Islamic mysticism
mohammad javad dakami; Akbar orvatimovaffagh
Abstract
Introduction
Muslim theologians and philosophers debate the manner in which the world was created by God. Theologians assert that God’s role in creation is characterized in terms of agency-by-intention (fāʿiliyya bi-l-qaṣd), while Peripatetic philosophers argue for agency-by-providence (fāʿiliyya ...
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Introduction
Muslim theologians and philosophers debate the manner in which the world was created by God. Theologians assert that God’s role in creation is characterized in terms of agency-by-intention (fāʿiliyya bi-l-qaṣd), while Peripatetic philosophers argue for agency-by-providence (fāʿiliyya bi-l-ʿināya), and Illuminationist (Ishrāqī) philosophers propose agency-by-agreement (fāʿiliyya bi-l-riḍā). Mullā Ṣadrā and his adherents advocate for agency-by-providence, where their definition of this kind of agency closely aligns with the concept of agency-by-manifestation (fāʿiliyya bi-l-tajallī) as suggested by Muslim mystics. Twentieth-century Muslim philosopher Mahdi Elahi Ghomshei introduced another form of agency, which he calls agency-by-love (fāʿiliyya bi-l-ʿishq). He posits that the primary impetus behind the creation of the world by the necessary existent is His love and delight for His own essence, serving as the source from which all things emanate. Elahi Ghomshei pioneered this concept to explain God’s agency. The central question of this study is whether this concept has precedent in the works of earlier Muslim philosophers and, if so, how it was addressed within those works.
Research Methodology
This research employs the analytic-descriptive method by examining library sources. Initially, we investigate the perspectives of the scholars concerning the agency of the necessary existent, and subsequently, we draw our conclusions.
Discussion and Results
An examination of the writings of philosophers and intellectuals predating Elahi Ghomshei reveals that they did not neglect the significance of love in God’s agency. Indeed, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, the role of love in the agency of the necessary existent has been consistently emphasized. Furthermore, certain philosophers contended that the creation of the world without love is inconceivable. However, instead of employing the term "agency by love," they utilized alternative expressions such as attraction force, natural magnetism, love-based motion, and others, as will be elucidated below.
Plato and Aristotle delved into the concept of the love of the demiurge—the creator of the world—or the unmoving mover for its own essence, highlighting its significance in imparting order and motion to worldly affairs. Among thinkers, Muslim philosophers and mystics stand out for their emphasis on God''s love and delight in His essence. Al-Fārābī offers a nuanced definition of love and delight, positing that the love of the necessary existent for its essence represents the pinnacle of love. He contends that God possesses the utmost perception, directed at the highest perceivable entity—His own essence. Thus, in the realm of the divine, the distinction between lover and beloved collapses, as they are one and the same.
Avicenna contends that the ultimate form of delight is found in the necessary existent''s delight in its own essence. This arises from its perfect perception of all beings, making it impervious to the realm of possibility and nonexistence. Avicenna posits that God is loved for His essence and is the object of love for all beings, suggesting that their very existence is sustained through their love for God. Shaykh al-Ishrāq Suhrawardī and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn also emphasize God''s profound inherent love for His essence, depicting Him as the most delighted being by its essence, and asserting that this fundamental love and delight are the primary impetuses behind the creation of the world.
Ibn al-ʿArabī asserts that all motion in this world, culminating in the existence of the universe, emanates from love—primarily the love possessed by God and also by other beings and natural causes through divine love. Without such affection, the world would remain unmanifest. Similarly, Imam Khomeini contends that divine love serves as the guiding and directing force in both the natural and supernatural realms (Imam Khomeini 1989, 76). He argues that existence and the sustenance of existence stem from essential love, which acts as both the existence-conferring and sustaining causes of beings. Referring to these two realms as the facilitators of creation and the pathways to perfection, he emphasizes that without this love, no entity could come into being, and no individual or object could attain perfection; thus, the heavens themselves are erected by love.
Conclusion
We conclude that although Mahdi Elahi Ghomshei was the first philosopher to employ the term "agency-by-love" to explain the agency of the necessary existent, discussions regarding God''s love for His own essence trace back to ancient times. Plato, Aristotle, and several other ancient Greek philosophers explored the notion of the creator''s love for its essence. In the Islamic world, mystics, philosophers, and theologians engaged with and endeavored to explain the notion of God''s agency within their respective frameworks. While they present various explanations for God''s agency—such as agency-by-intention, agency-by-providence, agency-by-agreement, or agency-by-manifestation—they unanimously affirm God''s possession of agency-by-love. These philosophers argue that perception is the source of love, with the intensity of love corresponding to the brilliance and beauty of the perceived entity. As God''s essence epitomizes beauty and brilliance, and He is both the perceiver and the perceived by His essence, He possesses the utmost love and delight for His essence.
Philosophy
ali aqajani
Abstract
Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence ...
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Introduction:
The relationship between ethics and politics and political ethics is one of the old and very broad concepts in the field of human mental issues. However, in the new era and with new perspectives, its rereading has gained double importance. Today, political ethics is in complete correspondence with related concepts such as religion, spirituality, government, secularism and other concepts and forms one of the challenges in the field of understanding politics.
Al-Farabi (870-950 A.H.) has occupied a very high and irreplaceable place in the history of Islamic philosophy. Farabi's coverage of various sciences in the realm of the Islamic world is amazing. The depth of thinking and the breadth of Farabi's intellectual horizon in terms of philosophy, especially political philosophy, is exemplary and rare. He is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to the world and scholars of thought, including in ethics, politics and their relationship. Based on this, the hypothesis of the article is that the practical manifestation and intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy should be found in some hybrid concepts. On this basis, why and how the relationship between ethics and politics is one of the problems and theoretical and practical issues of political science and ethics science, which various approaches and different viewpoints have been used to celebrate it. One of the most important efforts is related to the prominent Muslim political philosopher Abu Nasr Farabi. The hypothesis of the article seeks to answer the question of Farabi's approach to the relationship between ethics and politics based on the theoretical framework that the concepts of utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights are the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy.
Method:Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of the article is a combination of three questions and four approaches. which the article measures and clarifies Farabi's point of view towards them:
1: Three questions: The relationship between ethics and politics can be questioned in three ways. (Kechoyan 1382: 14). The first direction is whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, can basically pursue moral goals in the private sphere? The second question is whether the field of politics, ethics, or in more general terms, has its own prescriptive requirements in distinction from ethics and individual prescriptions or not? The third question refers to the field of tools and methods or the way of pursuing and applying the policies and goals of the public domain (ibid. 15). Do we necessarily have to use ethical methods in politics, or is the way of achieving and pursuing goals in politics independent of moral judgments (ibid., 15).
Four theories: On another level, the relationship between ethics and politics can be gathered and analyzed in four theories. Theories of separation of ethics from politics, compliance of ethics with politics, two-level ethics and the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). The fourth theory is the unity of ethics and politics (Islami 2013: 26). According to this theory, ethics is individual politics and politics is collective ethics. Ethics and politics are both branches of practical wisdom and seek to ensure human happiness.
Discussion:
Farabi has divided civil science into two theoretical and practical parts. He considers ethics as a theoretical part and politics as a practical part. In Farabi's commentary, Ibn Rushd clearly spoke about the separation of the two sciences. But Farabi himself did not try to separate the theoretical aspect from the practical aspect. The relationship between ethics and politics was considered from several angles. From one point of view, several questions were raised to which Farabi's answer should be received. The first question was whether politics, as a public sphere of human life, should pursue moral goals in the private sphere or not? Farabi's answer to this question is positive. Unlike today's political philosophy in the West, they do not believe in the separation of public and private spheres and consider them to be the same. Therefore, it should be said that according to him, ethics and politics are a science that has a single subject and goal. According to him, the goal of ethics and politics is happiness.
The second question was whether politics, as a public sphere, morally creates a sphere independent of the private sphere with its own special logic or not? According to Farabi, the individual moral sphere is not separate from the social moral sphere, and the principles governing them and the goals and objectives of both are common. The complexity of social issues is more than individual issues, but this cannot create a distinct morality.
Another question was whether ethical methods must be used in politics or whether having ethical goals is enough and whether a politician should act ethically. From Farabi's point of view, the science of ethics is not limited to individual moral reform, but also includes social reform, and the duty of the ruler and government in the society is to develop moral values, which must necessarily be attributed to it. On this basis, from Farabi's point of view, the theories of separation of ethics from politics, subordination of ethics to politics, are completely rejected; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics, in the sense of subordination of politics to ethics (in the sense of consistent moral standards).
Farabi considers the necessity of community to be certain, but what does he consider its origin? Is it natural, natural, voluntary or rational or instinctive? Farabi, except for the first point of view, which considered social life not natural but caused by external emergency. It accepts the rest of the approaches. But in general, he has an instrumental attitude towards society and considers it a means to achieve perfection and happiness.
Farabi introduces will as having three branches. The first branch of passion comes from feeling. The second category of excitement is caused by imagination. The third branch of passion comes from speech and thinking, which Farabi calls this kind of free will. Like Aristotle, Farabi believes that moderation is a virtue.
Conclusion:
Farabi is a creative and innovative philosopher and offers new and profound products to scholars and scholars of thought, including ethics, politics and their relationship, which is one of the ancient and very broad concepts. The article measures Farabi's view on the relationship between ethics and politics (issue) based on the theoretical framework of the article, which is a combination of three questions and four approaches: the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, two-level ethics, and the unity of ethics and politics (method). The hypothesis of the article, which is the second innovation of the article compared to homogeneous articles, considers some concepts such as utopia, happiness, government legitimacy, justice and citizenship rights as the manifestation and operational intersection of the relationship between ethics and politics in Farabi's political philosophy. (innovation) Based on this, Farabi considers the goal of ethics and politics to be the same; Ethics has a political nature and politics has a moral nature. The theories of the separation of ethics from politics, the subordination of ethics to politics, have been completely ruled out; Two-level ethics is also not acceptable and the principles governing both the fields of ethics and politics are the same. Therefore, he believes in the unity and similarity of ethics and politics in the sense of following politics from ethics (in the sense of compatible ethical standards). (Findings) According to this, Farabi is a philosopher who does not find force and domination, conquest and the sword as a way to build an ethical culture. It considers happiness both in terms of belief and in relation to society. The government is morally based on public opinion and will. He based his utopia on voluntary justice based on virtue and rejects natural justice, and in his opinion, all citizens have rights and have a fair share in society. (Result)
Fahime Shariati; Mohammadreza Akbarzade
Abstract
Intelligence has a wide range. Degrees of intelligence can be divided into primary and secondary intelligences..Examining the word intelligence with various words almost synonymous in transcendent wisdom such as intellect, science, wisdom, etc. shows that human intelligence is dependent on higher intelligence.Artificial ...
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Intelligence has a wide range. Degrees of intelligence can be divided into primary and secondary intelligences..Examining the word intelligence with various words almost synonymous in transcendent wisdom such as intellect, science, wisdom, etc. shows that human intelligence is dependent on higher intelligence.Artificial intelligence, which is the achievement of human intelligence, has very precise functions such as learning, optimization, generalizability.By describing, analyzing and comparing the intelligent machine with man, we can better understand the distance between human consciousness and the knowledge of the first causes and the entry of multiplicity and contradiction in the material world with the higher worlds.Traces of morality and will can be seen in different levels of reason, as well as in the types and varieties of intelligence in psychological issues...Although it seems that some of the human intelligence goes back to the way of performance in the field of ethics and voluntary actions, but due to the effects of external or previous conditions on human voluntary actions, the differences between these two types of secondary intelligence (human intelligence and artificial intelligence) It descends to a lower limit.Paying attention to the truth of the will and its effect on morality cannot explain the difference between human intelligence and the systemic functions of intelligent machines.Regardless of emotions, inner states or presence sciences, even the will cannot be the original distinction between human intelligence and artificial intelligence
Philosophy
zohre salahshur sefidsangi
Abstract
AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception ...
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AbstractAuditory perception, or hearing, is a major human sense, which was investigated by Muslim philosophers and neuroscientists. Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā, have provided careful accounts of the issues concerning external senses such as hearing. In his view, auditory perception occurs in the human soul, while neuroscience provides a fully material account of all perceptions, including auditory perception. From a neuroscientific viewpoint, sounds pass through interior layers of the ear to reach auditory neurons, in the course of which they undergo a complicated process leading to auditory perception.However, Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the whole process occurring in the auditory system is just preparatory for perception of sounds by the human soul. This is the soul that creates the true nature of sounds. On his account, the relation between sounds and the inner self is like that between actions and their agents, where actions are done by their agents, rather than that between a passive entity and what it receives.For this reason, Mullā Ṣadrā holds that the account of auditory perception offered by natural scientists is objectionable, since they involve a confusion between preparatory causes and efficient causes. The accounts provided by natural sciences rest content with an elaboration of material stages of auditory perception, while Mullā Ṣadrā believes that perception is non-material in nature, which is just enabled and prepared by those material processes. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā offers the following account: when the soul has a relation with the natural external world through its attachment to the body, it creates a similar image of the external object, where that image is both caused and known by the soul.After the auditory perception, the human soul draws on the images derived from physical entities or those received from the spiritual world (the imaginal world, or ʿālam al-mithāl) creates images in its imaginary perception as well. Contrary to senses that are limited to material entities, imagination extends to the supernatural world as well. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, imagination includes a number of perceptions, such as perception of sensible entities while no matter is present, their perception in dreams, and imaginal perceptions. Perception of sounds in the absence of any external material sources does not require material tools or organs, since many material features do not exist in that realm. This is comparable to memory in neuroscience, although it has not yet offered a plausible account of conscious selection of memories.Moreover, the hearing that occurs in dreams does not involve an environmental system. Although some people still perceive the waves of the material world in their sleep, this is a very different process from that of sensory audition. In the hearing that occurs in dreams, one might hear an intense sound like thunders, which affects one’s soul just like hearing in the waking state, although it was not perceived by the material organ of hearing; that is, one’s ears. Hearing in dreams is indeed one piece of evidence adduced by Mullā Ṣadrā as an argument for the immateriality of perceptions, but this type of hearing is investigated in neuroscience as a kind of dream. Despite their accuracy, the findings of neuroscience here merely demonstrate that perception occurs with the stimulation of certain cells in the body, but the stimulation does not show whether the area in question is a center for processing and storing information or a pathway through which information is transferred.Also in imaginal hearing, only external sounds of the imaginal world are heard, without being mixed with inner secretions, and the sound in the imaginal world does not require material factors such as waves and frequencies. For Mullā Ṣadrā, if the human imaginative faculty is strong, the relation with the imaginal world can occur in the waking state such that hidden imaginal forms are presented to the person, who will thus be able to hear sounds from the imaginal world. Because of its non-material character, this stage of auditory perception is not subject to neuroscientific investigations.The final stage of auditory perception is intellectual hearing, which is the highest degree of auditory perception, which has degrees of intensity and weakness, just like light. Intellectual hearing has degrees, the lowest of which has traces of imaginal sounds, but the higher we go on the scale of intellectual hearing, we come closer to a realm in which no imaginal properties are involved, a realm of pure perception. In its evolutionary course, intellectual hearing reaches a degree where it perceives profound supernatural ideas in the most translucent form. This is a hearing that emerges with the rise of the acquired intellect (al-ʿaql al-mustafād) and then gradually grows.
somayeh sadat mousavi; seyyed ali akbar hosseini ghaleh bahman
Abstract
IntroductionThe necessity of observing moral values by human beings is approved by every common sense and human nature; But does such a necessity also apply to the observance of moral values for God? If we accept that it is necessary for God to observe moral values, on what basis can we know whether ...
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IntroductionThe necessity of observing moral values by human beings is approved by every common sense and human nature; But does such a necessity also apply to the observance of moral values for God? If we accept that it is necessary for God to observe moral values, on what basis can we know whether God has acted morally or not? The truth is that knowing God as the moral agent and determining the theory of value God's actions has received less attention and no precise answer has been given.Value theories are responsible for determining the good and bad criteria for moral actions, and so far various value theories have been proposed to measure human moral actions. The most well-known theories of moral value include teleological theories, virtue-based theories, and conscientious theories. The fundamental problem in most of these theories is that they consider only man as a moral agent, and the criterion they offer is only for measuring the good and bad of human actions. Hence, in the face of the question of "whether God's actions are moral or not" they do not have a clear answer for the audience. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine whether we can basically consider God as a moral agent or whether the observance of moral values is only for man? Second, if God's actions can also be morally valued, by what criteria can we understand their morality? Are the criteria presented in the moral schools adaptable to God's actions, or should another theory of value be sought for God? In this research, we want to provide appropriate answers to such questions as possible.Methods In this research, the analytical method has been used to examine the extent to which the theories of virtue oriented, Deontological, and Teleological are applied to the actions of God.Results and DiscussionThe first theory of value to be examined is the theory of virtue oriented. Of course, those virtue ethics's views that have considered the criterion of valuing characters and recognizing virtues from vices as their end are considered as Teleological views, and any result obtained in examining the Teleological view also includes Teleological virtue ethics. Other virtue ethic's views are called Agent-based virtue ethics, which say that the criterion for good and bad deeds is only their motive; Not their goals and results. According to this view, the existence of good motives for God causes good deeds to be issued from Him, without pursuing a purpose from these deeds. This criterion is not acceptable for conforming to God's actions; Because God is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all God's actions have a wise purpose.The second theory of value is the Deontological theory. The general criterion in this theory is that an action is moral and right when it is done only because of duty. Since this cannot be assumed to be a duty to God, this view also cannot be chosen as a theory of value for measuring God's actions; Because duty means where there is a right and the right cannot be achieved without ownership. God is the owner of everything; Therefore, no one has the right to oblige him to do something. The third theory under consideration is teleologicalism. The general criterion in teleology is this: if something leads us to the desired result, it is good, and if it leads us away from that result, it is bad.We have said that God is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all God's actions have a purpose; Therefore, the main criterion of teleology is compatible with God's moral actions. But purposes such as profit, pleasure, power, and happiness, which have been proposed in kinds of teleological theories such as consequentialism and perfectionism, are all appropriate to man and cannot be considered as purposes for God. Nevertheless, the concept of "perfection" is one of the concepts that has the capacity to be presented to God; Because God is absolute perfection, and God's wisdom requires that the actions that come from Him be commensurate with His inherent perfection. Thus, a new interpretation of perfectionism can be offered that includes the actions of God.To do this, the circle of the moral agent must be considered beyond man so that God is also known as the moral agent. Then, the realization of "mere perfection", without restricting it to man, was considered as the purpose of moral actions. In this case, each of the moral actors will aim at the realization of perfection, and this perfection, according to the nature of each moral actor, can have different instances. For example, man's goal can be his own perfection and God's goal can be the perfection of creatures; Because the goal is the realization of perfection, and if a moral act leads to the realization of perfection for a person other than the doer, the moral goal is still achieved.ConclusionAccording to what has been said, our proposed theory, as a theory of value that can be applied to both human and God's actions, is a perfectionist teleological theory - which also includes a Teleological virtue ethics - with the interpretation that we consider the purpose of moral actions to be the mere realization of perfection. According to this theory, a good deed is an action that is compatible with perfection, and a bad deed is an action that is incompatible with perfection. This perfection is either the perfection of the moral agent himself or the perfection of a being other than the moral agent. Therefore, the perfection of creatures by God, which is itself pure perfection, is a moral act
Philosophy
Rohullah Kazemi; ghasem purhasan
Abstract
Abstract Introduction:Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts ...
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Abstract Introduction:Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts with the establishment of the intellectology. The purpose of this article is to prove the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. The question is whether the intellect is self-founded in Farabi's thought, or does it rely entirely on the bestowal of active intellect? If the intellect is self-founded, what kind of role will the active intellect play? In this regard, Is Farabi's diction clear or confused, and how his language can be interpreted in favor of the autonomy of intellect. Farabi's declaration is less vague and more explicit in his various works. As far as the author is concerned, most of the investigations on Farabi's theory of intellect has been reportable and descriptive, and less has been sought to interpret and present a theory. These researches have first reported the meanings of intellect. Secondly, they have discussed intellect according to psychology. Thirdly, they have centralize more on active intellect, and ultimately, they have discussed the relationship between intellect and religion (Reza Akbarian, 2009; Kamalizadeh, 2014, Baharnejad, Changi Ashtiani, 2011, Fazlur-Rehman, 2011, Khosravi, 2020), but the question about autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking has not been their problem. Method and MatterialThe question of this research is whether intellect self-founded in Farabi’s thought. Along with the main question, the following sub-questions also raised. What is the difference between Farabi and Aristotle regarding intellect? In his field of semantics, which meaning is relate to practical reason and which to theoretical reason? To what extent is man and his intellect highlighted by giving originality to reason? What is the difference between the first noumenon that make the intellect actual and the noumenon at the higher levels of the intellect; That is, the intellect becomes actual with concepts only or with the proposition? Our approach answering these questions involves reporting, describing, analyzing, and finally interpreting. First, we explicitly or contently report Farabi's ideas and provide them to the reader. Then, we have turned to interpretation of his ideas to get the main point of understanding; finally, we have obtained the proof of the autonomy of intellect in his thinking. Here all of Farabi's thoughts on intellect studied in his various works. Therefore, according to the question of research and its method, the article has a theoretical framework and not an applied one. According to Farabi’s affirmation (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174), psychology based on intellectology. Accordingly, in terms of research and method, we have gone to the intellectology instead of psychology in analyzing and interpreting his thoughts.Discussion and Results Based on the main question, the main conclusion of this article is the self-foundation and autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking. First, Farabi authenticates the intellectology over the phsycology (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174) and speaks on the intellect as the main form of the soul (Farabi, 2008: 144-145). This idea is a source that provides an important perspective for the establishment of autonomy. Secondly, in explaining the meanings of reason in a certain opportunity (fi maani alaql), Farabi shows that all areas of life, from the public sphere to the more specific one, are embodied only by reason. However, the most important meaning that Farabi chooses to explain is the fifth meaning of intellect, which has four stages: potential intellect, actual intellect, used intellect, active intellect (ibid: 2012: 259). The question is how the intellect comes out of potential and go through these stages until to be compeer with the active intellect. It is true that al-Farabi also speaks of the role of the active intellect in the emergence from potentiality, but the role of the active intellect is inherently an ontological role in conferring the forms of beings. In addition, the explanation that expresses the relationship between the active intellect and the human intellect is a metaphor, and this metaphor shows difficulty of this relationship in terms of logic and clarity. Farabi believes that the potential intellect has the ability to abstract the essences and forms of beings and then to place the same forms as their essences (ibid: 223). Intellect, both through self-evident propositions (Al-Farabi, 1986: 103) or through the first noumenon (Al-Farabi, 1964: 37), becomes actual with its inherent effort and becomes one with the noumenon (Al-Farabi, 2012: 227-229). For him, even the active intellect itself is the subject of the human intellect (ibid: 1986: 103;, 1964: 35-36; Davidson, 1992: 50-51). In addition to these arguments, according to Farabi’s thinking, reason is the essence in which the truths of beings are occult (Farabi, 2008, 145). Eventually, the intellect becomes compeer to the active intellect (Farabi, 1964: 35) and man becomes the substance in which the active intellect seems to have dissolved under the ensign of the growth of intellect (Al-Farabi, 1986: 124-125). Al-Farabi's attempt to consolidate logic as an independent science (Al-Farabi, 1996, 27) means that logic for him is the stability of intellectual autonomy that does not need outside of itself and inspiration (Al-Jabri, 2011: 244-245).ConclusionAll of Farabi's efforts centralizes on the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. Farabi does not claim just to connect with active intellect; He tries to prove the alignment of the human intellect with the active intellect. In his viewpoint, the intellect achieves all its evolutions in the question of being and the knowledge of the truths of beings, and this means that the intellect becomes autonomous to the extent of knowing the existence. From the viewpoint of the autonomy of reason, another perspective is to open for Farabi's reading. The denial or weakening of the autonomy of the intellect in Farabi’s philosophy makes the understanding of intellect experience of existence difficult in the epistemological and logical systems in many respects. Therefore, the author suggests that we study not only Farabi's thought but also philosophical thought from the perspective of the autonomy of Intellect.