains in its own realm. Such constancy does not necessarily have to do with immateriality, since such constancy of the material is conceived in modern philosophy and physics in terms of the growing block view of time.In critique of the recognition argument for the immateriality of memory, for example, we might say that it proves too much: The basis of this argument is the very paradox of Meno, which challenges not only the memory but also any kind of knowledge.Similarly, the identity argument proves too much and therefore it is objectionable in that if identity could show the immateriality of memory, it could establish the immateriality of the material world as well. For instance, the mountain I see today is identical to the one I saw yesterday. So, these are identical, without the mountain being immaterial. Since identity does not imply immateriality in these cases, it does not imply the immateriality of memory either.In response to the argument from brain change, we might say that, before their destruction, brain cells transmit their physical information to the young cells, which in turn transmit the information to other cells before they die. As an analogy, suppose that an audio tape lasts for twenty years, but before it expires, we record its content on another brand-new tape, which retains the same audio.In addition, since Ṣadrīans believe that the retained perceptual forms are directly present to us, they must say that we have knowledge-by-presence of them, albeit unconsciously. The idea of unconscious knowledge sounds implausible to me.To establish the immateriality of memory and imaginative forms, Ṣadrā also tries to undermine the material account of memory. He argues that the many forms we have perceived in our lives cannot be imprinted in our finite, and even small, material brains. However, this seems unlikely only for Ṣadrā while it is not impossible by itself. It simply can be explained away by modern science: it has been established today that a large amount of information can be stored in very small memory cards.A major objection I raised against the Ṣadrīan view is that errors in memory are incompatible with its immateriality and with being remembrance a matter of knowledge by presence. For just as sensory perceptions cannot be kinds of knowledge by presence because they involve errors, remembrance cannot be a kind of such knowledge because of errors it involves.Moreover, I argue that not only Ṣadrā’s commentators, but also Ṣadrā himself, failed to stay committed to the consequences of the immateriality of memory, as he sometimes says, and rightly so, that memories are destructible. This is an obvious endorsement of changes in such perceptual forms, which imply their materiality and inconstancy.ConclusionPre-Ṣadrīan philosophies as well as the prevalent scientific view present a far more plausible account of memory and how sensory and imaginative forms are retained than the Ṣadrīan constancy and immateriality account. Alternative materialistic explanations and the objection from errors in memory, as well as a host of other reasons, call Ṣadrīan arguments into question, including the sudden survival of movement, instantaneous detailed recollection of all forgotten memories in abnormal states or under unusual pressures, conceiving particular meanings as they were initially perceived by some old and sick people without any distortions, recognition and identity, and constancy of memory despite changes in brain cells.
Philosophy
Mahdi Baniasadi Baghmirani; Sayed Behshid Hosseini; Azadeh Shahcheraghi
Abstract
Epistemological issues in architecture are related to the movement of people in space. According to the philosophical concept of movement and MullāṢadrā's theory of substantial motion, perception refers to people's gradual perception of architectural spaces. Deep understanding of mosque-school spaces ...
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Epistemological issues in architecture are related to the movement of people in space. According to the philosophical concept of movement and MullāṢadrā's theory of substantial motion, perception refers to people's gradual perception of architectural spaces. Deep understanding of mosque-school spaces is not possible without movement. In order to achieve a deep understanding of these spaces, the observer must move in the space, and after experiencing physical and mental movements, he should promotes his perception level. The question of this research in the form of a case study is that, considering the variety of accesses in the Agha Bozor Mosque-School of Kashan; How does movement promote perception from the material level to the spiritual level? This research is descriptive-analytical and case study, and its results show that, despite the existence of separate paths (for prayer and educational performance) in the spaces of the mosque-school, the observer experiences three orders of movement (visual, physical and mental) by moving in each of these paths; in the form of four pillars in the mosque and three pillars in the school; It guides the observer's perception (in line with MullāṢadrā's perceptual hierarchy) from the sensory level to the imagination, and then to the intellectual level.
Philosophy
zohre salahshur sefidsangi
Abstract
AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception ...
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AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception occurs in the human soul, while neuroscience provides a fully material account of all perceptions, including auditory perception. From a neuroscientific viewpoint, sounds pass through interior layers of the ear to reach auditory neurons, in the course of which they undergo a complicated process leading to auditory perception.However, Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the whole process occurring in the auditory system is just preparatory for perception of sounds by the human soul. This is the soul that creates the true nature of sounds. On his account, the relation between sounds and the inner self is like that between actions and their agents, where actions are done by their agents, rather than that between a passive entity and what it receives.For this reason, Mullā Ṣadrā holds that the account of auditory perception offered by natural scientists is objectionable, since they involve a confusion between preparatory causes and efficient causes. The accounts provided by natural sciences rest content with an elaboration of material stages of auditory perception, while Mullā Ṣadrā believes that perception is non-material in nature, which is just enabled and prepared by those material processes. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā offers the following account: when the soul has a relation with the natural external world through its attachment to the body, it creates a similar image of the external object, where that image is both caused and known by the soul.After the auditory perception, the human soul draws on the images derived from physical entities or those received from the spiritual world (the imaginal world, or ʿālam al-mithāl) creates images in its imaginary perception as well. Contrary to senses that are limited to material entities, imagination extends to the supernatural world as well. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, imagination includes a number of perceptions, such as perception of sensible entities while no matter is present, their perception in dreams, and imaginal perceptions. Perception of sounds in the absence of any external material sources does not require material tools or organs, since many material features do not exist in that realm. This is comparable to memory in neuroscience, although it has not yet offered a plausible account of conscious selection of memories.Moreover, the hearing that occurs in dreams does not involve an environmental system. Although some people still perceive the waves of the material world in their sleep, this is a very different process from that of sensory audition. In the hearing that occurs in dreams, one might hear an intense sound like thunders, which affects one’s soul just like hearing in the waking state, although it was not perceived by the material organ of hearing; that is, one’s ears. Hearing in dreams is indeed one piece of evidence adduced by Mullā Ṣadrā as an argument for the immateriality of perceptions, but this type of hearing is investigated in neuroscience as a kind of dream. Despite their accuracy, the findings of neuroscience here merely demonstrate that perception occurs with the stimulation of certain cells in the body, but the stimulation does not show whether the area in question is a center for processing and storing information or a pathway through which information is transferred.Also in imaginal hearing, only external sounds of the imaginal world are heard, without being mixed with inner secretions, and the sound in the imaginal world does not require material factors such as waves and frequencies. For Mullā Ṣadrā, if the human imaginative faculty is strong, the relation with the imaginal world can occur in the waking state such that hidden imaginal forms are presented to the person, who will thus be able to hear sounds from the imaginal world. Because of its non-material character, this stage of auditory perception is not subject to neuroscientific investigations.The final stage of auditory perception is intellectual hearing, which is the highest degree of auditory perception, which has degrees of intensity and weakness, just like light. Intellectual hearing has degrees, the lowest of which has traces of imaginal sounds, but the higher we go on the scale of intellectual hearing, we come closer to a realm in which no imaginal properties are involved, a realm of pure perception. In its evolutionary course, intellectual hearing reaches a degree where it perceives profound supernatural ideas in the most translucent form. This is a hearing that emerges with the rise of the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād) and then gradually grows.
Mohammad Saeedi Mehr
Abstract
From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, ...
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From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, sonot only onecan define it, but should do so. In his book Al-Isharatva Al-Tanbihāt, he has provided a precise definition of pain,according to whichpain is the perception of what is perceived as a pest and evil qua pest and evil. Nasir al-Din Tusi, in his commentary on the book, has given a detailed analysis of this definition. In spite of its precision, it seems that Ibn Sina's definition suffers from someambiguities, for exampleit is not clear whether the pain is merely a subjective matter or has objective features. Moreover, the lack of clarity in the distinction between acquirable (mediated) knowledge and direct (unmediated) knowledge in Sheikh’s philosophy, has made it difficult to express the being directness feature of pain as a kind of perception, in this definition.
Abdurrazzaq Hesamifar
Volume 2, Issue 1 , October 2011, , Pages 43-59
Abstract
Since 17th century, western philosophy experienced a basic change in philosophical research and discussing the formation of knowledge and its validity became the most important problem in philosophy. This change, however, was reflected in Islamic philosophy three century later, because there was ...
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Since 17th century, western philosophy experienced a basic change in philosophical research and discussing the formation of knowledge and its validity became the most important problem in philosophy. This change, however, was reflected in Islamic philosophy three century later, because there was no relation between these two worlds of philosophy. As a great expert in Islamic philosophy, Motahhari attempted at first to be informed of the ideas of the modern and contemporary philosophers and afterwards to review them. One of these ideas on which he was concerned, was the problem of knowledge. There are two counter views on perception and its representation. The first one is realism which affirms the existence of physical things as the objects of perception and thinks that the external world is represented in the perceptions. The other one is subjective idealism which denies this matter. In their The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism, Tabatabaei and Motahhari by reliance on the realistic foundations of Islamic philosophy, criticize subjective idealism on the one hand and dialectic materialism on the other. Motahheri's view in this book which has been written in 1330s H. differs from his view in his Detailed Account of Manzoumeh which has been written in 1350s H. In the former book he regards idealism as equal to sophism and thinks of the idealist philosophers like Berkeley and Schopenhauer as equal to the sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, because they all deny the external world, but in the later he presents some deeper analysis of the theory of knowledge and proving the existence of external world. In this paper Motahheri's views on epistemology and his critics against idealism will be discussed and reviewed.
