sepideh razi
Abstract
One of the most significant issues in anthropology is the relationship between two major aspects of human life: soul and corpus. A review over philosophical texts from the early Greek era to the present time reveals the fact that soul’s relationship with the corpus is and has always been concerning ...
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One of the most significant issues in anthropology is the relationship between two major aspects of human life: soul and corpus. A review over philosophical texts from the early Greek era to the present time reveals the fact that soul’s relationship with the corpus is and has always been concerning philosophers. However, over time, separation of sciences and their narrowed down branches brought made it particularly interesting for other branches of science like embryology, psychology, parapsychology, etc. The main focus of this study is human genesis since his presence in the material world which is scrutinized through philosophical views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra and comparing their views with embryological theories of Thomas W. Sadler as a prominent theoretician in the field. Conception and order of formation of body organs, parents’ influence on embryo and their relationship, the time of acquiring soul and the issue of protective and exhaustive are among the points discussed in this study in order to make a better evaluation of the issue under study.Several theories have been developed on the formation of the first organ by eminent thinkers all of which could be culminated. If veins and nerves are considered as organs, they will be the first ones; otherwise, the heart is the initiator of embryogenesis. Ibn Sina concords with the second part of medical theories; however, regardless of the differences in views of Mulla Sadra on the genesis of the first organ, if the liver is the beginning point for veins and nerves, then, he will go with the first theory. For Ibn Sina, heart is the first organ for he believes that it is the origin of heat. Nevertheless, in some of his works, Mulla Sadra states the heart to be the first organ; yet, if the criteria for his selection is an overall look at his works, brain has to be considered as the initiator of embryogenesis due to its inherent priority and since liver as the origin of veins is formed earlier. Both of these approaches, however, contradict with the ideas Ibn Sina had on this issue. In the case of formation of other body organs, there seems to be almost no difference in views of these two philosophers on chronological order and for both of them, the other one’s first is the second one. Yet, Mulla Sadra’s views are supported more strongly by medical views of the modern world. This is due to the fact that, Ibn Sina puts the formation of veins and nerves two steps behind compared to the findings of modern medicine.Regarding the method and time of attachment of soul to the embryo, Ibn Sina takes the time when heart is completely formed as the time when embryo gains the intellective soul. Yet, based on his own principles, Mulla Sadra believes that when the embryo is formed, the fetus is of signs of "plant life”. In other words, the fetus at this stage eats and grows; however, it lacks sense and movement as the signs of “animal life” and intellectual perception as the main sign of “human life”. As the embryo evolves inside its mother’s womb, its aptitudes are realized and this gives it an animal soul and later on other human life traits are gradually flourished. Embryology findings of modern medicine reveal that fetus receives the essence of life from its parents and it is the beginning of birth and growth of a new creature. Thus, fetus is a living creature of life right from the conception. This concord well with the trans-substantial motion theory of Mulla Sadra. Accordingly, acquisition of soul from Mulla Sadra’s point of view and medical perspective coordinate well considering their views on the first organ of primary stages of soul and life even in their faintest forms. Views and ideas of these two philosophers on creation of soul and the protective and exhaustive factor are different. Ibn Sina believes that soul of parents is vicariously protective and exhaustive so that at first, the soul of mother is the collection of elements and creator of nature, then in the middle, mineral face or the born soul is exhaustive and protective with the aid of mother’s soul and finally the born soul becomes independent. Mulla Sadra denies this and believes that delegation in various affairs is in contractual affairs and not in real and inherent ones. For him, exhaustiveness of body organs is neither the souls of parents nor the soul of embryo but is the nutrition substances which collect the necessary and required components in its essence due to the trans-substantial motion and inherent perfection and is even more perfect and transforms as time passes and this is the plant soul of the embryo which protects it until the time comes for it to be qualified to gain the potential to show animal behavior beside above-mentioned deeds and behaviors. At this moment, human body is evolved and becomes legible to acquire intellective soul with which not only mineral deeds are conducted along with plant and animal behavior, but contemplation and perception also occur as the intellectual soul. Modern medical findings solve the problem of exhaustiveness of the embryo since they take fetus as a living creature; however, the concept of protectiveness as it is discussed in philosophy is of no ground in embryology and the only mention of it is made about the role the mother and her body has in protecting the fetus conceived in her womb. Mother’s body acts as a home and a system feeding and protecting the fetus and since it is the site for the nurture of a creature named human, her temperament and spiritual state will have their influence of the embryo.In conclusion, an overall evaluation of these views reveals that ontological principles of Mulla Sadra to elaborate on embryogenesis and the life of human embryo concord much better with modern findings of embryology as a science in comparison to the ones developed by Ibn Sina.No study has investigated the relationship between soul and corpus from this point of view. The method utilized in this study was documentary analysis using library resources. The references used in this study were all original texts including The Canon of Medicine, Book of Knowledge for Ala al-Dawla, Soul, etc. by Ibn Sina, The Transcendent theosophy in the Four Journeys of the Intellect, etc. by Mulla Sadra and Langman's Medical Embryology by Thomas W. Sadler.
mohammad javad esmaili
Abstract
Motion in the categories is one of the most significant topics in the natural philosophy of Ibn Sīnā (428 AH/1037 CE). Ḥakīm Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Tonekābonī (1040 AH/1631 CE-1124 AH/1713 CE), known as Fādhil Sarāb, one of the great thinkers of the Safavid era, composed a ...
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Motion in the categories is one of the most significant topics in the natural philosophy of Ibn Sīnā (428 AH/1037 CE). Ḥakīm Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Tonekābonī (1040 AH/1631 CE-1124 AH/1713 CE), known as Fādhil Sarāb, one of the great thinkers of the Safavid era, composed a work titled Risāla fī Bayān al-Ḥarka fī al-Maqula. In this work, he analyzes and evaluates a topic from the second chapter of the second article of the art of "natural hearing" of Ibn Sīnā's Cure, titled “On the Relation of Motion to the Categories,” where the nature of motion is discussed. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī's explanation is invaluable because his assessment is based on his identification of the nature of motion with the doctrine of gradation. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī's study has a "they say/I say” structure, which encourages the reader to pay attention to the ideas that are rejected as well as those that are accepted in the discussion. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī goes beyond the discussion of the nature of motion and also deals with issues such as the connection between motion and time and instantaneous motion (ḥaraka tawassuṭiyya), as well as continuous motion (ḥaraka qaṭʿiyya). Referring to the views of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (339 AH/ 950/1 CE) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (908 AH/ 1502 CE), he establishes a link between philosophical issues and the commentary tradition of the Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād. The editio princeps of the treatise, along with an analysis of the text, provides a basis for further discussion of Ibn Sīnā's natural philosophy. Ḥakīm Tonekābonī was born in Sarab, one of the villages of Tonekābon; after acquiring the basics of science with his father, he left for Isfahan and the religious schools of Tonekābon. The date of Hakim Tonekābonī's death is recorded as Monday, the 18th of Dhihjah in 1124 AH, and his burial place is recorded as the Takhte- Fulad of Isfahan. His masters in the intellectual sciences are Mirza Muḥammad Bāqir Sabzevārī (d. 1090 AH), Āghā Ḥossein Khʷānsārī (d. 1098 AH) and Mullā Rajab-ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080 AH). In this article, Hakim Tonekābonī's view of motion in the categories is examined from a historical and philosophical perspective, based on his work, Risāla fī Bayān al-Ḥarka fī al-Maqula (The Treatise of Motion in Categories). The approach is philosophical, because the issue of motion and its conceptual analysis has a long philosophical ancestry. On the one hand, Heraclitus considered being to be a kind of motion itself, and on the other hand, Parmenides described being as alien to and incompatible with motion. The analysis is at the same time historical, in that the first detailed exploratioin of this issue is found in Aristotle's Physics, whereas in the Islamic world, Ibn Sina in his works, especially in the Shifa (Cure), offered a philosophical explanation of the nature of motion by way of various interpretations of Aristotle's Physics. But Ibn Sina expressed his view of the nature of motion after evaluating previous arguments on the subject and their consequences. Ibn Sina then presents his own interpretation. For example, in other views, according to him, motionis a matter of homonym, or of analogical gradation; Or if it is analogical gradation, it is like settled topoi (places), or fixed blackness or fluid blackness. He himself, however, engages with philosophical analysis of the category of the passion and raises the question of whether passion is motion or a relation between motion and something else. And if passion is identical with motion, then is motion absolute or restricted? With this method, Ibn Sina does not accept the idea of ten categories, like the Aristotelians, and he regards either of the categories as a real genera [this is unclear]. Accordingly, passion is identical with motion. After discussing Ibn Sina's view on the nature of motion, I examine Hakim Tonekābonī's explanation of Ibn Sina's view. The treatise on motion in the categories by Hakim Tonekābonī is considered at two levels: 1. analysis of text itself, 2. further considerations in the form of comments and marginal notes. Hakim Tonekābonī offers further considerations or comments in six sections, which cover only half of the topics of the treatise. Hakim Tonekābonī's answers to the view that the motion is based on analogical gradation are presented in a "they say/I say” structure" that encourages the reader to return to the text of the treatise. Hakim Tonekābonī composed this treatise in order to in response to the debates over Tusi's Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād (The Purification of Belief) and to answer an aporia about the nature of motion.
Mohammad Ghomi; Mohammadjavad Esmaeili
Abstract
Ibn Sina believes that soul is ‘spiritually and bodily originated’, while Mulla Sadra claims that it is ‘bodily originated but spiritually eternal’. Mullah Mohammad Sadegh Ardestani in al-Hikmah al-Sadaqiyah believes that originatedness of the soul is neither consistent with its ...
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Ibn Sina believes that soul is ‘spiritually and bodily originated’, while Mulla Sadra claims that it is ‘bodily originated but spiritually eternal’. Mullah Mohammad Sadegh Ardestani in al-Hikmah al-Sadaqiyah believes that originatedness of the soul is neither consistent with its abstraction nor with its survival. He believes in the eternity and unity of Soul. From the perspective of Ibn Sina and other scholars, saying that soul is united and eternal is faced with two basic problems: 1. If soul has not been multiplied after its incarnation in the body, all human beings should be identical in all traits; 2. If soul has been multiplied after its incarnation in the body, the abstract entity are divided potentially and actually. In al-Hikmah al-Sadeqiyah, Ardestani has explained his claim in such a way that he would not face with the two mentioned issues. Using the philosophical works of Ardestani, we explain his viewpoint about soul.
Ghodsyeh Habibi; Saeed Anvari; Seyd Sadr-aldin Tahery
Abstract
Various ideas have been presented on how to relate mental forms toexternal objects, among which one can refer to two theories: theory ofessence objectivity and the theory of apparition. Most scholars have attributed these theories to Ibn Sina and Taftazani respectively. Comparing the views of Ibn Sina ...
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Various ideas have been presented on how to relate mental forms toexternal objects, among which one can refer to two theories: theory ofessence objectivity and the theory of apparition. Most scholars have attributed these theories to Ibn Sina and Taftazani respectively. Comparing the views of Ibn Sina and Taftazani,the present articleshows that they not only don’t follow two different approaches, but we can consider Taftazani's words as the confirmation of Ibn Sina's view. Also, referring to various interpretations of the theory of apparition, we will evaluate the attribution of the theory to Taftazani.
Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ...
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Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ‘no’. In Hekmat al-Ishehraq,Suhrawardihas three basic criticisms to the theory of completeessential definition, some of which can be generalized to the incomplete essential definition and also accidental definitions: (1) conflicts with the conventional use of language; (2) the incomprehensibility of the realdifferences; (3) the perpetual probability of neglect of one or more intrinsic features. The bold veins of these three critiques can be found in the treatise of Ibn Sina’sal-Hodoodva al-Ta'lighat, along with two other criticisms: (4) theperpetual probability of theacquisition ofrequisite rather than essence; and (5) the perpetual probability of the acquisition of remote genus instead of close genus. The only possible definition fromSuhrawardi point of view is the definition of quiddity through the combination of general accidents that are belonged to thatquiddity, provided that the definition proceeds in the epistemological trades between definiens and definiendum and on the basis ofdirect(unmediated) knowledge.This theory is also the extender of the line Ibn Sina has drawn in Al-Ta'lighatva Al-Isharat. Therefore, Suhrawardi'slogic of definition complementsthe Avicenna's logicofdefinition.
amirhossein pournamdar sarcheshmeh; mehdi azimi
Volume 7, Issue 3 , November 2016, , Pages 61-80
Abstract
Abstract
Almost all Islamic philosophers have directly or indirectly addressed the problem of ‘individuality’ and have provided some answers to the problem. Thus, one can review and survey all aspects of this discussion in the Islamic philosophy tradition, but here we intend to address just ...
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Abstract
Almost all Islamic philosophers have directly or indirectly addressed the problem of ‘individuality’ and have provided some answers to the problem. Thus, one can review and survey all aspects of this discussion in the Islamic philosophy tradition, but here we intend to address just one aspect, i.e. the Farabi's role in the evolution of this historical discussion, and in this way, to shed some lights on the neglected and less known angles of the rational tradition of Muslim philosophers. One of those who put the issue more and more at the center of the attention of thinkers is Mulla Sadra who, as a result of his philosophy of the Principality of Existence, expressed exuberant materials about individuality. Mulla Sadra attributes the idea of individuality- existence equality to Farabi. For scholars of the ancient period or even the contemporary period, there has never been any doubt in the authenticity of this assignment. This article seeks to reconsider this established attribution and through some textual and historical documents shows that this assignment can be disputed and even the issue that Farabi has had discussed ‘individuality’ is very suspicious.
Forough Rahimpour
Volume 5, Issue 3 , November 2014, , Pages 25-41
Abstract
Metempsychosis, in current philosophical terms, means transition of soul from its own body into another material body, either in this world or after death. This idea is absolutely rejected by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra through intellectual reasoning.
Each of these two great philosophers, depending on ...
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Metempsychosis, in current philosophical terms, means transition of soul from its own body into another material body, either in this world or after death. This idea is absolutely rejected by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra through intellectual reasoning.
Each of these two great philosophers, depending on their own principles, defend the unique relation between human soul and its body and negates the dependence of it to other body/bodies. Ibn Sina’s reasoning in the negation of metempsychosis is based on that believe that soul in respect of its essence is abstract, and in respect of its act is material.
So, although the cause of act and the donor of soul is immaterial intellect, but apt temperament and body substance is prone to this emanation. Additionally, Shaykh believes that the relation between each soul and its body substance is an intrinsically obligatory one.
Mulla Sadra on the other hand, believes in novel bases such as existence gradation and strengthening; evolutional substantial movement in all of the creatures (including soul and body parallel to each other); bodily occurrence of the soul at the beginning; and mingled composition of soul and body. Besides quoting and confirming the solution of Shaykh-alraies, he benefits from the bases of the transcendent philosophy, so he not only proposed a novel presentation of some proofs against metempsychosis, but presented a new solution to prove impossibility of metempsychosis, which is only explainable by the bases of the transcendent philosophy.
This article tries to explain and compare the chosen proofs of these two philosophers to reject metempsychosis, describe their particular bases, and show how in some cases, different bases are applied to attain a specific goal
